HINDU LAW BOOKS.

THE VYAVAHĀRA MAYUKHA,
TRANSLATED BY BORRODAILE.

THE DĀYA BHĀGA OF JĪMŪTA VĀHANA
AND

THE LAW OF INHERITANCE, FROM THE MITĀKSHĀRA,
TRANSLATED BY COLEBROOKE:

THE DATTAKĀ MĪMĀŃSA
AND

E DATTAKĀ CHANDRAS,
TRANSLATED BY SUTHERLAND.

EDITED,
WITH NOTES AND AN INDEX,

BY
WHITLEY STOKES, ESQ.,
OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW,
AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
HOME DEPARTMENT (LEGISLATIVE).

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CORRIGENDA

P. 5, line 14, of note, read 'Viyamitra.'
P. 18, par. 21, line 7, read 'Katyayana.'
P. 20, par. 27, line 1, read 'Yajnavalkya.'
P. 28, note (a), line 1, read 'attested.'
P. 30, note (a), line 2, read 'advantageously.'
P. 33, line 1, after 'Çotriyana' insert 'a.'
P. 35, note (b), line 1, for '18' read 'II.'
P. 35, par. 10, line 2, for 'Siva' read 'Çiva.'
P. 46, note 1, line 2, for 'Mayvikha,' read 'Mayukha.'
P. 51, head-line, for 'VI' read 'IV.'
   par. 14, line 4, read 'Vijñanévara.'
P. 77, par. 16, line 2, for 'person who partakes' read 'persons who partake.'
   line 6, for 'partakes' read 'partake.'
P. 83, note (j), line 3, add 'El.'
P. 91, line 2, for 'Çudma' read 'Çudma.'
P. 93, line 4, for 'or' read 'of.'
P. 102, par. 13, line 1, before 'that' insert 'to.'
P. 114, par. 4, line 2, before 'creditor' insert 'the' in marg. note, for 'removal' read 'renewed.'
P. 117, par. 3, line 3, for 'Bhāsāpati' read Bhāsāpati.
P. 144, par. 2, line 2, for 'Viramitrodaya.'
P. 152, par. 3, line 5, read 'physician.'
P. 154, par. 3, line 1, read 'Yajnavalkya.'
P. 166, line 31, read 'Vajnavalkya.'
P. 173, line 32, read 'Mitaksha.'
P. 182, line 6, read 'Nārāyaṇa.'
P. 193, line 21, read 'Çankha.'
P. 205, line 4 from bottom, for 'coheirs' read 'coheir.'
P. 207, line 12, read 'texts.'
P. 234, line 4 of Annot. 42, for 'enjoyed' read 'enjoined.'
P. 245, par. 9 in marg. line 2, for 'eithers' read 'either.'
P. 219, par. 24, line 5, for 'Açura' read 'Asura.'
P. 231, par. 3, for 'Gāndharva' read 'Gāndharva.'
P. 275, Annot. 41, line 2, read 'Asclepius.'
P. 279, par. 53, line 2, delete the comma after 'without.'
P. 291, par. 2, line 7, for 'Çudra' read 'Çudra.'
P. 299, line 6, read 'directs.'
P. 338, par. 10, line 8, of marg. read 'devolves.'
P. 388, par. 20, line 2, read 'similarly.'
P. 421, line 6, from bottom read 'legitimate.'
P. 494, par. 16, line 7, read 'Dāyabhaga.'
P. 505, par. 17, read 'sweetmeats.'
P. 511, line 8, read 'the estate.'
P. 514, par. 10, line 2, read 'in as much.'
P. 523, par. 11, line 2, read 'otherwise.'
P. 531, last line, read 'Ganeca.'
P. 533, Annot. 9, line 6, read 'performing.'
par. 64, read 'Qannaka.'
P. 547, par. 2, read 'Qannaka.'
P. 571, par. 107, line 3, read 'adopt.'
P. 575, line 2, read 'used.'
P. 594, note (a), add 'Ed.'
P. 603, Annot. 24, line 1, read 'dadhi.'
P. 610, par. 39, line 8, read 'absolutely.'
P. 613, par. 52, line 4, read 'secondary.'
P. 621, line 11, read 'Dasantha.'
P. 622, par. 38, line 5, read 'Çakuntalā.'
P. 635, par. 25, line 3, dele the comma after 'exempted.'
   Annot. line 8, read 'solemnities.'
P. 646, par. 39, read 'Paññāmai.'
P. 654, Annot. line 4, read 'etc.'
P. 657, Note (a),
P. 664, Note (a), add 'Ed.'
P. 665, Note (a),
P. 666, Note (a),
P. 669, Note I, line 1,
P. 660, Note II, line 2, for '221,' read '663.'
   Note III, line 1,
P. 670, Note IV, line 1, for '222' read '664.'
P. 671, Note V, line 1, for 'his' read 'her' and for '222' read '664.'
P. 672, Note VI, line 2, for '222' read '664' line 5, read 'Chintāmaṇī.'
P. 673, Note VII, line 1,
   Note VIII, line 2, for '224' read '665.'
   Note IX, line 2,
   Note X, line 5, read 'ability.'
P. 674, Note X, line 1, for '224' read '665.'
P. 675, Notes XII, XIII, XIV, for '227' read '667.'
P. 676, Notes XV and XVI, for '228' read '667.'
   Note XVII, line 2, for '228' read '668.'
P. 677, Note XVIII, for '228' read '668.'
   Notes XIX and XX, for '229' read '668.'
P. 678, Note XXI, for '229' read '668.'
   Note XXII, for '230' read '668.'
THE translator of the following work, fully conscious of its imperfections, hopes that a candid statement of the motives and circumstances under which he commenced and concluded it, may avert criticism, and save him from the imputation of presumption at least, in trying his strength at a task to which he is unequal.

Placed unexpectedly in a situation requiring some knowledge of Hindú Law, for the examination of the Vyavasthás, or expositions of civil law recorded in the courts under this Presidency, and at the same time totally ignorant of the subject, as well as of the language of that law, he naturally sought for information respecting the authorities by which the Çástrás were guided in their answers to the courts.

Very little enquiry sufficed to shew, that the Mitákshara and Vyavahára Mayúka were on all occasions quoted by them. The first was found to exist in print, and a manuscript copy of the latter was procured, very incorrect, as was afterwards discovered, but which sufficiently answered the purpose of reference at the time.

Having had at various periods occasion to translate, with a Çástrí's assistance, a few detached passages as tests of the Vyavasthás, the Sanskrit manuscript was bound with blank leaves, and these passages entered in their proper places. The facility of reference to Manú's Institutes, by its arrangement into chapters and verses, then led him to enter also the translations of its texts, wherever they occurred throughout, and becoming now tolerably familiar with the names of authors, he, after a tedious and somewhat laborious collocation of the subjects of Mr. Colebrooke's Digest with the corresponding chapters in the Mayúka, was enabled to collect translations of almost all the texts in the fifth and several succeeding chapters. Filling in, by translations of his own, the comments of the author, and the remaining texts not found in the Digest, he thus completed those chapters, and considered this sufficient encouragement to continue the translation to the end. The two first chapters were next attempted, and all that could be found to apply in Sir F. Macnaghten's Treatise, published about the time, being substituted for the Translator's own version, the work might be said to be finished, with the exception of the chapter on Inheritance; since that on Ordeals, being of little or no use, it was determined not to attempt.

Had the difficulties of the chapter on Inheritance been known at the time the translation was begun, they would certainly have put a stop to it altogether; but fortunately (it may perhaps be allowed to say, if the utility of the work be admitted), the facilities met with in the first instance had led the Translator so far, that he felt bound not to leave it undone, when so much had been got through. He enjoyed likewise advantages, which few, however inclined to be useful, would ever meet with; the four Çástrás, of the Sadr 'Adalat and Surat 'Adalat, were at his
side, with one attached to himself, and he had in the mean time gained some experience in the Law, and a little knowledge of the Sanskrit language.

Drawing therefore as much as possible from the invaluable translations by Mr. Colebrooke, both of the Digest and of the works on Inheritance, and from that of the Dattaka Mināmsā, he worked in the chapter on Inheritance, and put the finishing hand to the translation, for which indulgence is thus solicited.

The liberality of the Bombay Government has led them to extend their patronage and support to the book: at the same time it must be fairly stated, that such patronage does not involve responsibility for correctness, as the translation was submitted, in consequence of the season, in an unfinished state, and was honoured with such notice, probably from a desire to hold out encouragement to others to undertake useful works even if imperfectly executed, and from the personal kindness of the Head of the Government, rather than as a pledge that they were fully satisfied of its worth.

The faults of execution therefore, many as they are, rest with the Translator; he unfortunately could obtain no European aid, but would cheerfully bear the charge of rashness and incompetence, if the merit be conceded to him, of some industry, and a sincere desire to make himself useful; he seeks no further praise; censure he trusts to have disarmed.

A short account of the nature of Hindú law-books, and of those works which have as yet appeared in English, may assist in appreciating the real value of this now submitted.

The Mitākṣhara gives a list of twenty sacred authors, said to have written in ancient times upon Law (among other subjects), and whose works are entitled to equal and high veneration by the moderns. Their names are: Manu, Atrī, Vishnū, Harīta, Yājñavalkya, Ucānas, Angirās, Yama, Āpastamba, Saṃvartaka, Kāṭāyana, Bṛhaspati, Parāśara, Vyāsa, Čanakya, Likhita, Dadhakṣa, Gautama, Čātāpaya, and Vaisistha. Their institutes are technically termed Smṛti, of which only a small number now exist complete, and of many only a few texts remain.

Besides these, there were institutes of the following Legislators, considered by some perhaps of inferior authority, (and therefore often termed Upamāntī;) but now equally imperfect with those of their supposed predecessors. The names and number of both classes, indeed, are very uncertain; the same author being sometimes ranked with the first, and sometimes with the second class, by different modern commentators. They are: Pāithāni, Rṣyaśringa, Bauḍhāyana, Pulastya, Madhav, Gārgya, Kaśyapa, Nārāya, Jākāli, Lokākṣa, Kuthuni, Dhamyā, Aṣṭāvāyana, Datta, Prasūta, Bīgu, Viśvamitra, Devala, Sumantu

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1—Prof. Strange's Elem. page xii.  
2—Prof. to Digest, page xiii.
Vyāghra, Satyavrata, Atreyu, Vatsa, Soma, Kṛṣṇājini, Nācikeya, Mārkaṇḍeya, and perhaps others (a).

Modern legislators seem to have composed their treatises by selecting, each, such texts from these ancient institutes as best suited their own notions, working them up with a gloss of their own, “explaining their sense, and endeavouring to reconcile seeming contradictions, to fulfil this precept of their great lawgiver (Mann, chap. 2d, v. 14):—‘Where there are two sacred texts, seemingly inconsistent, both are held to be law, for both are pronounced by the wise to be valid and reconcileable.’”

The numerous and conflicting volumes which such a system has produced, will be at once seen. 2 From them several Schools have arisen: the Gauriya (or Bengal), the Maithila, (or North Bahār), and the Benares, with the Māhārāṣṭra, and the Drāvida, or Southern school. In all but the first, the Mitākaharā, one of the very earliest of these compilations, is received with respect, as the chief general authority, though in each some more modern, local work is allowed to compete with it on a few points. The most remarkable of these are, the

(a) The following list of the authors of Hindī law books, with their names arranged according to the order of the Sanskrit alphabet, has been made up from the lists given by Yājñavalkya, Pārāśara, the Padma-Purāṇa, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Rāma-Kṛṣṇa in his commentary on Pāraskara’s Gīthā-Sūtra and Wilson, MacCenzie Collection i. p. 19. See Steiner in Weber’s Indische Studien i. 233, 245.

1. Agni 19. Deva
2. Angiras (three redactions: A. Madhyamāna and Brhad A.) 20. Nārada
3. Atri 21. Parāśara
4. Āpastamba 22. Pāraskara
5. Vīyāna 23. Pītāmaha
9. Kātyāyana (two redactions: K. and Brhad K.)
10. Kuśāni
11. Gāṅga
12. Gaṇatama (two redactions as in No. 9)
13. Cidambara
14. Citavāna
15. Chāgaleya
16. Jātākārīya
17. Jāhali
18. Dāksha
19. Āśvina
20. Nārada
21. Parāśara
22. Pāraskara
23. Pītāmaha
24. Pulastya (two redactions: P. and Laga P.)
25. Pālāhi
26. Pracetās (two redactions: P. and Brhad P.)
27. Prajāpati
28. Budha
29. Brhaspati (two redactions as in No. 28)
30. Baudhāyana
31. Brhadāvija
32. Bhīgasī
33. Mann (three redactions: P. and Brhad Manu and Brhad Manu)
34. Marici
35. Yāma (two redactions as in No. 28)
36. Yājñavalkya (three redactions Y., Brhad Y., Brhad Y.)
37. Lākṣita
38. Lokāsi
39. Vasishthas (three redactions as in No. 30)
40. Vasūrī
41. Viśāva
42. Viśakha
43. Viśu (three redactions as in No. 30)
44. Vyāsa (two redactions as in No. 30)
45. Čandākha
46. Čandākha
47. Čādhya
48. Sanvarta (two redactions as in No. 28)
49. Śanva
50. Soma

The above list, it will be seen, does not contain the following ten names given by Mr. Borradaile: Aṅgārakīya, Atreyu, Kṛṣṇājini, Datta, Dhanamya, Nācikeya, Mārkaṇḍeya, Vatsa, Vyāghra, Satyavrata.—Ed.

1.—Pref. Digest xi.

2.—Pref. to the Digest, to the Inheritance, and to Strange’s Elements.
Mayukha for the Maharashtra and the west, the Smriti Chandrika for the South, of India; the Ratnakara and Chintamani, for Mithila. Bengal proper alone denies authority to the Mitakshara, having established for itself a totally different school, of which the Daya-bhaga of Jimuta Vahana is the head. The references in the margin preclude the necessity of noticing the other treatises of these schools.

The first work in the English language, on the subject, was the Code drawn up during Mr. Hastings' administration. The original, in Sanskrit, consists, like the Roman Digest, of authentic texts, with the names of their several authors regularly prefixed to them, and explained, where an explanation is requisite, in short notes taken from commentaries of high authority: it is, as far as it goes, a very excellent work. But, whatever be the merit of the original, the translation of it has no authority, and is of no other use than to suggest inquiries on the many dark passages which we find in it: properly speaking indeed, we cannot call it a translation; for though Mr. Halked performed his part with fidelity, yet the Persian interpreter had supplied him only with a loose injudicious epitome of the original Sanskrit, in which abstract many essential passages are omitted, though several notes of little consequence are interpolated, from a vain idea of elucidating or improving the text.

Upon these observations being made known to the Supreme Government, the Digest of Jagannatha was, under their authority, compiled, from various digests, and from commentaries on the institutes of Law. But: In restricting the compilation to the law of contracts and successions, he [Jagannatha] has omitted the law of evidence, the rules of pleading, the rights of landlord and tenant, the decision of questions respecting boundaries, with some other topics, which should be likewise treated, for the purpose of assisting courts of civil judicature in deciding private contests according to the laws, which the Hindu subjects of Great Britain hold sacred.

The great value of the Digest to English readers will be found, probably, in its collection of texts, which includes, under each of its heads, all the above sacred authors. Scarcely one of those from Manu applicable to Inheritance has been omitted by Jagannatha, and a classification, made for private use by the Translator, of all the texts of each author contained in the present translations on Inheritance, shews that the Digest contains a great many of every author not to be met with in the others. When freed from the perplexing commentary, it forms an excellent key to those Sanskrit works of a similar nature, called Smriti Sangraha, as the English version of any text may be found in a few minutes.

Sir William Jones's translation of the Institutes of Manu, coming in order of time between the above Code and Digest, is too famous to

1—Pref. to Inh. iv.
2—Sir W. Jones quoted in Preface, Digest IX—X.
3—Preface to Digest, page XI. and to Inheritance, page II; likewise Strange's Elements, 3rd, 159.
need notice. The opinion of it expressed in Sir T. Strange's work would, it is believed, hold good here, "that it is of authority as a textbook, but no further."

To make up for the deficiencies in the Code and the Digest, Mr. Colebrooke "long ago undertook a new compilation of the law of successions with other collections of Hindu Law, under the sanction of the Government of Bengal, for preparing for publication a supplementary Digest of such parts of the law as he considered to be most useful," and in the mean time gave to the world a translation of the two treatises on Inheritance, containing the doctrines of the two great schools, of Bengal and Benares, elucidated by notes from their respective adherents.1

The first of these, the Dāya-bhāga, is restricted in its operation to Bengal proper, as is the Dāya-krama-sāngraha, a work of the same school, subsequently translated into English by Mr. Wynch, of which no copy has yet reached these parts. (a)

The other, the Mitākshara, is equally authoritative with us on this side of India, as elsewhere, but, as previously observed, the doctrines of it are sometimes opposed by the Mayūkha, which is allowed to compete with it.

Two treatises on Adoption were in the same manner translated by Mr. T. C. C. Sutherland. As neither of them exists in the original in this part of the country, the Cāstrīs have no knowledge of them, and take the Mayūkha for their authority on that head. But great praise has been passed on the English version, by a high authority.2

The work of Sir F. Macneghten, being avowedly controversial and founded on Bengal law, is of no utility as a guide here. Every one must regret, that the two first chapters of the Mitākshara, those on judicial proceedings and evidence, were not given entire. Valuable as any extracts from such a work are, the insertion of the translation complete, would, we may venture to say, have doubled the value of this book to practical readers.

Of the last work published, the Elements of Hindu Law, by Sir T. Strange, it is scarcely necessary to make mention, as it is in every one's hands; but if it be not too presumptuous, we may remark that the learned author has cheerfully followed the steps, and entirely adopted the doctrine and advice, of the greatest of all European authorities on the subject of Hindu law and literature, which is of itself sufficient to stamp a high value on the book.

Of Nilakaṃṭha, the author of the Mayūkha, scarcely any thing is

1—Preface to Inheritance, page III. 2—Preface to Strange's Elements, XXIV.

(a) The Dāya-krama-sāngraha, an original treatise on the Hindu Law of Inheritance, translated by P. M. Wynch, Esq. fol. Calcutta: Printed by Philip Pereira, at the Hindoostance Press, 1818. The original text in the Bengali character is printed at the close of Mr. Wynch's translation.—Ed.
known here beyond his name, though his work is by repute acknowledged at Benares, Bengal, and also in Tanjore. Even at Purā, where one of his descendants, Hara Bhatta Kassikar, of great repute for learning, resided till very lately, no certain information is to be gained. The family is Deshast Mahārāṣṭra, long settled at Benares, where Čāmkara Bhatta the father, [author of several very celebrated works on the Mimāmsa particularly the Dvaita Nirnaya, which his son mentions] lived, and where our author was born, as he tells us in his preface, but at what date is uncertain. Hara Bhatta, above alluded to, says it was upwards of 200 years ago, whilst the general opinion is, that his writings were first circulated about 125 years ago. The manner in which, at the conclusion of the book, he speaks of himself and the dynasty under which he lived, might afford a clue, were not the authenticity of the passage doubted by some, and its meaning unknown to all. It is said that at Bharel, a town situated at the confluence of the Chambal and Jamna, a Rāja bearing the title of Saṅgara or Yuddha-sura, the ruler of a Mandel in that part of the country, held his court: that Bhagya Deva, one of his successors, took our author under his protection, and that he, out of gratitude, gave the name of his patron to the Book thus compiled under his auspices; and that sixteen generations have elapsed since the parties flourished. 2

Mr. Colebrooke declares him to be “an authority, concurrently with the Mitākṣhara, among the Mahrattas”; and in an account of the different schools of law furnished by him to Sir T. Strange, 4 Mr. Colebrooke observed: “In the west of India, and particularly among the Mahrattas, the greatest authority after the Mitākṣhara, is Nilakantha, author of the Vyaṣṭara Mayūkha, and of other treatises bearing the same title.”

These, twelve in number, were collectively styled by their author, Bhagya Bāskara, and in detail are generally classed as follows: 1st Sadākara Mayūkha, expounding the various rites and ceremonies of a Hindu’s life. 2nd Achaśara Mayūkha, treating of rites for conduct, morals and religion. 3rd Samaya Mayūkha, of dates and astronomical calculations for regulating the chief actions of life. 4th Čārdīka Mayūkha, of funeral ceremonies. 5th Niti Mayūkha, of the power, conduct, and duties of kings. 6th Vyaṣṭara Mayūkha, of law and justice. 7th Dēna Mayūkha, of religious gifts. 8th Utsarga Mayūkha, of public edifices. 9th Pratishtā Mayūkha, of the consecration of the same. 10th Prayācitta Mayūkha, of penance and expiation. 11th Čūddha Mayūkha, of purification. 12th Čantī Mayūkha, of planetary influence and worship.

The present one, the Vyaṣṭara Mayūkha, is strictly speaking the only one touching upon law. Its doctrines are quoted and alluded

1—Strange’s Elements 2nd, 164 note.
2—For this account I am indebted to a kind and valued friend, Captain H. D. Robertson, Collector of Purā, who has also most materially assisted me by procuring translations and explanations of doubtful and disputed passages from the Purā Pandita.
3—Preface to Inheritance, page iv. 4—Strange’s Elements 1st, 316.
to with approbation by Mr. Colebrooke in more than one place in his translations, and by Mr. Sutherland in the Dattaka Māṇḍūksa and Chandrika; and appears, particularly in the concluding chapters, to be rather of the nature of a Sūtra sāmāgri, or general collection of texts, without much commentary, than of those books elucidating the doctrines of one favourite author (like the Mitāksharā on Yājñavalkya) by a perpetual gloss, interspersed with a few texts out of the other institutes.

The reference to the authorities, troublesome as many may find them, are not without value, having been given as vouchers for the correctness of the version, as well as to guide those referring to the Mayūkha on business, to the particular page of the work where each text is to be found. The example of Mr. Colebrooke warrants this. In the cases of Sir T. Strange’s Elements, vol. 2nd, explained by him, the Mitāksharā and Digest are quoted indiscriminately in many places. But it is necessary, with regard to chapter fourth on Inheritance, to explain, that the reading of the Mitāksharā has, for reasons stated, always been retained in preference either to Jīmita Vāhana, or the Digest. Many of the texts, however, are only to be found in the two latter; or in the last one, and as Nilakantha’s doctrine sometimes accords with one and sometimes with the other, the reference will enable the professional reader to judge which school his author follows, still remembering that conformity with the Mitāksharā should be aimed at as far as consistency will allow, with which hope the author’s peculiar opinions, where he differs materially, have mostly been pointed out.

The Čāstris of the Courts can at any time discover the distinction, if called upon; for in the Sanskrit edition, prepared (from five manuscripts found in Surat, collated with an old one borrowed from Pūnē, one from Breach, and a new copy sent from Benares) by the five Government Čāstris of this place, and afterwards printed at Bombay (a) by order of Government, care was taken to insert, opposite to every text of Manu, the number of the chapter and verse, and opposite to every text quoted from Yājñavalkya, the leaf and page of the Sanskrit large edition of the Mitāksharā printed in Calcutta, of which the Courts generally have copies. The commencement of each page of the original is likewise denoted by the Roman numerals in the margin.

(a) Čaṇḍakarabhādityaceṣāmeyabhyanilakaṁ, hakite bhasyaaduddhākare vyavahāramayukham. 4to. Bombay, 1856.—2r.
PREFACE OF THE AUTHOR.

1. Salutation to Gaṇeṣa. Having declared the rules for a king's guidance and having duly bowed myself before the lotus-footed Sun, I, Nilakanṭha, proceed to compose something on decisions of law.

2. I meditate upon Čaṅkara, my Guru [whom I consider as an incarnation of him] who wears the crescent on his forehead, the lord of the bull, and consort of Pārvati, he who gives counsel to all those who visit the holy city.

3. He [who is] the chief of men [Čiva] has assumed a double form, with a view to point out [by the simile below given, that which is correct of] the two conflicting paths [of the divisibility or indivisibility of the spirit of god]. Čiṅ Čaṅkara [Čiva] himself is one form: Bhatta Čaṅkara is the other form here on earth, who has admitted the reasoning, that the spirit of god is indivisible.

4. False reasoners, deceivers, have on this point in some sort advocated the doctrine of divisibility, but it has been thrown out by me, as unfounded. For this reason there is no deficiency of discussion on my part; for the worship of god is not the less complete for want of flowers from the sky. [a miracle].

1—In the last chapter of the Āchāra Mayūkha; see a similar work, Reports 1st 460-81, tit. Rāj dharma.

2—The one side supported by the Mādhura, the other by the Hemādri.

3—Those holding the contrary, rejecting the doctrine of Māya, the cornerstone of the doctrine of indivisibility.
THE VYAVAHARA MAYUKHA
A COMPLETE TREATISE
ON
HINDU LAW,
BY NÍLAKAMTHA BHATTA.

CHAPTER I.
PROCEEDINGS AT LAW [VYAVAHARA MÁTREKA].

SECTION I.

1. Justice is the consistent art or practice [by a third person] of discovering the unknown point of "who is in the wrong" between two persons mutually disputing. Or that business, in which a Plaintiff and Defendant exist as the Agents, which is supported with proof, by possession and witnesses, and which admits of a fair discrimination between conflicting pleadings, is called Justice. But according to the Madanaratna: "In an answer of confession, the further [usual] proceedings in the suit are unnecessary." This is one part of the law; the other is calculated for the exclusion of [ungrounded] disputes, false pleadings, and the like.

2. Now these are the divisions of it. Yájñavalkya: When a person aggrieved by another, in a manner contrary to law, or approved usage, represents it to the King, or to the chief Judge, that representation is termed the subject of a judicial proceeding." Aggrieved, abused.

3. Eighteen divisions of it are laid down by Mami: Of those titles, the first, is debt on loans for consumption; the second, deposits and loans for use; the third, sale

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1—Followed by our author on many points, contrary to the Benares doctrines.

2—Macknight, page 409.

3—Ch. 8th, vs. 4th, ad. 7th. Colebrooke on Obligations, 18, para. 36. The arrangement of the Mayukha varies from the above, though the titles, or chapters, will be found the same, in names and in number, by excluding the three first, or introductory chapters, and the last, on miscellaneous topics, or sundries, which make twenty-two in all.
without ownership; the fourth, concerns among partners; the fifth, subtraction of what has been given; the sixth, non-payment of wages or hire; the seventh, non-performance of agreements; the eighth, rescission of sale and purchase; the ninth, disputes between master and servant; the tenth, contests on boundaries; the eleventh and twelfth, assault and slander; the thirteenth, larceny; the fourteenth, robbery and other violence; the fifteenth, adultery; the sixteenth, altercation between man and wife and their several duties; the seventeenth, the law of inheritance; the eighteenth, gaming, with dice and with living creatures; these eighteen titles of law are settled as the groundwork of all judicial procedure in this world.” Subtraction, non-performance.

—Rescission, repentance. Gaming, [dyútam], playing with inanimate agents: when with live agents, it is called samāhāvaya.

4. Here, though it is said by Brhaspati:1 “Killing a human being, robbery, touching another man’s wife, and both species of assault, compose the four kinds of heinous offences,” we may infer that by reason of the distinctions in the nature of crimes, connexion with women, and assault by word or deed, are here enumerated distinct and different, from the example of a bull and bullock. But I will hereafter clearly point out the distinctions [or characteristics] of these eighteentitles of law, [each in its separate chapter].

III.

5. The Initials of Justice.2 Brhaspati: “Let them erect a house in the midst of a fortified town, having in its Constitution of a Court, side; there let them determine on erecting a properly constituted assembly house.”—Or in other words, a court of justice, as it has been declared by Kátyáyana: “That place is truly termed a court of justice, where the king practices justice, discriminating between truth and falsehood, by a reference to the Dharmástra.” Manu:3 “A King, desirous of inspecting judicial proceedings, must enter his court of justice, composed and sedate in his demeanour, together with Bráhmans and counsellors, who know how to give him advice. Without ostentation in his dress and ornaments, let him examine the affairs of

1—See post, Ch. 18th, para. 2nd.

2—Ellis’s Lectures, “Part the 2nd.—Constitution of the Hindu courts; duties of the prince as chief magistrate; duties of the sábhásadás or assessors; duties of the púdvívaka or chief-justice [who is likened to an archon, prétor, and English judge]; several descriptions of courts; institution of suits; inadmissible suits; plaint, how to be drawn; answer, how to be drawn; proof, by which party to be produced; the four steps, páda, or divisions of a suit, viz., bhashápadá and ātrápadá, pleadings of the two parties; kátyápadá, production of evidence, and sádvásiddhápadá, decision by the decree; miscellaneous subjects connected with the administration of justice; the nature of proof, pramánam, and its kinds, namely human proof or evidence, manumsha pramánam, and divine proof, by oath and ordeal, divyapramánam; evidence, of three kinds: namely, likhita, writings; śáshà, witnesses; bhúkí, enjoyment; nature of each briefly stated.” This exactly corresponds with the two first chapters of the Marykha. Initials of justice.—Literally the “letters, or alphabet,” of law.

3—Ch. 8th, vs. 1st, and [the last hemistich of the 2nd.
litigant parties." Yājñavalkya: "The king, divested of anger and avarice, and associated with learned Brāhmaṇas, should investigate judicial proceedings, conformly to the sacred code of law."—The king, is any one, whoever properly affords protection to the people, not merely one of the royal tribe or Kshatriya.

6. Kātyāyana: "A king who investigates together with his chief judge [pradhivāka] minister, Brāhmaṇas, domestic priest, and assessors of the court, according to law, shall attain paradise." Here, the Brāhmaṇas are those [unmīnya] unappointed [to the court], but the ministers are those appointed. Even as it has been said: 8 "A person, whether appointed or not, is entitled to furnish legal advice."

7. Bṛhaspati gives this definition of the chief judge [pradhivāka]:

Examiner or manner, cross-examines, and who, extracting the [desired] information, speaks first, is termed the chief judge." Vyāsa shows the nature of a minister, or counsellor [ānātya]:
Let the king appoint as his minister, a man well informed in the meaning of all the sciences, free from avarice, one who speaks justly, a Brāhmaṇa [vipra], wise, of a family famed of old for these qualities, being a twice-born man [dvija]." Here the recapitulation conveyed by dvija, or a twice-born man [after vipra] is made specially with a view to the choosing a minister; either from the royal or commercial tribe, in default of one of the priestly class [vipra]; for thus says Kātyāyana: "If there be no learned Brāhmaṇa, let the king then associate in the administration, a Kshatriya or a Vaiṣṇava, skilled in the Dharmasāstra; let him carefully keep a Čudra [from such affairs]."

8. And Yājñavalkya thus declares an assessor [subhyā]: "Persons who are versed in literature, acquainted with the law, addicted to truth, and impartial towards friend and foe, should be appointed assessors of the court, by the king."—Bṛhaspati gives this enumeration of them: 8 "That assembly, in which seven, five or three Brāhmaṇas, versed in religious and worldly duties, preside, is to equal sacrificial ground."

9. The same author says: "Two persons must be appointed by the king, a secretary and an accountant, who are skilled in expanding words, and meanings, adept at counting, free from error, and learned in the different characters [or dialects]" Words, the science of etymology. Meanings, a dictionary. Kātyāyana: "Merchants who have just views of justice are to be there appointed hearers of causes." There, in the assembly, Bṛhaspati: "A vera-
cious man must be specially appointed, under the orders of the assessors, for calling and taking charge of the witnesses, plaintiffs, and defendants.” And he must be none other than a Çūdra, even as Vyāsa says: “But an attentive servant must be appointed by the king for collecting the materials for trial, a stout Çūdra, whose ancestors have followed the same employment, and he shall be placed under the orders of the assessors.” Yājñavalkya:1 “But if justice cannot be supervised by the king in person, from press of [other] business, let a Brāhman acquainted with all duties be associated with the assessors.”

10. Bhāsplate mentions the duties of the king, the chief Judge, and the rest: “The chief Judge is to report the case; the king is to give the necessary orders; the assessors are to investigate the matter [in the first instance]; the accountant is to calculate the money [transactions]; and the secretary is to take down the proceedings of the trial.” The same author says: “Let the king sit with his face to the east, the assessors looking towards the north, the accountant facing the west, and the secretary turning towards the south.” Yājñavalkya, speaking of the royal court, says further, respecting judicial functionaries:2 “The superintendents [adhikārāli] appointed by the prince, the separate trades [pāgāli], the joint companies [gṛṇi], as well as families [kūlāni], must be accounted to rank according to the order in which they are here named, in all rules of justice among men.” Superintendents appointed by the prince, the chief Judge and the rest. Separate trades [lit. a multitude] a collection of men getting their living by different trades, inhabitants of the same village, but of different casts. Joint companies are the very opposite of separate trades. Families, an union of kinsmen, connexions, and cognate kindred.3 Bhāsplate also says: “For those who wander in forests, let an office be established in the forest, that for soldiers in their quarters, and in like manner that for the merchants, in their meetings.” An office, a court of justice.

11. Kātyāyana notes the time for inspecting judicial cases: Court hours and “The king shall give decisions on complaints, in the days, place appointed for the court, in the first part of the day, in the way laid down in the Castra, putting down those who act inimically; passing over the first eighth portion of the day, the period

1—Macneighten, page 408.

2—Motin, p. 433, q. v. The ‘pāgā and ‘great’ are here translated according to the commentary, ‘Corporation, and ‘community’ might sufficiently denote them could we divest ourselves of English associations in using those terms, to which the Hindī societies do not in all respects conform. Mention of them occurs again at sec. 2nd, para. 1st, and chapter 2nd, sec. 3rd, para. 6th, and in the 13th chapter, para. 3rd. They are also very clearly enumerated and elucidated in detail, by Mr. Ellis; see Asiatic Journal, v. 8th, p. 17-31, and Strange’s Elem. 1st, 319.

3—Jñāti, denoting, from the context, ‘kindred,’ and not ‘caste.’
which includes the next three eighths, is declared by sages to be
the very best time pointed out by the Càstra for judicial business.”
Half the first watch [yàma] is the eighth of the day; the next three
eighths are contained between that time and [the sun’s reaching] the
zenith. Samvartha again declares the days to be set apart as unfit
[for business]: “The man who is wise will not look at judicial business
on the days here mentioned, the fourteenth, the new moon, the full
moon, and likewise the eighth [of each fortnight].” Brhaspati: “Let
the king, sitting there in the first part of the day, together with old
men, his ministers and his servants, examine causes and hear them
read the purånas, and the laws, the religious [dharma-] as well as the
moral laws.” [artha-càstra] There, in the court. Moral laws, the
laws of equity [niti-càstra].

12. Nàrada, on the disagreement between the religious law, and
the moral law, says: “When a difference may occur
between law and
between the religious law, and the moral, then let
them set aside what is declared in the moral law
[artha-càstra] and follow that which is enjoined by
the religious law [dharma-càstra].” But where dis-
crepancy occurs in the dharmàcàstra itself, Yàjñavalkya says: 2
“If two texts [smàrti] differ, reason [nìti, or that which reason best
supports] must in practice [vyavahàra] prevail.” The faults of those
who do not look to the essentials of justice are thus declared by Bri-
haspati: 3 “A decision must not be made solely by having recourse to the let-
ter of written codes [càstra], since, if no decision were made according
to the reason of the law, [or according to immemorial usage, for the
word yuktì admits both senses] there might be a failure of justice.”

13. They should fully attend to the customs of
the country [Deçàchàra] and the like; thus Bri-
haspati says: 4 “Let all Rules, of each country, caste, and
family, that have been derived and preserved from
ancient times, be still observed in the same way; otherwise
the subjects will rise in rebellion, discontent will be pro-
duced among the people, and the army and the Treasury
will suffer injury.” The twice-born classes, [dvija]
in the Dakhan, take the daughter of a mother’s
brother in marriage. In the Madhya deça, they follow various pro-
fessions, and are artisans, and eaters of kine; and in the east [pùrva]
the men eat fish, whilst their women are notorious prostitutes. In
the North, their women drink intoxicating liquors, and women in

1—At midsummer, from about seven o’clock, till about half-past eleven, A. M.
2—Digest, 2nd 570 note.
3—Cf. Digest, 1st, 127; 8.—2nd, 128. Ellis’s Lectures in Asiatic Journal, 8th, 22.
their courses are by the men there considered fit to be touched. These people are not deserving of penance, or punishment for such acts as these. The Purva are the same as the Pṛṣṭhikā; but in some copies they read sarva, 'all,' for pūrva, that is all classes. Brāhmaṇas and the rest. Punishment means legal correction. Some one here declares: "However, what is laid down by law as the penance &c., for such acts, applies to countries which are not included among the above mentioned." But others again say: "Punishment is to be construed of the nature of Penance: thus the people of that country will escape legal punishment only; and in other countries, both legal punishment and penance will ensue."

14. Vyāsa says: "If a decision cannot be obtained from the other [appointed] persons, in disputes among men who live by commerce, any handcraft, tillage, dying, or such profession, then let the matter be tried by those skilled in the same trade." Manu 2 "Let not a prince, who seeks the good of his own soul, [hastily and alone] pronounce the law on a dispute concerning any legal observance, among twice-born men in their several orders."

VIII.

15. Kātyāyana: "The king should thus interrogate a person coming before him [at a proper time, and in a respectful attitude], saying, 'Fear not, O man, but disclose by whom, where, when, and for what cause, your grievance arises?' He should then, in conjunction with his Brāhmaṇs and assessors, deliberate upon the representation thus made, and should it appear reasonable, he shall deliver to the complainant a summons, or depute an officer for the purpose of citing the adverse party."

16. Nārada: "A person being about to prefer a claim, may arrest his adversary [evading it, or not giving satisfaction in the matter] until the arrival of the summons."

The same author declares four kinds of arrest or duress [usedha]. "Arrest is fourfold: local, temporary, inhibition from travelling, and the pursuit of a particular occupation; the person in confinement by one of these modes, shall not break away from it." He also declares there is a punishment for breaking through restraint, by one thus confined: "One who, being arrested at a proper time, breaks his arrest, is to be fined." In some cases, says the same author, punishment is also to be inflicted on the party putting in duress: "But if a man inflicts duress upon any one in an illegal mode, as by confining [any of] his ten members [limbs, functions, or senses]: by stopping his speech, or breath, or the like, he

1.—Those on the S. E. of the river Saraswat;
2.—Ch. 9th. vs. 390.
3.—Macnaghten, p. 410.
5.—Maha. p. 411.
6.—Maha. p. 411. The remaining words there appear to apply to our next text.
worthy of punishment; not the man who breaks through [such is illegal restraint]." Nārada mentions an exemption from punishment in some cases of resisting duress: "A person placed in duress whilst crossing a river, or passing a forest, or in a bad [place or] country, or during an affray, or in other [distress] does not become liable to punishment, if he break through such severe duress." Kātyāyana declares this punishment for confining one exempt from restraint: "But it is thus decreed, that he who imprisons one not amenable to confinement, shall be punished by the king."

17. The same author defines those who are exempt from confinement: "Persons standing upon a tree or hill, or situated upon an elephant, horse, carriage, or vessel; and one standing in a dangerous place, are all exempt from arrest by those enforcing a demand; as well as one afflicted with sickness, and one suffering under misfortunes, and one employed [as a minister of religion] by Yajamānas."(a)—"Let not the King cause to be summoned, persons in a weak state, nor minors, old men, persons in danger; those actually employed in religious offices immersed in [worldly] business, those overcome with desire or habitual estrangements, nor persons employed on the duty of the king or of the Gods [utsava]11 "Nor those intoxicated, deranged, or idiotic; nor persons in grief, nor servants. Nor a young woman who is without friends [hīnapāsā] on either side, nor any woman born of a noble family nor one lately delivered of a child, nor a damsels of the highest tribe. These are termed dependent on their relations."

18. "But women upon whom their families are dependent, profligates, and harlots, and those who are expelled from their families, or degraded, may be summoned."

"Having well examined the charge, the King in weighty matters may summon, but in a gentle way, even those who have withdrawn [as hermits] to the woods, and the like of them."(b) Having ascertained the time, place, and comparative importance of the charge, the king may summon even those who are sick, causing them to be brought slowly in carriages." In some copies, they read, by a messenger.

19. A person who, being called, does not attend, deserves punishment, even as Bṛhaspati says: "Where a person possessed of relatives or family, from arrogance neglects to go where he is called, let them deliberate upon his punishment, in proportion to the cause at issue." Kātyāyana specifies certain grades of fine for corresponding sorts of complaints: "In petty causes, the fine shall be fifty, but in the middling, not lower than an hundred [panas], and in great causes, never less than five hundred."

(a) Persons employing priests to perform religious ceremonies—Ed.
1—Mūrta, p. 410. I have altered the translation.
2—Mūrta, page 411.
20. Pitāmaha declares what is to be done on the arrival of the person summoned: "Let the person prosecuted be placed standing before the Court with the complainant likewise." The third case [by or with] is used here in the sense of in company with. Kātyāyana: "Then let the Plaintiff fully tell his case, and the Defendant immediately afterwards; at the end of their pleadings then let the assessors [speak], and the Chief Judge after that." Bīhaspati: "If the Plaintiff and Defendant should come, each saying, 'I was first in suing,' let the Plaintiff be registered with reference to the class of the parties, or injured by the injury."  

21. "Relations, or any other man duly appointed, may undertake the plea, or answer, for persons weak [in mind or body], idiots, madmen, old men, women, minors, and sick people." Nārada: "He on whose account another is litigating, whether he be appointed [Vyaktika] by the Plaintiff or sent by the Defendant, his is the victory or defeat, by whom he is delegated." Kātyāyana however says: "He is guilty of officiousness, who is neither brother, father, son, nor constituted agent of the party; should he interfere, he is liable to amercement." But this relates to one not duly appointed.  

22. In some cases, the absence of a deputy is enjoined by the very same author: "In [prosecutions for] killing a Brahman, drunkenness, robbery, adultery with a spiritual preceptor's wife, killing a man, theft [stey], touching another man's wife, and also eating forbidden things; in charges for abduction, or ruin, of a virgin, assault, and forgery, as well as injury to the king, a substitute [pratikādi] is not to be given; the doer of the act shall defend himself." The word stey is used a second time, with a view to a more particular prohibition of an attorney. A substitute, a deputy [or attorney].  

23. Yājñavalkya points out the proceedings of the plaintiff, when the defendant has been brought up: "Let there be [a record] written in presence of the defendant, good plaint.  

Requisites of a, exactly what was made known by the plaintiff, marked with the year, month, and half month; the day, name, caste, and other [necessary notes]." In another smīti it is said: "That is termed a charge, or declaration, which is significant, technically precise, comprehensive, unconfused, direct, unequivocal, conformi—

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1—In the [manuṣcript] Purāṇād, the reading is "Vaidya varṇa ānunāgana"—In the printed one, or Vīramitiśodasa, "Vaidya varṇa ānupārṇa." In all the old copies of the Mayākha, "Dāmko varṇa ānunāgama." The last they all agreed to reject; of the other two readings, the first has been followed.  
2—Nārada in the Mitākṣara.  
3—Mena, p. 141.  
4—In the original, the same word [stey] is used for both.  
5—Mena, p. 142. Strange's Elements, 1st, 500.
able to the original complaint, probable, uncontradictory, clear, susceptible of proof, concise, not deficient, not adverse [to local and temporal usages], comprising the year, season, month, fortnight, day, hour; country, situation, place, village; the complaint and its nature; the tribe, appearance, and age of the adverse party; the weight and quantity of the property in dispute; the names of the complainant, and his adversary; the names of their respective ancestors, and of the ruling kings; the grievance done, and the names of the original acquirer, and grantor. The year and other points here mentioned, are declared to be of use in cases of mortgage and the like. And the necessity of sometimes noting the country, &c., is declared in another smriti: 2

XII.

dimensions, nature of the soil, the names of ancestors, and of former kings; these ten should be specified in a suit for immovable property."

24. Kātyāyana: "Let the Chief Judge record at length the first side of the cause, as told in the [Plaintiff's] own way of correction of it, on paper, after it has been corrected on a writing-board, in white letters." Nārada defines the limits of correction: 3 "He may amend his declaration until the answer is given in, but being stopped by the answer, the corrections must cease." "But as long as the Defendant shall not enter the answer of the plaintiff, so long may the Plaintiff cause them to write any further account of the matter."

25. The properties of a plaint being thus laid down, false plights at variance with them, are also touched upon, though well known as fictitious. Thus in another smriti:

Plaints inadmissible. "Let them utterly dismiss a false suit, unknown [to reason], shewing no trespass, unmeaning, unfounded, whether incapable of proof, or contrary." Unknown, as if he said, 'Flowers from heaven have been stolen from me.' Shewing no trespass, as, 'He follows his business by the light of my lamp.' Unmeaning, as, 'What d'ye call it [kacāyatapam] (a) has been taken from me.' Unfounded, as, 'He living opposite to me reads with a loud voice.' Ineapable of proof, as, 'This person laughed at me with a scowling brow,' or the like. Contrary, to common sense, as, 'I was abused by a dumb man.' Plaits in opposition to the City, district, or other point, are also touched upon: 4 "That complaint which is prohibited by the Government, or detrimental to the interests of a City, or a country, or to the different trades-people, citizens, villagers and merchants, is pronounced to be inadmissible."

1.—For instance, a man in Central India, [Madhyārā], suing for a plantation of betel-nut trees, [knowing they cannot grow at a distance from the coast] or for mangoes, out of season, &c. Vīramit, leaf 20th p. 1st.

2—Yājñavalkya—Mānta, p. 412. 3—Mānta, page 413.

4—Mānta, page 413.

(a) This word—in-ca-ta-pa—is composed of the first, rough or parachute letter of each varga of the Nāgārī alphabet: a similar formation is ga-pa-da-da, the third, smooth, or sarala letter of each such varga.—Ld.
26. But that suit which contains different heads of charge, does not thus partake of the nature of the false complaint; otherwise we should have the misfortune of finding a law contrary to this of Kātyāyana: "The King may also without doubt receive, from desire of seeking out the truth, that cause which contains many counts, and is decidedly admissible among legal proceedings." As for the saying, 'that a plaintiff jumbling together different heads of law does not stand,' it must be understood [that the different counts] may not be taken up at one time, but in their proper order.¹

27. Yājñavalkya states what is to be done when the plaint has been thus prepared:² "The answer of the party who has heard the declaration, must be written down in presence of the plaintiff."

28. Nārada explains the qualities of an answer:³ "The wise have held that to be an answer, which embraces the declaration, which is solid, clear, consistent, and obvious." Kātyāyana specifies four sorts of them:⁴ A denial, a confession, a special exception, and a plea of "former judgment, are the four sorts of answer." The same author explains a denying answer [mithyottara]:" When the Defendant makes denial of the claim, that should be considered in law as an answer of denial." The same author declares this again to be of four kinds: "An answer of denial is of four kinds; as 'this is false'; 'I know not this matter'; 'I was not then present'; or 'I was not born at that time.'" An answer of assent [satyottara] is noted in another śūrī: "A declaration affirmative of the matter in dispute, is termed an assent." Nārada exemplifies a special exception [pratyavaskandana]:⁵ "When the defendant acknowledges the receipt of the] sum as declared by the plaintiff, but alleges a consideration, it is deemed a special plea." Kātyāyana thus propounds the plea of former judgment [prāṇyāya]:⁶ "If a man, though cast at law, revive the suit, he should be considered as one previously confuted, and is called an appellant from a former decision."

29. The properties of an answer being thus fixed, [a defective one] is also explained in another śūrī, though the nature of an answer wanting these properties conveys intrinsic proof against itself:⁷ "That is not an answer, which is dubious, not to the point, too confused, too extensive, or not embracing all parts of the declaration. That which is relative to other matter, incomplete, obscure, confused, not obvious, is a faulty answer." Kātyāyana also says: "When an answer admits the truth of the plaint on one count, and on another sets up a special

¹—A passage, apparently a text, agreeable to this is found in Mouni.
²—Mouni, p. 413.
³—Mouni. p. 414.
⁴—Mouni, 414.
⁵—6—Cole. Digest, 1st, 376, 7—Mouni, p. 414.
exception [kāranam] and at the same time denies another Count altogether, it is, from its mixed nature, held to be no answer."

30. The same author states the reason for this notice of a void answer:1 "For in one suit, the proof cannot rest on both parties, nor can both obtain judgment, nor can two answers be offered at once." Here, the meaning is this: 'In giving a flat denial and a special exception in one answer, the actions of two different plaintiffs are opposed to each other.' It has been thus declared by Nārada:2 "It has been recorded, that in the case of a total contradiction, the proof rests with the complainant; and in the case of a special exception, with his adversary." Therefore both parties in one cause [exhibiting proof] is contrary [to law.] Even so, both actions lie on the Defendant, when there is a jumbling of a special plea, with plea of former judgment; for it is said by Vyāsa: "In pleading a former judgment and special exception, the Defendant must exhibit the proof." And again by the same: "In plea of former decision, it must be satisfactorily established, by exhibiting [copy of] the decree so gained to the Chief Judge, and the rest likewise." Therefore, in pleading a former decision, it must be established, either by exhibition of the decree, or by those who saw the original decree, or the like. But in an answer setting up a special exception, the defence [must be supported] also by witnesses, documents, and other proof. Here also, [proof on both sides in one cause] is contrary [to law.] The same rules must be observed also in a mixture of three or four [pleas in one answer.]

31. And in these matters, the properties of a void answer arise from conjunction: for if in due order, the properties of a [valid] answer are preserved; and this order, must depend upon the pleasure of the Plaintiff, Defendant, and the Assessors. And even thus Hārīta says: "When a denial and special plea are both contained in one answer together; also a confession with any other [answer,] then which [of them] is to be taken as an answer [to that plaint]? that which contains the most important matter, or that wherein there is something of use to the action, is to be considered as the proper answer, to prevent confusion: for otherwise." 'There will be confusion' is wanting [to complete the sense].

32. The meaning of it is this: 'In a claim for gold and clothes, when it is pleaded, that the gold was not received, and that the clothes were received and returned; first let them decide about the gold, and afterwards, the point relating to the clothes may be settled.' The same course is to be pursued, in a mixture of a denial with plea of former decision, and of the latter with a special plea. Likewise even in those disputes, where it is pleaded, 'the gold was received, but the clothes were not,' or, 'the

1—Macnaghten, p. 415. On the subject of the "Onus probandi," see Bingham on Evidence, p. 287. [Ch. 16th.]
2—Macnaghten, p. 415.
clothes] "were given back," or [where it is said:] "I gained a former action about the clothes," the case must be tried only with respect to the clothes, not with reference to the gold. For though it is a matter of more value, yet there is no action, or proof, upon it. But in a dispute where the Plaintiff says: "This is my cow which ran away at such a time; I saw it in his house just now!" and the Defendant answers: "This is utterly false; even before the time set forth [in the plaint] it was standing at my house," it comprehends both a denial and special plea; there is no property of a void answer in this, which is an answer of denial, [at the same time] shewing cause or special exception. The action lies here with the Defendant alone; not at all with the Plaintiff, because of this text of Hárīta: 1 "When an answer involves a denial, and a special plea, the special plea is to be first considered." Even so, if there be a conjunction of a denial with plea of former judgment, or of a special plea together with plea of former judgment, in a suit of only one count, it does not partake of a void answer. In both of these cases, the proof lies with the defendant only. This is enough to show, that in no one case can proof on both sides exist by any means.

33. Yājñavalkya lays down the order for exhibiting the proof, after the answer has been recorded in writing: 2 After this, let the Plaintiff immediately get them to write down the proof of the matter complained about: when that is satisfactory he will gain the cause, but when it is otherwise, it will be reversed." This again relates to an answer of denial, but in the other kinds of answer, the exhibition of proof lies with the defendant alone. Thus Hárīta: 3 "For in an answer pleading a former decree or a special exception, the defendant shall exhibit the proofs; in answer of denial, the plaintiff; but issue cannot be had in an answer of assent."

34. Yājñavalkya mentions, that there are four feet, or requisites of a decided suit: "A decision in causes is shewn to have four quarters." And these four quarters are explained in another smṛti: 4 "It has four divisions; namely the declaratory, replicative, probatory, and adjudicative, and is termed quadruple." But this has reference to an answer distinct from one of assent; because in an answer of assent, there are only two members: even as Bṛhaspati says: "In an answer of denial, the cause must be completed in its four members; and likewise in a special plea; but in one confessing the claim, the suit may be considered as complete with two members."

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1—Macnaughten, page 416.

2—Macnaughten, p. 449, where some little variation is found in the reading.


4—Macnaughten, p. 416-17, where the whole text, of which this is only the latter hemistich, is recorded.
35. Yājñavalkya. "A person complained against, not having cleared himself shall not retort, nor shall another charge a person already labouring under a charge, nor shall any thing foreign to the original complaint be introduced. But he may make a countercharge in cases of affrays or criminal prosecutions." 语

36. Nārada. "That man, who forsaking his original claim rests on other grounds, is known for a false claimant by reason of the confusion of his proceedings. The meaning is, that the false claimant becomes [only] liable to punishment; he is not to be cast in his cause so laid. And this must be taken with reference to suits for money: Even as the same author says: "A verbal error, is not fatal in all [any] civil actions; [for instance, in actions brought] for seduction, for landed property, or for debt, the Plaintiff is to be punished, but it does not annul his claim." The second hemistich is added for the sake of clearing up the first.

37. Yājñavalkya. "When witnesses are adduced on both sides, the witnesses of the first complainant [are to be examined]. If the first side be weak, or wanting in that point, those of the Defendant may be received. The first complainant, the Plaintiff in the suit. The first side, the plaint. If it be weak; when there is no proof required [of the plaintiff] because of the Defendant's taking it on himself, by an answer showing cause. The receipt of oral evidence, is put for the sake of denoting proof in other ways also.

38. The same author says: "A competent surety must be taken from each party for the decision of the dispute."

1—Macraugh, p. 417.
2—See sections 16th and 18th.
3—Macraugh, p. 417, where it is translated 'must be nonsuited.' I have made the text literal, to agree with the comment following.
4—Macraugh, page 417.
5—Macraugh, p. 430, 451, p. v. Here the text is made to apply to a general rule between plaintiff and defendant: in the Mitakshara, [Sir F. M.'s authority] it is laid down for a particular case, between two claimants for the same property and thus the Mitaksha and Mitakhshara differ widely.
6—Macraugh, p. 415. inrango's Elements, 1st, 897.
business; nor an ascetic; nor he who is unable to liquidate the claim of the individual, and a sum equal to it, as a fine to the king: nor one unknown, are to be taken [as sureties] in matters requiring security." Confined, bound in fetters, or the like. One of doubtful character, one addicted to particular vices. An heir, son, grandsons, and others entitled to take a man's estate. A poor man, one indigent. Obliged to dwell elsewhere, one turned out of the country. Yājñavalkya: "But the being security, contracting debts, and giving evidence, between brothers, as well as between man and wife, and likewise a father and son, if they be unseparated, is not recorded."

39. In default of security, Kātyāyana says: 1 "If a party be unable to furnish a competent surety, he is to be guarded; and at the close of each day, is to furnish wages for the payment of his guards." The same author adds: "A man of the twice born classes, who is deficient in security, shall be guarded by men accompanying him out of doors; but they shall confine in prison, Čādras and the other [low castes] who cannot give security."

40. Nārada 2 sets forth the qualities of a false plaintiff [hīnavādi]: "That man, who, entirely giving up his first ground of action, again takes up another plea, is, by reason of his passing away from one cause, decidedly known to be a false claimant." Yājñavalkya shews how to distinguish the party who is in the wrong: 3 "One who is constantly shifting his position, who licks about his mouth, whose forehead sweats, and whose countenance continually changes colour; one whose mouth dries up, and who faulders in his speech, who contradicts himself often; one who does not look up, or return an answer; who contorts his lips; one who undergoes spontaneous changes, whether mental, verbal, corporeal, or actual: such person, whether making a claim or giving evidence, is esteemed false." His mouth, the region of the lips.

SECTION II.

Of Proof in General (Pramāṇa.)

1. Yājñavalkya: 4 "Evidence is said to consist of documents, possession, and witnesses. In the absence of all these, a divine test is prescribed." Kātyāyana also: 5 "When one adduces human evidence, and the other appeals to a divine test, the king will, in this instance, proceed to examine the

1—Macnaghten, p. 419. 2—Macnaghten p. 418.
human evidence, and will not have recourse to the divine test. Even when human testimony is applicable to only one part of the case, that is to be received in preference; and recourse must not be had to persons willing to establish the whole case by supernatural means.

Proof by ordeal is not declared, when living witnesses are present; and when there are deeds or documents in a cause, neither ordeal nor witnesses shall be [present to]. As for those rules which are set up by separate tribes, [pages] joint companies [propi] corporate bodies, [gana] and the like, the proof of them must be written deeds; neither ordeal, nor witnesses, 

2. "In nonfulfillment of a gift, as well as in gift, and in cases where a decision is required between a master and his servant; in nonfulfillment of sale, and refusal to receive goods purchased; in gambling also, whether with inanimate or living objects, when disputes are brought up, proof by witnesses is declared requisite, not by ordeal nor by documents."

3. In disputes respecting the making of doorways and roads, and that about enjoyment of any thing, watercourses, and the like, possession is the strongest proof, not documents; nor witnesses.

4. Bṛhaspati declares ordeal to be in some cases the strongest: "Makers of false jewels, pearls, or coins; they who steal deposited articles; murderers, and those who commit adultery with other men's wives, are always to be examined by [ordeal of] oath; in charges of deadly sin, if witnesses are present, and the defendant [vāsi] (a) accepts the ordeal, the witnesses then shall not be examined. Vyasa: "If he say, this writing was not made by me; it was forged by this man, having laid down that writing, a decision on the case shall be made by ordeal." "In the case of a capital offence committed in a desert, in an uninhabited place, at night; or in the interior of a dwelling; and in the case of a denial of a deposit, divine test must be resorted to." Bṛhaspati: "When doubts are produced in written or oral evidence; and where the circumstantial evidence is incomplete, ordeal is then to be made the means of clearing up the matter."

5. The same author states a liberty of choice in some cases, between ordeal and witnesses: "In the investigation of Matters of choice, a capital offence, or affair by deed or words, and in all cases of violence committed long ago, both witnesses,

2—See note, section 1st, para. 10th; and post, Chapter 2nd, sec. 3rd, para. 6th; chap. 12th, para. 3rd.

2.—See subsequent Chapters on these heads. 3.—Ordeal, Mitakṣarā.

(a) Some make here: vāsi is plaintiff; pravāsi is defendant.—E.'

3.—Nārada, in the Mitakṣarā, Maṇḍagriś, p. 439.

5.—Maṇḍagriś, p. 139, q. v. 'Assault and battery' does not exactly define the Hindī law-term, which includes 'assault, &c.' under this head. See Chapter 10th, sections 1st and 2nd.
and divine test may be had recourse to." "Writings for debt or witnesses; as well as the entry of any trifling circumstance, or the like and ordeal, are mentioned as admissible, with a view to the wellbeing of the subjects." Entry of any trifling circumstance, one point of proof. In an affray, by words, meaning personal abuse, as 'you have murdered a Brahman,' or the like.

6. But what Kâtyâyana says that: "In wordy affrays, and in disputes for land, they shall not take notice of ordeal." Explanation. relates to trifling cases of abuse; the word land is merely used to signify fixed property [in general] by putting a part for the whole. Even as Pitaáamha says: "In disputes for fixed property, they must cause ordeal to be excluded," therefore, if there be witnesses or other legal proof then ordeal is prohibited. Even so the same author says: "They shall cause the matter to be proved by these [three means,] by witnesses, by documentary evidence, and by possession."

7. Pitaáamha: "Where deeds are not to be procured, nor proof by possession, nor witnesses; and there is no manifestation, [or descent, of the judgment] of the Gods, then the proof lies in the opinion of the king." Disputes, which maintain such a doubtful form, that they are not capable of being determined with certainty, the King shall decide, by his own opinion of them, for he is the lord of all. Thus the Vyavahára Mátreka is finished.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF PROOF.

SECTION I.

Of Evidence by Writings (Lekhya).

1. On this subject Bhihaspati says: Writings are declared to be of three kinds; those written by the king, made at a particular place, and likewise written by any person with his own hand; but their further subdivisions are very numerous." As for only two kinds being mentioned by Vaisishtha: "Writings are understood to be of two natures, those executed among the people, and those relating to the king's affairs," it is occasioned by his considering as one, without distinguishing them, those made at a particular place, and those under a person's own hand. Among the people, is a parallel expression to that of, 'among mankind' [in general.] According to the author of the Samgraha, written evidence is declared to be of two kinds, those deeds made by the king, and those current among mankind.

1.—The Smriti Samgraha. 2.—See post, para. 6, 8.
2. Bhāsāpati: "Writings among mankind are of seven kinds; for partition, gift, purchase, pledge, public agreements, slaves, debts, and the like: the king's orders are of three kinds." That record of partition which brothers, or other collaterals, execute, after making a just division by mutual consent, is called the written memorial of the distribution. And when a man has given away land, the deed which he gets drawn out, for holding the land as long as the moon and sun shall last (a), unreserved, and incapable of being seized by any one, that is known as a writing of gift. "When any one, having bought a house, field, or the like, causes a deed to be drawn up, containing an exact statement of the price, that is called a writing of purchase." "When a man, having given in pledge either moveable or fixed property, causes a writing to be made out, stating in it the conditions, whether of preservation or enjoyment [by the mortgagee], it is called a writing of pledge." "If the people of a whole village, or of a district, mutually execute a writing, under their own signatures, among themselves, for the sake of some ordinance not contrary to the king's [laws], that is called a writing of agreement." "When a person, destitute of clothes and food, makes a writing in a forest to this effect, 'I will do your work,' that is called a writing of slavery." "When a person, taking up money at interest, makes out a deed himself, and causes the same to be done by the other party, it is termed a writing of loan, and by the wise, a deed of debt." From the words the like, we must understand, of purification, and the like.

3. Katyaśayana declares what are these deeds of purification and the like: "When an accusation has been sustained, and penance for it performed, by a man, the deed certifying his purity, is known as a deed of purification, if attested by witnesses." "In all the higher classes, where an accusation is sustained, the writing which is passed when the dispute is finished, is known as a deed of peace." When a decision is given in boundary disputes, a deed of boundaries is drawn out." Pratāpati mentions a deed of bail: "When the bailiff carries the very thing bailed again to another for pledge, he shall cause a deed of pledge to be recorded in writing, and give with it the deed [be received] in the first instance."

4. Vijñāvalkya also: "Having discharged the whole debt, he should tear up the writing, or cause another to be executed for acquaintance."

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1—Cokebrook’s Digest, 3rd, 105.
(a) See J. Grimm’s Deutsche Rechtsaltertümmer, 2te ausg. s. 87.—Ed.
3—Macnaghten, page 450.
5. Nārada thus lays down the difference between the two kinds of writings before mentioned, those made with a person's own hand and by that of another: "Documentary evidence is declared to be of two sorts: [the first] in the handwriting of the party himself, which need not have subscribing witnesses (a); and [the second] in that of another person, which ought to be attested: the validity of both depends on the usage of the country."

XXV.

Yājñavalkya: "But every document which is in the handwriting of the party himself, is considered as sufficient evidence, even without witnesses, unless obtained by force or fraud." Force, duress, Fraud, desire [to cheat], or the like. The same author states a distinction among those done by another: "Whenever a contract has been agreed upon between parties by mutual consent, a writing shall be made of it, attested by witnesses, headed with the name of the obligor; and the year, month, fortnight, day, name, tribe, family, scholastic title, the names of the parties' fathers, &c. must be specified." Scholastic title, as, one well qualified in a branch of the Rg Veda, or the like; taking his name from a particular qualification, as, a Rg Veda, a student of the Rg Veda. The same author says: "When the transaction is completed, the borrower should sign his name with his own hand; adding, 'what is above written has the assent of me, son of such a one;' and the witnesses, being equal, shall also write, putting the names of their father first, 'I, such an one, am witness to this writing.' And the writer shall then write at the end, [of the deed itself] 'this has been written by me, the son of such an one, having been sought for the purpose by both parties.'" Equal, in number and qualifications. In some copies, for equal, they read unequal, by inserting the letter a [the negative sign]. Nārada: "That debtor who is ignorant of the art of writing, shall cause to be written his assent; or if the witness be so, by means of another witness, in presence of all the witnesses."

6. Yājñavalkya and Brhaspati illustrate the three kinds of royal deeds, before alluded to: "Let a king, having given land or assigned fixed property, cause his gift to be written, for the information of good princes who will

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1—Digest, 1st, 21. Macnaghten, p. 443-444, q. v. Of the different readings here referred to, I have adopted that of the Digest as more intelligible, [the other seeming to infer four kinds] and agreeable to our author.

(a) So by Scottish law holograph deeds are held equivalent to an assented deed in affording proof of one of authenticity and of deliberate engagement. Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland 9th ed. 380. As to holographs see 2 Bent. Ind. Eq. 459-460-461; Morton v. Copeland 16 C. B. per Maule J.—Ed.

2—Digest, 1st, 23.

3—Digest, 1st, 24.


6—Macnaghten, page 444. Digest, 1st, p. 26, where this text is ascribed to Vyūsa.

7—Digest, 2nd, 162, q. v.
succeed him, either on prepared silk, or on a plate of
copper; sealed above with his own signet (a). "Having
have sunging his ancestors and himself, and stating the
quantity of the gift, with the measure of the acquisition, and the di-
vision, and set his own hand to it, and specified the time, let him rend-
er his donation firm." Fixed properly, a ceremony in mines or the like,
given by the king or others, having the probable gains fixed. That
which is received, is an acquisition, whether land or any other thing. Its
measure, stating it to be so much. That which is given, is a gift,
whether a house or any other thing. Its divisions are the boundaries.
Stating, reciting. Moreover: "If the king, pleased with the service or
bravery of any one, bestow on him a district or other [portion of land,]
by a written deed, that is a writing of favour." "When
the king, after going through the plaint, answer, proofs, and decision; in a cause, issues a written [deed] to
the gaining party, that is called a writing of victory." (2)

7. Vyāsa thus mentions the king's deputy: "A Secretary special-
ly appointed by the king himself, shall fully write
down the King's grants or orders, either for peace or
war, on copper-plates, or else on strong cloth." And
here the same author mentions what is to be written by the king, as
his own signature of acknowledgement: "He shall himself write with
his own hand, the boundaries and measurement [of the disputed land,
adding] 'done before me, the son of such an one, being king of such a
place.'" Boundaries and measurement; their accep-
tation will be understood from the former texts.

8. But Vasiṣṭha mentions four kinds of royal writings: "Grants
are to be considered as the first, and next decrees;
Royal Orders. these, with his orders, and respectful correspondence,
are the four kinds of royal writings." That writing,
whereby he communicates any business to the heads of districts, to his
servants, and to the guardian of the kingdom, is called a letter of
orders." "That whereby he makes known any busi-
ness to his family priest, his domestic chaplain, or his
spiritual teacher, all persons to be respected and wor-
shipped, is termed a letter of respectful address." 
Grants, and decrees, are already mentioned.

9. Vājñavalkya: (3) "An instrument being in another country, or
badly written, or destroyed, or effaced, or stolen, or
Reused and torn, or burned, or divided, he shall cause another to be
proof of Writings. executed." Naṇḍa: (4) "In the case of an instrument
being deposited in another country, or destroyed, or

1.—For examples of this, see Asiatic Researches, vol. 9th, page 106–466, &c.
(a) Compare the note of the English common-law that no freethink may be derived
from the Crown but by matter of record. Dow. and Stud. 6. 1. d. 8.—Ev.
2.—A text similar to this will be found, attributed to Vasiṣṭha, in Macaulay,
p. 457.
3.—Macaulay, p. 457. Digest, I. r. 355. 4.—Macaulay, p. 457.
badly written, or stolen; should it be in existence, time must be allow-
ed; should it not be in existence, ocular evidence must be resorted to.” Evidence, witnesses; in their absence, ordeal; for it is said by Kātyā-
ıyāna: “In the absence of writings and witnesses, they may exhibit proof by ordeal in judicial matters.” Yājnivalkya: “The correctness or validity of a disputed or doubtful writing, may be established by comparing it with something written by the Defendant with his own hand (a) or the like; by its fitness, the possibility of receipt, the existing evidence; marks; established connection, or circum-
stances; title, and such reasonable marks.” Fitness, the debtor’s want of money. Possibility of receipt, residence of both parties in one place. Marks, impression of a seal, and the like. Evidence, by witnesses, or other proof. Circumstances, amounting to connection, as, the possible means of receipt [of the matter in dis-
pute.] Title, some possible mode of acquisition. Reason, inferences. Prajāpati: “A decision is to be made with the greatest care, when royal orders of a king are exhibited, by producing the im-
pression of the seal set with the king’s own hand, and the hand-writ-
ing of his Secretary.”

10. Brihaspati states what are bad deeds: “A writing made by
Invalid Deeds. persons dying, inimical, in fear, or in pain; by women; by intoxicated or profligate persons; by those diseased; or,
[obtained] at night, or by fraud, or violence, does not stand good.”
“When only one witness, [and he] accused of crime, or a vile person, has attested a deed, it is called a false deed; and where the writer is a similar person, it is considered the same.”

1.—A text very similar to this is found in Macnaghten, p. 455, yet there are so many points of difference, that I cannot safely adopt it, in opposition to the commentary of the Mayakha.

(e) As regards the presumptio ex comparatione scriptorum, the Hindū law contrasts advantageously with the English common-law, which totally excluded the proof of handwriting by comparison. See now Stat. 17 and 18, Vict. c. 125, ss. 27 and 103. The Indian Act of 11 of 1858, sec. 47, provides that “on an enquiry whether a signature, writing or seal is genuine, any undisputed signature, writing or seal of the party whose signature, writing or seal is under dispute, may be compared with the disputed one, though such signature, writing or seal be on an instrument which is not evidence in the cause.”

The proof by comparison of writings was admitted by the Civil law with great caution and under restrictions which show its distrust of this species of testimony. “Literarum exame natione penitus non repulsā, sed sola non sufficiens, augumentum autem testium conferentes” (Novell. 78, c. 9). It was to be admitted only in cases of necessity. “Sed necesse est omnino collationem literarum supplementos corum qui subscripto-
serint, assumere: tunc competens est proponere guidem ad comparationes (neque enim eam modum omnibus interdicosse) per omnes autem substitutis procedere, et omnino, (si pataverit cius judex operere credi), etiam insinuandum insinuare preferendi (Novell. 73, c. 7) Burgo, Commentaries on Colonial and Foreign Laws, II, 701.—Ed.
SECTION II.

On Evidence by Possession.—(Bhakti.)

1. Nārada: "Possession, with a clear title [āgama] affords evidence; but possession constitutes no evidence, if unaccompanied by a clear title." Vyāsa mentions possession as distinguished by various qualities, similar to that supported by title. Possession is fivefold: titled, long, continuous, uninterrupted, and known to the adverse party." Nārada declares the imperfection of [right in] the thing contested, when supported by enjoyment only: "He who simply pleads possession, but no title, in consequence of proving such false possession, is to be considered a thief."

2. And this is to be taken within a period fit for recollection of legal title: But where it is not fit, even enjoyment alone is declared to be sufficiently valid, by the same author: "In cases falling within the memory of man [smaṛtākāśa] possession with a title is admitted as evidence. In cases extending beyond the memory of man, the hereditary succession of three ancestors, is admitted as evidence, even though the title be not produced" (a). Though the title be not produced: the absence of title arising from the non-attainment of that fit period: because of the impossibility of determining it afterwards. In cases beyond the age of man also, the same author says, on the applying to recollection in the absence of title: "He who enjoys without right, even for many hundred years, the ruler of the earth should inflict on that sinner the punishment of a thief."

3. But whereas he again says: When possession has been held, even by injustice, by three former men, including the father [of the

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1—Macnaghten, p. 439. For 'title,' see Strange's Elements, 1st, 31.
4—Macnaghten, p. 431. It is attributed in the Mitakshara to Kātyāyana.
5—Macnaghten, p. 431-432.
6—Reports Ist. 367.

(a) See a letter of Sir W. Jones cited in Röör and Montrion's Hindī Law and Judicature (Calcutta 1859) p. 15. If the owner of real property, whether land or other, allow another to hold it for three generations under any deed without claiming it, such property becomes lost to him, and ownership accrues to the person in possession. But as three generations may lapse in two or three years, it is provided by the Čātra that the actual possessor's ownership shall ensue if the property has been held for any time after the āditiḥdvi or extreme age [leg. memory] of man. In the Mitakshara this āditiḥdvi is fixed at 100 years; however Kātyāyana and Vyāsa state 60 years as the time when three generations may be said to have passed over and after which the claim of the original proprietor is null under any plea. 1 Morley Dig. 422 citing Sexual Chandra Rana v. Abh Diwakar, 1 Binn. 307. The right of a hindū widow [in Bengal] is not necessarily extinguished by her omitting to apply for separate possession. n 14. In last and undivided share for more than twelve years after his death 1 Morley Dig. 423 citing Mt. Chanan-ana. v. Sawan Sahai, 3 S. D. A. Rep. 30. As to the Bengal Rule of Limitation, see Bengal. Regs. 11 of 1723 and 11 of 1806. As to the Madras Rule, see Mad. Reg. 11 of 1802. As to the Bombay Rule, see Bom. Regs. 1 of 1806, and 2 of 1827. — Ed.
present occupant], that is not capable of being taken away from him, when it has gone in order through three lives." This means, "If property enjoyed even without legal title, as well as after unjust acquisition, by three former persons including his father, is not capable of being taken away, how much less so, when it is impossible to fix the absence of legal title [in the present occupant]." Since, also, there is a text of Harihara: "When possession has been held without very good title, but by three former men, that cannot be taken away when it has gone in order through three lives, this must be considered as of possession without a good title proper for attainment of property, and not without the form of a title altogether.

4. What is further said in a text of Yajnavalkya: "He by whom a title has been obtained, must produce it when impugned, but his son and grandson need not; for them, possession is of weight," only means, that the maker of the title alone is punishable in default of proving it, and not his sons or other heirs: but the fulfilment of their intent does not consequently follow. Even as Harihara says: "He by whom a title has been acquired, is subject to penalty in case of not producing it; but not his son, or his grandson; though the possession of these two also, is forfeited." Yajnavalkya: "When a person dies during his defence of a cause, his heirs shall support it; enjoyment held without legal title is there of no use." Hence, those who take shares in his estate, whether sons or other persons. If, the title in dispute.

5. On the other hand: it may be said that the assertion of possession during a long space of time being requisite as proof, is contrary to law; because the prosecutor's argument, defeat also occurs, from enjoyment by another during a very short space of time; from what the same author says: "Loss accrues to him, who for twenty years observes his land enjoyed by another without interfering; and in the case of movable property, for ten years."

6. To this it is answered, that it only means there shall be a loss of the fruits, or profits produced from the land, or other thing litigated, for so long as the owner has observed [its occupation] by another, uncontested by him; but not loss of the land, or other thing itself also, because such interpretation would be contrary to the [former] text, "He who enjoys without right," &c.

7. Kâtyâyana: "This law has been clearly settled, that no weight of title attaches to the possession of him who has violently carried off cattle, women, men, or other invalid. [animals]; neither by his son after him." Nârada: "A pledge, boundaries, a minor's estate; deposits, both specified and unknown; women; the property of the king, and that

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1—Macnaghten, p. 439. 2—5—Macnaghten, p. 493.
4—Reports, vol. 2nd, 373—Macnaghten, p. 424. 5—Para. 2nd.
6—A somewhat similar text is found in Macnaghten, p. 424.
of Çrotiyas, are not lost to the owner’s by another’s possession of them.” Manu: 1 “A milk-cow, a camel, a riding horse; [a bull, or other beast] which has been sent to be tamed for labour; and other things used with friendly assent, are not lost, [by length of time], to the owner.” Sent to be tamed, what is given in charge to another for the sake of taming.

SECTION III.

On evidence by witnesses (Sākhī).

1. In the Todarananda, Narada says: “But in doubtful matters, when two men are disputing, strict attention must be paid to their witnesses, as to what was seen, heard, or understood.”

2. Bhaspati states the distinctions of them: “Witnesses are declared to be of twelve sorts, written, caused to be written, concealed, or recollected, a member of the family, a messenger; a spontaneous witness and one in answer; another man employed in the business; the king; his superintendent [adhyaksha] and likewise the village.” Written, entered by the plaintiff in a deed. Caused to be written, one entered [in the same] by the defendant, at the plaintiff’s request. Concealed, one made to hear behind a partition, or the like. Recollected, reminded from time to time of the business [to be proved]. Spontaneous, a witness coming to give evidence of his own accord. One in answer, speaking after other witnesses, upon hearing or being told [their evidence]. Superintendent, the chief judge: and this is meant to include the assessors and other [members of the Court], by reason of this text of Katyāyana: “The secretary, chief judge, and assessors in succession, [are witnesses when the king presides in a cause].”

3. The same author says: “There shall be nine, seven, or five, [witnesses]; even four or three; or two may be taken, and number. if they are both Çrotiyas(a); a single witness shall not be examined at any time.” Written witnesses shall be two, as well as concealed ones; three, four or five, shall be the number of those caused to be written, spontaneous, reminded, men of the family, and likewise, those called in answer; a messenger, and accountant, and

1—Chap. 8th, v. 146.
2—Bentham’s Treatise on Evidence, page 26–57.
3—Ditto, ditto, page 68.—The term in Sanskrit signifies ‘self-willed.’
4—The last hemistich is omitted in the text, and supplied here from Macnaghten, page 443.
5—Probably Bhaspati, elucidating his own preceding text.
6—Brähma well read in the Vedas.—Ed.

(a) Brähma well read in the Vedas.
likewise one employed in the business, may give evidence as a single witness, and the king, as well as the superintendent [and other officers of the Court]."

4. Yājñavalkya declares the admissibility even of the written witness and the rest, as a single witness, with mutual consent of both parties: "By the consent of both parties, even when legal, one person, of virtuous knowledge, may be a witness." Vyāsa: "A witness, whose actions are pure, and who knows his duty [towards men], whose word is known, is admissible, even if the only witness, when it is necessary, in criminal cases." Whose word is known, often seen to be a speaker of truth. A single witness, if unconnected with the party, may be taken in cases of deposit and the like; for Kātyāyana says: "In a very secret deposit, even one single witness is declared admissible; as well as one witness, sent by the plaintiff in a case of things borrowed for use," Borrowed, ornaments or other jewellery, as ear-ornaments or the like, obtained for the sake of a wedding, or the like. The same author says one witness is also admissible in disputes about saleable articles: "They shall cause the article to be identified by the very man who finished it; that single witness is in such a dispute declared good evidence."(a)

5. Vyāsa details their qualifications: "Persons religiously brought up, fathers of sons, purely descended, of a good family, veracious speakers; constantly performing their duties towards Gods and men, who have forsaken hate and envy; Crotriyas, and those independent; learned men; persons stationary; and young men, may all be received as witnesses in case of debt or the like, by the wise."

6. Nārada: "Among companies of artisans, men who are artisans shall be witnesses; and men of one tribe among those of the same; foreigners [outcasts] among those living outside, and women among women." Kātyāyana tells us who are men of one tribe [varga]: "Bhirgu calls them men of one tribe, who are wearers of [false] tokens, members of joint companies and of separate trades; and other merchants; also communities [Samāhastha] and other such men. The Nāyakas of the several communities, whether of slaves, bards, wrestlers, or the drivers of elephants, horses, and carriages, are termed in law, Vargi." Yājñavalkya makes this mention of those of another caste:  

---Macnaghten, page 447-448.

(a) By Act II of 1855 sec. 28, except in cases of treason, the direct evidence of one witness, who is entitled to full credit, shall be sufficient for proof of any fact, but this provision shall not affect any rule or practice of any Court, that requires corroborative evidence in support of the testimony of an accomplice or of a single witness in the case of perjury.—Ed.

2.—Lingā. The context would induce us to apply it to the Lingātī. Vants of the Dakha, who do actually wear a linga upon their arms as a distinctive mark.

3.—Çreni and Pūgā, for which see chap. 1st sec. 1st para. 10; 2d para. 1st—and chap. 12th para. 3.

4.—Macnaghten, p. 442, Dig. 1st 22.
"There should [in general] be three witnesses: persons who take delight in acts ordained in the Veda and in sacred law-books; and properly, they should be of the same sex and class with the party for whom they give evidence: but, if that cannot be, those of all classes may be examined."

7. The same author tells us who are excluded: "A woman, a minor, an old man, a gamester, an intoxicated person, a madman, an infamous person, a juggler, an infidel, a forger, one deformed, one degraded from caste, a friend, one interested in the subject-matter, (6) a partner, an enemy, a robber, a public offender, one convicted, an out-caste, and others, are incompetent witnesses." An out-caste, turned out by his own family. From the phrase, slaves and others, and the like must be understood. Bṛhaspati; "The evidence of a mother's father, and of a father's brother; of a wife's brother, and her maternal uncle; of a brother and his son; a friend, and a daughter's husband, is inadmissible in all disputes." Nārada. "He, who not having been pointed out, comes and offers his evidence, is technically called a self-spoken man; he is not proper to be examined in evidence." Kātyāyana. "Of witnesses recorded, and summoned by a litigant party, should one utter a contradiction, all will be rendered incompetent by that contradiction."

XXXIV.

8. Of these also, Nārada declares in some cases the admissibility:

Exceptions. "Slaves, degraded persons, and the rest, who are declared not to be [legal] witnesses, may also be admitted to give evidence, with due consideration of the weight of the matter in dispute." In the absence, says Manu: "On failure [of witnesses duly qualified] evidence may [in such cases] be given by a woman, by a child, or by an aged man; by a pupil, by a knishman, by a slave, or by a hired servant." Yājñavalkya. "All persons may be witnesses in cases of adultery, theft, affray, and criminal business." Here, the separate mention of adultery, and the rest, in

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1—Macnaghten, p. 446; Reports Ist 105-6-7.

(6) By Act 18 of 1855 sec. 11, no person shall, by reason of any interest in the result of any suit or of any interest connected therewith or by reason of relationship to any of the parties thereto, be incompetent to give evidence in such suit.—Ed.

2—Macnaghten, p. 446.

3—Macnaghten, p. 446.

(c) Act II of 1855 sec. 14 enacts that the following persons only shall be incompetent to testify: 1. Children under seven years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly. 2. Persons of unsound mind, who, at the time of their examination, appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly; and no person who is known to be of unsound mind shall be liable to be summoned as a witness, without the consent previously obtained of the Court or person before whom his attendance is required. By sec. 15 any person who, by reason of immaturity age or want of religious belief, or who by reason of defect of religious belief, ought not, in the opinion of such Court or person, to be admitted to give evidence on oath or solemn affirmation, shall be admitted to give evidence on a simple affirmation declaring that he will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.—Ed.

4—Chap. 6th v. 70. Reports Ist 106.

5—Macnaghten, p. 447.
treated of actions of a criminal nature, has reference to the act of
adultery or other offence in a secret way. Upanas: "A slave, a blind
man, one deaf, a woman, a minor, an old man, and the like, these
persons also, if unconnected with the party, are admitted as witnesses,
in criminal cases. Unconnected, not partial to either side.

9. Bhaspati: "Witnesses acquainted with the matter, if there
be any objections to them, they shall declare faulty;
if the opponent charge as faulty [witnesses] who have
no fault, he is worthy of a fine equal to it." The op-
ponent [vādī] here means the defendant. Equal to it,
an amount equal to what forms the ground of suit.

Vyasā: "Objections to witnesses are to be recited in
court by the defendant; and they shall cause to be
read out [to the witnesses] all the objections, when
taken down in writing, and they shall give a reply to
them." The meaning is, having clearly set before the witnesses the
disqualifications alleged, as taken down in writing [from the Defend-
ant], they shall be made by the Court to state their explanations on
the subject. The same author says: "But on their admission [of the
disqualifications], their evidence is never at any time fit to be received.
But [if the case is] otherwise, the objections must be substantiated,
with evidence, by the Defendant."1 "A person failing to establish an
exception openly made against witnesses, should be punished; but if
proved, the witnesses are to be dismissed, and deprived of the privilege
of giving evidence." Moreover, they shall undergo humiliation
in the mode consonant to the Čāstra: provided the plaintiff's sole reli-
ance has been placed on the veracity of the witnesses. If otherwise,
in case of their not confessing. Substantiated, made to acknowledge it.
With evidence, by proof. The meaning is, that the charge shall be
substantiated as clearly as possible.

10. However, this text: "Objections to witnesses, apparent to
the members of the court, or those universally admit-
ted by the world to be true, are to be taken for grant-
ed, and not to be considered as requiring proof with a
view to obviate that particular disqualification," has reference to wit-
nesses publicly known to be in the confidence of the party.2 In case
of these disqualifications being unknown to the defendant, the same
author says: "Those objections in proof [which are known] are to be
made manifest by assessors in the time [of trial], be declared by the defendant; but concealed faults are to
be pointing them out from the Čāstra."

11. This is the meaning, 'That concealed [objections] are to be
declared, by quoting the Čāstra upon them, at [any]
time before the witnesses speak.' But they are not to
be mentioned afterwards, for thus says Bhaspati:
For any legal objections to written deeds, as well as

1.—Macneughten, p. 448.
2—Bentham on Evidence, page 46, applies here, in so far as the Members of the Court are not bound to shut their eyes to their own knowledge.
to witnesses, which may exist, are to be declared in the time of trial; if mentioned afterwards, it shall not vitiate them as proof.” Mentioned, proper to be spoken; that is, proper to be stated in the commencement, according to the rule of grammar, “The suffix [kta] implies an act begun and not past, and likewise an agent.” Here this suffix denotes the agent. Here, their punishment is stated by Kātyāyana: “He who, when the matter has been spoken, shall charge, as disqualified, witnesses before unsullied, and shall not state any cause for it, shall receive the lowest amercement.” In case of the inability of the witnesses to explain away the objections urged against them, the plaintiff must do it: thus says Bṛhaspati: “The action of him whose documents or witnesses in a cause are alleged to be faulty, shall not be favorably adjudged, so long as he fails to clear them from the charge.” Then, the documents, &c.

12. Kātyāyana declares the punishment for suborning false witnesses: “He, by whom false witnesses have been set up, through wicked desire of gaining any object, shall have the whole of his property confiscated, and then have his object made null.” Object made null, go without the object of his suit.

13. Nārada declares the means of discovering false witnesses: “He who, by reason of his wicked state, caused by his own crimes, appears as if irresolute, goes from place to place, or runs after every person; who suddenly coughs much, and likewise every now and then draws his breath; who scratches, as if writing, with his feet; and who shakes his hands and clothes; whose face changes colour, and whose forehead sweats; whose lips become dry, who looks above and about him, and who speaks much, in a hurried manner, without restraint, unquestioned, such an one is to be known for a false witness: they shall punish one so sinning severely.”

14. Kātyāyana and Manu⁵ state the mode of examining witnesses: “In the forenoon, let the Judge, being purified, severally call on the twice-born, being purified also, to declare the truth in the presence of [some image, a symbol of] the divinity, and of Brāhmaṇs, while the witnesses turn their faces either to the North or to the East.” Manu: “The witnesses being assembled in the middle of the Court-room, in the presence of the plaintiff and the defendant, let the Judge examine them, after having addressed them [all together,] in the following manner: ‘What ye know to have been transacted in the matter before us, between the parties reciprocally, declare at large, and with truth; for your evidence in this cause is required.’”

15. In disputes about kine, horses, and the like, the same author requires the production of the thing in dispute: “In the presence of the plaintiff and defendant, and in company with the thing to be proved, they shall cause them to state their evidence openly; not at any time

1—Coke, Mit. 306. note. 2—Chap. 6th v. 37. Macaughten, p. 447.
3—Chap. 8th v. 73-89. Macaughten, 417. Strange, 1st 319.
without having it before their eyes. Evidence may be given upon the disputed article alone, without either attending, in some cases; this is the law in cases respecting quadrupeds, and likewise in those for bipeds, and fixed property." "In disputes about articles of weight, number, or measure, they may also in its absence, cause the witnesses to state their evidence. In all matters capable of proof, evidence is requisite, but not otherwise." Without either, in some cases; that is, without both the plaintiff and defendant, in presence of the disputed article. In some cases, meaning, in cases of quadrupeds and the rest. Articles of weight, gold, or the like, proper to be weighed. Of number, coin or the like, fit to be counted. Of measure, things proper to be measured, as rice, wheat, and the like. In absence, in default of the production of the thing to be proved. In matters capable of proof, in disputes at law.

16. In cases involving murder, the same author says, the depositions of witnesses are to be taken in presence of Śiva:

Further rules for examination of witnesses.

"In charges of killing living creatures, they shall deliver their evidence in presence of Śiva; in default of the marks, they shall cause them to deliver it; not otherwise." It, the deposition of the witnesses, to be given in default of marks of the murder. Otherwise, in existence of marks of the murder. The same author says: "Procrastination must not be used by the king in the examination of witnesses; it becomes a great fault, by reason of the time [lost], and bears the quality of denial of justice." Nárada: "Having called the witnesses, and bound them down firmly by an oath, he shall examine them separately, all of them well versed in the established rules of life, and acquainted with the matter in dispute." Vasishtha: "That act, which was seen by all of them together, is to be told by them even in the same manner [together]; but that which was [seen] by them separate, shall be related separately by each.

XXXIX. But where the acts known by the witnesses, were done at different times, each shall then be made to depose [separately]; this rule is declared."

17. Manu: "Let the Judge cause a Brāhmaṇa to swear by his veracity; a Kšatriya, by his horse, or elephant, and his weapons; a Vaiśya, by his kine, grani and gold; a mechanic, or servile man, [Cádra] by [imprecating on his own head, if he speaks falsely,] all possible crimes." "Brāhmaṇs who tend herds of cattle, who trade, who practise mechanical arts, who

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1—The gloss enumerating only articles of quantity, it might be doubtful, did common sense allow such a supposition, whether articles measured by length were not excluded, but the latitude always claimed for that frequently occurring phrase, 'the like,' would include measures of length as well as quantity. And, et cetera, the like, the rest. The same is not unknown to the English law. Burn's Justinian, Preface to 1st edition. "Also, upon another account, he hath sometimes made use of mere words than otherwise he would have done, namely, to avoid the frequent repetition of the term, &c., which is a vague expression and apt to create uneasiness in the reader's mind, for that he cannot be satisfied from thence how much or how little is intended to be understood."

2—Chap. 5th, v. 113, 102. see post, Chap. 3, para. 2.
profess dancing and singing, who are hired servants, or usurers, let the
Judge exhort and examine as if they were Cûdras. They who are
fallen from their proper sphere of life; they who live by the bodies of
others; they who long for the privileges of twice-born men, are to be
examined as if they were Cûdras." The meaning is, that he should
exhort them thus: 'By speaking contrary [to truth], your honourable
character will be lost,' or the like.

18. The test for depositions of witnesses is declared: "The king
shall declare the matter in dispute clearly proved, if
the evidence be nothing wanting as to the place, [or
country], the time, age, thing in dispute itself, the name, caste, [family
or kind, its weight [or measure]." Yâjñavalkya states this [rule for]
decision on the counter-statements of witnesses: "If the evidence be
discordant, the testimony of the greater number shall prevail; if the
witnesses be equal in number, the testimony of the virtuous; if vir-
tuous men depose two inconsistent facts, the testimony of those who
are most eminent by their honesty."

19. The same author declares the punishment for not deposing
after having agreed to give evidence: "If a man does
not give his evidence, he shall be made by the king to
pay the whole debt, with a tenth imposed besides, be-
fore the lapse of forty-six days." The whole, including
interest. A tenth, together with a tenth share. This tenth share is to
be taken [from the witness] by the king; and the debt, with its
interest, is to be taken [from the same] by the creditor. This is on the
authority of the Mitâksharâ. The punishment for re-
fusal to give evidence, by a witness knowing [any thing
of the matter] is thus stated by the same author: "He who, having
been called on for his testimony, being influenced by his passions, con-
ceals it from others, should be made to pay eight fold, and if a Brâh-
man, should suffer expulsion." Be made to pay, eight times as much as the
fine laid down for a defeat; if he be a Brâhman, and unable to pay this
fine, he is to be banished. Kshatriyas and the other [lower castes] are
to be made to work at their own proper profession, according to the
Mitâksharâ.

20. Manu. "The witness who has given evidence, and to whom
within seven days after, [a misfortune] happens, [from]
disease, fire, or the death of a kinsman, shall be con-
demned to pay the debt, and a fine." Yâjñavalkya: "Even when
evidence has been delivered by witnesses, if other more excellent wit-
tnesses, or double the number of the first, depose contrary to them, the
first witnesses shall be declared false."

21. Nânda: "But after the cause has been de-
cided, all proof, whether by documents or witnesses,
shall be useless, provided it were not made known
before."

2—Macmugthcn, p. 452. 3—Chap. 5th, v. 108.
22. Yājñavalkya declares a command for witnesses giving untrue statements in some cases, and the penance for perjury when so doing: "Where men of the four great classes would be liable to suffer capital punishment, there indeed the witness may speak untruths: A Śārasvata oblation must be presented by regenerate men, for the sake of purification from the offence." Vishnu declares the penance for Čádram: "And a Čádra shall give one day's fodder for ten kine." One day's, that is, what will be fully sufficient for their food during one whole day. Thus far of witnesses.

CHAPTER III.

On Ordeal, (Divya).

1. It has been thought useless and unnecessary to translate the Chapter on Ordeals, of which a sufficiently copious account is given in Sir F. Macnaghten's work on Hindú Law, page 460 et seq., to which, as well as to a very interesting paper in the first volume of the Asiatic Researches, page 339, on the same subject, the reader is referred. But as one mode of Ordeal is by oath, the section relating to it is here added, for the satisfaction of those who consider an oath necessary duly to appreciate testimony; though it will be observed, this oath of Ordeal evidently refers to the litigating parties, and not to witnesses.

2. Nine modes of Ordeal having been discussed in order, [as enumerated in the following text of Bṛhaspate]: "Ordeal by the Scales, by Fire, and by Water, [are the first]; that by Poison [the fourth], and by consecrated Water, [Kosha] is the fifth; that by Rice is stated as the sixth, that by Burning Oil the seventh, that by Iron is named as the eighth, and that by Lot is recorded as the ninth," * * * * * we come to

1—Macnaghten, p. 454 q. v.

2—Ellis's Lectures, part the third. "Oaths and Ordeals: the several kinds of expurgatory ordeals [namely, according to Yājñavalkya and others, agni-divyam, by fire; Jala-divyam, by water; Visha-divyam, by poison; Kosha-divyam, by holy water; and, according to Nārada and others, Tāntala-divyam, by chewing dry rice; Taptā māgha-divyam, by taking gold from clarified butter while hot; Phāla-divyam, by the hot plough-share; Dharma-divyam, by taking one of two images, representing justice and injustice, from a covered pot]; occasions on which the ordeals may be lawfully performed; the penalty incurred by the party demanding the ordeal, in case his adversary succeeds in performing it; the seasons of the year in which, and the persons, considered with respect to caste, age, sex, &c., by whom, the several ordeals may be legally performed; nature of the ordeals to be performed in suits for property, determined by the value of the thing in dispute; places where the ordeals can be legally performed; the punishment to be inflicted for failure in an ordeal; ceremonies common to all ordeals, as upavāsaam, fasting, &c.; particular to be observed in the performance of the several ordeals; and first, in the ordeal of the balance: materials of which the scales are to be made; mode in which this ordeal is to be performed; the same with respect to the ordeal by fire, water, poison, holy water, rice, gold, the plough-share, and images; different kinds of improcatory oaths, and occasions on which they are lawful,"
3. Oaths (Capathás.) Manu:1 “Let the Judge cause a Brahman to swear by his veracity; a Kāśtriya, by his horse, or elephant, and his weapons; a Vaiśya, by his kine, grain, and gold; a mechanic, or servile man, (Cádha) by [impractizing on his own head, if he speak falsely,) all possible crimes.” And Brhaspati says, “A man’s honour, vehicles, weapons, kine, seed, and gold; [impracticing by the feet of the Gods and of Brahman, and by the heads of his children or wife; all these oaths are declared at all times applicable in small disputes. In criminal accusations, oaths are declared purificatory.” (a).

4. Yājñavalkya: “He, upon whom no frightful calamity happens, whether by the act of God or the King, within the term of fourteen days, shall be held true: there is no doubt.” Frightful, great. One of small moment, according to the Mitákshara, [does not affect him], because of the non-invulnerable of mortal bodies. Kátyáyana also: “He to whom a frightful calamity does not happen, whether by the act of God or the King, within fourteen days, is to be known as one true by his oath.” Calamity, accident.

LXXXII. Frightful, causing great anguish. According to Vácháspati Mísa and Smárta Bhráhmadvédáyá, a small accident does not affect him, because it is the lot of humanity. Again Kátyáyana says: “Now in case of contradiction [of the oath] by ten Gods, within twice seven days, the debtor shall be made, by every possible means, to pay the money sued for, and a fine as well.” “When to him alone, and not to all, there happens disease, fire, or the death of a near relation, he shall be made to pay the debt and a fine.” “Fever, dysentery, boils, great pains in the deep-seated bones, diseases of the eyes, or of the throat, or madness, and pains in the head, with loss of use of the hand, are the heaven-directed diseases of mankind.” In contradiction by the Gods, death of a relation or the like, happening to him alone. By this, [is intended], the exclusion of epidemic diseases and the like. Here, by the phrase to him alone, distinguishing the before mentioned debtor, is meant the mark of disease or the other calamity accruing to the debtor alone, not to his sons or other relatives; and those, only great, not slight ones, as has been already mentioned. By this reasoning, it means only a mark appearing against the defendant himself, as some uncommon disease, or the like, according to Vácháspati Mísa. For this very reason, the death of a near relation is specified, but not their diseases or the like.

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1—Chap. 8th, v. 113, Anti. Chap. 2, Sec. 3, para. 17.

(a) Act V. of 1840, which substitutes solemn affirmations for oaths among Hindus and Muhammadans, does not extend to any declaration or affirmation made in any of Her Majesty’s Courts of justice. See 1 Malt. 2. C. Rep. 327. – Ed.
CHAPTER IV.
ON INHERITANCE, [DA TVA-VARTANA].
SECTION I.
Of Property or Ownership, [Samaya].

1. Now we come to speak of such ownership, as is necessary for deciding regarding imitable property. The distinctions as to its power and operation, are produced by purchase, acceptance, &c. The reason of this is, that the causes of purchases, &c. arise from worldly transactions alone, not from the Čātra; for proprietary rights are understood even by those not acquainted with that sacred code, in deducing it from which the subject is needlessly enlarged. Bhuvanaśīla is of this opinion in his Nāya Viveka.

2. As for the text of Gautama: \(^1\) "An owner is by inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure, or finding. Acceptance is for a Brāhmaṇ an additional mode; conquest for a Kshatriya; gain for a Vaishya or Čūdra," it is by way of repetition in matters established in the world. For people admit inheritance [to be] in that, which becomes one's own by the mere loss of the owner's property therein. The word \textit{more} is used to include purchase, seizure, [or acceptance] and the rest. Here even, in such like loss, the word inheritance, has force; by reason of its joint application [in the text] to purchase and the other means of ownership. And the same may be proved by the argument, that \textit{without admitting a cause [there can be no effect]}.\(^2\)

3. According to Dāruṇyāra A'chārya: 'The ownership of sons and the rest, in the wealth of the father, is not generated previously during his life, but is produced by partition.' And the author of the Saṁśeṣa says the same. But it is not so; for, from the plain sense of this text: 'Even by birth, ownership in wealth is obtained,' and other similar ones, it is evident, that, ownership in the father's wealth depending on the filial relation, it is generated even by the production of a son. And [the same results] from this text of Yājñavalkya: \(^3\) "For the ownership of father and son is the same, in land which was acquired by the grandfather, or in a cowpdy, or in chattels which belonged to him." 'And this does not mean, that the reason of the acquisition of ownership is found in the grandfather's death, and not in the production of a son,' for [if it did], such ownership would be wanting, in case no grandson were to be born to him up to the time of his death. In this way therefore, either the word \textit{grandfather} is of no use [in the argument]; or it follows \textit{a fortiori} [prasaktaḥ] that there

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1—Col. Mit. 244-250. Reports vol. 2d 312, 314.
2—Col. Mit. 277-8.
3—Col. Mit. 244-250.
is no equal ownership in [property] acquired by the great-grandfather, and other [more remote ancestors]. And the argument of "cause and effect" might hence be repeated.

4. As for this text of Devals: 1 "When the father is deceased, let the sons divide the father's wealth; for sons have not ownership, while the father is alive and free from debt," the first hemistich comprises up to the time of partition, because it declares the [ascertainment or] instrument, or agents, of the [act or] ceremony: but the last hemistich refers to their dependance, as declaring the same person's cause; but it does not mean the absence of ownership. It is also made clear in this text of Cakraka: 2 "From this it results, that while the father lives, sons shall not divide the wealth: even if there should be afterwards an increase by [means of] them, still the sons are unfit, by reason of their dependance upon the wealth and religious offices of the father." Here, dependance is specified immediately, with a view more strongly to insinuate the foregoing prohibition. 'Even if by them subsequently, [be made] is the proper interpretation. By them, by the sons, subsequently to their birth. Increase, what is obtained by acceptance, or the like. The proposition is this: 'If in property accepted by sons or other [heirs], their dependance [is clear] from the [father's] undisputed ownership, how [can we doubt their dependance] in property acquired by the father?' And this dependance attaches to partition, supererogatory moral observances, industry, and the like. So also Hārīta: 3 "While the father lives, sons are not independent in regard to the receipt and alienation of wealth, to the partition of it, or to censure." By the words receipt and alienation, supererogation is pointed out. Censure, according to Madana, means reproving of the slaves and other [household servants].

5. As for this text: 4 "The father is master of all gems, pearls and corals; but neither the father nor the grandfather, is so of the whole immovable estate," it also means the father's independance, only in the wearing and other [use] of ear-rings, rings, [etc.], but not as far as gift or other [alienation]: neither is it with a view to the cessation of the cause of his ownership on the production of a son. This very meaning is made manifest also by [the text] noticing [only] gems, and such things as are not injured by use. Even so, this text: 4 "Though immovables and bipeds have been acquired by the man himself, a gift

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2.—Colebrooke’s Jaina Vāhana, 19.—Digest, 2d 627, q. v. In all the translations of this text, as well as in some of the original versions of it, there is nothing about "partition." The word has crept in from a modern copy of the Mayākha procurèd at Benares, and used in preparing it for the press. It will be observed that there is a variation in the readings of the last part in all the books.

3.—Cole, Mit. 234, where his word "sārvasva" is translated "of all [other moveable property]"; but the present version is made conformable to the interpretation of our author. Reports 2d 481.

4.—In some works this text is assigned to Vṛṣekha. Here and in the Mīthakaśāstra, page 937, it is anonymous,
orsale of them should not be made without convening all the sons;" is only a prohibition against the gift, sale, or the like, not against the use of them.

6. Now the pre-existing undefined [joint] ownership of more than one brother or other [co-heir] is, by partition between each, defined and made apparent. On this point some one has said: "This [ownership] is produced different, as a separate portion, by the destruction of the former ownership contained in the common property." But, justly speaking, since proximity arises in considering the production of another ownership on the destruction of the former; therefore [separate] ownership, existing even originally from community of interests, is discovered by partition, by the result furnishing separate substances or things.

LXXXVI. To return to the Text: Acceptance is for a Brāhman an additional mode; that is, according to some, "What is obtained by acceptance, is the Brāhman’s additional mode of increase." With reference to inheritance, and the other [five modes common to all], this acceptance is, for a Brāhman alone, an additional mode. It results therefore, that conquest and the other [modes enumerated] are in like manner [additional] for Kshatriyas and the rest.

8. In conquest also, where the property of the conquered consists in houses, lands, money, or the like, there alone [ownership] is acquired by the conqueror; but in the revenues of the conquered, the conqueror possesses the same, but no property in them. Even so in the sixth [book of the Mīmāṃsā]: "The whole earth must not be given away by the king of the world, neither a [whole] district [mandala] by the ruler of that district." But the property in each village, house, or other [portion] of a whole country or a district of it, belongs solely to the owner of the soil [bhūmika] or other [proprietor]. The revenue only [may be taken] by the prince. Therefore, in gift, or other alienation of such lands as are here made mention of, a gift of the land is not brought about; we must only suppose a mere livelihood [given by the prince out of his revenues]. But in purchases from the owner of the soil, even ownership accrues in the [property transferred], whether houses, land, or other. Then indeed, the benefits of a gift of land also may be obtained from it [by buying land from the owner and then giving it away in charity].

LXXXVII. Gain, [Nirvīśhṭa] is that which is acquired by usury, agriculture, commerce, tending of animals; and [secondly] what is acquired by service. From the dictionaries, we find the synonyms of ‘Gain’ to be, ‘Hire,’ and ‘Enjoyment.’ Hire again, is defined to be Service. Enjoyment, is usury and the rest. Here, the first men-

1—Of Gautama, para. 2.

2—The terms, ‘kara ḍhrita,’ ‘kara graha,’ are used in the same sense in the inscription in As. Rec, 9th, 910, note c. v.
tioned [are sources of gain] to the Vaigya class: The second [service] to the Čādra class.

10. Now, the reason of sale and other transfer of property, is to be deduced solely from worldly motives, [and not from law; with which proposition we set out.] And in like manner, popular practice is established in the ownership of calves and other [produce] of a man’s own cow, or the like: But it would not be so, if it depended on such means only as the law furnishes [for deciding such a question], because we do not learn from the law the means of distinguishing the produce of one’s own cow or the like.

11. Yet, [an opponent may say]: There may be ownership in daughters, sons, or other issue of a wife, in the same way as there is in the produce of one’s own cow; [and], a case of necessity being assumed, [for instance,] by the rule: “In a vīvajīt sacrifice a man gives the whole of his possessions,” the gift of every thing being granted, the necessity thence arises for the gift of a daughter or son, and therefore your reasoning from the sixth book of the Mīmāṃsā [that they are not to be given], will be at variance with such rule.

12. [I answer] No; because there being no such property in a wife as there is in a cow or the like, there cannot be any property in the children produced from her: And in a worldly sense, the reason of ownership is determined, solely in the production of that which contains the principles of ownership. Neither can it be said, that property may also exist in wives, from acceptance [in marriage]; for then, by reason of the absence of property possessed by Kṣatriyas and the other [two classes in] their wives, from their want of the [right of] acceptance, there is also a want of it [property] in their issue.

13. Therefore, since the text: 1 “This law is propounded by me in regard to sons equal by class,” restricts the taking of an adopted son solely to one equal in class; and since with respect to Kṣatriyas and the rest, acceptance of an adopted son is even secondary; then also with respect to Brāhmaṇs, it is not the principal mode; because it is contrary to reason to have two contrary, but connected, explanations of performing one and the same rite.

14. Neither can it be said that a Brāhmaṇ alone is entitled to the rite of accepting a son, and that a Kṣatriya is not entitled, since we know that the right [of accepting a son] does pertain to them, from the following and other texts of Čaṇakya and others: “A daughter’s son as well as a sister’s son, are affiliated by Čādras.” Even so, in the marriage of a Brāhmaṇ with the daughter of a Kṣatriya or other [lower class], by the Brāhmaṇa rite, the secondary rank must be admitted, both for the gift and acceptance; otherwise they are principal. Thus two explanations [of the same rite] are [here again] oppos-

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1--Cale. Mit. 320. 2--See post. sec. 5th, para. 9.
ed. As regards Kshatriyas, the admissibility of all to Brāhmaṇya nuptials and the rest is in no degree contrary [to texts.] Even so Mirya in the Tātra Ratna has said: 'The gift of sons and the rest is inferior [or secondary].'

15. Neither are we to suppose [absolute] property, merely because the laws of language [admit the expression], 'own wife, son, daughter; for in the same way as we say 'own father,' 'own mother,' and the like, the expression also arises in speaking of kindred. If so, the power of the word 'own' might likewise affect the term kindred, for in dictionaries we find: "In the word kindred, the pronoun own [is feminine]; in soul [it is masculine]; in kindred, it is [common to] three [genres]; and in the expression peculiar wealth, it is neuter."

16. However, since in the sixth book of the Mīmāṃśā, gift of a slave born in the family is mentioned, this point must be considered. Since property in the mother is wanting, from absence of the complete power of gift, acceptance, purchase, sale, and the like, then in the household-slave begotten on her, there is also an absence of the power, from the impropriety of it. This conclusion is conformable to the argument with which we set out.

SECTION II.

Of Heritage, (Dāya.)

1. Wealth not re-united, nor put back again into a common stock, and [still] admitting of partition, is Heritage. By not re-united, I mean to exclude wealth [never before joint, and now first] united for purposes of gain or the like, because the term 'partition of inheritance,' does not apply to dividing of [wealth] thrown together by merchants. In like manner we must also exclude re-united property, in the sense in which that term will hereafter be defined. Even as [we find] in the Smūti Saṁgraha: 'That which is received through the father, and that received through a mother, is described by the term Heritage: The partition of it is now related.' And in the Nīghantu, it is said: "The learned define heritage to be, wealth of a father, which admits of partition." The word father is merely put to denote relations in general, as a part for the whole.

1.—In the Amara Koṣa, page 103, the expression is "Śvastriyān dhane," signifying, "the pronoun is not feminine, in the word wealth," instead of "Śvastriya dhane," as here. Neither in the Śrīkāṇṭha, [page 76], nor in the Madīni, [page 154], is the reading like the Maṇḍīkā; and in the Benares copy, it is according to the Amara Koṣa.

2.—Post, section 9th.
2. This heritage is of two kinds, obstructed and unobstructed. It is of two kinds.

Obstructed.

And unobstructed.

When the life of the owner of the property, or that of his sons, or other [heirs], is interposed, that [property] is [termed] obstructed; for instance, the wealth of uncles and the like. But where ownership accrues to sons, or other [next heirs], solely from affinity to the owner, without reference to other means of acquiring property, [the heritage] is then unobstructed, as the wealth of a father. This is the definition of heritage.

SECTION III.

Of the Partition of Heritage.—(Dāya-Viśhāga.)

1. This Nārada declares: "Where a division of the paternal estate is instituted by sons, that becomes a topic of litigation, called by the wise, partition of heritage." The word sons includes [by synonymy] grandsons, and the rest. And in the same way, by paternal [is intended the estate of] the grandfather and the rest. But Madana has the very words, 'of a father and the rest.' And this definition, of partition of heritage, has been declared.

2. Even when there is a total failure of common property, a partition may also then be made, by the mere declaration, 'I am separate from thee.' A partition may even be a mere mental distinction. This exposition clearly distinguishes the various qualities of this term.

SECTION IV.

The Periods of Partition.—(Viśhāga-Kāla.)

1. Mānuṣaṣa "After the death of the father and mother, the brothers, being assembled, may divide among themselves the paternal [and maternal] estate; but they have no power over it, while their parents live [unless the father choose to distribute it]." By inserting the word and the consummation of both their deaths is not required. Even thus, in the Madana Ratna and Shriśi Sam-

1—Of the various readings of this text noticed by Mr. Colebrooke, in his note to Mā., page 242, where it will be found, the author adopts the following: 'piṛyaṇa,' 'prakalpyate,' 'tadrivaṇa pāda,' and 'pura.'

2—The Madana Ratna, referred to for this reading, by Mr. Colebrooke, and formerly mentioned, page 1 note.

graaha: "A partition of the father’s wealth may take place, even whilst the mother lives, for this reason, that without her husband, the mother does not from her independence also derive ownership. "A partition of the mother’s wealth also may take place, in like manner while the father is alive, for, if there be issue, the lord [of the wife] is not lord of the wife’s wealth.”

2. This is opposed to a text of Brhaspati. "On the demise of both parents, participation among brothers is allowed: and even while they are both living it is right, if the mother be past child bearing.” Närada. "Let sons regularly divide the wealth, when the father is dead; or when the mother is past child bearing, and the sisters are married; or when the father’s sensual passions are extinguished.” Sensual passions, desire. Extinguished, averse. The expression, and the sisters are married, must be taken collectively with [the mother’s] child-bearing, and extinction of [the father’s] passions, after the simile of the crow’s eye.

3. Gautama: "After the demise of the father, let sons share his estate. Or, while he lives, and the mother be past child bearing, if he desire partition.” From this expression, if he desire, partition is declared legal also, before the mother is past child bearing, by the father’s wish alone.

4. Brhaspati declares partition in some cases without his wish:
"The father and sons are equal sharers in houses, and lands, derived regularly from ancestors: but sons are not worthy [in their own right] of a share in wealth acquired by the father himself, when the father is unwilling.” From which it results, that sons are worthy of a share in property, acquired by the grandfather or other [ancestor], even though the father do not wish it: (a).

5. In the grandfather’s property also, partition in some cases depends on the father’s pleasure, say Manu and Vishnu:
"And if a father by his own efforts, recover [a debt or property unjustly detained] which could not be recovered before [by his father], he shall not, unless by his free will, put it into parcenary with his sons, since

1.—See Section 10th on "Woman’s property."
2.—Colo. Jm. Vá. 23-36. Digest, 3d, 18-78. 3.—Colo. Mit. 250.
4.—That bird being fabled [from its singular mode of peering] to look two ways at once, Colo. Mit. 358 note.
5.—Colebrooke, Mitákšírā, 260, but I have here followed the translation given in Jumila Váhana, page 34, as more conformeable to the doctrine of the Mayáthikha, which allows only three periods of partition. The Mitákšírā on the other hand asserts, four, and in support of this doctrine, divides this very text of Gautama into three portions.
6.—Chap. 9th, verse 200. Colo. Jm. Vá. 28.—Mit. 270. Digest 3d, 33, and the note there.

Over which, as well as over his own acquisitions, the father has full dominion. In fact it was acquired by himself.” Bhāshpati. 1 “Over the grandfather’s property, which has been seized [by strangers], and is recovered by the father through his own ability, and over [any thing], gained by him through science, valour, or the like, the father’s full dominion is ordained. He may give it away at his pleasure, or he may defray his consumption with such wealth; but on failure of him, the sons are pronounced entitled to equal shares.”

6. Nārada 2: “A father who is afflicted with disease, or influenced by wrath, or whose mind is engrossed by a beloved object, or who acts otherwise than the law permits, has no power in the distribution of the estate.” Hārīta: 3 “If the father be free from desire, old, perverted in mind, or long afflicted with disease, partition of his wealth [may be made].” Free from desire, according to the Madana Ratna, means, without desire of partition. Perverted in mind, following practices contrary to law. The sense is, ‘that partition may be made, even against the will of [such a] father.’

7. Hārīta says, that when the father is incapable, partition takes place by the concurrence of the eldest son: 4 “But if he be decayed, remotoely absent, or afflicted with disease, let the eldest son manage the affairs as he pleases.” Cānkha and Līkūta: 5 “If the father be incapable, let the eldest son manage the affairs of the family; or, with his consent, the next brother conversant with business.” The next, the one born after him. Partition by the pleasure of one capable of the maintenance and other [care] of the family [is intended]. From this it results that if all be so [qualified], it is [immaterial or] undetermined.

8. Vājñāvalyka: 7 “When the father makes a partition, let him separate his sons [from himself] at his pleasure, and either [dismiss] the eldest with the best share, or [if he choose], all may be equal sharers.” A voluntary partition alone [is denoted] by the last hemistich; since the dependance of the will in the two cases mentioned, has been above declared, from the impropriety of independance; [and further] from the inconsistency [which would result in such construction] of the text: [For then he might give] to one a lākh [of rupees]; to another a single kaunit; to a third, nothing at all; which

1—Cole. Jm. Vā. 134, the reading of which, ‘Bhūgaodāvya,’ is here followed Digest, 3d 32.

2—Cole. Jm. Vā. 52.—Mit. 253. Digest 2d, 541.

3—This text is found, but with a different reading, in Cole. Jm. Vā. page 19, to which, with the note there, the reader is referred.


5—The first hemistich of the stanza of which this is the sequel, occurred before at sec. 1st, para. 4.

would be no [fair] exposition [of the law]. A distinc-
tion in the share of the eldest, is noticed by Manu: 1

"The portion deducted for the eldest, is a twentieth
part [of the heritage], with the best of all the chattels;
for the middlemost, half of that, [or a fortieth]; for the youngest, a
quarter of it, [or an eightieth]." But, if there be no deduction, the
shares must be distributed in this manner: Let the eldest have a double
share, and the next born, a share and a half, [if they clearly surpass the
rest in virtue and learning;] the younger sons must have each a share: [if
all be equal in good qualities, they must all take share and share alike.]"

9. Between twins, the birthright of that one first born is thus
declared by Manu: 2 "The right of invoking Indra by
the texts, called Svabrahmanivas, depends on actual
priority of birth; and of twins also, [if any such be
conceived] among [different] wives, the eldest is he,
who was first actually born." 3 "Among twins, to
him whose face [kinsmen] first see after his birth,
belong [the privileges of] male offspring, [the right of performing ob-
sequies] for his father, and [the honours of] primogeniture."

10. However, in the Pinda Siddhi and other medical books, the
right of primogeniture is awarded to the last born [of twins]. This is
opposed by the above [texts] in the matter at issue, because it has no
foundation in the sacred writings; like as: "Purification ensues after
a month [to Cádras.]" However, the right of primogeniture of the
last born is declared in the Bhágvata, 4 in this text and the like:
"When a double fetus is conceived, the last conception is that first
brought into the world." [But] this doctrine is also opposed to the
above texts [of Manu and Deva], whilst in the Puráñas, many prac-
tices are disclosed, contrary to the written law. According to some,
the question ought to be decided by the customs of the country. But
what I stated at first, [in favour of the first born], is the proper doctrine.

11. And this partition by deduction, is not respected in the Káli
Partition by de-
tinction, illegal in
modern times.
or present] age, for it is one of the things [expressly]
set aside in the present age, as has been already
proved by me in my Samaya Mayúkha.

12. Nárada allows the father a double share: 5 "Let the father,
making a partition, reserve two shares for himself." This
text relates to an only son. For in the Madána Rátmá
is this of Çankha and Likhitá: 6 "If there be one son,
let the [father] himself reserve two shares, and the best

1—Chap. 9th, vs. 112-116-117. Digest 2d, 548-552.
2—Chap. 9th, v. 126. Digest 2d, 577.
3—This following texts found in the Digest 2d, 578, attributed to Deva], and not Manu.
4—In the third Skanda, treating of the birth of Hiranyakşína, and Hiranyaksha
twins, Daityas, produced by Diti, one of the wives of Kasyapa Rishi; the first
hemistich of the text is omitted by our author, probably from its extreme grossness.
5—Col. Mit. 979, Jâm 74, 35-41. Digest 3rd, 43.
6—Jâm. Vâ. 44 Digest 2d, 558; where the same gloss is mentioned nearly in the
words of our author, though it is not found in the Madána Páripáta, which is probably
the one alluded to here.
of the slaves and cattle. The word one relates to the most excellent.

XCV.

By the author of the Amara [Kosha], 'chief,' 'other,' 'only,' are declared the synonyms of one. All which, according to the Pāṇijita, denote a son well qualified.

13. Bāhaspati, however, declares the right to only an equal share with his sons, even if there be only one, in property acquired by the grandfather: "In wealth acquired by the grandfather, whether it consists of moveables or immovable, the equal participation of father and son is ordained." Yājñavalkya: "For the ownership of father and son is the same, in land which was acquired by the grandfather, or in a cowry, or in chattels [which belonged to him]." Kātyāyana: "When the father and the sons even, take all that, which has been made upon the common wealth, in equal shares, it is called a legal partition."

14. As for this text of Yājñavalkya: "A legal distribution, made by the father, among sons separated with greater or less shares, is pronounced valid," according to Madana, Vījñānāvācara and others, it means, 'If the [distribution], made by the father be legal, it cannot be set aside. This text again, of Nārada: "For such as have been separated by the father with equal, greater, or less, allotments of wealth, that is a lawful distribution: for the father is lord of all," relates to the former ages.

15. In a case of equal partition between a father and his sons, a share belongs also to the wife; says Yājñavalkya: "If he make the allotments equal, his wives, to whom no separate property had been given by the husband or the father-in-law, must be rendered partakers of like-portions." If any had been given, they are only to get half, for he adds: "Or if any had been given, let him assign the half." The half; meaning, so much as, with what had been before given as separate property [striylhana], will make it equal to a son’s share. But if her property be [already] more than such share, no share [belongs to her].

16. The same author treats of a want of wish to participate, in the case of a son able to earn, and not desiring a share: "The separation of one who is able to support himself, and is not desirous of participation, may be completed by giving him some tribe." According to

1—Jin. Vā. 42. Digest 3d, 34. 2—Cole. Mit. 277-8: Jin. Vā. 25: Digest 3d, 34. And see sec. 1st, para. 3.
the Mitakshara it means that: 'Any thing whatever may be given, for the sake of preventing the desire being entertained by his sons, of receiving [a share of] the heritage.'

17. An equal partition, after the death of the father, is declared in another smīti: "Let sons divide equally both the effects and the debts, after [the demise of] both parents." Harita: "When the father is dead, the partition of the inheritance should be made equally."

18. Vajnavaikya: "Of heirs dividing after the death of the father, let the mother also take an equal share." Vishnu: "Mothers receive allotments according to the shares of sons." In another smīti [it is said:] "A mother, if she be dowerless, shall in a partition by sons, take an equal share." The meaning is, that if she have dower, she shall take only as much as, with that dower, will make her an equal sharer with her sons. But no share [belongs to her], if her property be more than such share.

19. Vyasá declares the [right to] share, even of a stepmother, and the paternal grandmother: "Even childless wives of the father are pronounced equal sharers (a) ; and so are all the paternal grandmothers: they are declared equal to mothers." From this [word] all, the step-grandmothers also are to be included.

XCVI.

2.—Jim. Vá. page 61, where the word 'father' is omitted.
5.—Dhama, wealth, taken as before in that sense, of separate property, purn. 15.
6.—Jim. Vá. 64, Digest 3d, 12. Reports 2d, 452.

(a) So infra: the wife, if faithful takes the wealth, but if there be more than one, they will divide and take equal shares. See In the Goods of Dadoo Minna 1st Sept. 1863, Ind. Jur. Oct 25th 1863 p. 50, before the High Court of Bombay where Arnold J., after citing these passages, said, "this doctrine has been followed by the late Supreme Court, in a case of the goods of Chapu Juddoo, decided on the 22nd of June 1861, of which we have been furnished with a note by the Chief Justice, where the Court, after consideration, and obtaining answer from the Čāṣtra of the Sadr Ādālā and at Puná, held that, "if there be more than one widow, each of them is entitled to an equal share of the property." It appears from those answers that, although the author of the Mayukha cites no text in support of his opinion, such texts are to be met with in the Yāmajīśodāya, an authority of the Benares School, and Macanabaghe's Principles of Hindu Law, a work of authority in Bengal. It is also said, page 19, that if there be more than one widow, their rights are equal. The case in Morton's Reports, page 314, handed up to us yesterday by Mr. Westropp, shows that this rule was acted upon by the Supreme Court in Calcutta as early as the year 1791, and in Morley's Digest, [N. S.] vol. I, p. [150, par.] 15, we had an instance of its being acted upon in the North-Western Provinces in 1850. On these authorities we hold that the widows in this case are prīma facie entitled to equal shares of the property, and it remains to be considered whether either of them is disqualified by misconduct to her share, and if not, then, whether we ought to grant administration to them jointly or to one only, and, if the latter, to which of them. Is the elder widow then deprived of her right by the misconduct proved? As to the general doctrine that proved infidelity before widowhood disqualifies, and proved incontinence after widowhood, divests the inheritance, the authorities seems to clash, [See Act XXI of 1850, and Taylor's Rep,
20. Yājñavalkya declares the mode of partition among the sons of different brothers: “Among grandsons by different fathers, the allotment of shares is according to the fathers.” It means, that if there be one son of one, two sons of a second, three of a third [or the like] their shares will be solely according to the number of the fathers, and not in the number of the sharers themselves.

21. Kātyāyana: “Should a younger son die before partition, his share shall be allotted [by the elder brother] to his son, provided he had received no fortune from his grandfather.” “That son’s son shall receive his father’s share from his uncle, or from his [uncle’s] son; and the same [proportionate] share shall be allotted to all the brothers according to law.” Or [if that grandson be also dead] his son takes the share; beyond him succession stops.” The younger son [anuṣaṇa] denotes also that the eldest [is bound to portion off his brother’s son]. Stops, at the great grandson.

22. We must thus understand it: ‘The son of the great grandson, or the rest will not, on the death of the father.3 [grandfather, and great grandfather, without interval after the death of the great-great-] grandfather, obtain his wealth, being of another [line], so long as his son, or

300) As to the nature of the proof of incontinence that disqualifies, there is again a discrepancy in the authorities. Sir T. Strange, page 136, after laying down the principle that “an unchaste wife is excluded from the inheritance,” adds, “that nothing short of actual incontinence in this respect disqualifies,” and the authorities collected in the appendix to which he refers support this view. In all the cases we have been able to consult, the proof of incontinence or infidelity seems to have been positive. The Mayūkha, on the other hand, page 105, lays it down: “That even a suspicion of incontinence is enough to reduce a widow’s rights to that of mere maintenance.” This, as it seems to us, can hardly mean vague suspicion; it must mean a reasonably well grounded suspicion, short of actual proof. In this case, for instance, had Ruṣeṣa gone off with Śrīraja alone, and been proved afterwards to have been in company with him at a distance from her husband’s residence—this would have constituted, as it seems to us, a case of suspicion sufficient to deprive her of the inheritance (on the authorities of the Mayūkha).” In Bengal two widows take the whole estate for life, and on the death of one the whole survives to the other, upon whose death it goes to the collateral heirs of the husband. 1 Mod. Dig. 313. In Madras it has been held, that the eldest widow succeeds the other widows being entitled during her life to maintenance only, the second widow succeeding on the death of the first. 1 Mad. 2d. 460, 457, and R. A. No. 1 of 1835, 2 Ind. 44. But see Strange Manual H. L. 2d. ed. 325 where the author lays down that in Southern India the wives are viewed as on an equality and inherit equally; and consider the following passage from the Milākshara chap. II. sec. 1 par. 5 (omitted in Colebrooke’s translation) which the Editor refers to Vakil Črīnivásáchārya. “The singular number “wife” signifies the kind; hence, if there are several wives belonging to the same or different castes, (they) divide the property according to the shares prescribed to them, and take it.”—297.


2.—Digest 3d. 7. Both the readings noted there are thrown out by the author, who reads “anuṣaṇa,” instead of “niṣa.”

3.—This is an apparent interpolation of the words following between the brackets, in italics, as they are found only in the Benares copy.
other [heirs] are alive. In default of son, grandson, [and great grandson] in the general [family] only, he also will take [the succession].

23. And this does not refer to an undivided family, but to a re-united one. For it is said by Devala. 3 "Partition of heritage among undivided persons, and a second partition among divided relatives living together [after re-union], shall extend to the fourth in descent: this is a settled rule." And 2 "Be it debt, or a written contract; or a house, or arable land, descended from his grandfather, he shall take his due share of it, when he comes, even though he had been very long in a foreign country." “If a man leave the common family and reside in another province, his share must undoubtedly be given to his male descendants when they appear.” It means: ‘between the great-great-grandfather, and his sons, separated when in a state of union, and [afterwards] re-united.’

24. This refers to those fixed in the same district; because, where they reside in different districts, it will descend even to the fifth, as is declared by śrīhaspati, in treating of residence in other lands. 3 “Be he the third person, or the fifth, or even the seventh, [that is, in the second, or fourth, or even in the sixth degree], he shall receive the share that gradually descends to him, on full proof of his birth and family-name.”

25. Śrīhaspati 4 declares a partition in some cases according to the mothers: “If there be many [sons] sprung from one [father], alike in number, and in class, but born of rival mothers, partition must be made by them according to law, by the allotment of shares to the mothers.” Vyāsa. 5 “If there be many sons of one man, by different mothers, but equal in number, and like by class, a distribution among the mothers is approved.”

26. Śrīhaspati 5 gives this opposite example: “Among brothers, who are equal in class, but vary in regard to the number [of sons produced by each mother], the shares of the heritage are allotted to the males [not to their mothers].”

27. Yājñavalkya 6 states a partition among sons of different classes: The sons of a Brāhmaṇ, in the several tribes, have four shares, or three, or two, or one; the children of a Kṣatriya have three portions, or two, or one; and those of a Vaiśya take two parts, or one.” The sons of a Brāhmaṇ, that is, borne to him by a Brāhmaṇ, or a Kṣatriya, or a Vaiśya, and a Cāḍra. Those of a Kṣatriya, those by a Kṣatriya, a Vaiśya, and a Cāḍra. Those of a Vaiśya, those borne to him by a Vaiśya and a Cāḍra.

1—Digest 3d, 10.

2—Digest 3d, 441, Jīm. Vā. 140; in both the text is assigned to Śrīhaspati.


5—Digest 2d, 575. 6—Cole, Mit. 201. Digest 3d, 114.
28. Bhāṣpāti: "Land, obtained by acceptance of donation, must not be given to the sons of a Kshatriya, or other wife of inferior tribe; even though his father give it him, the son of the Brāhmaṇi may resume it when his father is dead." Devaṅga: "The son begotten on a Čudrā woman by any man of a twice-born class, is not entitled to a share of land: but one begotten on her, being of equal class, shall take all the property [whether land or chattels]: this is the law settled." Of land, acquired by purchase, and the other modes also. Yet he does obtain a share of the [moveable] wealth.

29. But the son by a Čudrā woman, not legally married, does not obtain a share, even of the moveable property. And Manu: "The son of a Brāhmaṇa, a Kshatriya, or a Vaiṣya, by a woman of the servile class, shall inherit no part of the estate [unless he be virtuous; nor jointly with other sons, unless his mother was lawfully married]: whatever his father may give him, let that be his own."

30. Bhāṣpāti declares this distinction after the father’s death: "The virtuous and obedient son, born by a Čudrā woman to a man who has no other offspring, should obtain a maintenance; and let kinsmen take the residue of the estate." Gantana: "A son by a Čudrā woman, born unto a man who leaves no [legitimate offspring, shall, if he be strictly obedient like a pupil, receive a provision for his maintenance.] A provision, for his maintenance; or, 'as a means of livelihood.'"

31. The same author: Sons termed Pratiloma [shall have an allotment] similar to that of the son produced by a woman of the servile class." Sons termed Pratiloma, meaning, those produced by a woman, higher than the begetter with respect to class. (a).

32. Yājñavalkya states a distinction with regard to a son begotten by a Čudrā on a woman not married to him: "Even a son begotten by a Čudrā on a female slave, may take a share, by the father’s choice. But if the father be dead, the brethren should make him partaker of the moiety of a share.” Choice, the pleasure of the father. From specifying by a Čudrā, it is clear, that a son begotten by a twice-born man on a female slave does not obtain a share, even by the father’s choice:

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2—This is cited in other books as a text of Bhāṣpāti: Jān. Vā. 148, Mit. 292, Digest 3d, 133.
3—Chap. 9th, 155, Mit. 293, Jān. Vā. 149, Digest 3d, 136.
4—Jān. Vā. 149, Digest 3d, 139. 6—Digest 3d, 139. 6—Digest 3d, 140.

(a) Pratiloma literally means against the heir i.e. contrary to the regular course. The word in the text should have been pratilomajñāt.—Ed.
Neither after the death of the father, will he get the half; nor, in the absence of sons or other [heirs], will he get the whole. This is the argument of the Madana Ratna, and others.

33. A distinction is thus declared respecting a son born after partition: one born [to a man] separated [from his sons] will alone take the father’s [wealth]." Bṛhaspati: “All the wealth, which is acquired by the father himself, who has made a partition with his sons, goes to the sons begotten by him after the partition: those born before it, are declared to have no right. "As in the wealth, so in the debts likewise, and in gifts, pledges, and purchases.” They have no claims on each other except for acts of mourning and libations of water.” If there be nothing but debts, then that [son] is not even bound to pay those debts, without receiving a share from those formerly separated; for, as will afterwards who takes the estate, must be made to pay the debts off it.”

34. But if any one of them have re-united [with the father], a partition with that [son born after partition] shall be made. As is declared by Manu. “A son born after a division, shall alone take the paternal wealth: or he shall participate with such of the brethren as are re-united with the father.”

35. Vaiśṇavalkya states a distinction, at a partition after the father’s death, with respect to a son born immediately afterwards, by a mother, or step-mother, or brother’s wife, whose pregnancy was uncertain: “When the sons have been separated, one who is [afterwards] born, of a woman equal in class, shares the distribution.” The partition is to be thus effected: Something is to be contributed by all the brothers, or others [who had previously shared], each something out of his own share, until the [posthumous son’s] share is equal to their own. Vishnu: “Sons with whom the father has made a partition, should give a share to the son born after the distribution.”

36. And this we must understand as allowing for [subsequent] expenses and income. For if it be so, then, says the same author: “His allotment must absolutely be made, out of the visible estate, corrected for income and expenditure.” Out of the visible estate, out of the wealth actually forthcoming.

3—Post chap. 5th, section 4th, para. 16.
37. At the time of a partition among brothers, this distinction is noted by Vasishthā: "Partition of heritage [takes place] among brothers, [having waited] till after the delivery of such of the women as are childless [but pregnant]." Having waited is omitted [and supplied].

38. A further distinction in a partition after death of the father, is stated by Bhūpāla: "For younger brothers, whose investiture and other ceremonies have not been performed, their elder brothers shall perform them, one of the collected wealth of the father." The term yāvīyāsah, [i.e. substituted for yāvīyāsanā (6)], with the freedom exercised by ancient sages after the number of the Vedas, by omitting the regular inflection [num] and the prolongation of the vowel [dingā].

39. The mention of brothers brings in the sisters also. Even so the same author: "And those unmarried daughters who are as yet uninitiated, must be initiated by their eldest brother, even one of the father's wealth, according to the [usual] rite."

40. Yājñavalkya² [premising]: "Uninitiated brothers should be initiated by those, for whom the ceremonies have been already completed," states a distinction in regard to initiation of sisters: "But sisters should be disposed of in marriage, giving them as an allotment, the fourth part of a brother's own share," meaning, that a fourth part of such share as would be allotted to a son of such class as the sister [happens to be] being given to each sister [according to her rank], they are to be initiated.

41. For the sake of consistency in deciding upon the taking the heritage Yājñavalkya⁴ gives this [detailed] description of sons principal and secondary: 1st. The legitimate son, [farras] is one precreated on the lawful wedded wife: 2d. Equal to him is the son of an appointed daughter [patrika]: 3d. The son of the wife, [kshetraje] is one begotten on a wife by a kinsman of her husband, or by some other relative: 4th. One secretly produced in the house, is a son of hidden origin: 5th. A damsel's child, is one born of an unmarried woman: he is considered as son of his maternal grand sire: 6th. A child begotten on a woman whose [first] marriage had not been consummated, or on one who had been deflowered. [before

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1—Col. Mit. 283, Jun. Vá. 39
2—Digest 5d. 101. where the subsequent explanation is noticed.
4—Or married, since marriage is the only one of the rites of initiation [samākāna] to which a female is entitled. See note to page 289 of the Mitakshāra.
5—Col. Mit. 381. Digest 5d. 860, et

married] is called the son of a twice-married woman. 7th, He whom his father or his mother give for adoption, shall be considered as a son given [dattaka]: 8th, A son bought, is one who was sold by his father and mother. 9th, A son made, is one adopted by the man himself. 10th, One who gives himself, is self-given. 11th, A child, accepted while yet in the womb, is one received with a bride. 12th. He who is taken for adoption, having been forsaken by his parents, is a deserted son."

42. The legitimate son, born of a woman of equal class, and lawfully married, is the principal, [Of those secondary].

43. The son of an appointed daughter, is of two kinds: Of which the first is thus explained by Vasishtha: "This damsel, who has no brother, I will give unto thee, decked with ornaments: the son, who may be born of her shall be my son." And the other [kind] is thus noticed by the same: "The appointed daughter is considered to be the third [description of sons]." In this case, the father's obsequies and the like, are to be performed by the appointed daughter alone.

44. The son of the wife, is one begotten on the wife of a brother or other [relative dying] without male issue, under the orders of the eldest brother, by [his] younger brother, or other [relative as the case may be] being of the same lineage.

45. The son of a twice-married woman, is he who is produced of the second marriage of a woman, whether a virgin unenjoyed by her first husband, or whose first marriage had been consummated.

46. Here we must mark, that with the exception of the given son, [all the other ten] secondary sons are set aside in the Kali or present age, for we read, in the prohibitions of it: "The acceptance likewise of affiliations, other than those of a legitimate and adopted son." 13

SECTION V.

On Adoption (Dattaka).

1. Mann says: "He is called a son given [dattarima], whom his father or mother affectionately gives as a son, being qualifications alike [by class], and in a time of distress; confirming or an adoption, the gift with vows." According to Madhava: "The disjunctive, or, means, that if the mother be not present, the father alone may give him away; and if the father be dead, the mother the same; but if both be alive, then even both." From his

2—Coles, Mit. 304.
3—See "General note" to the translation of Mann: page 385, text, number 8.
4—Chapter 9th, 163, Mit. 305, Digest 3d, 256. Reports 1st, 193.
using the word in distress, (it seems that) if not in distress, he must not be given.

2. Viṣṇuṣaṇyaṇa says: "This prohibition regards the giver only (and not the gift); as affecting the person, and not the religious ceremony, [kratuvartha]." But it is not so; for the certainty of the religious ceremony is ascertained from the invisible [or prospective] nature of this [rule regarding gift of a son] in the text. Or, if indeed a visible [existing] object [be allowed for obviating the exception, as to distress], still, by reason of the absolute necessity for the object of the rule being prospective in regard to the theme in hand, in going beyond it, the establishing of the invisible [prospecting] benefit produced by the ceremony, and not before existing, [is brought about]. Some however say, "To the word distress, the sense of a prohibition does not apply, because of the want of that quality of the Paraskākhya rules, [which would show] non-existence of distress, by the absurdity they would involve, among other things, of quitting the straightforward sense of the text; and that we require only to suppose some sign or motive of distress: not that, when distress is the inciting motive, by not giving the son the crime of [not relieving] distress, [will be incurred]; because the mere connexion of name and person in this text is to be understood, and there is, in [requiring] the necessity of distress, a want of the actual completion of the gift.

3. Moreover, the assertion made by him [Viṣṇuṣaṇyaṇa] in his chapter on marriage that: In transgressing the prohibition against [presuming] sickly brides, and the like, it is merely an opposition to a manifest object [or rule], whilst the state of a lawful wife is superinduced notwithstanding, is by the above argument overruled.

4. *Ālikhe*, according to Medhiṭāthi, means, 'not by tribe, but by qualities suitable to the family; accordingly, a Kesāvya, or a person of any other inferior class, may be the given son [dattaka] of a Brāhmaṇa."* But Kulīka Bhāṭṭa says, it means 'equal in eloses,' and this is correct; for Yājñavalkya, after enumerating the twelve sorts of sons, in this way: "The legitimate son is one procreated on the lawful wedded wife" &c., says: 'This law is propagated by me in regard to sons equal by class." And this I will make clear by two texts of Čauṇaka, to be cited hereafter [para. 9]. Viṣṇuṣaṇyaṇa also declares the same: "By the eldest son, as soon as born, a man becomes the father of male

1—Cole. Mit. 395.  
2—Cole. Mit. 249.  
3—Mahārāṣṭhī, vitaka prakaran, loc. cit., page 2d.  
4—Cf. Mit. 399 note, where our Author is noticed—Dutt. Min. 32, Dutt. Civil. 155, Reports 1st, 108.  
5—Mit. 322, Jum. Va. 151, Digest 3d. 973.  
6—Mit. 319, quoting Manu, chapter 3d, 106; the first identical here, and the last in the next paragraph.
issue," for the eldest chiefly fulfils the office of a son, and is therefore not to be given. And this prohibition also regards the giver only, and not the taker; according to the same authority.

5. This prohibition might indeed apply to the giver alone, provided this text of Manu contained a prohibition of the gift of an eldest son. But it does not, for there is a want of proof [in the affirmative], and because the expression, becomes the father of male issue, is a declaration of parentage alone, and moreover that even, as regards its applicability to the discharge of debt alone. Accordingly, the last hemicicly exactly agrees with this interpretation: "And is exonerated from debt to his ancestors; such a son therefore is entitled to take the whole." 2 The whole, the wealth.

6. And a male child alone becomes adopted, not a female, "He [suh] is called a son given." From the pronoun he, entered in the text, [being masculine, and] referring to connexion between name and person, we must understand one, where a mother and father are agents; where affection, water, and proper qualifications exist; with necessity as a reason; and where the act of gift, equality of class, and male sex [are united], in the same way as, from the [masculine] pronoun him, in the holy text: "Let a Brahman of eight years be initiated, and let him [from] be instructed," we infer, 'that the age is eight years; the order, that of a Brahman; and the sex, male; his initiation with the string completed,' &c.

7. From this results the refutation of what some persons have held, viz.: 'That the terminations kṣr, and mām being common to all genders; that the word daśtrīna ending in mā-m therefore, since there is no distinction between it, and the act by which a gift is concluded, it may be applied in like manner even to a girl, when given, whether to her husband or to any other.'

8. Čautaka thus declares the mode of adopting a son: 3 "I, Čautaka, now declare the best adoption: One having no male issue, or one whose male issue has died, having fasted for a son; having given two pieces of cloth, a pair of earrings, a turban, a ring for the forefinger, to a priest, religiously disposed, a follower of Vishnu, and thoroughly read in the Vedas: having venerated the king and virtuous Brahmānas, by a madhuparka both a bunch of sixty-four stems entirely of the kuça-grass.

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1—It is not however very clear that such is the intent of the Mitākshara.


4—Datt Mīm. 88-89-91—Datt. Chand. 168-69. The Madhuparka is a prepared food, of honey, liquid butter, and curds, 'presented to a person to whom it is intended to show particular respect on his coming to a house, as to a guest, to a bridegroom at a marriage, to a Brahman at a sacrifice and the like,' WILSON.—Ed.
and fuel of the palaça tree also: having collected these articles, having earnestly invited kinsmen and relations; having entertained the kinsmen with food; and especially Brahmans: having performed the rites, commencing with that of placing the consecrated fire, and ending with that of purifying the liquid butter; having advanced before the giver, let him cause to be asked thus, 'give the boy.' The giver, being capable of the gift, [should give] to him with the recitation of the five prayers, the initial words of the first of which are, Ye yajñyaena, &c. Having taken him by both hands, with recitation of the prayer, commencing, "Devasya tvā, &c." having inaudibly repeated the mystical invocation, Aṅgāṅa ane, &c. "having kissed the forehead of the child: having adorned with clothes, and so forth, the boy bearing the reflection of a son: Accompanied with dancing, songs, and benedictory words, having seated him in the middle of the house: having according to ordinance, offered a burnt offering of milk and curds, [to each incantation,] with recitation of the mystical invocation, 'Yastvā hridā: the portion of the Hymed commencing, 'tubhyam aham,' and the five prayers, of which the initial words of the first are Soma dadat, &c." [let him close the ceremony.]

2. "The adoption of a son, by any Brahman, must be made from amongst sapindaṣī, or kinsmen connected by an oblation of food(a); or on failure of these, an asapinda, or one not so connected, may be adopted: otherwise, let him not adopt." "Of Kṣatriyās, in their own class positively: and [on default of a sapinda kinsman] even in the general family, following the same primitive spiritual guide [guru]: Of Vaiśyas from amongst those of the Vaiśya class [Vaiśyajātishu]; of Cādus from amongst those of the Cādus class. Of all, and the tribes likewise, in their own classes only: and not otherwise. But a daughter's son, and a sister's son are affiliated by Cādus." "By no man, having an only son [ekaputra] is the gift of a son to be ever made. By a man having several sons [bahuputra] such gift is to be made, on account of difficulty [prayamantas]." "Let the best of the regenerate [the Brahman] to the extent of his ability, bestow a gratuity on the officiating priest. A king [Kṣa-

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(a) A Brahman having a daughter and daughter-in-law living cannot adopt the son of a daughter deceased; nor can such person, so illegally adopted, adopt his wife's sister's child, and make him heir to the grandfather's property, which would pass to the daughter-in-law on the Brahman's death and consequently to his daughter, the daughter-in-law not being allowed to alienate the property during the daughter's life. Bacca Ganga v. Bacca Shreevantur Sci. Rep. 73, 1 Marth. Dis. 13.—Ed.

1—This is added to render the passage intelligible. In the Datt. Mām. the sense breaks off here in a singular manner, being continued in other texts; our author leaves it equally incomplete.


4—Datt. Mām. 62, Datt. Chand. 166, where it is translated.

5—Datt. Mām. 92 3, Datt. Chand. 170.—"is to be anxiously made."
triva, the produce of] half even of his dominion: next in order, a Várya three hundred pieces; a Čátra, the whole even of his property: if indigent, to the extent of his means." Bearing the reflection, equal to, [or like].

10. A daughter's son and a sister's son: Now, as in the instance of the stick, in the formula: "[The sacrificer, yajñīm] delivers the stick to [the Bráhman, who personates] Maithré Varuna." though the stick [really] be the object required, from the necessity of its previous existence, still, by the use of the fourth case [to], Maithré Varuna is alone denoted as the object, as is the most fit, from his act of uttering the summons in the formula: "The holder of the stick [the who personates Maithré Varuna] then utter the invocations [to the deities, for their presence in the sacrifice]." Even so, in this place, since the state of non-release from debt [results from want of a son], and because the sixth case [of Čátras, in the text] has the sense of the fourth [to or for], therefore both the daughter's and the sister's son alone, are to be admitted for Čátras, as the means [of relieving the father from debt]. So, by the propriety of only these two, the purport of the restriction of the rule is declared: thus, "The daughter's son and the sister's son alone are for Čátras." But if the impossibility of it for Čátras [be urged], by reason of the impropriety of the restriction, [I answer]; they are both exhibited by the texts as the objects for Čátras alone, since it would be absurd to make the restriction apply to the agent, [parisamkhya] in respect to Bráhmans and the rest.

11. Therefore the daughter's son, and sister's son even, are the most proper for Čátras. In default of them, another also [may be adopted], if of similar class, as declared by the same author [para. 9]: of Čátras from amongst those of the Čátra class. This word, class, is not [necessarily] implied, by its connexion with daughter's son and sister's son, alone, for there is no [necessary] mutual connexion between the states, of daughter's son, sister's son, and common caste. And there is a risk of our [thereby] making an absurdity of parallel passages of the same author. This is fully explained by my father in his Dvaita Nava, and the same is the rule [dēhāra] ordained by sages.

12. And the assertion of their right [to adopt] being demonstrable in the very same way, [the argument upon] the word Nishād casts a pati,1 the assertion in the Čádhlī Viveka, that there is a want of title for Čátras to celebrate the acceptance of a son with a Homa(t), authenticated by Vedaka mantras,' is hereby refuted.

13. The Homa however, being accompanied with mantras, must

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1—"The lord of those residing among the Nishādas, who might be of any caste, and therefore entitled to adopt; but when none Nishāda shahpā, "the Lord of the Nishādas," that is, one of that caste, he, as being lower than a Čátra, could not adopt, in the proper form.

(*) Burnt offering.—Ed.
be celebrated by them through the instrumentality of a Brahmān, in conformity to the text of Pārvaṇa: "When fasts, vows, burnt sacrifices, oblation at aṇaṇa, silent meditation, or prayer, and the like, are performed by a Brahmān [on the part of another], the benefit of them accrues to him who caused their performance." And the very same is declared, both by Śaṅkara and Īśānācārya.

14. However, what [in seeming contradiction] Pārvaṇa himself adds: "The Brahmān, who, for the sake of his king, performs Homa with sacrificed materials furnished by a āgāra, shall himself become a āgāra and the āgāra shall become a Brahmān," means, according to Īśānācārya, that the whole benefit of the act accrues to the āgāra, whilst the crime fully attaches to the Brahmāna.

One law, for women and āgāras.

15. The right also pertains to women, exactly as to āgāras, by reason of the text: "Women and āgāras are governed by the same law."

16. Vasishthād: "Man, produced from virile seed and unmingled blood, proceeds from his father and his mother, as an effect from his cause. Therefore his father and mother have power to give, to sell, or to abandon, their son. But let no man give, or accept, an only son: for he is [destined] to continue the line of his ancestors. Let not a woman give or accept a son, unless with the consent of her husband."

"A person, being about to adopt a son, should take an unmarried house, or the near relation of a kinsman, having convinced his kinhead, and announced his intention to the king, and having offered a burnt offering with recitation of the prayers denominated 'viṣṇai' in the middle of his dwelling. But, if a doubt arise, let him set apart, like a āgāra, one whose kindred are remote; for it is declared [in the Vedas]: ‘Many are saved by one’.

When a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards born, the given son shares a fourth part."

17. Therefore, if there must be an order from the husband, it is for a married woman only, as above shown; but, for a widow, even without it [adoption] may be made, with the permission of her father, or, on failure of him, of the relations [Nṛdhāla] under this precept: "Let a female be taken care of, by her father while a child, by her husband, etc."

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1.—Dict. Min. 63, Mil. 303-19-11-15 and notes. Digest 3d, 222. Reports 1st, 190
2.—Dict. Huaid. 150 takes up the text here. Reports 2d, 450.
3.—Reports 1st, 197; 3d, 458. Nṛdhāla is sometimes interpreted "Caste," but improperly. It means Gentile kindred only. See Mil. 303, note, where our author’s opinion is noticed on this point.

(c) A present, especially one made to a Brahman on the conclusion of any public ceremonial. Wilson.” – Ed.

(b) This prohibition is directory only, not imperative. See Chima Gaṇapātīv, Kṛṣṇa Gaṇapātī, 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 54. — Ed.

(c) So held in Appilata Ḫuppadar v. Nīlāvali Ḫammal, 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 43. — Ed.
when married, and by her sons, in her old age. If none of these exist, let her other relations [Nyâlâ] take care of her. A woman is never fit for independence." (d) This has been declared by Yâjñavalkya only with reference to difference of age, and the circumstances of a woman, being under the power of her husband. In case of his being dead, or [unwieldy] from old age, or other [disqualification], or from helplessness, then [this is] indeed under the power of her sons or other relatives.

18. By Kâtyâyana also it has been said: "If a woman, without the orders of her father, husband, or son, should perform obsequies, such obsequies are of doubtful validity." What is here said of the orders of her father, husband, &c. relates only to the difference of age. Obsequies here means, rites performed for the other world; wherefore, at whatever age a married woman may [require to] receive the command of her husband, that very command is in the case of a widow not required, since the command of any other person, not here mentioned, is nowhere declared requisite. Therefore the right of adoption, even without the order of her [late] husband, does pertain to a widow.

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19. The same remote kinsman, means, in each case, the sapinda nearest [to the adopter]; among whom again, the nearest of all is the brother's son (d); for: "If among several brothers of the whole blood, one of them have a son born, Manu 3 pronounces them all fathers of a male child by means of that son." And the Mitaksharâ has the same. And this must be the proper motive of that precept; for it is impossible there can be any other. The remote kinsman, means 'one of another caste.' And my father has said that; "A married woman, who has even had a son born, may become an adopted son." (e)

This also is reasonable, for it is not in opposition [to other maxims].

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1.—Digest 2d, 381. Reports 2d, 450. 2.—Reports 1st, 193, 2nd, 251.
3.—Dig. 3d, 320. Jim. Vd. 260, Digest 3d, 265. Reports 2d, 83.
4.—Dott. Mm. 3d. Dott. Chaud. 191.

(d) This 'precept' does not appear to be in point; and so far as regards the widow the doctrine in support of which it is cited, seems questionable. It has, however, been held in Bombay that a widow may adopt a son without consent of her husband, if she have obtained permission of the caste and the sanction of the ruling powers. But under such circumstances she must adopt the next of kin to the deceased husband—his brother's son if such exist. See Arjéhokrâj Mahârâj v. See Golchôkra-rajâj Mahârâj 1 Bom. 191, Haidâr Râo Mûkâr v. Govind Râo Bâlâkântâ Râo Mûkâr 2 Bom. 76. So in Madras the Palâtis have said, obiter, that a widow's adoption with the mere consent of her husband's relations would be valid: Kâame Sengonji Nachiar v. Sekaranathu Horâdalith Gudâth 1 Mad. Sel. Dec. 101, 104, and see M. S. D. 1849, p. 115, 117, and S. A. 156 of 1857 M. S. D. 1853, p. 5: Strange's Manual of Hindu Law, 2d ed. § 72; Goubin Études sur le Droit Civil des Indiens 79, 84. 1 Strange H. 1, 79: Carlins's note to Mitaksharâ, ch. 1, sec. XI, cl. 9. And see R. A. 35 of 1881, heard 16th Dec. 1883, and reported in 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. In Bengal the husband's assent seems indispensable. Mâna. Prin. 65, Mâna. Cons. 196. 3 Coleb. Dig. 242, and so held in a Benneits case 9, 8. D. A. 169: Rajâ Ueç Déri Chêl Singh v. Kammar Gunâshâ Tây 2 Knapp P. C. 203, 231—Ed.

(e) So, apparently, held in Bombay provided he be a sapinda 1 Bom. 191; 1 Mad.
Dig. 17 Credit in Madras; Chetty Culaâm Parâakâm v. Chetty Culaâm Manâbo 1 Mad. Sel. Dec. 406.—Ed.
20. As for this text of the Kalikā Purāṇa: "O Lord of the earth, a son, having been initiated under the family name of his father, unto the ceremony of tonsure inclusive, does not become the son of another man [apart from him]. The ceremony of tonsure and of investiture being indeed performed under his own family name, sons given, and the rest may be considered as issus; else they are termed slaves. After their fifth year, O king, sons given, and the rest are not sons. But, having taken a boy five years old, the adopter should first perform the tonsure for male issus. It belongs to aggafftras only. Unto the ceremony of tonsure and the investiture, the party, any here is inoperative, used for the sake of entirely including all such cases; for if it be meant as a kind conclusive, it will have the objection of being in opposition to the ceremonies of tonsure and investiture [specified in the text.] But such a rule is not to be placed on this last passage, because it is not to be found in two or three copies of the Kalikā Purāṇa.

21. The son given is of two sorts; first, simple; second, son of two fathers. (Karmavasayaya). The first is one bestowed without any special compact; the last, is one given under an agreement to this effect, "be shall belong to us both." Here the first will perform the funeral ceremony, and the other rites for the adopter only, as many times as demonstrated. In the desire of accomplishing the acceptance of a son, by the term 'son' being in the second person, in the plural, "being about to adopt a son" [para. 19] and the like, detailing the rules for the ceremony, the production of a son is declared. And not that the adopter can possibly imagine, 'his filial relationship is derived from my capacity of begetting.' Therefore, from the word 'son,' who having committed the whole duties of a son, we must admit the production of one, as far as requisite, and not previously existing. Hence, in the family of the acceptor, the condition may (in this way) be brought about, from which result the acts suitable to the different relations, of son, father, and the rest. Even as is declared by Manu: "A given son must never claim the family and estate of his natural father; the funeral oblation follows the family and estate, but of him who has given away his son, the obsequies fail.'

22. Follows the family and estate, goes after the family and estate, the latter expression corresponding generally with the term "goes along with." The given son, the simple adopted; since, in the case of a vedamarried man, the [double] obligation of family connexion and the like, will be hereafter declared. The funeral oblation according to Mehatīti, Kulaka Bhatta, and others, means the funeral

1.—Dutt, Min. 68. Dutt, Chand. 173, Min. 310, and Note, giving our Author's opinion. Digest xii, 148-9. Remarks 188, 191.

2.—The reading of the Mayākha is purposely more explicit here than in the other works, which read 'tonsure and other rites.'

3.—Min. 305 note, quoting this passage.

4.—Chapter 3th, 143. Mit. 315. Digest xii, 141. Dutt, Min. 195. Dutt, Chand. 197
ceremony, and other Črāddhas. According to other authors again the
funeral oblation means sapinda connexion; and obsequies, the funeral
and other Črāddhas. The correct interpretation is this: As by the
passage: "He, who has begotten a son, and whose hair is [still] black,
may maintain a sacred fire," the difference as to his age and condition
is exemplified, and again, the difference of place, by the passage: He
measures out the inner portion, and the outer portion of the altar;" even
so, in this place, having merely exemplified the acts connected
with the obligation of the funeral oblation for the natural father and
the rest, by the terms, 'family,' 'estate,' 'funeral oblation,' and 'obse-
quies,' the cessation of them is declared.

23. From this also results, the establishment of the cessation of
family connexion with the father's whole brother, and the rest. There-
fore also, even the son begotten by the simple adopted son, shall perform
[his father's] sapindī karan, pārvana obsequies, and the rest, in con-
junction even with the [original] adopter. Even so, his son also.

24. However, what Kātyāyana, opening the discussion of the 'son
of two fathers,' by this text: "Now, when the family
connexion of sons, either adopted, purchased, or son of
an appointed daughter, remains unsettled, through
their acceptance by another they become sons of two
fathers," and the like, says: "If there be no offspring
of these adopters by their own wives, they [the secondary sons] take
the estate, and give the funeral oblations to three ancestors; if there
be no [offspring], to either [the giver or receiver], they will give the
oblation for both. Having separately considered both
in one Črāddha, they shall call upon both of them."

Has reference to the 'son of two fathers,' because of his promising:
'They become sons of two fathers.'

25. If either the natural parent, or the adoptive father, have no
other male issue the Dvānāchāryāyaṇa, or 'son of
two fathers,' shall present the funeral obligation to him,
and shall take his estate; but not so if there be
[male issue]. If both have legitimate sons, he offers
an obligation to neither, but takes a quarter of the share
allotted to a legitimate son of his adoptive father; from
this text of Vasishthā: "When a son has been
adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards born, the
given son takes a fourth part;" and likewise this of Kātyāyana: "If
a legitimate son be born, the rest are pronounced shares of a fourth
part, provided they belong to the same tribe; but if they be of a different
class, they are entitled to food and raiment only." The reading in
the Kalpataru is, 'a third part.' Those of the same tribe, according to
Vijaṇācayāra are, the son of the wife, the son adopted, and the rest.

1.—Mit. page 253 note. Reports 2nd, 668.
2.—This passage is quoted in the notes to the Mitakshara, page 318.
5.—Mit. page 316. Ante Section 4th, para. 41—ci seq.
28. But if sons are wanting to both, then he shall perform a single Çrabhita to both in the mode declared above, by the term "in one Çrabhita," &c. Moreover in the Hemadri is a text of Kśitihastri: "As many as there may be degrees of forefathers, with so many, their own forefathers, let sons, given, and the rest associate the deceased; in order, their sons with two forefathers, their grandsons with one, should [do] the same. The fourth degree, at pleasure. This [sapinda relation] extends to three degrees." At the regular seasons, there is no distinction of degree; but on the [anniversary] day of death, having invoked them singly, let him perform the Çrabhita according to the proper rite. Which cause is consequent also to the text of Kātyāyana. [para. 24.]

27. This is the meaning: 'The son of two fathers, and the rest, shall perform the sapindk kāraṇa of those dying in the families of both the real and adoptive father, together with those of the same degree, [that is] in company with the father [of the deceased], and the rest. But the sons of those adopted, and the rest, shall perform their sapindk kāraṇa together with that of both the natural, and adoptive [father]. Their grandsons also shall associate their real father with their adoptive grandfather, and their real great-grandfather.' The fourth degree, their great-grandson. Pleasure desire; that is, they shall invoke the adopter, or not, [as they please]; but the real father, they shall even summon. At the regular seasons: that is, at the days of new moon, Ānāvāsyā and other seasons, the Črabhita according to the degrees of [forefathers] of the real and adoptive fathers, is to be celebrated. But on the anniversary of death, having invoked the single person alone, let them celebrate the Ekapādikāra Çrabhita for him.

28. Some however say: 'Since the rite of simple adoption is not [mentioned], it does not exist; and there is no agreement to the effect: He belongs to us both, because no rite for it exists. One taken without this agreement, therefore, is even a son of two fathers.—And even by him, either a double Çrabhita, or a single one, may be celebrated, by invoking [singly or together] both his real and adoptive father, in the Ānāvāsyā and other Çrabhitas. But the sapindk kāraṇa. Pārvana, and other Çrabhitas, must be performed for the adopted son, in company with both his real and adoptive father, by his son. Even so, by his son, and the rest.'

29. This must be considered. Because, though the phrase 'simple adopted' is certainly nowhere mentioned, still, however, this [meaning] satisfactorily results, even from the declaration of the entire cessation of the connexion with the real father and the rest, by the above recorded text of Manu [para. 21] which prohibition does not apply in a Dvīyaknusūyāya adoption. Further: A marriage in the family of the progenitor [Vṛj] within seven degrees, which


2.—Chandu instead of Chheda "excluded," which is the meaning of the Datt. Mīm. and Chand.
is altogether illegal according to the text of Gautama: 1 With the kinsmen on the side of the father, viz. of the procurator, [Vijji; beyond the seventh degree; and with those on the mother’s side, beyond the fifth, &c.,] would be unmeaning in a Dvâmashâyana adoption, because the sapinda affinitie [to the procurator] still exists therein [beyond that]. Therefore, the term, ‘simple adopted,’ must necessarily be expressed, to make the same agree with that of the text, because of the declaration of the sapinda connexion.

30. Moreover, in the Pravâsâhâyâya [it is said]: 2 “They who adopt any one of either Gotra, after the example of Çaunga and Çâlakôsa,” In which also, the term either Gotra, is spoken of the Dvâmashâyana. And the prohibition of connexion in the real family [Gotra] is declared by the text of Manu; which is the difference [between the two]. By the distinction also, between adopted son, ‘simple,’ and, ‘son of two fathers’ [the term, simple] is proper to be included; whereas even the propriety of the term ‘simple adopted son’ is established.

31. Even so Bhadra Somâyana, 3 satisfactorily reconciles the one doctrine, under the text of Manu [para. 21]: “That there was a cessation of the sapinda connexion between Arjuna [as the son of Kunti, born after she was] given in adoption by [her father] Sûra to Kuntibhoja, and Subhadra, [as] the daughter of Vasudeva, who was the son of Sûra,” with the opposite opinion, “that Arjuna could not marry the said Subhadra,” as might seem to result from that text of Gautama [para. 29], applying solely to the prohibition of [a wife] come of the father’s kindred,” by adducing the affirmation of the commentaries in favour of the utter exclusion of the family connexion [after the adoption]. 4

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3—In the Mûlamâśa.

4—This will be more intelligible from the following genealogy. Arjuna’s real father was Indra, though he took the name of Pandava from his mother’s husband Pandu, and his marrying Subhadra, espoused his maternal uncle’s daughter [which is reprehended in general; see Chap. 1st, Sec. 1st, para. 19]; but as the mother had been previously given away in adoption, their relationship, as cousins by the mother’s side, had ceased.
32. As for what some author says: 'That the sapinda connexion of Kumātri with the family of Sura, is declared by Somesvara, under the text of Gaudama, to continue through seven degrees,' the reason is, that he has not read the book. Therefore, the text of Gaudama, after having previously declared the cessation of sapinda relationship, refers to the prohibition [of marriage] in the family of the natural father, and not as considering the subject of sapinda relationship. In this way, the correctness of the terms, son 'simple adopted,' and 'son of two fathers,' being established, the possibility of an agreement to the effect: 'He shall belong to us both,' [para. 21] is likewise established; for the object is manifest, by the acceptor knowing him to be 'son of two fathers.' And again, the sapinda relationship of the simple adopted son, extends, in his adoptive father's family, to seven degrees on the father's side, and to five degrees on the mother's side.

33. As for these texts of Vradihà Gaudama: "The sons given, purchased, and the rest, who are adopted from those of his own general family, by the observance of form, enter the lineage [gotra, of the adopter]. But the relation of sapinda is not included," as well as of Bhadram: "Sons given, purchased, and the rest, retain the relation of sapinda to the natural father, as extending to the fifth and the seventh, degrees: like this, their general family, which is also that of their adopter," and moreover of Narada: "For the sake of religious merit, [being adopted] like the real son, under the family name of each respectively [tad tad gotvam] sons [who are] reared: for such, merely participation in a share, and [the oblation of] the funeral caje, is declared" they are, all three, not of good authority; [at least, if their authority be good, they are to be used only for the sake of determining the want of sapinda relationship of] the Dvijamshy-ārya, as far as seven generations, in the family of the adopter; for, in the case of a simple adopted son, his sapinda relationship, as far as seven generations in the family of the adopter [Palaka] is declared [to commence] by the before quoted text of Gaudama, [para. 29] and because his sapinda relationship at the same time, in the family of his real father, is declared to cease by the text of Mann [para. 21].

34. As for the following matter, written by certain respectable authors in discussing the subject of sapinda relationship: "Yet if an adopted son's investiture and other initiatory rites, have been celebrated in the general family [gotra] of his real father, his sapinda relationship to his real father's family [kula] is retained, both to the father, and to the mother; to the fifth degree [from the mother.]

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2—Datt. Min. 27 and note q. v. 108.
3—Datt. Min. 199 note, where our author is again noticed and the text attributed to Devabh.
and to the seventh [from the father]: but to three degrees in the family of the adopter; by reason that there is a want of the state of begetting, and of investiture, to the author of the secondary paternal relation, the adopter. However, if the adopted son be [so] initiated in the general family of the adopter, his [sapiṇḍa relationship] with the adopter and the rest [of his family] will continue even to seven generations, and to five [as above:”] its foundation is not known.

35. Again: If the paternal relation exists not, by reason of the absence of the acts of begetting, of investiture, and the like, in what manner arises the adopted son's sapiṇḍa relationship to either [even,] as far as three degrees or his performance of ġrāḍha and other ceremonies for the adopter and the rest of his family? Neither can it be said, ‘the paternal relation and sapiṇḍa relation are [necessarily] connected; because by this, on the absence of the first, the want of the sapiṇḍa relationship would cease. The result of it is this: Sapiṇḍa relationship even [of the adopted son], with the adopter and the rest of his family, has been already pronounced from the text of Gaṅgādhara and others [para. 29:1] “With the kinsmen on the side of the procreator beyond the seventh degree.” And this is conclusive.

36. Now this is the rite for gift and acceptance of a son. In this matter, the power of giving [in adoption], where there are more sons than one, allows even of any one of them, not being the eldest; and that of acceptance, attaches to one who has not had a son born, or whose sons are dead. The right of married women [to adopt, is good] with the orders of the husband, in default of him, of their [own] fathers, and the rest. Of Gaḍrana [adopting] the daughter’s son, or the sister's son, are to be taken, and no other. By the other [superior classes] however, the nearest sapiṇḍa relation; in default of them, the remote [kindred], but not one of another caste.

37. Then the giver, on the day [fixed] for the acceptance, having duly called to mind the [proper] time, and the other considerations, and having thus vowed: ‘I am about to make a gift of my son for the cessation, between myself and the rest [of my family], and this son, of the several duties arising from the reciprocal connexion, at present existing between [us, as] father, son, and the like;' shall perform the Gaṅga puja, svasti vāchana, mātrekā puja, Viḍhiti ġrāḍha, and the other rites.

1—The remainder of this section, though not found in any Gauḍaṇḍa copies, was introduced from one obtained at Puri. It appears to be an extract from some other work, or, a summary of the doctrine of the Mayūkha, by some more modern authors.

2—In the original, it is “continuation” pravṛttī, for nivṛttī, which the sense requiring, was adopted.

3—A religious rite preparatory to any important observance [Wilson], where the mode of it is described.
38. The accepter too, having fasted on the day preceding that for
the acceptance, and on the next day having summoned
his kinsmen, and made known his taking a son to the
king; having called to mind the time, and other (considerations), and having thus vowed: 'I am about to
take (this person) as is son, to the cessation of the mutual connexion of father, son, or the like, at present subsisting between him, and his pro-
creator and the rest (of that family); and for the accession between him
and me, and the rest (of my family), of the duties mutually arising
from the respective connexion of father, son, and the like (by this adop-
tion), and having performed, the Canoea puja, Svasti, vratham, Matsyaká
puja, Vridhhi Çraddha, Acharyya varan, and the various reverences to
be made, after a special vow to the Acharyya, with the ear-rings, ring,
suit of clothes, turban, maddiyapakka, and the rest, let him give a feast
to three Brahmans, and to his kindred.

39. And the Acharyya, having thus vowed: 'I am about to do
my proper duties,' and having performed the marking
out of the altar, and the other (acts) as far as the con-
secration of the fire, inclusive, shall celebrate the rites
enjoined in the words of the Vedas and the rest, as far
as the straining of the clarified butter inclusive.

40. Then let the accepter, having gone near the giver, thus beg,
'Give me this son'; and the giver, with relation of the
gift completed, five prayers (the initial words of the first of which are)
Ye yañjena, having called to mind the time, and the
rest, having repeated his motives as above detailed, shall declare, 'I
give you this son, adorned with ornaments, according to my ability.
This is the gift of his son, commencing with the words of the Vedas.'

41. Then the accepter, having accepted him with the prayer de-
vasya tvā, and the others, and having repeated
the Kañna stati in the form enjoined by his own
çakha, having inaudibly repeated the mystical invo-
cation angad angat, &c. having kissed the forehead of
the child, let him carry him within his own house, adorned with clothes
and so forth, accompanied with rejoicings.

42. Next, the Acharyya, having performed the setting up of the
clarified butter, and the rest, as far as the portioning
of it, inclusive, having performed a burnt-offering even
with the clarified butter, with the Vyākriñ incanta-
tion, both backwards and in due order, having dressed
the oblations, let him offer a burnt-offering. He then

1—From 'anuvadhane chakshu,' line 1st, to 'kratum,' line 3d.

2—Datt. Mlm. 37. For this and the following passages, turn to para. 8, and the
references there.

3—From 'Ye yañjena,' line 5, to 'Gati.'
commences the principal burnt-offering of dressed oblations, for acceptance of a son, with the words of the Veda. Having commenced with the words, "Tubhyam aday," &c., let him conclude with those commencing "Prayavadattah." Thus ends the rite of adoption.

SECTION VI.

Partition of debts, and of concealed effects.

1. This settled, I return [to my subject]. Katayavana states a distinction in partition of debts: "The debt of the father, one incurred by a parcerly himself on account of the debts of the father, and one specially his own; debts so incurred, must be examined on a partition with the kinsmen." On account of the debts of the father, incurred for the sake of discharging the father's debts. Specially his own, [contradicted by other] than himself, for the maintenance of his family. The same author says: "A debt contracted by a brother, a paternal uncle, or a mother, for the [support of the] family, must be fully discharged by the coheirs, when partition is made."

2. The same author also says, in case the debt be less than the property: "But having given the debt [to the creditors], and what was bestowed through affection, let them divide the balance." Balantcid, promised, Narada:4 "What remains, after discharging the father's donation, and after payment of his debts, may be divided by the brethren, so that their father continue not a debtor." The father's donation, what had been promised by the father. The same author says: "What has been given for religious purposes, and through affection, and the debt which has been added by himself, that [and] the visible [estate], let them divide; [any other debt] is not to be given, out of the paternal estate." The meaning is this: 'What has been given for religious purposes, as well as through affection; [that is] what it has been added by the father himself, [that is] what has been made by himself; such debts [and the visible estate] they shall divide. Payment [dama] is not [allowable], out of the paternal estate, of debts other than these.'

1—In the last line of the page.
2—From section 11h, para. 40th.
3—Digest 3d, 330.
4—Digest 3d, 359.
5—Digest 3d, 388, where a different turn is given to the text.
6—Digest 3d, 23, J. W. 21, where the same difference is observable between these two translations, as in that of the foregoing text and our author, whose version is altogether different from both.
7—Digest 3d, 391.
2. The same author also says, in suspicion of effects undiscovered: "A house, arable land, or quadrupeds, discovered after partition, as the property of the deceased, must be equally divided; if it be justly suspected that effects are concealed, a discovery by ordeal is prescribed by law." Thus Manus declared, that household utensils, beasts of burden, and milch cattle, ornaments, and workmen, must be divided, when discovered among the heirs; if effects are suspected to be hidden, a discovery must be obtained by the Kosha mode of ordeal.

Workmen: slaves, and the like. Here even, the Kosha ordeal itself has been fixed in such matters, in the chapter on ordeals, by this very authority: "In sustaining the truth of doubts in partition among heirs, at all times, and in sending a multitude of proofs [kriyas], let them even undergo the Kosha ordeal."

SECTION VII.

On property not liable to division. (Arthayana.)

1. Manus says: "Wealth, however, acquired by learning, belongs exclusively to any one of them who acquired it; so does any thing given by a friend, received, at or on account of marriage, or presented as a mark of respect to a guest." Vyasa: "Wealth gained by science, or earned by valour, or received from affectionate kindred, belongs, at the time of partition, to him who acquired it, and shall not be claimed by the coheirs." Received from affectionate kindred; [Saudayaka; this term] will be hereafter explained.

2. This [wealth] must be understood to be acquired, without loss to the father's estate. Thus also Yajnavalkya: "Whatever else is acquired by the co-partner himself, without detriment to the father's estate, as a present from a friend, or a gift at nuptials, does not appertain to the coheirs; nor shall he who recovers hereditary property, which had been taken away, give it up to the coheirs; nor what has been gained by science.

1.—Digest 3d, 393, where the text is attributed to Karyayana; at page 90 of that vol. the last stanza is read differently, and attributed to Bhaspati.
5.—At para. 13; and in section 16th, para. 8th.
3. But Çankha declares a special rule, relating to the recovery of land, derived from ancestors but long lost: “Land [inherited] in regular succession, but which had been formerly lost, and which a single [heir] shall recover solely by his own labour, the rest may divide, according to their due allotments; having first given him a fourth part. That is, having given to the recoverer a fourth part of the recovered property, they shall divide the balance equally, with the recoverer.”

4. Manu says: “What a brother has acquired by his labour without using the patrimony, he need not give up to the coheirs; nor what has been gained by science.” Vyāsa: “What a man gains by his own ability, without relying on the patrimony, he shall not give up to the coheirs, nor what he acquired by learning.” Acquisition by learning is explained by Kātyāyana: “Wealth gained through science, which was acquired from a stranger, while receiving a foreign maintenance, is termed acquisition through learning.”

5. The same author elucidates this term: “What is gained by the solution [of a difficulty], after a prize has been offered, must be considered as acquired through science, and is not included in partition [among coheirs.]”

6. Solution, according to the Madana Ratna, means the reading of [passages of the Vedas] having the order of construction, krama, and the sentences, jātās, and the like, duly linked together. Some, again, say it is the interpretation, in a public assembly, of concealed meanings, required

3—Jim. Vā. 109, Digest 3d, 311.
4—Mit. 271. Digest 3d, 338.
6—Digest 3d, 384. The quotation in Jim. Vā. breaks off after this.
7—See Asiatic Researches 8th, 390.
to be made known. The construction is: 'resolved after a prize has been offered.' Display, public exhibition. Superior reading, pre-eminent reading. In regard to artisans, meaning, that this law respecting science, is to be applied also among artisans. Increase of price caused by great satisfaction [with the work]. Performance of a sacrifice is merely an example.

7. Here also, in all these cases, indivisibility applies, only when no detriment has fallen on the paternal estate, in acquiring, as well superior knowledge, as wealth: for, in case of detriment [to the estate, the acquisition] is even divisible. Even so, Katyāyana says: 'Yet Brihaspati has explained that wealth shall be partible, if it was gained by learned brothers who were instructed in the family by their father, or paternal grandfather, or uncles; and it is the same, if the wealth were acquired by valour, [with assistance from the family estate.']

8. Also in case of loss to the paternal estate even, the acquirer gets a double share, from this text of Vasishtha: 'He amongst them, who has made an acquisition, may take a double portion of it.'

9. Nārada states a distinction in some cases, in acquisition of wealth through learning. 'He who maintains the family of a brother studying science, shall take, even though not told, [acrūta] a share of the wealth gained by science. The word acrūta means unlearned, according to the Madhava Ratna. But the proper sense is, not promised, thus: 'I will give a share.'

10. Gautama declares a distinction also, with regard to wealth acquired without detriment to the father's estate:

Distinction in wealth acquired without detriment to the paternal estate.

His own acquired wealth, a learned man may, if he please, give up to unlearned co-heirs. He who is versed in knowledge, is a learned man. The meaning is, that, with his own pleasure, he may give it to his unlearned brethren. Katyāyana: 'No part of the wealth, which is gained by science, need be given, by a learned man, to his unlearned co-heirs; but such property must be yielded by him, to those who are equal, or superior, in learning.' A learned man need not give a share of his own acquired wealth, without his assent to an unlearned co-heir; provided it were not gained by him, using the

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4—The commentators are here differing about the sense to be given to dhruvā, whether it is to mean the Vedas, (and thence the knowledge of them) or hearing, (and thence telling, pravakśa, which last our author prefers.
5—Jim. Vā. 112. Digest 3d, 349, but our author adopts a different reading.
7—The following text is out of Nārada, Jim. Vā. 112. Digest vi. 343.
paternal estate." According to Madans, this prohibition applies, only where there exists other property for those brothers who are present; but on failure of other property, [a share of it] even must be given to them.

11. Bhaspati declares that to be impartible, which has been given by the father or other [person]: "That which may have been given, either by the paternal grandfather, or by the father, as well as by the mother, is not to be taken back; any more than that acquired by valour, or the wealth of a wife." Krsna: "Excepting what is gained by valour, the wealth of a wife, and what is acquired by science, which are three sorts of property exempt from partition; and any favour conferred by a father." Ktyyana.3 "That which is taken under a standard, is declared not to be subject to distribution. And also, what is seized [by a soldier] in war, after routing the forces of the enemy, and after risking his life for his lord, is named spoil taken under a standard." The same author says:3 When a soldier performs a gallant action, despising danger, and favour is shown to him by his lord, pleased with that action; whatever property is then received by him, shall be considered as gained by valour."

12. Here Vyasa states a distinction:4 "The brethren participate in that wealth, which one of them gains by valour or the like, using any common property, either a vehicle [or weapon] or the like; to him, two shares should be given: but the rest should share alike.

13. Vyasa defines the gifts of affectionate kindred, [sandyakam].

Gift of affectionate kindred.

Wealth received with a maiden defined.

CXXV.

1—Mit. 258, Jm. Vä. 110-117. Digest 3d, 343.

2—3—Jm. Vä. 131. In the Digest 3d, 367, these texts are attributed to Manu, but not found in his Institutes.

4—Jm. Vä, 111. Digest 3d, 71.

5—The text is afterwards, in sect. 108, para 8th, attributed to Ktyyana, and read differently "with a maiden."

6—In the Digest 3d, 368, this text is attributed to Manu, but not found.
14. What is acquired in this, or a similar manner: “The Arsha
rite again consists in giving his daughter after having
received a pair of kimis.” 1 is denominated, wealth re-
ceived with the maiden. Here, even, like wealth
acquired by learning, such acquisition also is imper-
bile, if it be acquired without detriment to the father’s
estate: But, if gained by any other means, except
learning or the other [specified modes], it is even liable
to partition. And so Manu: “And if all of them, being unlearned,
acquire property [before partition] by their own labour, there shall be
an equal division of that property [without regard to the first born],
for it was not the wealth of their father: this rule is clearly settled.”
Labour, employment in agriculture, &c. not of their father, is to be
taken, as without assistance from the father’s wealth.

15. Other things exempt from partition, have been enumerated
by Manu: 2 “Clothes, vehicles, ornaments; prepared
food, water: women; sacrifices and pious acts; as well
as the common way, are declared not liable to distribu-
tion.” Vehicles, conveyances. The clothes, convey-
ances, and ornaments, belong respectively to the possessor: if they are
of equal value. If the value of one article be more or less than that of
another, then let them be divided.

16. But the clothes, &c. and other [things] worn by the father,
must be given to the person who partakes of food at his obsequies; as
directed by Brihaspata: 3 “The clothes and ornaments, the bed, and
similar furniture, appertaining to the father, as well as his vehicles and
the like, should be given, after perforning them with fragrant drugs
and wreaths of flowers, to the persons who partakes of the funeral
repast.”

17. If the goats, &c. be unequal in number, a distinct mode of
disposal is ordained by Manu: 4 “Let them never
divide a single goat or sheep, or a single beast with
unloven hoofs: a single goat or sheep belongs to the
first born.”

18. Both the prepared food and water, are to be enjoyed [by all]
according to their occasions. Women, female slaves.

19. However, if they were set apart by the father, they are not
to be distributed, even if of an equal number, by rea-
son of this text of Gautama: 5 No partition is allow-
ed, in the case of women connected [with the father
or with one of the co-heirs].”

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1—Mitāchārādhyāya leaf 8, page 1st. See Manu, chap. 3d, v. 29. Digest 3d, 604.
4—Mit. 273.
20. According to the Kalpataru: 'By the term sacrifices and pious acts, [Yoga-kshema], holy councillors, family priests, and the like, are denoted.' But Langalakshī says: 'The learned have named a conservatory act, kshema; and a sacrificial one, yoga; both are pronounced indivisible: and so are the bed and the chair.' In this place, a conservatory act, means [construction of] tanks, gardens, and the like; a sacrificial one, a grand sacrifice, a feast to Brāhmans, and the like. The meaning is this: Whatever property is, with consent of all whilst in a state of unity, set apart for this purpose, and kept by one individual, with that very property that act of religion shall be executed, by that same individual, and by no other: Neither shall all join for the purpose. The common way, the way to the house or the like, also land for a cattle pasture, and the like.

21. As for this text of Čaukha and Likhita: No division of a dwelling takes place; nor of water-pots, ornaments, and things not of general use;" and this of Vyāsa: "A place of sacrifice, a field, a vehicle, dressed food, water, and women, are not divisible among kinsmen, though [transmitted] for a thousand generations," whereby they declare the impertible nature, both of a dwelling and a field, they have reference to a religious foundation, and land for cattle pasture, and the like; [or else] to the prohibition of the partition, by the Kshatriya or other [son of a Brāhman by women of the other tribes,] of these two things, obtained [by the Brāhman] by acceptance of donation; because it has been already noticed as forbidden. Or [thirdly], it may refer to a partition of even these two things, when of little price, at a valuation, and not by actual division of them.

22. Bhāṣapati declares a distinction, in regard to clothes and other matters: 'They by whom it is affirmed, that clothes and the like are indivisible, have not proved that the collected wealth of opulent men, their vehicles and ornaments, shall not be divided; property held in common [would be] unemployed, for it cannot be given to one [in exclusion of another]: therefore it must be divided by [some mode deduced from] reasoning; else it would be useless. By the sale of clothes, and ornaments; on the recovery of a written debt; by compensating the dressed food with [an equal allotment of] undressed grain; an [equitable] partition is made." 'Water drawn from a [single] well or pool, shall be taken by turns: Let a [single] female slave be successively employed by co-heirs in their respective houses, according to their several shares; if numerous, the slave shall be distributed in equal allotments: such is the law in respect of female servants. A bridge and a field shall be shared [by co-heirs] in due proportion: and the pasture ground for cattle shall be used by the co-heirs in

1—Mit. 374, Jirn. Vāh. 132-3, notes.
proportion to their allotments.” *On the recovery,* meaning, by levying it from the debtor.

23. Kātyāyana: “Wealth which has been fixedly assigned for the purpose of religion, and entered in a deed; and likewise water; slaves also, and such fixed property (or a cow, or a house) as has gone in order of descent; clothes that have been worn, and ornaments, do not resemble (divisible effects). According to the time they have been enjoyed, even so let them be made use of [in turns] by the brothers.” Wealth, means such as has been set apart as the share (to be expended for) religion, and so entered in a deed. Water, contained in wells or the like. Fixed property, a means of livelihood [vrtti.] Do not resemble, [that is, are] unfit for partition.

24. The division of property, concealed by deceit from the other brethren, is thus explained by Yājñavalkya. “Effects, which have been withheld by one co-heir from another, and which are discovered after the separation, let them again divide in equal shares: this is a settled rule.” Effects, withheld, whether by the eldest, younger, or other brother, among the co-heirs; for thus says Manu, “An eldest brother, who from avarice shall defraud his younger brothers, shall forfeit the honours of his primogeniture, be deprived of his [additional] share, and be chastised by the king.”

25. In this place, also, the term eldest brother, is used merely to denote the heirs generally, by the argument exemplified in the loaf and staff; and the meaning is: ‘If blame attaches even to the eldest, how much more to the younger ones?’ Even so Gāntama: “Him indeed, who deprives an heir of his right share, he does certainly destroy; or, if he destroy not him, he destroys his son, or else his grandson.” Whoever debarrs, or excludes from participation, an heir, or person entitled to a share; he, being thus deprived of his share, destroys that person, who so debarrs him of his right; or if he do not destroy him, he destroys his son, or his grandson.

26. Nārada: “That wealth, which has been acquired by a man after separation, belongs to himself alone: what has been recovered, after being seized or lost, and the before mentioned [property] may be afterwards [divided].” Before mentioned, as [property] concealed by any one, among the co-heirs. May be afterwards, divided; is wanting [to complete the sense.] Manu.”

1—Digest 3d, 375. The translation is altered to suit the gloss.
3—Chap. 9th, 213. Mit. 284. Digest 3d, 594.
4—Mit. note to page 394.
5—Mit. 294, from which this appears to be a passage of the Vedas. The subsequent gloss is all, except a few words, a transcript from the Mitākṣara.
6—This text is not found in the Institutes.
“When any common property whatever is brought to light after partition has been effected, that is not considered a [fair] partition: it must even be made over again.”

27. *Yājñavalkya* states the modes of decision in case of denial of partition made by any one: “When partition is denied, the fact of it may be ascertained by the evidence of kinsmen, relatives, and witnesses; and by written proof, or by house or field separately possessed.” From the term, *separately possessed*, we must understand it of house or land separately given [to each] from the connexion between the adjective, and the thing denoted by it. Nārada also says: “If a question arise among co-heirs in regard to the fact of partition, it must be ascertained by the evidence of kinsmen, by the record of the distribution, or by separate transaction of affairs.”

28. The same author says: “The religious duty of unseparated brethren is single. When partition has indeed been made, religious duties become separate for each of them.” Here the term *unseparated*, is intended even to denote the condition, whilst the substantive, *brethren*, is [merely] a general term, of which the condition is so denoted. By this [reasoning], in every unseparated family, of whomsoever it may consist, father, grandfather; son, son’s son; paternal uncle, brother, brother’s son, or other [member], the religious duty is even single.

29. Here again, as, in the unity of place, time, agent, and the like, one agent is by reasoning obtained for several causes, as supporting several parts of one act; so even, we may understand from the text, that there may be distinct acts of agents [otherwise] unseparated. Hence all those religious acts required for performance of sacred, as well as of more common rites, even of unseparated brethren, are separate for each, in manner of the distinctions in the nature of a consecrated and a common fire, and the like, though mutually connected. Even so the ġrāddha also, of the paternal uncle, brother, son, or other [dying without a son] at the Anuvāśya, and other [seasons], is even separate, by reason of the separation of the deified [person from the pārvama rite]: But the ġrāddha &c. of brothers [dying] without [maintenance of] a sacred fire, is to be executed by one instrument [or agent] only, because all the deified persons are conjointed. In case of separation of place, by residence abroad, the ġrāddhas are even separate. The [extra] acts with the fire, requisite for the rites of those who maintained a sacred fire, also are even separate; but the worship of the household deities, the Vaisvadeva and other rites, are to be done by one agent only. Even so Čakrīna says: “Residing with one dressing of food, worship of a single house-
hold deity, and moreover one single sacrifice at meals to the vīcva-
devs, or manes, shew unity. In a family of divided brethren, these
acts are performed in each house separately."

30. As for the text of Āgayānya, as quoted in the Pārijāta:

"Of those who reside with one dressing of food, even if [previously] separated, O my lord, one alone shall
perform those four sacrifices, which follow the Vāk-
yagna; if men of the twice-born classes, unseparated
as well as separated, have their meal dressed separate, let them each
celebrate these sacrifices distinct, previous to taking their food, day by
day;" it has reference to persons reunited [after separation], because
this conclusion is clearly ascertained, from the one phrase, "of separa-
ed persons also, residing with one dressing of food," and the other:
"of separated, and unseparated [coparceners," in the text].

31. Therefore, in case there be a separate dressing of food, among
reunited [coparceners], the great sacrifices [Mahā-
yagna] are separate. The Vākyagnya, is the Brahma
yagna. The phrase, those which follow it, is here
the atadgṛṇa form of a Bahlūrhi compound, [not
being a component part of that which it denotes]; or
if it were of the other form, [being a component part], the phrase, the
Vākyagnya, and the rest,' would be void of meaning; for the ascertainment
of all the four is certain, even from the fact that: In giving up
the first of the five ceremonies, there would be no attainment of the
end. Hence, the Brahma yagnya is to be even separately done. But
[after all], these two texts are not respected by venerable authors.

32. And these texts also, recorded in the Dharma Pravṛtti:

"Sons unseparated must celebrate one anniversary
Črāddha for both parents; if they be in different coun-
tries, they may perform separately [it, with] the
Darsa [or Amāvāsyā] and monthly Črāddhas: If
they be abroad in other towns, unseparated brethren
are, even at all times, to celebrate the Darsa and monthly Črāddha
for both parents, each separately: When unseparated, but resident in
different towns, each living upon the wealth acquired by himself, those
brothers should celebrate the Črāddha and Pārvaṇa, each separately,"
with the following one in the Sntī Śaṅkunāchāya; The Viçvedeva
sacrifice, and the anniversary Črāddha, as well as the Mahālaya [or
Pitru pakṣha] rite, are, in case the family be spread abroad, to be cele-
brated separately, and the Darsa Črāddha in like manner:" are by a
certain author, said to have reference to reunited brethren, residing in
different countries. The correct opinion however is, that these even
are all unauthentic.

33. Or else, if there be unity of place, time, agent, and the rest,
the instrumentality of one only, is found by reasoning.

Conclusion But where the agents are different, and the same re-
drawn. results by the text itself; for, in a difference of place,
there is a want of concurrence both of the text and reasoning too; and therefore, the separate performance of Črāddhas and
other rites, by any one of them whomsoever, is founded in reason; which is my conclusion.

34. Nārada, declares other signs also, of partition: 1 "Separated but not unseparated, brethren, may reciprocally bear testimony, become sureties, bestow gifts, and accept presents." "Gift and acceptance; cattle, grain, houses, land, and attendants, must be considered as distinct among separated brethren, as also the rules of gift; income, and expenditure." Those by whom such matters are publicly transacted with their coheirs, may be known to be separate, even without written evidence." Gift and acceptance have reference to borrowing transactions. These very terms, 'gift and acceptance,' are repeated in the second text 2 for the sake of clearness. Acceptance of cattle and the rest among separated persons, accomplished by each apart, is even the means of generating [sole] ownership: but among unseparated brethren, acceptance by one alone is the origin of the [joint] ownership of the others also. The rules of gift, written deeds, and the like. Income, entry [or accumulation] of principal and interest, or the like. Bhāspatī: 3 "They who have their income, expenditure, and wealth distinct, and have mutual transactions of money lending, and traffic, are undoubtedly separate." Yājñavalkya: 4 "It is declared, that brethren, husband and wife, father and son, cannot become sureties for each other before partition; nor reciprocally lend, nor give evidence for each other.

35. In default of all these signs of partition, ordeal [must be resorted to], since the very same author has declared: 5

In default of any marks, ordeal permitted.

3XXXIII. In the absence of all these, a divine test is prescribed." As for the text of Yiddha Yājñavalkya: "In doubts upon the subject of partition, the division must be proved by the kinsmen, witnesses, and written deeds: proof by ordeal is not to be;" it has reference to the existence of other signs.

36. In case also of total failure in ascertaining whether they were separated or united, a fresh partition is enjoined by Manu: 6 "When there is a doubt of partition among the co-heirs, a partition must be again made, even though they have taken separate places of abode." Nārada states the duties of separated coheirs 7 "When there are many persons, sprung from one man, who have their [religious] duties [dharma] apart, and transactions [kṛyā].

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2—Or the last, as here transposed, evidently by the fault of the transcribers. The reading of the last text is different, the 'rules of gift;' for 'diet.'
4—Digest 1st, 228.
5—Ante Chap. 1st, Sec 2d, para. 1st.
6—Not found in the Institutes.
7—Jim. Vā. 333. and notes. Digest 3d, 430.
apart, and are separate in the materials of work [karma gunā], if they be not accordant in affairs, should they give or sell their own shares, they do all that as they please: for they are masters of their own wealth." Duties; ceremonial, that is, the five great sacrifices, [para. 31,] and the like. Transactions, commerce, and the like worldly acts. The materials of work, household necessaries, and the like, as the means of performing the acts [of the householder]. By the separate existence of these, a partition is manifested. The sense is, that they, so separated, may [each], even without the consent of the others, make the gift, sale, or other alienation [of their respective shares].

37. As for the text of Bṛhaspati:1 "Separated heirs, as those who are unseparated, are equal in respect of immovables; for one has not power over the whole, to give, mortgage, or sell it;" according to Madana, it is for putting a stop to the right, among coheirs, even separated as to their shares of [moveable] effects, [though unseparated in other respects], to dispose, by gift or other "mode, without [general] consent, of grain, or the like, the produce of undivided fields, or other [fixed property]. According to Vijnānavarman and others, it is for the sake of obviating any future doubt, whether they be separated or united; for, by the consent of those unseparated, the facility of the transaction is ensured.

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38. The same author,2 with reference to one separated by his own wish, and afterwards disputing, says: "If he subsequently dispute a distribution, which was made with his own consent, he shall be compelled by the king to abide by his share, or be amerced if he persist in contention." Contention, pertinacious pursuit.

SECTION VIII.

On Obstructed Heritage, or Succession,—[Sapratibandha Dāya.]

1. Now, of the degrees of succession to obstructed heritage. Yajñavalkya thus relates the order of succession to the wealth of one [dying] separated, and not re-united:3 "The wife(α) and the daughters(β) also; both parents; brothers likewise, and their sons; gentiles, cognates, a pupil, and a fellow student: on failure of the first among these, the next in order is indeed heir to the estate of one, who departed for heaven leaving no male issue. This rule extends to all [persons and] classes."

1—Mīt. 237, Jīm. Vā. 31. The text is, in the first anonymous, and in the second, assigned to Vyāsa.
2—Digest 3d, 399.

(a) See Ravo Bhādr Sheno Bhādr v. Raopshunker Shankerjee 2 Borr. 657.—Ed.

(b) See cases digested in 1 Morl. Dig. 319, and Paramud v. Vahktaman; 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 223.—Ed.
2. The wife, if faithful to her husband, takes his wealth; not if she be unfaithful(c); for it is declared by Kātyāyana:

First, the wife "Let the widow succeed to her husband's wealth, provided she be chaste." So Hārīta says: "If a woman becoming a widow in her youth, be headstrong, [suspected of incontinence] a maintenance must in that case be given to her, for the support of life." Prajāpati: "Dying before her husband, a virtuous wife partakes of his consecrated fire; or if her husband die [before her, she shares] his wealth; this is a primeval law." Consecrated fire, all the [five sacred] fires. The same author says: "Having taken his movable and immovable property, the base and the precious metals, the liquids, and the clothes; let her duly offer his monthly, half-yearly, and yearly funeral repasts; with presents offered to his manes, and by pious liberality, let her honour the paternal uncle of her husband, his spiritual parents, and daughter's sons; the children of his sisters, his maternal uncles, and also ancient and unprotected persons, guests, and females, [of the family]." Base metals, namely, tin, lead, and the like.

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3. As for this text of Bṛhaspati: "Whatever property a man possesses, of every kind, after division, whether mortgaged, or other, that the wife, [in whatever form married, jāyas] shall enjoy after the death of her husband, with the exception of fixed property. Even if virtuous and if partition have been made, a woman is not fit to enjoy real property," it, according to the Śṛṅgī Chandrika, refers to a wife who has not [even] a daughter; for a woman having a daughter obtains the fixed property also. Mādhava, again, considers it to relate to the prohibition of sale, or other transfer, of real property, by a widow, without concurrence of the heirs.

4. As for this text of Kātyāyana: "After the death of the husband, the widow, preserving [the honor of] the family, shall obtain the shares of her husband, so long as she lives: but she has not property [therein, to the extent of] gift, mortgage, or sale: it is a prohibition of gift of money, or the like, to the Bandi, Chārana, and the like [swindlers]. But gift for religious objects [not visible], and mortgage of the like, suitable to those objects, may even be made,(d) since fixed and moveable property are

1—See post para. 9, and references. 2—Bṛhaspati, Jn. Vā. 158-9, Digest 3d 458.
3—Our author varies the reading, omitting mention of grains, after metals, and reading "ādikām yearly," for "ādikām, other."
4—Reports 1st, 55—3d, 668.
(c) See Doe J. Badamoney Ram & N. Niceoney Dos 1 Morl. Dig. 279; Montr. 314.—Ed.
(d) It has accordingly been held at Bombay that the widow of a Hindu, who died without male issue, might give away her husband's property in Kṣatriyāguna [grant of lands in propitiation of Kṣruṇa] notwithstanding the existence of her sister's son, provided she herself have no son, or other near heir of her own, whose rights would be affected by such gift of their inheritance to another. Kuppa Ramanns v. Secukram Sasamukur 1 Borl. 109; 1 Morl. Dig. 263.—Ed.
both noticed, in the above quoted text: "Having taken," &c. [para: 2d] and from this of Kātyāyana himself: "A widow, actively engaged in meritorious observances and fasts, constant in the duties of her widowhood, intent upon restraining [her passions], and making holy gifts, even if wanting a son, shall reach the heavenly abodes."

5. Moreover, the text of the same author 1 "Heirless property goes to the king, deducting however a subsistence for the females, as well as the funeral charges; but the goods belonging to a venerable priest [Cṛṇatiya] let him bestow on venerable priests:" and further that of Nārada: 2 Except the wealth of a Brāhmaṇa [property goes to the king on failure of heirs(e)]. A king, who is attentive to the obligations of duty, should give something as maintenance to the women of such persons. The law of inheritance is thus declared: 'have both reference to women set apart, 5 because the term, 'lawful wife' [Patiṇḍi], is not mentioned.

6. But as for this of Nārada: 4 "Among brothers, if any one die without issue, or enter a religious order, let the rest of the brethren divide his wealth, except the wife’s separate property. Let them allow a maintenance to his women for life, provided these preserve unsullied the bed of their lord. But if they behave otherwise, the brethren may resume that allowance," it relates to the women of one dying unseparated; [or] re-united, because the reading [of the text] is upon that very subject, according to Madana.

7. Kātyāyana: "But if her husband have departed for heaven, the wife obtains food and raiment: Or [too], if unseparated, she will receive a share of the wealth, so long as she lives." 3 The term unseparated is also an illustration of a re-united family. The word 'but [too]' has here the sense of ‘or.’ From this results a double object of the text, according to Madana: the last [hemistich] referring to a wife lawfully married; the first, to a woman set apart. The foundation of this exposition is to be considered. But [indeed] the same author clearly explains the real meaning: "She who is intent upon her service to her venerable Guru, is fit to enjoy the share assigned: should she not perform her proper duty, he shall order her [only] clothes [already] worn, and a morsel of food." Her Guru, her father in law, and other [venerable relatives]. At his pleasure, she may receive a share: otherwise, merely food and raiment. This is the meaning:

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1—Mit. 334. 2—Mit. 335 Jım. Vá. 177. Digest 3d, 540.
4—And in Vícáka’s Náruṇyāccha’s case it has been held by the Privy Council that even in the case of a Brāhmaṇa property escheats to the Crown on failure of heirs. Quære fœnus whether such property would not be subject in the hands of the crown to a trust in favour of Brāhmaṇas?—Ed.

(f) See cases digested 1 Morl. Dig. 438.—Ed.
8. The same author says: "But a wife, who does malicious acts injurious to her husband, who has no sense of shame, who destroys his effects, or who takes delight in being faithless to his bed, is held unworthy of separate property [stridhana]." As for this text: "Let them follow this very same rule also, with females degraded [by crime]: but clothes and grain are to be given to her, and let her be caused to reside within the house," it has reference to a husband [living], says a certain modern compiler. This very rule that is, regarding the divorce of a degraded [wife].

9. Even a mere maintenance is for a woman suspected of incontinence, from this text of Harrita: "If a woman, becoming a widow in her youth, be headstrong [suspected of incontinence], a maintenance must in that case be given to her for the support of life." Headstrong, according to the Mitakshara, means 'suspected of incontinence.' This establishes our argument [The wife, if faithful, &c., para. 2nd], that a lawfully married wife, restrained [in her conduct], takes the wealth. But if there be more than one, they will divide it, and take shares.(g)

10. In default of the wife, the daughter succeeds. Even as Mann says: "The son of a man is even as himself, and the daughter is equal to the son: how then can any other inherit his property, but a daughter, who is as it were himself?" If there be more daughters than one, they are to divide [the estate], and take [each a share].

11. In a case also, where some of them are married, and some unmarried, the unmarried ones alone [succeed], by reason of this text of Katyayana: "Let the widow succeed to her husband's estate, provided she be chaste; and in default of her, the daughter inherits, if unmarried."

12. Among the married ones, when some are possessed of [other] wealth, and others are destitute of any, these [last] even will obtain [the estate], from this text of Gaumama: "A woman's property goes to her daughters, unmarried, or unprovided for." Unprovided, destitute of wealth. These acquainted with traditional law, hold, that the word, 'woman's' [wife's] includes the father's also.

1—Digest 3d, 585, see post Sec. 10th, para. 12.
4—Mit. 326, 341. Ante para. 2.

(g) Equal shares, vide supra chap. iv. sec. iv. § 10.—Ed.
13. In default of daughters, the daughter’s son (succeeds), by the text of Vishnu: 1 “If a man leave neither son, nor son’s son, nor [wife, nor female] issue the daughter’s son shall take his wealth. For in regard to the obsequies of ancestors, daughter’s sons are considered as son’s sons. (b)"

14. In default of the daughter’s son, comes the father; in default of him, the mother (c); even as Katyayana says: 2 “The widow, being a woman of honest family, or the daughters, or on failure of them, the father, or the mother, or the brother, or his sons, are pronounced to be the heirs of one who leaves no male issue;” and likewise Vishnu: 3 “The wealth of him who leaves no male issue, goes to his wife; on failure of her, it devolves on daughters; in default of daughters, it devolves on the daughters’ sons; if there be none, it belongs to the father; if he be dead, it appertains to the mother; on failure of her, it goes to the brothers; after them it descends to the brother’s sons; if none exist, it goes to the relations [sakulya].”

15. As for the opinion of Vijñanavāraka: 4 “that in the complex term parents,’ the omission of one term and retention of the other [ekashce] constitutes an exception to the regular compound [dvandva], and although the order [of construction] be not certainly defined, yet the meaning [in favour of the mother’s priority] may be understood, because the word ‘mother’ stands first in the proper form of the compound; also, from the consecutive order of the particular compound [‘mother and father’] being the rule, of which the omission of one term and retention of the other [‘parents’] is the exception, and since the father is a common parent to many sons, whilst the mother is not so; therefore, of the two, the mother in the first instance takes the estate, and on failure of her the father; 5 it must be set aside, as contrary to those texts: for the word ‘mother’ being placed first, in the proper form of the compound, is an exception to the general rule, in regard to the option allowed for the omission of one term and retention of the other; and further, there is a want of proof, in fixing the proper order according to the diffusion or condensation [of the parental power].

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2—Mit. 320.

(b) And it has been held that a grandson through a deceased daughter is entitled to perform religious ceremonies for the benefit of the soul of his deceased grandfather, on the failure of a trustee, in preference to a daughter who is a childless widow; these two being the only issue of the deceased Stockmader Mullick v. Sreenaty Treepuvaah Seendry Joses Falt. 93. —Ed.

(c) This is the doctrine of the Dāya Bhāga, c. xi. s. i. 5: s. iii. s. iv.: 1. Murct. Dig. 321. According to the Mitakshara the mother succeeds before the father, Mit. c. ii. s. iii. 1—5.—Ed.

3—Mit. 323-350 note. Jīm. Vā. 160-194-196. Digest 3d, 459. The mention of ‘daughter’s sons,’ is omitted in the Mit. and even in some copies of Jīm. Vā.; and our author leaves out the name of “kinsmen” before relations. 4—Mit. 348.

5—The remarks on this intricate and contested subject in the notes to the Mitakshara, page 345, are too valuable and opposite to be omitted here. “The commentator [on the Mitakshara] Balamblattas, is of opinion, that the father should inherit first
16. In default of the mother, the uterine brother; in default of him, his son. As for the declaration of Vijnanavara and others, that in default of the uterine brother, those by different mothers succeed; on failure of them, the sons of the uterine brother, it is wrong: since the term 'brother' has the force of 'whole brother,' and a secondary quality is implied by the term, brother by another mother; and hence an exposition in favor of both, is contrary [to reason]. Some however say, upon the term 'brothers:' That since: "Brothers and sisters, with sons and daughters," is one of the maxims [of Pāṇini], and the term 'brothers and sisters,' resolves into [the complex term] 'brothers,' by the omission of one term and retention of the other, in a compound of two species: therefore, in default of brothers, the sister [succeeds]. But it is not so, because there is a want of proof [of the correctness] of omitting one term, and retaining the other, in a compound of two species.

17. The sons of a brother, also, if themselves fatherless at the time of the paternal uncle's death, provided they are capable of understanding [the use of] property, will divide the father's share with their father's other brothers, after the example: Among grandsons by different fathers, the allotment of shares is according to the fathers.

18. In default of brothers' sons succeed the gentile relations, [Gotraja] within the seventh degree, being connected by funeral oblations, [sapinda]. The first among these is the paternal grandmother, from this text of Manus: The mother also being dead, the father's mother shall take the heritage, [on failure of brothers and nephews.]" Even though she is [here] mentioned immediately next to the mother, still she is to be entered at the end, after the brother's sons, after the manner of the

and afterwards the mother; upon the analogy of more distant kindred, where the paternal line has invariably the preference, before the maternal kindred; and upon the authority of several express passages of law. Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita, author of commentaries on the Mitakṣara, and on the institutes of Visuṣu, had before maintained the same opinion. But the elder commentator of the Mitakṣara, Visuṣu Bhatta, has in this instance followed the text of his author, in his own treatise entitled Madana Pārījata, and has supported Vijnanavara's argument, both there and in his commentary named Subodhini. Much diversity of opinion does indeed prevail on this question. Čūkara maintains, that the father and mother inherit together: and the great majority of writers of eminence [as Anantarka and Kamalakara, and the authors of the Smṛti Chandrika, Madana Rāma, Varahāra, Mayākha, &c.] gives the father the preference before the mother. Nārāyaṇa and Kṛṣṇa Mahārāja have adopted this doctrine. But Vasudeva Misra, on the contrary, concurs with the Mitakṣara in placing the mother before the father; being guided by an erroneous reading of the text of Visuṣu, as is remarked in the Vīramīrṇī. The author of the latter work proposes to reconcile these contradictions by a personal distinction: If the mother be individually more venerable than the father, she inherits; if she be less so, the father takes the inheritance. In practice however, the question can never occur, unless the deceased had separated from his wife, which is seldom if ever done.

1—Mit. 347. 2—Mit. 346 note. 3—Ante Section 4, para 20th. See Mit. 318. Reports 2d, 29.

4—Chapter 9th, 217, Mit. 326-328-49, Jain. Vā. 19, Digest 3d, 503, Reports 1st, 190-292.
entry of [the śrāddha for] incidental persons at the end, [as deceased acquaintances, &c.], because the placing her in the middle [is in violation] of the rank fixed for each, as far as brother’s sons. [para. 1.]

19. In default of her, comes the sister($j$); under this text of Manu ¹ "To the nearest sapinda, [male or female], after him in the third degree, the inheritance next belongs;" and this of Brahaspati:² "Where many claim the inheritance of a childless man, whether they be paternal or maternal relations, [sakulya], or more distant kinsmen [bandhava], he who is the nearest of them shall take the estate." And [the next rank is] her’s, both from her being begotten under the brother’s family name, and there being no further reservation with respect to the gentile relationship [Gotrajatya]; it does not particularly specify the same gentile kindred. Neither is she mentioned in the text as the occasion of taking the wealth; [but as next of kin, she succeeds].

20. On failure of her, the paternal grandfather, and half-brother, are both to share and take it, their propinquity being equal, since the [deceased person’s] own father was begotten by the former of those two, and was himself the begetter, of the latter, as well as of the deceased. The propinquity being similar, and there being a want of any other notice, however slight, beyond the order of the text, or the like, therefore, in other cases also, we must act even thus. For this reason, in default of these two, the paternal great-grandfather, the father’s brother, and the sons of the half-brother, shall take and share it.

21. All the sapindaśas and the samānodakas follow, in the order of propinquity, as enumerated by Manu:³ "Now the relation of the Sapindaśas, [or men connected by the funeral cake], ceases with the seventh person, [or in the sixth degree of ascent or descent,] and that of Samānodakas, or those connected by an equal oblation of water, ends only when their births and family names are no longer known." The seventh, must be understood as of him passed away.

22. If no distant kinsmen [Sodaka] exist, then come the cognate kindred [Bandhū], who are thus specified in another Śruti:⁴ "The sons of his own father’s sister, the sons of his own mother’s sister, and the sons of his own mother’s brother, must be considered as his own cognate kindred.” The sons of his father’s paternal aunt,

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²—Digest 3d, 532.
³—Chap. 5th, 60, Jim. Va. 173-217. Reports 1st, 190-293.
⁴—Mit. 359. Digest 3d, 535. Reports 1st, 107-293.

the sons of his father’s maternal aunt, and the sons of his father’s maternal uncle, must be deemed his father’s cognate kindred.” “The sons of his mother’s paternal aunt, the sons of his mother’s maternal aunt, and the sons of his mother’s maternal uncles, must be reckoned his mother’s cognate kindred.” Here also, the order [of succession] is even the order of the text.

23. If on the other hand [it be said]: ‘As the right of the wife and all the others, in succession to the wealth, is derived from the deceased himself alone, even so that of the cognate kindred is derived in like manner from him: What title then can the cognates of the father or of the mother [of the deceased] have to the wealth? The term ‘sons of the sister of the father’s father,’ and the like, is only for the sake of shewing the connexion between the name and person, and does not mean a connexion with the wealth.’ [I answer]: Even without that text, if, after the example of ‘the father’s maternal uncle, his paternal uncle,’ and the rest, in like manner also, the continuous application of that term [cognate among the father’s and the mother’s cognates be held to exist, by conjunction [of kin through some intermediate person], we should have the absurdity of rendering unintelligible, the connexion between name and persons. Hence, the text is intelligible only by the acceptance of paternal and maternal cognates, in considering that subject in the rules of succession to property. The conclusion is, that the very same applies, by the declaration of the cognate affinity, in the rules for impurity and other [mutual obligations].

24. In default of cognate kindred, the preceptor; on failure of him, the pupil; by this text of Āpastamba: “If there be no male issue, the nearest kinsman inherits: or, in default of kindred, the preceptor; or, failing him, the disciple.”

25. In default of the pupil, the fellow-student is the successor: in default of him, a Četrośi; from the text of Gaṇatama: “Venerable priests [Četrośi] should share the wealth of a Brāhmaṇa, who leaves no issue.”

26. In default of such an one, any other Brāhmaṇa, by reason of this text of Kātyāyana: “But in default of all those the lawful heirs are such Brāhmaṇas, as have read the three Vedas, as are pure [in body and mind], as have subdued their passions. Thus virtue is not lost.” And Nārada says the same: “In every case, the king may take the wealth of a subject dying without an heir, except the estate of a Brāhmaṇa: for the property of a Brāhmaṇa dying without an heir, must be given to Četrośiyas.[k]

1—See, Mit, 353, note, where our author’s doctrine is quoted. 2—3—Mit, 353. 4—Manu, Chap. 9th, 183. Mit, 353. 5—Digest 5d, 538, where it is assigned to Devala.

(k) But now see the case above cited.—Ed.
In all other cases, the king.

28. Yājñavalkya states a distinction with regard to the estates of ascetics and the like: ‘The heirs of a hermit, of an ascetic, and of a student [Brahmachāri] are, in their order, the preceptor, the virtuous pupil, and the spiritual brother, and associate in holiness.’ The student, a perpetual one, for the father and the rest even are [the natural heirs] of a temporary student. The spiritual brother, one who has agreed to bear the appellation of brother. An associate in holiness, one appertaining to the same hermitage. ‘Being a spiritual companion, and belonging to the same hermitage is a compound of nouns designating the same person,’ [Karmadāśāyanam samāsa]. According to Vijñānavara, [the succession] of preceptors and the rest, is in the inverse order. But Madana prefers the direct order. From this text of Vishnu: ‘The spiritual preceptor shall take the property of a deceased hermit.’

29. The funeral rites of the deceased, as far as the tenth day’s rites inclusive, must be performed by that person [among the heirs] who takes the estate, whoever it may be, [from the wife, downwards] even as far as the king himself(1). Even thus Vishnu says: ‘He who is heir to the estate, is the giver of the funeral oblations.’

This same matter has been fully explained by me in the Čraddha Mayūkha, in determining the order of those entitled to perform them.

SECTION IX.

Of Re-union after Partition.—[Śrutvisāya]
father, and the rest, are merely as a part to denote the whole, of the persons who make the partition, after the example: "He measures the altar, half within, and half without;" otherwise, there would be a division of the text itself [into three]. Hence, re-union may take place with a wife, a paternal grandfather, a brother's grandson, a paternal uncle's son, and the rest also. "He who, being once separated [from the co-heirs] dwells again [in common, is termed] re-united." From joint location [of such an one], the sense of separated brothers, [one's own] sons, and the like, does not result. [When two settle thus]: 'The present, of future, wealth of us two, is common property, until we make a partition a second time,' when there exists such a sign, either by an understanding or expressed wish, it is an union.

2. In this place, Mann states a distinction: "If brethren, once divided and living again together as parencers, make a second partition, the shares must in that case be equal: there is not in this instance any right of primogeniture [Jyeshtyam]." Here, some say: 'that, the unequal distribution being set aside by the phrase, the shares must in that case be equal, the prohibition of the 'eldest son's right' is repeated [though contrary to rules of composition] for the sake of making it clearly understood, that although there is to be no inequality in making up the share of the eldest, yet in the distribution the shares may be even unequal, when made up of greater and lesser shares, at the time of re-uniting the property.'

3. But since the term, 'eldest son's right' [Jyeshtyam] and the like, is merely a declaration of the general meaning; therefore, if [the contributions to] the wealth were greater and less, still the share of each must be equal. And the same is the popular practice. Hence, as the foundation of the practice is derived from this text, any supposition of a declaration contrary thereto, is at variance with reason; for another author has said: "The body of the law, like Grammar, furnishes, for the most part, the foundations of popular customs."

4. Brhaspati: "If any one of the re-united brethren acquire wealth by science, valour, or the like [with the use of the joint stock], two shares of it must be given to him, and the rest shall have each a share." According to Madana, the meaning of the text is, that a double share being established for the acquirer, by the phrase, 'to the acquirer, two shares; then, in a partition among [unseparated] brethren not re-united, he gets two shares, only in what he has acquired without detriment to the father's wealth, but in a [fresh] partition among re-united brethren.

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2—Jim. Vâ. 155. Digest 3d, 551. 3—See Sec. 7th, para. 6.
he gets two shares of what was acquired by him, even if at the detri-
mament of the re-united property.

5. Vyājñavalkya enumerates the order of those entitled to suc-
cceed to the wealth or one re-united: "As of a re-
united [coheir], the re-united [coheir], so, of the uterine
brother, the uterine brother," which is an exception
to the regular succession [failing male issue], of. "The
wife, the daughters," and the rest. Hence, this mean-
ing results, that it is the re-united parenesship, and
not the condition of the wife [the daughter], and the
rest, which causes a preponderance of the right of in-
heriting the property of a re-united pareener.

6. As for the doctrine of Vyājñiveçvara, Madana, and others
That this also refers to one devoid of son, grandson,
or great grandson, both from the maxim 'that the sub-
ject forming an exception be of a nature similar to
that [of the rule] which is rejected,' and from the
want of connexion between the terms of the former
text: "Of one who departed for heaven leaving no
male issue," and the present one: therefore, even though there exist a
wife, or other un-reunited near heir, of such any one dying after re-
union, still, the others alone who had re-united with him, will take
his estate; it must be considered. Since, [in the second case], there
is a want of proof, in the connexion, if the text is to be carried on even
without that rule: nor [in the first case], is the complete similarity [of
the rule and exception] to be looked for, in all cases of share, but only
in a few points; [as may be instanced] from the nature of a 'deceased'
Sapinda, where, in default of connexion between the term, 'leaving no
male issue,' and that of, 'one who departed for heaven,' they would
not find the term, ' of one deceased.' Yet it cannot be so, for that very
term is found in the text of Manu, to be presently adduced [para. 13]:
"be deprived of his allotment at the distribution, or should any one
of them die:" But if connexion [of the terms] be allowed, we should,
in the case of sons, some re-united with the father, and some not re-
united, or of grandsons so situated with sons, have them shares
sharing equally, which is a contradiction: and in the case of one having
male issue, this text does not apply.+

7. And here again, [such connexion] is at variance with that
practice, the origin of which may be demonstrated to be in the general
code of Law, [para. 3]. But [should it be said], 'though the text be
inapplicable, in the case of one having male issue; in default of such
connexion; yet if there be an assemblage of sons not re-united, with

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1—Mit. 396, Jóm. Vá 209: Digest 3d, 597. A literal and connected version
of this text, is required in this place, to understand clearly the succeeding argument: "Of
the re-united [coheir], the re-united [coheir]; so, of the uterine brother, the uterine
brother: shall either give up, or shall retain the share;" [giving it up] if a son were born
of him, or [retaining it] if he died [without one]."

2—3—Section 8th, para. 1st.

4—In some of the copies, this sentence is not to be found in this place.
brothers re-united, or the like, then the brothers and others [re-united] would obtain the wealth, not the sons or others [not re-united]; it is not so; because in the last hemistich of the [above] text, it will be shown to be unworthy of respect.

8. The sense of the first quarter [of the whole text]: "Of a re-united [cohei], the re-united [cohei]." has an exception in the second quarter, of the uterine brother," with which the other is connected. The meaning therefore is, that, in a case embracing both whole and half brothers, all re-united together, only the re-united whole brother will take the wealth of the re-united brother deceased. The last hemistich is as follows:

"Shall give up the share, to [a son at any time] born; or shall retain it, if he died [without issue]." and the sense of it is this: 'If the pregnancy of the wife of a deceased re-united cohei, be unascertained at the time of dividing the [re-united] property, and a son be afterwards born, the paternal uncle or other re-united [parcener] shall give the share to that son; but on failure of him, he [the uncle, &c.] himself shall take it.'

9. Here, the filial relation alone affords the right of taking the father's share; not the fact of production posterior to the partition, since this cannot cause such a result besides, it creates [unnecessary] proximity [to specify: 'subsequently' born], and [thirdly], would have the absurdity of denying the [known] right to a share, in the case of a son produced in another part of the country previous to partition, but unknown [at the time]. Therefore, to the son previously born even, though not re-united, the uncle, or other [parcener] though re-united, shall give his share.

10. The same author propounds the right, of an uterine brother not re-united, and a half-brother re-united, in taking shares of the wealth: One of a different womb, being again associated, may take the succession; not one of a different womb; if not reunited: but [a whole brother, if reunited, obtains the property; and not [exclusively] the son of a different mother." Here, from the terms, one of a different womb; son of a different mother, the half brother alone is not designated, but the paternal uncle, and others likewise, because there is nothing to distinguish such association: for, if otherwise, we should have the absurdity of rendering senseless the union with uncles, and the rest, already established [by the

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1—Of the text with which para. 5, commenced. Mit. 357, Jím. Vá.
2—This seems likewise to be the doctrine of the Subodhini, Cole. Mit. 358. note.
3—Yājñavalkya Mit. 358. Jím. Vá. 201. Of the readings mentioned there, our author adopts. "Nāryodaryo dhaman haret, and Saṁvriti mānyamahi'rajaḥ." The translation of some of the terms is here altered, to suit the gloss.
text at para. 1.] And there is a want of any other acts suitable to a state of re-union.

11. *If not re-united;* this term applies to those both preceding and following it as a lamp upon a threshold [gives light both within and without]. So, the word re-united, by varying the application of it, is to be understood of the whole brother, as entitled by union, both of the wealth and also of the womb. The word if, occurring in the former phrase, is to be understood immediately after this, as well as at the end of the text. The word exclusively [even, etc] should be supplied.

12. The following are the meanings of the terms of this text:

Exposition of the text.

'One of a different womb,' that is, one of a separate womb; [such], the wife, the father, the father's father, the half brother, the paternal uncle, and others, if they be re-united, may take the wealth. If not re-united, those of a different womb do not [succeed]. Hence, by reason of the rule respecting fitness and dissimilitude, the re-union of one of a different womb, is declared as the reason for his taking the wealth. A whole brother, termed 're-united,' [by union of the womb], even if not re-united [by union of the wealth], will take the property. By this reasoning, the community of womb alone even, is declared a sufficient reason. So, one re-united, as possessing union of wealth; but if only born of a different mother, he will not take any thing whatever.

13. From the above results, that, the one from his re-union, the other from his community of womb, both jointly share and take it [between them]. Manu 2 specially determines this very principle, in the right of succession among re-united persons: "Should the eldest, or youngest, of several brothers, be deprived of his allotment at the distribution, or should any one of them die, his share shall not be lost: but the uterine brothers and sisters, and such as were re-united after a separation, shall assemble together and divide his share equally." Be deprived of, by entering another order, by degradation from sin, or the like. Uterine, must be joined with brothers, in construction. And such as were re-united, that is, the wife, the father, the paternal grandfather, the half brother, the paternal uncle, and the rest, [para. 1].

14. On this point, Prajapati states a distinction: "Whatever concealed wealth is brought to light, becomes the property of the re-united possessors: but lands and houses, those not re-united shall entirely take, according to their shares." Concealed wealth, what is capable of being hidden, by depositing in the ground, or otherwise, as gold, silver, or the like. Such, those re-united, that is, of a different womb, shall take: but landed property, the uterine brother [takes]. Kine, horses, and other [animals],

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1—Coly, Digest 1st, 9 note. "In Logic, Auvya, and Vyātiroka; the first is the relation of events, of which whenever one occurs, the other also occurs; the second is the connexion of circumstances, of which when one occurs not, the other also does not occur."

2—Chapter 9th, 211-12, Mit. 259. Ji. u. Va. 210, Digest 3rd, 475.
the uterine and he of a different womb [shall share]. According to Madana, he of a different womb alone, if re-united, will take the houses, horses, and the like; but it is not so noted in the text.

15. According to the Śrīveti Chandrikā: 'But if there exist only one species of property, out of the [above sources, as] concealed wealth, land, kine, and the rest, the uterine brother alone, even not re-united, takes it.' The proof of this must be considered. Among uterine brothers, if some of them are re-united, but other brothers not, nevertheless, those re-united alone will take the wealth, because community of womb, and re-union, exist as a double cause [of succession]. Even so Gautama: "When a re-united [parcevor] dies, his re-united coheir shares his estate," and Bīhaspati: "Two brothers, who become re-united through affection, [after being separated] share mutually."

16. Here, this is the refined sense: 'A son, whether re-united with his father, or not re-united, shall obtain the entire paternal share, since the power of intercepting the right to take a share, lies in the filial relation. Among [several] sons also, when one is re-united, and the other is not, the re-united one alone [succeeds], by the text [para. 5th]: "Of a re-united [coheir] the re-united [coheir]."

17. In a case of reunion, between a father, son, and any other, not being his son, the son alone [succeeds], because the same has already been declared [para. 8th], by the terms: "shall either give up, or shall retain, &c."

18. In an assemblage of father, brothers, paternal uncles, and others, not being sons, re-united, the parents alone [take it]. Of them again, the mother is first, and then the father, according to Madana.

19. But [after them] the brother, paternal uncle and the rest, shall even take and share it [equally]: for among them all, the state of union exists, as the cause whence their right of taking [shares] is derived.

20. So likewise, in an assemblage of un-reunited brothers, re-united paternal uncles, half-brothers and others, they even share it [in common], by reason of the two phrases [the one, para 10]: "If not re-united; but [a whole brother, if] re-united, obtains the property: and not [exclusively], the son of a different mother." (the other para. 5): "As of a re-united [coheir] the re-united [coheir], so of the uterine brother, the uterine brother."

21. In case of the re-union of the wife alone, she alone takes it, from the same text; "of a re-united [coheir] the re-united [coheir]."
22. In an assemblage of the other persons, reunited together with her also reunited, they alone [succeed]; she does not.

Moreover, in commencing the topic of reunion, both Çankha and Nârada have declared: "Among brothers, if any one die without issue, or enter a religious order, let the rest of the brethren divide his wealth, except the wife's separate property. Let them allow a maintenance to his women for life, provided these preserve unsullied the bed of their lord: but if they behave otherwise the brethren may resume that allowance." "The maintenance of the daughter of such an one, is enjoined, to be made out of her father's share: if still uninitiated, she will take a share [for the purpose]; if [he died] after that, her husband shall support her."

23. And here, like as no necessity exists for gifts in honour of the deceased at the Abhyudayeshti sacrifice, because there can be no doubt of the existence of materials for it, even so, the term, among brothers, is not [necessarily] required, since from the very commencement, there is a certainty of the agency of reunited persons, in the shares, or like [succession], by death, or entry into a religious order.

24. As for what Çankha, in proceeding to expound reunion, says:

"Of those also, departed for heaven without male issue, the property goes to the brothers: In default of them, both parents will take it, or the eldest wife," it, according to Madana, is intended to fix the order of the un-reunited brothers, and the others, upon the death of one dying reunited, subsequent to the death of his paternal uncle, brother's son, or half brother, with whom he had previously made a reunion. And, according to the same authority, in this case also, first is the mother, and next the father [para. 18]. The eldest that is, she who [best] preserves her duty.

25. In default of a wife, the sister; according as Bhāspati says: "His sister also, is entitled to take a share of it. This law concerns one who leaves no issue, nor wife, nor parent." Some read, his daughter. In default [therefore] both of daughter and sister, the nearest sapinda succeeds.


2—This passage, from the Vedas, is left imperfect, the Çāstris professing not to understand it themselves.

SECTION X.

Of a Woman's Peculiar Property.—(Sridhara.)

1. Manu: 1 “What was given before the nuptial fire [Adhyagni] what was presented in the bridal procession [Adhyayavanika] what was given in token of love [Pratidatta] and what was received by her from her brother, her mother, or her father, are denominated the six-fold property of a woman.”

2. Six-fold, is here used in order to prevent its reduction to a smaller number, a position which bome out by the word other in the following text of Yajnavalkya: 2 “What was given to a woman by the father, the mother, the husband or a brother; or received by her at the nuptial fire [Adhyagni], or presented on her supersession [adhivedanika(a)], as also any other [separate acquisition], is denominated a woman's property.” Vishnu likewise specifies more than those six: “What has been given to a woman by her father, her mother, her son, or her brother; what has been received by her before the nuptial fire, [Adhyagnyapaga], what has been presented to her on her husband's espousal of another wife [adhivedanika], what has been given to her by kindred, as well as her perquisites [Culka], and a gift subsequent [Anvadvayavika], are a woman's separate property.”

3. In explanation of property given before the nuptial fire [Adhyagni] and the other kinds, Katyayana: 4 says: “What is given to women at the time of their marriage, near the nuptial fire, is celebrated by the wise as woman's property bestowed before the nuptial fire [Adhyagnika].” “That again, which a woman receives whilst she is conducted from her father's house [to her husband's dwelling] is instanced as the property of a woman, under the name of gift presented in the bridal procession [Adhyayavanika].” What has been given to her through affection by her mother-in-law, or by her father-in-law; or has been offered to her as a token of respect, is denominated an affectionate present [Pratidatta].” “What has been received by a woman at time subsequent to her marriage, from

(a) See Montrion note ix. Morl. Dig. 598. She may sue her husband for it.—Ed.
3—Jim. Va. 63. Digest 3d, 562, where for ‘son’, is read ‘friend’.
5—Mit. 306, note.
the family of her husband, is called a gift subsequent [Anvādiḥciyika], and so is that which has been similarly received from her own family"¹⁻². Whatever is received by a woman as the value of household utensils, of beasts of burden, of milk or curd, or ornaments of dress, or for works, is called her perquisite [Kulka]. The meaning is, when the bride does not [as usual] obtain household utensils and the rest, then, whatever is given to her at the time of her marriage as the price of them, is termed her perquisite. What she receives on her supersession [Adhvīdeanika] is explained by Yājñavalkya:³ “To a woman, whose husband marries a second wife, let him give an equal sum [as a compensation] for the supersession, provided no separate property have been bestowed on her: but if any have been assigned, let him allot half.” Half, here means only so much as will [when added to her own property, make it] equal to the [prescribed] amount of supersession.

4. Devala: “That which a husband has promised for separate property [strīdhana] must be made good by his sons, even as a debt.” Promised, to his wife [strīyal].

5. On the subject of giving property to women, Kātyāyana further declares: “Separate property, excepting immovable, is to be given to women by their father, mother, husband, brother, and kindred, according to their means, as far as two thousand.” The wealth to be given excludes immovable property, and must not exceed two thousand panas, according to Madana. So Vyāsa:⁴ “A present, amounting to two thousand panas, ‘at the most, may be given to a woman, out of the wealth.’ And this sum, of two thousand [panas] at the outside, is to be given every year, so that in a period of many years, more would be by this [means be given]. If they are able, even immovable property may be given, according to the same, [Madana.]”

6. But, in property given to a woman with a view of cheating the heirs out of it, as well as ornaments or the like, given to her merely for the purpose of wearing, a woman has no ownership [or property]; for thus says Kātyāyana: “But whatever has been given to women with a fraudulent design, as well as entrusted to them for use, by their father, brother, or their husband, is declared not to be women’s property, [Strīdhana].”

¹—Mit. 337, Jam. Vā. 69, and note. The Mayūkha follows the reading of the Ratnakara, “Svākūlāh tathā.”
²—Digest 3d, 563. Jam. Vā. 92, and note. The reading of the Digest, as far as it agrees with the gloss of our author, is retained.
⁴—See Chap. 22nd, for the value of the pana. Of the various readings of this text noticed in Jam. Vā. 72, our author adopts: “Dvīsāharaḥ para dayā.” Digest 33rd, 53.
7. In what they have earned by the arts, or obtained from friends or those distinct from parents or the rest, women have no property; for thus says the same author: "The wealth, which is earned by mechanical arts, or which is received through affection from any other [but the kindred], is always subject to her husband's dominion. The rest is pronounced to be the woman's property." However, though a text says: "A wife, a son, and a slave, are [in general] incapable of property [Nirdhana]: the wealth which they may earn, is [regularly acquired for the man to whom they belong]: it also relates [only] to wealth earned by mechanical arts and the like. It is moreover agreeable to reason, to refer this also to their not having absolute dominion in wealth received on their supersession [Adhivedanika] and the rest.

8. Again, though Manu says: "A woman should never make expenditure from the goods of her kindred [which are] common to [her and] many; or even from the property of her lord without his assent." (Expenditure, is disbursement,) yet, in some kinds of wealth, they are declared to possess sole property, by Katyāyana: "That which is received by a married woman, or with a maiden, in the house of her husband, or of her father, from her brother or from her parents, is termed the gift of affectionate kindred [Saudāyaka]. The independence of women, who have received such gifts, is recognised in regard to that property, for it was given by their kindred to soothe them, and for their maintenance." "The power of women over the gifts of their affectionate kindred is ever celebrated, both in respect of donation and of sale, according to their pleasure, even in the case of immovable.

9. But over immovable property given them by their husbands, they do not possess full power, from this text of Nārada: "What has been given by an affectionate husband to his wife, she may consume as she pleases, when he is dead, or may give it away, excepting immovable property."(a)

10. The non-existence of absolute power, in husbands and the rest, over women's property, is declared by the same author: "Neither the husband, nor the son, nor the father, nor the brothers, can assume the power over a woman's property, to take it or bestow it: If any of these persons by force consume the woman's property, he shall be compelled to make it good with interest,

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6—Jim. Vā. 77. Digest 3rd, 574., where it is attributed to Katyāyana.
and shall also incur a fine. If such person, having obtained her consent, use the property amicably, he shall be required to pay the principal when he becomes rich.” Manu: “Such kinsmen, as [by any pretence] appropriate the fortunes of women during their lives, a just king must punish with the severity due to thieves.”2 “Such ornamental apparel, as women wear during the life of their husbands, the heirs of the husband shall not divide among themselves; they who do so, are degraded from their tribe.” Wear, meaning, things worn by them, which have been given to them for the purpose by their husbands or the others. Devala:3 “Her maintenance, ornaments, perquisite, and gain, are the separate property of a woman; she herself exclusively enjoys it, and her husband has no right to it unless in distress.”4 “If he let it go on a false consideration, or consume it, he must repay the value to the woman with interest; but he may use the property of his wife, to relieve a distressed son.” Maintenance, wealth given by her father, or the others, for the purpose of subsistence. Gain, interest [or profit]. To let go, get rid of, and give away, have all the same meaning in this place. The word son is here used in its general sense, for [any member of] the family. Yajnavalkya5 “A husband is not liable to make good the property of his wife, taken by him in a famine, or for the performance of some religious duty, or during illness, or while under restraint.” Here, by using the word husband alone, it is virtually declared, that woman’s private property must not be taken by any other but him, even when distressed by a famine or other calamity. Religious duties, such as are indispensable. Under restraint, in prison.

11. In some cases a husband, though unwilling, may be forced to restore it; for, says Devala:6 “But if the husband have a second wife, and do not show honour to his first wife, he shall be compelled by force to restore her property, though amicably lent to him. If suitable food, raiment, and dwelling, be withheld from the woman, she may exact her own [property,] and take a share [of the estate] with the co-heirs.” That is, at their hands.

1—Chapter 8th, 22.


3—Jim. Va. 7c, and the note there. Cole on Oblig. 233, Digest 3rd, 577. At the present day, where the woman’s dower is high, it is put out at interest, which is the meaning given to gain, by Jim. Vā. and his commentators.

4—Digest 3d, 577.


6—Jim. Vā. 77. Digest 3d, 581; but by both it is attributed to Katyāyana, and joined to the foregoing texts of that author.
12. This however, relates to a virtuous wife, for a wicked one should receive no portion; and accordingly, the same author says: "A wicked wife gets no separate property or portion."

13. The right of succession after a woman's decease, that [part of her] private property which is entitled a gift subsequent, [Anuvâdhayy(a)] is thus settled by Manus: "What she received after marriage [Anuvâdhaya] from the family of her husband, and what her lord may have given her through affection [pratidatta] shall be inherited, even if she die in his life-time, by her children [Pradâ]."

The term children is thus explained by the same author: "On the death of the mother, let all the uterine brothers, and the uterine sisters, equally divide the maternal estate."

14. When, from non-existence of daughters and the rest, the right of inheritance devolves even to the sons, from their connexion, then it becomes reciprocal. When this right is taken up by unmarried daughters, then [the son's succession arising from] that connexion, is at end: but, according to the Mitâkshara, it is not declared that the succession pertains [equally or] reciprocally to the brothers and unmarried sisters, yet, it has been said by others: It is declared, that there is no original connexion of sons and daughters, in property received by their mother after marriage [Anuvâdhaya], or given by her husband through affection [Pradâdatta].

15. The distinctions in succession among daughters, are pointed out by Manus: "A woman's property goes to her children, and the daughter is a sharer with them, provided she be not given away; but if married, she receives a mere token of respect." Is a sharer, shares equally with the sons. Not given away, unmarried. It means, that if there be one [unmarried], then the
married [daughter] receives a mere token of respect, that is, only something very small. If there be no unmarried daughter, the share of the married daughter is equal to that of the brothers, according to the text of Kātyāyana: 1 “Married sisters shall share with [brothers or] kinsmen.”

16. Some trifle also must be given to the daughters of those daughters, according to the text of Manu 2: “Even to the daughters of those daughters something should be given, as may be fit, from the assets of their maternal grandmother, on the score of natural affection.”

CLVII.

17. But all acquired by marriage [Yautaka] goes to the unmarried daughter alone, not to the son. So a prior text of the same: “Property given to the mother on her marriage [Yautaka] is inherited by her [unmarried] daughter.” Property given on her marriage, whatever is received by her at the time of marriage or other [ceremony] whilst seated together with her husband; for, according to Madana: ‘The word Yautaka, is, in the Nighantu, derived from their being then joined together [Yuta].’

18. In respect to woman’s property, before enumerated in the texts of other sages, distinct from that acquired subsequent to marriage [Anvādhaya] or through their husband’s affection [Pritidatta], these distinctions are declared by Gautama: 3 “A woman’s property goes to her daughters, unmarried or unprovided.” Unprovided, such as are destitute of wealth.

19. The daughter of a Brāhmanī wife, however, shall take the wealth of her step mother; thus Manu 4: “The wealth of a woman, which has been in any manner given to her by her father, let the Brāhmanī damsels take; or let it belong to her offspring.” By giving the particle or the sense of ‘and,’ we have it, ‘and shall be shared by [her issue].’ Some say, that the word Brāhmanī is used to denote any girl of equal or superior caste, but the proof of this must be well examined.

20. If there be no daughters, then the issue of those daughters succeeds, according to the text of Nārada 5: “Let daughters divide their mother’s wealth; or, on failure of daughters, their male issue [tad anvaya.”]

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1—Digest 3d, 594. 2—Chap. 9th, 133. Mit. 570. Digest 3d, 600.
3—Chap. 9th, 131, Jim. Vā. 82, and notes. 4—Auto, Sec. 8th, para, 12. Reports 2d, 445.
6—Mit. 370 and note. Jim. Vā. 82. In the former, it is translated “their male issue,” in the latter, “her male issue,” our author prefers the former; see para. 25.
21. A distribution among daughters by different mothers, as well as among the different daughter's sons, to be just, must be apportioned after the example of that prescribed for the sons of different fathers, where the partition is according to their father's shares [not to the number of the sons of each father.]

22. However, Yājñavalkya says:2 "The daughters share the residue of their mother's property, after payment of her debts, and the issue succeeds in their default." And here again, some say, the word issue [ānvaya.] has reference to the offspring of the daughters; whilst others hold, that if she leave no daughter, even her sons may take it, since the word tad3 in the text of Nārada above, distinctly points out the mother alone; and this [first] doctrine agrees with custom. The residue after payment of her debts; on this subject those acquainted with the ancient law have declared, that the sons alone must take the property, [if only] equal to, or less than, the amount of debt.

23. If daughters or the rest do not exist, the sons, grandsons, and the rest must take it, for thus it is declared by Kātyāyana:4 "But on failure of daughters, the inheritance belongs to the son."

24. This right of inheritance, of daughters and the rest, in the mother's property, exists only in wealth given before the nuptial fire [adhyāgni.] and in the bridal procession, [adhyāvāhanika.] and the other [kinds] above recorded in the texts [paras. 1—2—3.] specifying woman's property; for, if relating to all wealth in which their mother has any property, it would go to set aside those texts [limiting it to six.]

25. From this we must understand, that the often repeated term 'woman's property,' which Bṛhaspati, Gautama, and the rest, have adopted; for example: "A woman's property goes to her children," [para. 15.] "A woman's property goes to her daughters," [para. 18.] and the like, relates even to the texts above delivered. As many again as, even without actually keeping the phrase, 'woman's property,' have parallel expressions, such as, 'divide the maternal estate,' [Manu, para. 13.] or the like, all those in like manner have reference to the same texts, by a combination of objects having the same origin.

1—See Section 4th, para. 20. 2—Mit. 266-7-393. Jim. Vā. 52.
3—Our compilers read tadā, following the modern Benares copy, but it is evidently wrong, the whole argument running on the word tad as a pronom.
4—Jim. Vā. 52, Digest 3d, 594.
26. However, the text of Yajñavalkya: "Let sons divide equally both the effects and the debts, after the demise of their two parents:" relates to what is acquired by the act of partition and the like, with the exception of that declared in the above texts as woman’s property. From this it is clear that, if there be daughters, the sons or other heirs even succeed to the mother’s estate, distinct from that part before described (as woman’s property.)

27. Again, if there be no offspring of either sex, the further succession is declared by Yajñavalkya, referring to the abovementioned woman’s property: “Her kinsmen [Bándhavá] take it, if she die without issue.”

28. The same author expounds the succession of kindred [Bánchávara] to be according to the different kinds of marriage: “The property of a childless woman married in the form denominated Bráhma, or in any of the other four [unblamed modes of marriage,) goes to her husband: but if she leave progeny, it will go to her daughters; and in other forms of marriage [as the Áśura, &c. it goes to her father, and mother, on failure of her own issue.”] [In the one case,] if there be no husband, then the nearest to her in her [tati] own family takes it; and [in the other case,] if her father do not exist, the nearest to her in [her] father’s family succeeds, [for the law that:] “To the nearest sapinda, the inheritance next belongs,” as declared by Manú4 denotes, that the right of inheriting her wealth, is derived even from nearness of kin to the deceased [kษásé] under discussion—and, though the Mitákshará holds, ‘that on failure of the husband, it goes to his [tati] nearest kinsmen [sapinda] allied by funeral obligations;' and, ‘on failure of the father, then to his [tati] nearest sapindas;’ yet, from the context it may be demonstrated, that her nearest relations are his nearest relations; and [the pronoun [tati] being used in the common gender,) it allows of our expounding the passage (those nearest to him, through her, in his own family;) for the expressions are of similar import.

29. In the Bráhma or in any of the other four, relates to the Bráhmanical class, on account of these [rites] being the only ones lawful in respect to them. But as the Bándhavá rite is also lawful to the Kshatriya class and the rest, so also, the wealth of her who has been married ac-

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1.—Mit. 263. Jims. Vá. 55. The last hemistich of this text was quoted above, para. 22. See section 4th, para. 17.
3.—Mit. 368. Jims. Vá. 86. Digest 3rd, 606. These rites are explained, Digest 3rd, 634.
5.—Page 365. The correctness of this version is doubtful.
CLX. According to that form devolves to her husband alone. And so Manu: "It is ordained, that the property of a woman, married by the ceremonies called Brāhma, Daiva, Arsha, Gandharva, or Prājapatiya, shall go to her husband, if she die without issue." "But her wealth, given on the marriage called Āsura, or on either of the two others Paścācha and Rākṣasā] is ordained, on her death without issue, to become the property of her mother and her father."

30. On failure of the husband of a deceased woman, if married according to the Brāhma or other [four] forms; or of her parents, if married according to the Āsura or other two forms, the heirs to the woman's property, as expounded above, are thus pointed out by Brhaspati: "The mother's sister; the maternal uncle's wife; the paternal uncle's wife; the father's sister; the mother-in-law, and the wife of an elder brother, are pronounced similar to mothers. If they leave no son born in lawful wedlock, nor daughter's son, nor his son, then the sister's son and the rest shall take their property." Here must be understood, 'on failure both of the daughter, and also of her daughter,' because only on failure of them does the right of inheritance pertain to the son born in wedlock, or to the daughter's son.

The son in that case inherits presents from kin-dered.

And the brothers get the perquisite.

31. In respect of property given by the kindred [Bandhu] at an Āsura marriage or the like, Kātyāyana says: "That which has been given to her by her kindred, goes, on failure of kindred, to her son."

32. But on the subject of the perquisite, Gautama holds: "The sister's perquisite belongs to the uterine brothers; after [the death of] the mother."

33. But what Cānkhā says: "The lover [may take back] his nuptial present [on the death of his betrothed mistress]," must be understood of one, dying previous to the celebration of the marriage. Here it is further remarked by Yājñavalkya: "If she die [after birth plighted], let the bridgroom take back the gifts which he had presented; paying however, the charges on both sides." The meaning is, that the husband may take back, if his bride be dead, what remains of the perquisite previously given, after calculating the expenses incurred by himself and by her father.

2—Jñ. Vā. 96. Digest 3-617. In the translation of Jñ. Vā. the maternal uncle is put for his wife, and the paternal uncle's wife is not noticed. The present version will be found in the Digest 3d, 618, except that his son is there explained, the son's son.
3—Jñ. Vā. 96. Digest 3d, 593-615. In both, it is 'husband,' instead of son.
4—Mit. 362, Jñ. Vā. 94. Digest 3d, 614. All the authorities seem in favor of this version against Jñātā Vāhana.
5—Digest 3d, 614.
6—Mit. 373.
34. On some points Bandhūyāna records a distinction: “The wealth of a deceased damsel, let the uterine brothers themselves take. On failure of them, it shall belong to the mother; or if she be dead, to the father.” Those skilled in the ancient law have declared, that this relates to ornaments or the like, presented by the maternal grandfather and the rest, at the time of betrothal, to a girl [who afterwards] dies before completion of the marriage. Here ends the subject of woman’s property.

SECTION XI.

Of exclusion from inheritance.—(Ānānīṣa).

1. Yājñavalkya says: “An impotent person, an outcast and his issue; one lame, a madman, an idiot, a blind man, and a person afflicted with an incurable disease, as well as others [similarly disqualified], must be maintained, excluding them, however, from participation.” His issue, means the offspring of an outcast, but may recover their rights. 2. If, after division, virility or the other [absent qualification] be regained, by medicine or other means, the person will then receive his share, like as a son born after partition [does].

3. Maṇu says: “Impotent persons and outcasts; persons born blind or deaf; madmen, idiots, the dumb, and such as have lost a sense [or limb; nirindriya], are excluded from a share of the heritage.” Have lost a sense, deprived of the nose [or smell,] or the like. Nārada also declares: “An enemy to his father, an outcast, an impotent person, and one formally expelled (Apayaṭīṭa), take no shares of the inheritance, even though they be legitimate: much less if they be sons of the wife by an appointed kinsman.” One afflicted with an obstinate or an agonizing disease, an idiot; one insane, blind, or lame, must be maintained by the family, but their sons take the shares [of their parents.]”

1.—Mit. 374. Jīm. Vā. 90. Digest 3d, 312.
3.—Apte Sec. 4th, para. 35.
4.—Chap. 9th, 301. Mit. 361. The term Nirindriya is explained, in Jīm. Vā. 103 note 7. Reports 1st, 78.
5.—Mit. 381, Jīm. Vā. 104. Digest 3d, 303. Reports 1st, 78. Our author adopts none of the readings noticed by Jīm. Vā. but takes that of Gāndha’s text below.
6.—Digest 3d, 303.

(c) The mental incapacity which disqualifies a Hindū from inheriting on the ground of idiocy is not necessarily utter mental darkness. A person of unsound mind who has been so from birth is in point of law an idiot. The reason for disqualifying a Hindū idiot is his unfitness for the ordinary intercourse of life. Punnamadgāḥ, Anuṣṭv. Ramasvāmi Auyagār, 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 214. Cf. Co. Litt. 247 a.—Ed.
4. Formally expelled, one turned out by his kinsmen with the ceremony of kicking down a waterpot or the like, for high treason [Rajadroha] or a similar crime, according to Madana. It properly applies to one who goes across the sea in a vessel or the like, to another quarter of the globe, for the sake of a livelihood; [for] \(^1\): "Communion is not permitted with a Brâhmana [Dvija] who has passed the sea in a ship, even though he has performed penance for it;" therefore, connexion with such an one in this age of the world, is reprehended. And no form is laid down for performing the ceremony of kicking down the waterpot, or for expulsion for high treason. Cauikha and Likhita \(^6\): "The heritable right of him who has been formally degraded [Apayâstrana], and his competence to offer oblations of food and libations of water, are extinct."

5. Vasishtha \(^5\): "They who have entered into another order, are debarred from shares." Hence are meant the perpetual student, the hermit, and the ascetic Kâtyâyana\(^6\): "But the son of a woman married in irregular order, as well as he who is produced through a kinsman [Sagotra], and an apostate from a religious order, never obtain the inheritance."

6. [Produced] through a kinsman, means one born of a woman married to one of her own [Sagotra] relations. The son of a woman married in irregular order, means, according to some, the Kshetraja, Kânlina, and other sons.

But, when the marriage of a younger daughter has been celebrated whilst her eldest sister is still unmarried, they are then both said to be 'out of their order;' and this is the proper application of the term [Akrâma.] If he be of the same class as his father, his qualification for inheriting is declared by the same author\(^5\): "But the son of a woman married in irregular order may be heir, provided he belong to the same tribe with his father; and so may the son of a man, belonging to a different [but superior] tribe, by a woman espoused in the regular gradation.

7. Also, if sons be begotten by a husband on a wife sprung from a higher class, they shall not take the inheritance, for thus says the same author \(^5\): "The son of a woman married to a man of inferior tribe, is not heir to the estate. Food and raiment for life are considered to be due to him by his kinsmen."

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1—General note to Manu, Smîti (3).
5—6—Digest 3d, 326. Jûm. Vâ. 105. Of the readings mentioned, our author has, grossadhikman aûstrana.
8. If there be other sons endowed with good qualities, the inheritance is not to be taken by a vicious one; for says Manu:1 “All those brothers, who are addicted to any vice, lose their title to the inheritance.” Ethispati:2 “Though born of a woman equal in class, a son destitute of virtue is unworthy of the paternal wealth; it is declared to belong to those kinsmen who offer funeral oblations to the deceased, and are of virtuous conduct.” “A son redeems his father from debt to superior or inferior beings; consequently there is no use for one who acts otherwise.”

9. But all those excluded from participation must be maintained during the rest of their lives, by those who get the estate, from this text of Manu:3 “But it is fit, that a wise man should give all of them food and raiment, without stint, to the best of his power; for he who gives it not, shall be deemed an outcast.” (Without stint, signifies ‘as long as they live,’) as well as from the foregoing one of Vajñavalkya [para. 1]: “Those excluded from inheritance, must still be maintained.”

10. Those who have entered into another order, and outcasts, as well as their respective sons, are not to be maintained. Thus Vasishtha says: “They who have entered into another order, are debarred from shares [para. 5]; as also an impotent man, a madman, and an outcast; but let the impotent and madman (receive) a maintenance.” Here, the maintenance of two only being mentioned, is meant as an indication that the others are excluded. Devala:4 “When the father is dead [as well as in his life-time] an impotent man, a leper, a madman, and idiot; a blind man, an outcast, the offspring of an outcast, and a person fraudulently wearing the token of religious mendicity, are not competent to share the heritage: food and raiment should be given to them, excepting the outcast.” Wearing the token, assuming a prohibited mark [linga], Bauddhāyana:5 “Let the co-heirs support with food and apparel those who are incapable of business, as well as the blind, idiots, impotent persons, those afflicted with disease and calamity, and others who are incompetent to the performance of duties, excepting however the outcast and his issue.” Even those degraded from the life of an ascetic, as well as their sons, are neither of them to be maintained, according to Madana and others.

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2—Jnā. Vā. 102, Digest 3d, 301-2, where the term Črutriyā is applied to the kinsmen themselves, as an illustration merely.
3—Chapter 9th, 209. Mit. 352. Reports 1st, 412.
11. But the blameless sons, even, of one from these causes disinherited, shall take a share, according to the text of Visnu: "The legitimate sons, even of these, [are sharers of the patrimony;] but not the sons born to a degraded man after the commission of the act which caused his degradation, nor those who are procreated [on a woman of a higher class, that is] in the inverse order of the classes: their sons do not participate, even in the property left by the paternal grandfather;" and this of Yajñavalkya: 3 "But their sons, whether legitimate, or the offspring of the wife by a kinsman, [Kshetraja] are entitled to allotments, if free from similar defects."

12. Yajñavalkya delivers a special rule concerning the daughters and wives of these: "Their daughters must be maintained likewise, until they are provided with husbands." "Their childless wives, conducting themselves aright, must be supported; but such as are unchaste, should be expelled: and so indeed should those who are perverse," If she be unchaste, a woman must be turned out of doors, and without a maintenance (a) A perverse woman also should be turned out of doors, but a maintenance must be provided for her, according to Madana, and others.

CHAPTER V.

NON-PAYMENT OF DEBTS,—[āṇaḍaṇam(b)].

SECTION I.

Of Loans in General.

1. Bihaspiti explains, on this subject, the rules for regulating a creditor's conduct, or transactions: "A prudent lender should always deliver the thing lent, on receiving a pledge [Bandhaka] of adequate value, either to be used by him, or merely kept in his hands; or with a sufficient surety [Lognaka], and either with a written agreement, or before credible witnesses." A pledge, such as this, when the pawnee

1—Digest, 3rd, 316.
(b) ḫaḍāṇam (from ḫaḍa 'debt' and āḍhaṇam 'taking') means 'Recovery of debts by legal process.'—Ed.
promises, ‘As long as I fail to clear off thy debt, so long will I not alienate, either in gift, sale, mortgage or other mode, this house, field, or other [pledge.]’ *Surety*, one standing in the debtor’s room. The same author says: “That loan [kāna] which, increased to four times or eight times the principal, is [thus] received back, without apprehension of sin, from an abject or distressed person, is called a loan on interest [kusida].”

2. Kātyāyana: “Stipulated interest [karita] is that which has been specially [and freely] promised by the debtor, in interest on a time of extreme distress, above the allowed rate.” Then— “When any one pays interest from time to time, it is recorded as Čikkhâvidhi or hair-interest(č).” From time to time, means interest is to be paid by the day, month, or year.

3. Yājñavalkya: “An eightieth part [of the principal] is the monthly interest, when a pledge has been delivered: the rates of it, otherwise, it may be, in the direct order of the classes, two, three, four, or five in the hundred.” Otherwise: if there be no pledge; for Vyāsa says: “Monthly interest is declared to be an eightieth part of the principal, if a pledge be given; a sixtieth part is to be paid, if there be [only] a surety; and if there be neither pledge nor surety, two in the hundred [may be taken from a debtor of the sacerdotal class].” Yājñavalkya ordains: “All borrowers, who travel through vast forests, may pay ten, and such as traverse the ocean, twenty in the hundred.” They must pay it, as shewn by the last half of the couplet: “To lenders of all classes [according to circumstances]; or whatever interest has been stipulated by them [as the price of the risk to the lender].”

4. Vishnu says: “In all the classes, if a person borrow money under agreement, as, ‘I will repay it to-morrow,’ but should for his own profit not pay it, the lender shall receive interest from after [the term fixed.]” The interest on a thing lent for use [Yāchita] is thus declared by Kātyāyana: “He who, having received a chattel lent for use, goes to a foreign country without restoring it, must pay, interest, according to the value of it, after one year.”—7: “Though a loan be made [expressly] without interest [Uddhāra], yet, if the debtor pay not the sum lent after demand, but [fraudulently] go to another country, that sum shall carry interest after a lapse of three months.”—8: “A debtor, who even residing in his own country, pays

1—Digest 1st, 11. 2—Digest 1st, 50. Colebrooke on Oblig. 34. For interest, see Strange, 1st, 256-6.

(c) Growing like the ākha or single lock of hair left at tonsure.—57.


5—Digest 1st, 42.

6—Digest 1st, page 39 and 37, for the different readings.

7—Digest 1st, page 46. Strange 1st, 280.

8—Digest 1st, page 101, where it is ‘three seasons.’
not [the debt] after more demands than one, shall be forced, however unwilling, to pay interest on it, though not stipulated, [after the lapse of one year.]” And Nárada\(^4\) says: “There shall be no interest, without a special agreement, on valuable things lent through friendship, [for use, not for consumption]; but, even without agreement, property so lent bears interest after half a year.” Kátyáyana\(^5\): “What has been amicably lent for use, shall bear no interest until it be demanded back; but if, on demand, it be not restored, it shall bear interest [on its true value] at the rate of five in the hundred.”—\(^5\): “Should a man, having bought a marketable commodity, [fraudulently] go to another country, without paying the price of it, that price shall be interest after three seasons [or six months].” \([\text{Even} \text{ without a journey to a foreign country}], a \text{ deposit, the balance of interest, a commodity sold, and the price of a commodity purchased, not being paid [or delivered]} \text{ after demand}, shall bear interest, at the rate of five in the hundred [if the debtor be a Çádra].”

CLXVIII

5. Nárada\(^4\) says: “A commodity, the price [of a commodity], wages, a deposit, and [the like]; a fine [to the king], a thing clandestinely taken [without a design to steal it], a thing idly promised, and a stake played for, carry no interest [before demand], without a special agreement.” A stake played for, the object played for with dice. Without special agreement, not positively declared. Yájñavalkya\(^6\): “Property lent, which the creditor will not receive back, when tendered, must be deposited with a third person, and bears no interest afterwards.”

6. Bihāspati\(^9\): “On the precious metals [or gems], the interest may make the debt double; on clothes and inferior metals, treble; on grain, quadruple; so on fruit, beasts of burden, and wool or hair.” Fruits, flowers, roots, fruits, &c. Beasts of burden, bullocks, &c. Wool, that of sheep; and the hair of the Chamara [Bos Gruminia] and other [animals of that species.] But, this of Manu\(^7\) “Interest on grain, on fruit, on wool or hair, on beasts of burden, [lent to be paid in the same kind of equal value,] must not be more than enough to make the debt quintuple,” must be understood as a prohibition of sixfold, or higher increase. Kátyáyana says: \(^2\) “For gems, pearls and coral; for gold and silver, for cloth made of [cotton] the produce of fruit, or made of silk, or made of wool or hair, the interest stops when it doubles the debt.” Of silk, that is, made from the produce of insects, and clothes made from the hair of the chamara and other animals. Vasishtha: “Interest on copper, iron, queen’s metal, prince’s metal, tin, and also on lead, makes the debt threefold, only if much time have elapsed.” Vyaṣa: “Interest increasing the debt sixfold, is declared allowable on vegetables, cotton, and seeds.” Kátyáyana.\(^9\) “For all sorts of oil and

1—Digest 1st, 97. 2—Digest 1st, 99-100. 3—Digest 1st, 104.
4—Digest 1st, 134. 5—Digest 1st, 153.
6—Digest 1st, 109. 7—Digest 1st, 112.
8—Digest 1st, 121. 9—Chap. 8th, v. 151. Digest 1st. 1:6.
spirituous liquors, for the different kinds of clarified butter, for molasses, and salt, the interest is held legal, though [with the principal], the debt be made octuple.” Vishnu: "On precious metals, [or gems], the highest interest shall make the debt double; on cloth, treble; on grain, quadruple; [on fluids, octuple]; on female slaves or cattle, the offspring shall be taken as interest." So: "[Rare] flowers, roots, and fruit; what is sold by weight [except gold and the like], may make the debt eightfold."

7. Nárada: "Of interest on loans, this is the universal [and highest rule]; but the rate customary in the country, where the debt was contracted may be different." Universal every where current; and this relates only to a debt doubled, or more than doubled, by interest, by the first transaction; for if at a different time a fresh speculation be entered into, with a different person, or even with the same, under a chance of profit or loss, in such case, even higher interest may accrue. So also Manu: "Interest on money received at once, [not month by month, or day by day, as it ought] must never be more than enough to double the debt, [that is, more than the amount of the principal paid at the same time." But in any one case where it is realized [by degrees] or at various times also, more than this legal or allowable interest may be levied, according to Vijnáneyvarna and other authorities.

SECTION II.
Of Pledges,—[Aḍhā]

1. Bīhaspati: "A pledge [Aḍhā] is called bhandha, and is declared to be divisible into four parts: Moveable [or personal;] and fixed, [or real;] for custody only [gopya;] and for use [bhogya]." Nárada: "That to which a [secondary] title is given, is a pledge. It has two forms, to be released at a fixed time, or to be retained until payment be tendered."

2. Ħárta: "In the same state as the pledge has been deposited, even so let the pawnman take care of it: otherwise he shall lose his interest; or in case of its being damaged, he shall pay the value of it." Damaged, that is, if the pledge be destroyed. Yājñavalkya: "If a pledge for custody [gopya] be used, there shall be no interest, nor, if a pledge for use [bhogya] be damaged." meaning, damaged so as to be unfit for use. Kātyāraṇa: "He who employs on work an unwilling [slave or other living] pledge, without the assent [of the owner] shall be compelled to pay the value of the work.

1—Digest 1st, 113. 2—Digest 1st, 115. Vasishtha.
3—Digest 1st, 53.
4—Chap. 8th, v. 151. The last hemistich was quoted above.
5—Cole. on Oblig. 80. 6—Digest 1st, 140, q. v.
7—Digest 1st, 142.
8—Digest 1st, 145. Strange’s Elem. 1st, 288.
9—Digest 1st, 151.
or shall receive no interest, on his loan." *Employes on work* makes use of him. *Value of the work,* the hire [of the person, &c. employed.]

3. Yājñavalkya. 1 "A pledge spoiled, [lost,] or destroyed, unless by the act of God or the king, shall be made good [by the creditor.]" *Spoiled,* which has incurred damage. *Made good,* by being restored equal to its former state. *Bṛhaspati:* 3 "Any pledge, being used, and wholly spoiled [by the fault of the pledgee] the principal debt shall be lost." In case of a pledge being damaged, its value must be paid for, as Vyāsa says: 3 If gold, or other (precious) thing, shall be pledged, and lost by the negligence of the receiver, that creditor, on the principal and interest of his loan being paid, shall be forced to pay the price of the pledge." Nārada: 4 If a pledge be lost [and the creditor do not replace it,] the principal itself shall be forfeited; unless the loss was caused [without his fault] by the act of God or of the king." Mānu: 5 "[The pawned] must satisfy the pawn, [if the pledge be spoiled or worn out,] by paying him the original price of it; otherwise, he commits a theft of the pawn."

4. Bṛhaspati: 6 "If a pledge be destroyed by the act of God or the king, creditor shall either obtain another pledge, or receive the sum [lent] together with interest." Vyāsa: 7 says: "If the pledge be destroyed by the act of God or the king, no fault is by any means imputable to the creditor." Kātyāyana: 8 "When a pledge becomes unfit for use, or perishes, without any fault on the part of the creditor, the debtor shall be compelled to deliver another pledge; [for,] he is not exonerated from the debt." Yājñavalkya 9 also declares: "By the acceptance [or actual possession] of a pledge, [the] validity [of the contract] is maintained. If it be spoiled, when carefully kept, another chattel must be pledged, or the creditor must receive the amount [of principal and interest.]"

5. Nārada: 10 says: "Pledges [ādhi] are declared to be of two sorts, immovable and moveable; both are valid when there is actual enjoyment, and not otherwise." Vāsishṭha also says: "When more deeds than one have been drawn up, at the very same time, in a case of pledge, he who has first got possession must be held to have the strongest pledge." The same author adds: "If two creditors should, on the very same day, come with a view to take possession of their pledge, it must then be equally divided, and possessed by them; this is certain." Kātyāyana: 11 "Should

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a man hypothecate the same thing to two creditors, what must be decided? "The first hypothecation shall be established, and the debtor shall be punished as for theft."

6. Yājñavalkya¹ says: "That pledge is totally lost, which the pawnor fails to redeem when the principal is doubled. That fixed with a term for redemption, is lost on the expiration of the term: but an usufructuary pledge is never destroyed." (c) But Bhāsati² declares: "Gold being doubled, and the stipulated period having expired, the creditor becomes owner of the pledge, after the lapse of fourteen days." Vyāsa³ "After giving notice to the debtor's family, a pledge for custody may be used when the principal is doubled, and so may a pledge for a limited period, when that period is expired.

7. Bhāsati² : "When the debt is doubled by the interest, and the debtor is either dead, or has absconded, the creditor may attach his [pledge or the debtor's] chattel, and sell it before witnesses." Yājñavalkya.⁵ "A debtor shall be compelled to pay, with interest, a debt contracted on a peculiar pledge, [Charitram] and he shall be compelled to re-pay twofold, a debt contracted on a chattel [of small value] delivered as an earnest [of purchase or sale]." (b) When a borrower, from his confidence in the lender, deposits with him a valuable pledge for a small consideration, or where the lender, entertaining a like confidence in the borrower, advances a large sum on a pledge of small value, this will be a peculiar pledge; or the word Charitram may signify, the pledge of good actions, as, of the reward for ablution in the Ganges, or the like. And in both these species, denominated peculiar pledge, even if the thing be doubled by interest, it is not forfeited. Even if the debt be doubled, it must be paid, but the pledge is not forfeited. Delivered as an earnest, means that when a debt contracted on such grounds is doubled with interest, the earnest so pledged is not forfeited.

8. The same author⁶ says: "To the debtor who comes to redeem his pledge, the creditor shall restore it, or be punished as a thief; and if the creditor be [dead, or absent, the debtor may pay the debt to his kinsmen, and shall take back his pledge”.⁷ "Or appraised at the value it then bears, it may

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¹—Digest 1st, 183, Reports 1st, 303.
²—Digest 1st, 186, where the text is attributed to Vyāsa. Reports 1st, 303.
³—Digest 1st, 197.
⁴—Digest 1st, 199. Strange's Elem. 1st, 288.
⁵—Digest 1st, 203, from which the present translation deviates to suit the gloss.
⁶—It has been held by the Madras High Court that by Hindu law a purchaser may recover in an action for breach of a contract to deliver goods not only double the earnest-money but also damages for the non-delivery, Alwar Chetti v. Pandalingu Chetti, 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 9.—Ed.
⁷—Digest 1st, 169. 7—Digest 1st, 171.
remain there [with the creditor], exempt from interest." If the creditor [Uttamañña] be not present, [the debtor] may place the amount of his debt, with its interest, in the hands of some other person of his creditor's family, and take back his pledge. Or if he wish to sell the pledge, from desire of realizing its value, let him have it valued at the time, and leave it in deposit [with his creditor but] without interest [considering it a debt discharged]. This is the meaning. Bhāsas-patī: "When land or other [immovable property] has been enjoyed, and more than the principal debt has accrued thereon, then, the principal and interest having been realized, the debtor shall obtain his pledge." Yājñavalkya: "Whenever a debt under mortgage has become doubled by interest, then the pledge shall certainly be returned, whenever double the sum lent has been received."

SECTION III.
Of Sureties,—[Pratibhā].

1. Now surety is of three kinds, according to Yājñavalkya, who says: "Sureties is ordained for appearance, for trust, and for payment(a)." Trust here means,—Raising of confidence, by saying 'this man is true.' Bhāsas-patī again, enumerates four kinds of sureties, [of whom]: "The first says, 'I will point him out'; the second, 'this man is trust-worthy'; the third, 'I am the payer of this money'; the fourth, 'I will cause to give it.' Which last means, 'I will hereafter make [the debtor] pay this debt.' Kātyāyana says: "Let three full Paksha, or lunar half-months, be allowed to the surety, for the purpose of seeking an absconded principal, and if he point out the principal, then let the surety be held worthy of being absolved." The three half-months, are to be understood only as an example, meaning, that so much time must be allowed as is required for the search.

2. Kātyāyana: "If a surety for the appearance of a debtor produce him not at the time, and in the place agreed on, he shall discharge what he is bound for, unless he was prevented by the act of God or the king." Discharge what he is bound for; shall pay the sum due to the creditor. Bhāsas-patī: "The two first [kind of sureties] on failure of their engagement, must pay the sum lent, at the time stipulated; the two last, or in

(a) These three kinds are, 1. Dārśana-pratibhā a surety for appearance. 2. Pratigya-pratibhā, a surety for confidence, one who engages for the general honesty and responsibility of another. 3. Dātan-pratibhā a surety for the repayment of a loan or the fulfillment of an engagement; a fourth is Dṛṣṭānta-pratibhā, one who engages to deliver up property belonging to the debtor, if he fails to pay the debt. The two first are liable for any loan or advance made upon their credit; if not paid by the borrower: the responsibility of the two last extends to their sons. WILSON, Gloss.—Ed.

1—Digest 1st, 177.
3—Digest 1st, 223.
4—Digest 1st, 233.
5—Digest 1st, 241.
default of them, their issue, when the debt is sued for.” Kātyāyana1: “Money due by a surety need not on any account be paid by his grandsons, but in every instance such a debt incurred by his father must be made good by a son, without interest.” Vyāsa2: “The son of a son shall [in general] pay the debt of his grandfather, but the son [only] shall pay the debt of his father incurred by his becoming a surety, [and both of them] without interest; but it is clearly settled, that their sons, [the great-grandson and grandsons respectively] are not [morally] bound to pay.” The grandsons need only pay the principal amount of their grandfather’s debts—A son need only pay the principal of a debt incurred by his father as a surety, and devolving on him.

3. This however, supposing the security to have been undertaken by him without receipt of property [or consideration] in return; for if he received [any] property as an inducement to become surety, in that case, the sum for which he was bound shall be paid with interest, by his sons or grandsons. And accordingly Kātyāyana3 declares: “Should a man become surety for the appearance of a debtor, from whom he had received a pledge [as his own security], the creditor, [if that surety die], may compel his son to pay the debt, even without assets left by his father.”

4. Yājñavalkya4: “When there are two or more sureties jointly bound, they shall pay their proportionate shares of the debt; but when they are bound severally [Ekachchhāya], the payment shall be made [by any of them], as the creditor pleases.” Severally, is when each of them makes this agreement, ‘I alone will pay the whole.’ This [agreement] being obtained as the creditor’s guarantee, any one of the sureties, from whom he may please to demand the debt, must pay it. If the compact of each be thus, ‘I will pay my share,’ then payment must be made accordingly. Thus must it be understood. Kātyāyana: “When two or more are severally bound, any one of them may be made to pay, whenever he is found.” If absent in a foreign country, his son shall pay the whole; if the father be dead, his son shall be forced to pay, according his father’s share.” Father’s share, that is, in proportion to the father’s share [of the whole debt guaranteed].

CLXXV.

5. Yājñavalkya5: “When the surety is compelled to pay a notorious debt to the creditor, the debtor shall be forced to repay double the sum to the surety.” Bṛhaspati: 6 “Should a surety, being harassed, pay the debt for which he was bound, he shall receive twice the sum from the debtor, after the lapse of a month and half.”

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1—Digest 1st, 253. 2—Digest 1st, 254.
3—Digest 1st, 248-49, the second reading is followed.
4—Digest 1st, 257. Colebrooke on Obligations, 155-61.
SECTION IV.

Of Recovery of Debts.

1. Now these are the rules for recovery of debt by a creditor. Brihaspati:¹ "From a debtor who promises payment, the debt may be recovered by mild remonstrance and the like; and by other resources; by the mode of moral duty; by legal deceit; by violent compulsion; and by confinement at home." Promises, engaged for by the debtor.

2. By other resources, that is, by the means [upāyā], which are thus enumerated by the same author:² "By the interposition of friends and kinsmen, by mild remonstrance, by importunate following, or by staying constantly at the house of the debtor, he may be compelled to pay the debt: this mode of recovery is called a mode consonant to moral duty, [dharma]."³ "When a creditor, with an artful design, borrows any thing of his debtor, or withholds a thing deposited by him, or the like, and thus compels payment of the debt, this is called legal deceit [upādhi]."⁴ "When, having tied the debtor, he carries him to his own house, and by beating or other means compels him to pay, this is called violent compulsion [balātkāra]."⁵ "When he forces the debtor to pay, by confining his son, his wife, or his cattle, or by watching constantly at his door, this is called lawful confinement [kācharitam]." Following, claiming his attention. Staying at the house, begging the money of him. Deposited, [anvāhītām] ornaments or other things, given as if for delivery to another.⁶

3. The rules for putting such means in force, are thus declared by Kātyāyana:⁷ "By mild expostulation let a creditor procure payment from a king, from his master, and from a priest; but from a friend, or an heir, by some artful contrivance." Bhūrgu ordained, that merchants, cultivators of land, and artists, must be made to pay their debts according to the custom of the country; but that a creditor might enforce payment from dishonest debtors, by violent measures." The same author adds:⁸ "A debtor, being arrested [and freely acknowledging the debt,] may be openly dragged before the public assembly, and

¹—Digest 1st, 249.  2—Digest 1st, 339.
⁴—Digest 1st, 343.
⁶—Digest 1st, 344, q. v.  8—Digest 1st, 339.
confined until he pay what is due, according to the immemorial usage of the country [deckâchâra].” Preventing the prisoner from performing natural evacuations, is thus prohibited by the same author: “When a prisoner has need of ejecting urine or feces, he should either be followed [at a distance] or dismissed on security.” Security, by leaving his son or other relative, to be a prisoner in his stead.

4. Taking security for a prisoner’s appearance, he may be set at liberty for meals; for the same author says: “Should he have given a surety, he must be released each day, at the hour of meals; and at night, if a surety have been given to such effect: But if he do not tender a surety for appearance, nor avail himself of such a surety, he must be confined in jail, or delivered to the custody of keepers.” “A venerable, trustworthy, and virtuous man, shall not be confined in jail; unrestrained, he must be released, [or dismissed] under the obligation of an oath.” Nor avail himself, if he should not give [security], having the opportunity. Jail, a prison. Keepers; that is, he must be put in confinement duly made over to the officers. Trust-worthy, creditable.

5. Bhraspati: “After the time for payment has past, and when the interest ceases [on becoming equal to the principal], the creditor may either recover his debt, or require a new writing in the form of wheel-interest [chakraviddhi].” After the time for payment has past, and that is, when the debt having by interest become double, or more than that [where higher interest is legal], the interest on that event reaches its legal boundary. The creditor may recover his debt, may exact it. Charging interest on a debt, of which the interest has been [from time to time] added to the principal, is called chakraviddhi, wheel or compound interest.

6. Nârada: “Should a debtor be disabled, by famine or other calamity of the time, from paying the whole debt, he shall be only compelled to pay it [in small sums], from time to time, according to his ability, as he happens to gain property.” Manu: “Even by personal labour shall the debtor pay what is adjudged, if he be of the same class with the creditors or of a lower; but a debtor of a higher class must pay it [according to his income], by little and little.” And though Yajñavalkya says: “He may compel a poor debtor of a low class to do work, by way of paying his debt: but a Brâhma, if indigent, must be made to pay gradually according to his income [or casual gains]:” yet the word Brâhma here refers to any man of high caste. The same author adds: “He who recovers an acknowledged debt

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1—Digest 1st, 346, where it reads, ‘in letters.’
3—Digest 1st, 357. Strange 1st, 397.  4—Cole. on Oblig. p. 80. “Compound Interest.”
5—Digest 1st, 383.  6—Chapter 8th, v. 177.
7—Digest 1st, 351. Strange’s Elems. 1st, 308. See Chap. 16th, Sect. 1st, para. 3 note.
8—Digest 1st, 356.
by his own act, [in any of the legal modes to which the debtor has tacitly consented] shall not be blamed by the king; and if the debtor shall complain of such an act before the king, he shall be fined, and compelled to pay the debt."

7. Brihaspati: "This rule concerns an acknowledged debt; but he who contests the demand, shall be compelled to pay, on proof in court by written evidence or oral testimony." "When the debtor appeals to judicature, or when the demand is unliquidated [or doubtful, sandigdha] he shall never be constrained by the mere act of the creditor; and he who constrains a debtor thus exempted from such constraint, shall be fined according to law." Constraint [asatdha]; imprisonment not against the king's order. He adds: A debtor is considered as appealing to judicature, when he says, 'I will pay whatever shall by law be declared to be due.' Kātyāyana: "Any creditor who harasses a debtor appealing to judicature, shall forfeit that claim, and pay an equal fine." Brihaspati: "Should any person take upon himself to act in a disputed matter, without having first made known his case to the prince, he shall be seized and sentenced to punishment; neither shall his claim be awarded."

8. Yama: If a rich debtor, through dishonest perverseness, pay not his debt, the king shall compel him to discharge it, and may take from him twice the sum [as a fine]." Yājñavalkya: "A debtor shall be forced to pay to the king ten in the hundred, of the sum proved against him; and the creditor, having received the sum due, must pay five in the hundred [towards defraying the charges of judicature]." "Ten in the hundred, that is, ten besides [or over] every hundred [awarded to his creditor.] A tenth share [from the debtor cast], and a twentieth, [from the creditor] is here meant. The result is, that these two shares belong to the king, and the balance goes to the creditor. Taking a tenth share, relates to a poor debtor; for in respect to a rich one, Nārāda records this distinction: "But if a rich debtor, though dishonest perverseness, pay not his debt, and the king be forced to cause payment, he may then take twenty as his share." meaning, twenty on the hundred.

1—Digest 1st, 363-4.  2—Sec Chap. 1st, Sec. 1st, para. 16.  3—Digest 1st, 364.

4—Digest 1st, 368.

(a) There are four kinds of asatdha: kādāsaḍha, confinement for a time by the end of which the affair must be settled; kānaṣṭha, restraint from any particular act, restriction from religious rites; prosecute prohibition of removal, a writ of ne exeat, and sthānaṇaṭha, confinement in any given place.—Wilson, Gloss.—Ed.


6—Digest 1st, 372-3. Strange's Elem. 307. This was the practice under the Mahāratta Government, which levied a tax upon both parties, that from the winner being termed Harki, that of the loser Ghunegārī.

7—Digest 1st, 371 and 375.
9. When more creditors than one are collected together against one debtor, the order of payment is [to be as] thus laid down by Yājñavalkya:¹ "A debtor shall be forced to pay his creditors in the order in which the debts were contracted, after first discharging those of a Brāhmaṇ, or of the king." And in the Vīvāda Rānākāra we find these words of Kātyāyana:² "If there be many debts at once, that which was first contracted shall first be paid, after those of a king, or of a Brāhmaṇ learned in the Veda".³ "If all the contracts were written in one day, the debts, payment, subsisting demand, and interest, shall be equal; otherwise, in order of time":⁴ "That capital on which it is proved that the assets were gained, and no other debt, must be paid by the debtor [out of those assets]."

10. Yājñavalkya,⁵ "If the debtor pay by little and little, let him write the sums paid on the back of his written contract, or let the creditor give a receipt signed by his own hand." Nārada:⁶ "Let the creditor give a writing after the debt has been acquitted; or if that cannot be, let him make a [public] acknowledgement: this shall be a mutual acquittance of the creditor and debtor." Acknowledgement, some deed of settlement, for the purpose of making known repayment of the debt.

11. The bad consequences that will ensue to a debtor, neglecting to pay his debts, are now described. Kātyāyana says:

Moral effect of fraud. "He who shall not pay to his creditor what he has received from him in loan [Uddhāra] or other way, shall most certainly be born again, either his slave, servant, wife, or beast of burden." Loan, debt [of all kinds, iṣṭam. To other, must be supplied, loan for use, and deposit. Slave, one by birth. Servant, a slave bought with a price. Nārada: "If a man do not repay what he has borrowed for use, and a debt, as well as what he has promised, that sum may be increased, even to ten million times its original amount. And after that, if it be allowed to increase still more, until by its own accumulation it have amounted to an hundred [times] ten million, it must then stop; the debtor shall become, in each successive birth, a horse, an ass, a bull, and a slave." Promised, what he has agreed to give. Vyāsa also says: "When a person, being either an ascetic, or keeper of a perpetual fire, dies indebted to any one, the future rewards, or the austerities of the one, and the sacred duties of the other, shall all be transferred to the account of the creditor."

¹—Digest 1st, 736 and note. In the 7th line, “uttamvarṇaṇām,” is printed for uttamarpāṇām, contrary to all the manuscripts.
²—Digest 1st, 377-8.
³—Digest 1st, 350.
⁴—Digest 1st, 385.
⁵—Digest 1st, 386.
⁶—Digest 1st, 386.
12. Bhāspati declares: “The sons must pay the debt of their father, when proved, as if it were their own [that is, with interest;] the son’s son must pay the debt of his grandfather [but] without interest; and his son [that is, the great-grandson] shall not be compelled to discharge it, [unless he be heir, and have assets.” So Yājñavalkya: The father being gone to a foreign country, or deceased [naturally or civilly] or wholly immersed in vices [or difficulty,] the sons, or their sons, must pay the debt; but if disputed, it must be proved by witnesses.”

13. Debts must be paid by the sons, or other relatives, when they have reached their twentieth year, for Nārada says: Only when twenty years old. The father, or if the family be undivided, the uncle, or the elder brother, having travelled to a foreign country, the son shall not be forced to discharge the debt until twenty years have elapsed. Katāyana: If the father be at home, but afflicted with a chronic disorder, [though not without hope of recovery], or absent, his debt shall be paid by his sons, after a lapse of twenty years. The word absent includes the sense of ‘dead,’ as well; even as Vishnu says: “If he who contracted the debt should die, or become a religious anchoret, or remain abroad for twenty years, that debt shall be discharged by his sons or grandsons, but not by remoter descendants, against their will.

14. Nārada: A father being dead, his sons, whether after partition or before it, shall discharge his debt in proportion to their shares; or that son alone who has taken the burden upon himself. Katāyana: If any debts exist against the father, his son shall not take possession of his effects. They must be given to his creditors, and if he die without wealth, still his son must pay his debts.” Wealth, must be connected to without; the meaning is ‘if he die] without wealth.’ Bhāspati: The father’s debt must be first paid, and next a debt contracted by the man himself; but the debt of the paternal grandfather must even he paid before either of those.

15. Yājñavalkya: A son need not pay, in this world, money due by his father for spiritual liquors, for lustful pleasures, for losses at play; nor what remains unpaid of a fine, or toll [Cūlka]; nor any thing idly promised.” Bhāspati: “The sons are not compellable to pay sums due by their father for spiritual liquors, for losses at play, for promises made with-

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1—Digest 1st, 263-6, and note. Reports 2nd, 9.
3—4—Digest 1st, 277. Reports 2d, 57.

5—Digest 1st, 266.
6—Digest 1st, 267. Colebrooke on Obligations, pages 25 and 152, particularly.
7—Digest 1st, 265.
9—Digest 1st, 305.
out any consideration, or under the influence of lust, or of wrath; or sums for which he was a surety; or a fine, or a toll [Culka], or the balance of either.” Ucanaś declares: “A fine, or the balance of a fine as also a bribe [or toll, Culka] or the balance of it, are not to be paid by the son, neither shall he discharge debts improper, [not sanctioned, by law or custom.”]

16. The order of those bound to pay the debts (of one deceased) is thus told by Yājñavalkya: “He who has received the estate, must pay the debts of it; and in like manner, he who takes the wife [of the deceased]; or the son, whose [father’s] assets are not held by another [manyāshrita]; but of one having no son, the other heirs [Rikthinā, must pay the debts: or, may levy them, para. 18.]” He is said to receive the estate legally, who does so, even when there is a son of the deceased in existence, but disqualified by some disheriting defect, as if he be an eunuch, or the like; but illegally, when he usurps the estate of a father, whose son is free from any disqualification. The same [responsibility attaches] to him who takes the wife of another. The term, assets not held by another, may be understood in both ways, [of one who has taken his father’s assets, as well as one whose father had no assets], by reason of the absence of an opponent endowed with the quality of alienation, as well as from the absence of an opponent only pointing out the quality of property.

17. And first of all, he who has received the estate; or failure of him, the person who takes the wife; and on failure of him, the son, possessed of unalienated wealth [manyāshrita]. If there be none, it must be paid by the grandsons, but the principal only. If they be not in existence, then the great grandson, the wife, daughter, or other heirs [Rikthinā], if they have received the estate, must pay the debt—such is the meaning. It is not to be paid by the great-grandson, the wife, or the others, if they have not taken the estate. But receipt of ever so small a portion of the estate, imposes the liability of liquidating the debts, to whatever amount. For there is no such law, as [that payment shall follow only on receipt of property] equal or more than equal [to the debt to be paid(a)].

18. The wife, daughters, and other heirs to a creditor dying without male issue, being entitled to receive his estate, may levy his debts from his debtor. This is another meaning of the latter part [of the text, para. 16].

19. Vishnu: “He who takes the estate of one whether leaving a

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1—See Sec. 3d, paras. 2-3.
2—Reports 2d, 303, note.
3—Digest 1st, 270-71.75, and the readings there.
4—It would seem that some text of Vishnu had been omitted here, and that the succeeding passage was the commentary, but all the copies read it in this way.
(a) It has, however, been held in Madras that a son is liable for his father’s debts only to the extent of the property inherited by him from the latter, S. A. No. 13 of 1851, Mad. S. D. 1851, p. 13. And it would seem that the precept in the text is, like so many others, merely moral and directory and not imperative. Colebrooke cited 2 Strange II. 1st. 75.—Ed.
son or no male issue, must pay his debts." This is the meaning, Bhāspati: "Even so, the person who takes the widow shall be liable for the debt, on failure of successors to the estate." Kātyāyana: "The judge shall compel a son to pay the debt of his father, provided he be involved in no distress, be capable of property, and liable to bear the burden; but in no other case shall he compel the son to pay his father's debts." First let him who takes the estate pay; after him, the son; if there be no son, or he be utterly destitute of means, then he who takes the wife." Nārada: "But if a woman take the protection of another man, carrying her riches and her offspring, he must pay the debt of her husband, or abandon such a woman." Kātyāyana: "A debt which has been contracted by indigent and childless vintners, and the rest must be paid by him, who has the care of their wives."

CLXXXII. Nārada says: "Of the successor to the estate, the guardian of the widow, and the son, he who takes the assets becomes liable for the debts; the son, if there be no guardian of the widow, nor a successor to the estate; and the person who took the widow, if there be no successor to the estate, nor son." Or, the meaning of the last part is, that if there be no son possessed of wealth, then he who takes the widow must pay the debts of the deceased; by reason of the former quoted text of Yājñāvalkya, [para. 16].

20. Kātyāyana says: "Debts incurred for domestic uses, by the slave, wife, mother, or disciple, of one gone to a far country, or deceased, and also by his son, must be paid, so says Bhrigu." And Yājñāvalkya holds; "A woman shall not pay debts incurred by her husband or son; neither a father those of his son, nor a husband those of his wife, unless contracted on account of the family." Kātyāyana: That must be paid, which may have been verbally promised, as well as what has been engaged for to another." Nārada: "A father must pay the debt of his son, contracted in a time of distress." Yājñāvalkya: "If the wife of a herdsman, a vintner, a dancer, a washerman, or a hunter, contract a debt, the husband shall pay it, because his livelihood chiefly depends on the labour of such a wife." The same author says: "A debt acknowledged [by her husband], or contracted by her jointly with her husband or son, or contracted by the woman herself, must be paid by a wife [or mother]; no other debts shall a woman be compelled to pay." And even if not acknowledged, she shall still pay

1.—Digest 1st, 274.
2.—Digest 1st, 275. 3.—Digest 1st, 350.
4.—Digest 1st, 325.
5.—Digest 1st, 272. Reports 1st, p. 155, note 3.
7.—Digest 1st, 313: Reports 2d, 203. Cole, p. 28-9. 8.—Digest 1st, 288.
9.—Digest 1st, 317. Cole, on Oblig, 29. Strange 1st, 276. 10.—Digest 1st, 314.
it, if she have received his estate: for, thus says Kātyāyana:—"If a wife be thus addressed by her lord at the point of death, [or just before a long journey], ‘Such a debt must be paid by thee,’ she must pay it, however unwilling, if assets were left in her hands." Nārada:—"But if a woman who has male issue, [but no several property], desert her son, and recur to another man, her son alone must pay the whole debt.” This however refers particularly to a son who has got possession of his father’s wealth. Nārada:—"A debt contracted before partition by an uncle, or a brother, or a mother, for the support of the family, all the parcellers or joint-tenants shall discharge.”

21. Should neither [the creditor, nor] his sons nor other relatives, be in existence, the modes of obtaining payment are as declared by Nārada:—If a creditor of the priestly class be not present but have issue, the king shall cause the debt to be paid [to them;] if he have no issue, to his near kinsman [Sākulya;] if he leave none who are near, to those who are distant [paternal and maternal, Bhandu;] if he leave no heirs, near or distant, [nor persons connected by sacred studies,] the king shall bestow it on worthy priests; but if none such are present, let him cast it into the waters: [the debts of other classes, in similar circumstances, he may seize for himself.”] Prajāpati also says:—“If there be no distant kinsmen, let it be paid to some twice-born man, or be cast into the water: When cast into the water or into the fire, that money is carried to the account of [the deceased, or of] his ancestors in a future state.” If however an owner should appear to claim money [which is to be so] thrown into the fire, or the like, he shall obtain it.

CHAPTER VI.
Of Deposits.—Nikshēpa.

1. Nārada:—"Where a man bails any of his effects to another, in whom he has confidence, and from whom he has no doubt of receiving his property again, it is a deposit, which the wise call Nikshēpa:” When a thing is deposited, under seal, without mentioning its quantity; if its kind and form be unknown, it is considered as an Upanidhi: but the wise call a specified deposit Nikshēpa.”

1—Digest 1st, 315, where it is attributed to Nārada. 2—Digest 1st, 329.
3—Digest 1st, 324.
4—Digest 1st, 335.
2. Bhihaspati: "The merit of one who preserves a deposit, or protects a dependant, is the same with the merit of him who gives golden vessels or clothes." The very thing bailed must be restored to the very man who bailed it, in the very manner in which it was bailed: it must not be delivered to his heir, apparent or presumptive. "Deposit, a thing bailed. Not to his heir, but to the bailer, in his own person. Mann: "He who restores not a thing really deposited, and he who demands what he never bailed, shall both be punished as thieves: or shall pay a fine equal to the value of the thing claimed."

3. Bhihaspati: "Should the bailee suffer the thing bailed to be destroyed by his negligence, while he keeps his own goods with very different care, or should he refuse to restore it on demand, he shall be compelled to pay [the value of] it with interest." Different care, preserving his own property. But if his own property should at the same time suffer injury, through that act of negligence, he is not to blame. Yajñavalkya: "If the depositary, of his own accord or use of them, [without the consent of the owner,] use the thing deposited, he shall be anerced, and compelled to pay the price of the thing with profit." Use, make a livelihood by employing it in his worldly transactions for the sake of gain.

4. Profit, interest: of which a distinction is mentioned by Kātyāyana: "A deposit, the balance of interest, a commodity sold, and the price of a commodity purchased, not being paid after demand, shall bear interest at the rate of five in the hundred." Mann: ["For the first offence, the King should compel a fraudulent depositary, without any distinction between a deposit under seal or open, to pay a fine equal to its value."

5. Bhihaspati: "If it be destroyed by the act of God or of the king, together with the goods of the bailee, there is no fault in him." Yajñavalkya: "But he shall not be compelled to replace that [deposit] lost by the act of God or the king, or seized by robbers." Mann: But if a depositary, by his own free act, shall deliver a deposit to the heir of a deceased bailer, he must not be harassed, either by the king or by the kinsmen [of the deceased]. Heir, a near relation. The sense is

3—Chap. 8th, v. 191. Digest 1st, 432. q. v.
6—Digest 1st, 427. 7—Chap. 8th, v. 192. Digest 1st, 432.
10—Chap. 8th, v. 190, Digest 1st, 420.
this, 'he must not be harassed, without proof, for the sake of more property [than was delivered]."

6. The whole of the above laws relating to deposits, are also otherwise collectively applied to other bailments. Bhāṇapati:1 "In the case of a deposit for delivery [anvāhi-tam], a loan for use [yāchitam], a bailment with an artist [gilpi nyāsa], and a pledge, [bāndhaka], the same law is enacted, and likewise in the case of a person received under protection [or a dependent]." A deposit for delivery, is, when a chattel is given into the hands of another, saying, 'Such an one deposited it with me, and I pray you give it to him.' Loan for use, ornaments or the like, borrowed for the sake of show at a marriage, or other ceremony. A bailment with an artist; what has been openly deposited with goldsmiths, or such persons, to be made into earrings or the like. Nārada:2 "This very law is enacted in the case of loans for use [yāchitam], deposits for delivery [anvāhitam] and the like; bailments with an artist, [gilpi nyāsa],3 sealed deposits [upanidhi], bailments in the form called nyāsa, and rebailments [pratinyāsa]."4 Rebailment, that is, when the depositary rebails to another the very thing which had been bailed or deposited with him by the original owner.5

7. Compensation must in some cases be made by the artist, even when the goods bailed have been destroyed by the act of God or the king; for Kāṭyāyana says:6 "If the artist keep the thing bailed, after the time agreed on for working it [into ornaments and the like] he shall be forced to pay its value, even though it be destroyed by the act of God."

8. Nārada: "An eighth share of the value is lost, of clothes once washed; when twice washed, a quarter; thrice, a third; and when four times washed, a half; but after more than half the value is gone, it shall be valued in order, according to the damage of each quarter share." Yājñavalkya: "The washerman who wears on his own person, the clothes of his employer, shall be fined three panas. But if they be sold, or let out to hire, or pledged, or lent out by him, [he shall be fined] ten panas." Let out to hire, what has been given to another for receipt of hire. Pledged, put out in pawn.

1—Digest 1st, 410.


5—Strange's Elem. 1st, 289-90. 6—Digest 1st, 448. Strange 1st, 203.
9. The rules respecting loss incurred in melting all metals, except gold, are thus expounded by the same author: "Gold undergoing the action of fire is nothing diminished thereby; the loss on silver in a similar operation is two panas per centum; in tin and lead, eight; in copper, five; and ten in iron." Whenever the loss [in the weight] of [returned metal, whether] silver or other, is greater than these rates, a fine must be imposed on the goldsmith, or other [workman].

10. A distinction as to the increase in weight of thread, furnished the workman for the purpose of making up certain clothes and the like, is laid down by the same author: "Ten panas per centum shall be the increase in [weight of] cloths made of woollen or cotton thread. In cloths of middling quality, five panas per centum must be the increase, but in those of fine quality, three panas are declared to be the standard." In some kinds, decrease is allowable, by the same authority, who says: "In embroidered clothes, as well as those made of a hair, a thirtieth share is declared [to be admissible] as loss [in weight], but there is to be neither loss nor gain, in the weight of those made of silk, or of the bark of a tree." Embroidered, by describing the Svastika, or other patterns on ready prepared cloths, or other material, with coloured thread or the like.

11. In work, when a certain term is specified, and the workman fail to send home the article when demanded within the term, then, even if damage happen to the goods, the workman is not to blame; for the same author says: "If, having fully considered the nature of the work, a certain time be fixed for its delivery; in that case, should the owner demand it when only half finished, and not obtain it, still it shall not be awarded to him." The exceptions are declared by the same author: If, when the term has elapsed, and the work is finished, the workman should not deliver it when demanded of him, and it be afterwards damaged, or stolen; the person who would have received the article, shall obtain the value of it." And again: "He who, having received a thing borrowed for his use, shall not restore it when demanded back, shall be seized, and by force compelled to give it up; and let a fine be imposed, if he do not then restore it.

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1—The following rules are not unknown to the English law, which has several statutes to prevent fraud in similar cases. See Tomlin, tit. "Manufacturers," "Gold and silver," "Wire-drawers."

2—As Res. 5th, 91. Wilson ad verb.

3—Essay on Bailmants, 90-91, "Hiring of work."
CHAPTER VII.
Sale without Ownership,—(Aśvāmivikrāya.)

1. Vyāsa. 1 "When the goods of another are sold in the owner's absence, [whether they had been] borrowed for use, bailed for delivery, deposited under seal, or stolen, it is a sale without ownership." Kātyāyana. 2 "Let the judge declare void a sale, a gift, or a pledge, made without ownership." Without ownership, is here a past participle, and used separately, to denote the nature of each [act of sale, gift or pledge.]

2. Nārada. 3 "An open purchaser is clear of imputation, but a purchase in secret is a theft." 4 "He who buys any thing from a slave without authority from his master, from a man not of a good character, in private, at a very low price, and at an unfit hour, becomes the accomplice of him." The accomplice of him, that is, of the thief.

3. Vajjāvalyaka. 5 "The right to a thing lost [and then found.] must be proved, by the mode of acquisition, or by [evidence of] possession; otherwise, on failure of proof, a fine equal to a fifth part shall be paid to the king." Fifth part, a fifth share of the lost property. When the evidence given by the witnesses adduced by the loser, is contrary to his claim, he must be fined in double the amount of the lost property, for Vyāsa says, 6 "If the plaintiff prove not his loss by witnesses, he shall in that case be compelled to pay double its value; and the purchaser is entitled to the thing."

4. He also lays down the course to be pursued by the buyer: 7 "But if the seller be produced, the purchaser shall by no means be condemned; for then the law suit must be continued between the owner of the thing lost and the seller. Bṛhaspati: 8 "When the seller has been made appear, and has been condemned in the law-suit, let the judge cause him to pay the price to the buyer, and a fine to the king; and restore the property to its owner." Kātyāyana: 9 "Let time be given to the buyer for the production of the seller, according to the length of the road." 10: "If he cannot produce the seller, let him even justify the purchase; and if the purchase be justified, he shall in no wise be blamed by the king." The claimant should first

1.—Digest 1st, 453. Strange's Elem. 1st, 289, 302, 3.
2.—Digest 1st, 474. 3.—Digest 1st, 512. 4.—Digest 1st, 491.
5.—Digest 1st, 498.
6.—Digest 1st, 499. 7.—Digest 1st, 502.
8.—Digest 1st, 479. 9.—Digest 1st, 484. 10.—Digest 1st, 501.
prove his property by evidence of kinsmen; next, to clear himself, the buyer should prove a fair purchase by [similar] witnesses, his own kinsmen."

5. "Even if the purchaser clearly prove the sale, still the property must revert to the former owner who lost it." Moreover, Manu: "But if the vendor be not producible, and the vendee prove the public sale, the latter must be dismissed by the king without punishment; and the former owner, who lost the chattel, may take it back, on paying the vendee half its value." Not producible, not to be pointed out. It alludes to the property being assayed [as it were by the buyer], by [the test of] a public sale.

6. Kātyāyana: "The defendant, not clearly proving an open sale to him, or not pointing out the seller, shall be made to deliver the thing claimed, and to pay a fine." Bhāspatī: If a purchase be made before a public assembly [of traders], with the knowledge of the king's officers, but from a seller whose dwelling-place is unknown; or if a claim be made after the death of the seller [though known], the owner of the thing may recover his own property, on paying half the price given; half the value is lost to each of them: such must be the decision." Marīchi: But if he cannot produce the seller, his dwelling-place being unknown, the loss shall be borne equally by the buyer, and by the [former] owner who had lost the thing. Dwelling place, the spot where the seller resides.

7. Nārada: "For the possession of women, or cattle, as well as land, leave must be distinctly granted. He who enjoys them without leave, shall be forced to pay the hire of such enjoyment." Granted, ordered. The hire of enjoyment, rent, similar to the hire.

8. Yajñāvalkya: "The owner of a thing lost, or stolen, which had been seized by the officers of the police or revenue, whether by sea or land, shall take it, [if claimed] within one year; after that time, the prince [shall retain it]." As for this text of Manu: "Three years let the king retain the property, of which no owner appears, [after a distinct proclamation]: the owner, appearing within the three years, may take it; but, after that term, the king may confiscate it," it is only with reference to property belonging to a Čratriya, [one conversant in the Vedas]: The same author says: "The king may take a sixth part of the property so detained by him, or a tenth, or a twelfth, remembering the duty of good kings." Then, in the first year, he must give up the whole of the pro-

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3—Digest 1st, 508.
4—Digest 1st, 510. 5—Macnaghten, p. 426. 6—Chap. 8th, 30.
7—Chap. 8th, 33.
property. In the second year, let him give it up, after deducting a twelfth share; in the third year, a tenth; in the fourth, a sixth. After that term, the king may confiscate it; this only in case of its owner not appearing after three years; and then it may be appropriated by him only for his expenses; but if the owner then make his appearance, it must be made good to him, even if suspended: Thus says the Mitakshara. This however, only if the owner be unknown; for if it be known, that such an one went away, forgetfully leaving the said property behind, then he shall get it back, even after three years. Even the prince possesses no right of disposing of it, though he may at the same time take some portion, however small, as his share.

9. Yājñavalkya propounds the remuneration for trouble of the finder, keeping during one day, the stray animals of another: “The owner of stray animals must pay four panas, if the animal be of the species with solid hoofs; five panas for a human creature; two for every buffalo, camel, cow, or animal with cloven hoofs; but only a fourth, for every goat, or sheep.” But their food must be paid for besides.

10. On the subject of treasure trove, [Nidhi] Yājñavalkya says: “Let the king obtaining unclaimed property [Nidhi] give half to Brāhmaṇas; but a learned Brāhmaṇa may keep the whole, for he is lord of all.” “And the king shall receive a sixth part of unclaimed property occupied by any other person.” “In case of its being discovered without information from the finder, he must be made to pay a fine as well [as the sovereign’s share].” “If however, any one prove by mark, measure, or the like, that the property found belongs to himself, in that case let the prince deliver it to him, after giving a twelfth share to the informer, and taking his own sixth. This is stated by Manus: “When a man claims treasure trove, declaring truly, ‘This is my own property,’ the prince shall still retain his own sixth share, and also a twelfth.” This twelfth, being that assigned for the informer(a).

11. On the subject of property carried off by thieves, the same author says: “Let property carried off by thieves be restored by the prince to the owner, of whatever class he may be; if the prince take possession of it, he partakes of the crime with the thieves.” In case he be unable to recover it from the thieves, Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana [Vyāsa] says: “Should the prince be unable to recover stolen property from thieves he shall make it good from his own treasury, provided he be powerless.” Thus has been expounded the law of sale without ownership.

1—Macnaghten, 437. Digest 1st, 461. 2—Chap. 8th, v. 35.
3—Chap. 8th, v. 40. Macnaghten, 437. 4—Macnaghten, 437.
(c) As to treasure trove, see Mad. Reg. XI of 1838, Act XII of 1838, Mad. S. J. 1860, p. 88. Yājñavalkya by Roer and Moutr. i. 34, 35.—Ed.
CHAPTER VIII.

Concerns among Partners.—(Sambhava Samvikhanam.)

Concerns among partners.

1. Narada: “When traders, or others, jointly carry on business, it is called a ‘concern among partners’; a title of judicial procedure.”

2. Bhashapi: “Whatever property a man lends, with the assent of many, or whatever business he so causes to be performed, is considered as the act of all the partners.” They are declared to be competent arbitrators, and witnesses for each other, in doubtful cases of deceit, provided they bear no enmity to either party.” “Should one of the partners be justly suspected of fraud, in buying, selling, [and the like], he may be cleared by ordeal: such is the rule in all controversies.”

3. Yajnavalkya: “A man of crooked ways; let the other partners expel without profit; and let a partner unable to act, appoint another man to act for him;” : “If one partner does what the others forbid, or disapprove, or if he be negligent, [in doing what they allow], and the [common] property be injured, he shall make it good; but he who preserves it from [robbers or other] misfortune, shall receive a tenth part of it [as his reward].”

4. Katyayana: “If four kinds of artisans be jointly employed; young apprentices, more experienced scholars, good artists, and teachers, they shall receive, in order, one share, two, three, and four shares, of the pay, or profit.” Young apprentices, persons learning their trade. More experienced scholars, those who are well versed in it. Good artists, thoroughly skilled [in every branch]. Teachers, persons making new inventions. Bhashapi: “Where several men jointly build a house or a temple, or dig a pool, or make sacred utensils, let the chief workman receive a double share of the pay.” The same author adds: “This has been ordained by wise legislators for a band of musicians: let him who marks the time skilfully, take a share and a half; and let the singers have equal shares.”

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1—Digest 2d, p. 1
2—Digest 2d, 66-7.
3—Digest 2d, 8-3.
4—Digest 2d, 17-34.
5—Digest 2d, 19.
6—Digest 2d, 78.

(a) Yajnavalkya (11. 259) also lays down that: “Traders who carry on business jointly, for profit, shall share the profits and losses, either in proportion to the capital brought in by each, or according to the contract between them.”—Ed.
5. **Kātyāyana**: "If men, [who have joined together in any business], but are dispersed abroad, meet with imprisonment, then, whatever is paid for the sake of their liberation, shall be borne by them according to the share of each."³ "The law [before] propounded relates to all partners, whether merchants, husbandmen, robbers, [commissioned in war time], or artisans, when they have made no special agreement for their shares."

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**CHAPTER IX.**

**Subtraction of Gift.—(Dhatipradänahum.)**

1. **Nārada**: "When a man desires to recover a thing which was not duly given, it is called subtraction of what has been given; [and this is] a title of administrative justice."CXCV. *Not duly given*, is a past participle, to denote the quality of the transaction, and signifies 'prohibited.' The same author adds:⁶ "In civil affairs, the law of gift is four-fold; what may, or may not, be given; and what is, or is not, a valid gift."

2. **Nārada**: "What is bailed for delivery, what is lent for use, a pledge, joint property, a deposit, a son, a wife, and the whole estate of a man who has issue living, the Sages have declared unalienable, even by a man oppressed with grievous calamities, and [of course], what has been promised to another." Now, as a man has no property in his wife or son, it is only a repetition of the prohibition against their alienation, in conformity to the Vedas. 'Neither between, nor in the heavens above.' From this, and from the law of *Yajñavalkya*: "In distress [for the maintenance of] the family, [or, the family not opposing the gift, on account of poverty], property may be given away, except a wife and son," the purport of the above is confirmed by the reservation of a wife and son. The non-existence of property in a wife or son has been already examined in the discussions on property.

3. In case of their being alienated, not only will the act be untenantable in law, but moreover penance also must be performed; for, in treating of this very subject, Daksha says:⁸ "The man who gives them away is a fool, and must expiate the sin by penance." So *Manu*:⁹ "He who receives what may not be given, and he who gives away the same,

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1—Digest 2d, 80, where it is ‘utensils of leather,’ Chármika, for Dhármika; some of the manuscripts had the other word.
2—Digest 2d, 83.
3—Digest 2d, 93.
⁴—5—Digest 2d, 94-5.
7—Digest 2d, 198. Reports 1st, 60, 2d, 428. See Chap. 4th, Section 1st, para. 12.
8—Digest 2d, 119.
⁹—Not found in his Institutes.
shall both be punished like thieves, and be both caused to pay the fine of Uttama sáhasa.”

4. What things may be given, is declared by Brihaspati: “A man may give what remains, after the food and clothing of his family.” What must without fail be given, is told by Kátyáyana: “He who delivers not a present which he has promised to a Brahman, shall be compelled to pay it as a debt, and incurs the first aumencement.”

5. Gautama: “A man shall not give, even what he has promised, to a person whom the law declares incapable of receiving.” Gift or sale of a livelihood [Váti] are thus forbidden by Vyása: “They who are born, or yet unbegotten, and they who are still in the womb, require the means of support: no gift or sale should therefore be made.”

6. Nárada thus propounds the distinctions, of gifts, valid and void: “Valid gifts are declared to be of seven sorts; void gifts assume sixteen forms.” “They who know the law of gifts, declare, that things once delivered as the price of goods sold; as wages; for [the] pleasure [of hearing poets, musicians, or the like;] from natural affection; as an acknowledgment to a benefactor; as a nuptial gift to a bride [or her family;] and through regard, cannot be resumed.” Regard, religious purposes: “What has been given by men agitated with fear, anger, lust, grief, or [the pain of] an incurable disease; or as a bribe, or in jest, or by mistake, or through any fraudulent practice, must be considered as ungiven: So must any thing given by a minor, an idiot, a [slave or other] person not his own master; a diseased man, one insane, or intoxicated, or in consideration of work unperformed.” “But what shall be given ignorantly, to a bad man, called a good one, or for an illegal act, must be considered as ungiven(a).”

7. Grief; pain, misfortune; the interpretation is, afflicted with pain created by fear or other impulse: Whatever has been given by one excited by fear, of beating or the like, or by other causes; and in the same manner, what is given with the intention that it may be expended, from anger against
brothers or other persons [the rightful heirs: by mistake, as, when gold is given by mistake, when the intention was to give silver; through fraudulent practice, as if, 'The king were about to give a cow to Devadatta, and it be given to some other man, supposed to be the right person by his assuming the dress of Devadatta: by a diseased man, one whose mind is unsettled by disease; by one intoxicated with any substance or liquor which produces drunkenness; or insane, by the effects of the air, or from any other cause. Given, bestowed; what is given to a person who fails afterwards in the performance of any act, the donor [at the time of giving it] thinking, 'This person will do my work:': what has been given to those practising unlawful arts, under an idea that they will perform a lawful act: All these gifts may be reversed.

8. Kātyāyana: "What has been given by men under the impulse of lust, or anger, or by such as are not their own masters, or by diseased, or deprived of virility, inebriated, or of unsound mind, or through mistake, or in jest, may be taken back." Through lust, for the sake of seducing another man’s wife. Deprived of virility, or womanishly timid. Given through mistake or in jest, means as a bribe [útkekha]."

9. "If a bribe be promised for any purpose, it shall by no means be given, although the consideration be performed."

Recovery prohibited, of a bribe once given.

Bribes defined.

10. Manu: "When the Judge discovers a fraudulent pledge, or sale; a fraudulent gift, and acceptance, or in whatever other case he detects fraud, let him annul the whole transaction." Fraud, circumvention. Or in whatever other case, that is, in whosoever business. The meaning is, the whole of that business in which fraud is

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1—This is better explained in the Mit. leaf 19th, page 2nd, line 10th, "Further, what is given thus, 'This man will do this my work; that is, from hope of a profitable return."

2—Digest 2nd, 197. Reports 2nd, 117.


4—Digest 2nd, 194.

5—Chap. 5th, v. 165, Strange’s Elem. 1st 268.
detected shall be reversed.: Kātyāyana: "What a man has promised, in health or in sickness, for a religious purpose, must be given; and if he die without giving it, his son shall doubtless be compelled to deliver it." For a continuation of this subject, the Dvaita Nirmaya, written by Gaṇapati, must be referred to.

CHAPTER X.

Of Service.—[Abhayapati Gṛṇiṣkau].

1. Nārada: "When a man yields not the obedience he has promised, it is called a breach of promised obedience; which is a title of law." Servants are of three ranks, says Bṛhaspati: "The soldier is the highest of servants; the ploughman is the middlemost; the porter is declared the lowest, and so is a servant employed in the business of the household." Nārada: "He who shall be commissioned for affairs, or for the superintendence of the family, should be considered as a commissioned servant; and he is also called a family-servant [in some instances]."

2. Kātyāyana: "Bṛghu admits the servitude of one who, being his own master, gives himself, as [the marriage of] a wife [self-given is acknowledged]: slavery should be limited to three classes; never can a Brāhmaṇa become a slave." The servitude of men of the military, commercial, and servile classes, who have forfeited their independence, may be in the direct, not in the inverse order of the classes." Nārada: "In the inverse order of the classes, slavery is not legal." Kātyāyana: "Where men of the three twice-born classes forsake religious mendicity, let the king banish a man of the sacerdotal class, and reduce to slavery a man of the Kshatriya or military tribe, says Bṛghu." The taking the word Kshatriya or military class, intends the commercial and servile classes also, a part being put for the whole. The mode of banishing a Brāhmaṇa is thus explained by Dakṣa and Nārada: "If a man, after assuming religious mendicity, abide not by his duty, let the king cause him to be lacerated by the feet of dogs, and immediately banish him."

3. Kātyāyana: "But even a man of equal class must not reduce a Brāhmaṇa to slavery; yet a mild and learned man may employ in labour one inferior to himself in those qualities: still let not the highest twice-born man perform impure work." Manu: "Both him of the military, and him of the commercial class, if distressed for

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1.—Digest 2d, 306. 2.—Digest 2d, 304. 3.—Digest 2d, 218.
4.—Digest 2d, 220. See Bl. Com. 1st, 425. The English law admits four kinds.
5.—Digest 2d, 234. See Bl. Com. 1st, 425, note 1.
6.—Digest 2d, 303. 7.—Digest 2d, 227. There is a variation in the reading of this text.
8.—Digest 2d, 257. 9.—Digest 2d, 254-5. 10.—Chap. 38th, v, 411. Strange's Elem. 1st, 135.
(c) Act V of 1843, sec. 2 prohibits the enforcement of any rights arising out of an alleged property in the person and services of another as a slave. See cases cited 3 Med. Dig. 377, 378.
a livelihood, let some wealthy Brāhmaṇa support, obliging them, without harshness, to discharge their appropriate duties." Appropriate duties, meaning respectable, and such as are suited to their class.

4. Kātyāyana: "He who seizes a woman of the sacerdotal class, he who sells her, and he who enslaves a woman of family, impelled by lust, or causes her to be approached by another, shall be amerced, and that [enslavement] is null." "The man who treats as a slave the nurse of an infant child, or a free woman, or the wife of his dependent, incurs the first amercement." Vishnu. "He who employs a man of the most elevated class in servile duty, shall be fined in the highest amercement." Kātyāyana. "And he who attempts to sell an obedient female slave [Bhakta], though she resist the sale, and though he be not distressed, but able to subsist, shall pay the first fine."

5. The distinctions in slaves are laid down by Nārada: "One born [of a female slave] in the house [of her master]; one bought; one received [by donation]; one inherited [from ancestors]; one maintained in a family; and, like him, one pledged by a [former] master; one relieved from great debt; one made captive in war; [a slave] won in a stake; one, who has] offered [himself] in this form. I am thine; an apostate from religious mendicancy; [a slave for a] stipulated [time]; one maintained in consideration of service [Bhakta]; a slave for the sake of his bride; and one self-sold, are fifteen slaves declared by the law."

6. "Of those [slaves], the first four are not [of right] released from slavery: unless they be [emancipated] by the indulgence of their masters, their servitude is hereditary. That low man, who, being independent, sells himself is the vilest of slaves; he also cannot be released from slavery." Among those, whoever rescues his master from imminent danger of his life, shall be released from slavery, and shall receive the share of a son. Yajñavalkya: "He who, having become a Sanyāsi, falls from that state, shall remain the slave of the prince during the rest of his life."

7. Nārada: "One maintained in a famine is released from servitude on giving a pair of oxen." "One pledged [is] also released when his master redeems him, by discharging the debt. When his master redeems him, by discharging the debt, a debtor is released from servitude."

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1—Digest 2d, 256. 2—Digest 2d, 257.
3—Digest 2d, 258. 4—The word 'Bhakta' means also 'serving for maintenance.'
5—Digest 2d, 254-25. Colebrooke on Obligations, 26. 6—Digest 2d, 251.
7—Digest 2d, 241. Reports 1st, 372, note. 8—Digest 2d, 242. The last half of the couplet is here omitted; it is as follows: 'for what was consumed in a famine, is not discharged by labour [alone].'
9—Digest 2d, 243. Here again, the last half couplet is omitted; "but if [the creditor] take him in payment, he "becomes a purchased slave."
10—Digest 2d, 245. 11—Digest 2d, 246.
offered himself in this form, 'I am thine;' one made captive in war, and a slave won in a stake, are emancipated on giving a substitute equally capable of labour.' 1: "A slave for a fixed period is also emancipated, by fulfilling the stipulated terms." 2: "One maintained in consideration of service is immediately released on relinquishing his subsistence; and a slave for the sake of his bride is emancipated by divorcing his wife." Substitute, a surety, deputy. Bride, a female slave.

8. Yajnavalkya: 3: "One enslaved by force, and also one sold by robbers, is released from slavery." Nārada: 4: "One not his own master, who, having given himself[to one man] in this form, 'I am thine,' goes [to another], does not obtain his wish; the former owner may reclaim him." One not his own master, the slave of another. The word slave, used throughout on this subject, being not specially confined to the masculine gender, must therefore be understood as affecting all rules also for female slaves.

9. A reason for enfranchising female slaves is declared by Kātyāyana: 5: "If a man approach his own female slave, and she bear him a son, she must in consideration of her progeny, be enfranchised with her child. Progeny, offspring; meaning, that she becomes thereby qualified for liberty.

10. Nārada: 6: "Let the benevolent man, who desires to emancipate his own slave, take a vessel of water from his shoulder, and instantly break it, sprinkling his head with water containing rice and flowers; and, thrice calling him free, [let the master] dismiss him with his face towards the east: thenceforward let him be called 'one cherished by his master's favour;' his food may be eaten, and his favours accepted; and he is respected by worthy men.

11. Kātyāyana: 7: "A free woman, or one who is not a slave [of the same master; for this word, adhī, may bear either sense], becoming the bride of a slave, also becomes a slave [to her husband's owner]; for her husband is her lord, and that lord is subject to a master." "Whatever goods belong to a slave, his master is declared by law to have dominion over them." 8

1—Digest 2d, 245. This should come in after "Paying the debt with interest," &c.
2—Digest 2d, 247.
3—Digest 2d, 239.
4—Digest 2d, 237. The translation is varied here, to suit the gloss.
5—Digest 2d, 247.
6—Digest 2d, 248.
7—Digest 2d, 252-3.
8—Digest 2d, 262. The last misspelling is here [it would seem fraudulently] omitted; but that matter has no right to the goods which are acquired by public sale. See particularly Collyer brooke on Obligations, 30-31-232.
CHAPTER XI.
Non-payment of Wages.—(Icchāśāhānam.)

1. Nārada: "The rule and the act of payment, and non-payment, of the wages or hire of servants, are now declared, called in law, Non-payment of wages or hire.

2. Yājñavalkya: "He who causes work to be performed without fixing the wages, shall be compelled by the king to give a tenth part of the [profit arising from] commerce, cattle, or grain.

3. This relates to light work—For if the work be heavy, Bihārapati says: "Let the man who guides the ploughshare have a third or a fifth part [of the grain]." Let (the ploughman), to whom food and vesture are given, take a fifth; and let him who is supported by the profit (alone), receive a third part of the grain produced." Food and vesture, a servant boarded with receipt of food and clothes.

4. Nārada: "A servant who refuses to perform the work he has undertaken, shall be compelled to fulfil his agreement, first paying him his wages; but, if he persist in his refusal after receiving his wages, he shall forfeit twice their amount." Mauna: "That hired servant or workman, who, not from any disorder but from insobriety, fails to perform his work according to his agreement, shall be fined eight rakṣikās and his wages or hire shall not be paid." He adds: "Yet, whether he be sick or well, if the work stipulated be not performed [by another for him, or by himself], his whole wages are forfeited, though the work want but a little of being complete." But, if he be really ill, and when restored to health shall perform his work according to his original bargain, he shall receive his pay even after a very long time." So Vishnu: "A servant [or workman by time], who leaves the work before the expiration of the full term, shall forfeit the whole price of his labor, and pay one hundred paras to the king.

5. Again: "If the master dismiss the servant before the full time has passed, he shall pay him his whole wages, and a hundred paras to the king, unless the servant was in fault." Viddha Mauna: "A servant shall pay the full value of what he has lost by care inattention; twice the value of what he has lost by gross negligence or malice; but he shall not be forced to pay any thing for

1—Digest 2d, 246.
2—3—Digest 2d, 261-64. See Tomlin, and Burn, 4th. "Servants."
4—Digest 2d, 267.
5—Chap. 8th, 215. Digest 2d, 268.
6—As Res. 5th, 91.
7—Chap. 8th, 217; Digest 2d, 270.
8—Chap. 8th, 216. Digest 2d, 271.
9—Digest 2d, 271. Reports 2d, 237.
10—Digest 2d, 272.
what robbers have seized, for what has been burned, or for what an inundation has carried away, [unless he were himself blameable]. Malice, enmity. Carried away, swept away. Yajñavalkya: "Be who raises obstacles on solemn occasions shall pay twice the amount of his wages; one who declines when on the road [shall be compelled to pay] the seventh part of the wages, or the fourth part, if he leave him on the way." Vṛddha. Cases of dispute about wages and discharge: Munā. Should a merchant having hired a servant for a certain journey sell his goods by the way, and discharge the servant, his wages must be paid; but the servant shall receive half only of the hire. Kātyāyana: "And if the goods he stopped, or seized on the way, the servant shall receive wages for so much of the way as has been passed by him." The master, who leaves in the way a tired or sick servant, without taking care of him in a village for three days, shall pay the first or lowest amercement. Be stopped, be attached by the king's order.

6. Bṛhaspati: "If a servant, by the command of his master, and for his benefit only, do an improper act, the offence shall be imputed to the master." The master, who pays not the hire of labour after the work is performed, shall be compelled by the king to pay it, as well as a proportionate amercement.

7. Nārada: "The owner of goods, who hires carriages or beasts of burden, and takes them not, shall be compelled to pay a fourth part of the hire; or the full amount, if he leave them on the road." Carriages, conveyances of all sorts. Beasts of burden; horses and other animals, carrying burden on their own backs. Kātyāyana:

"He who hires, at a fixed price, an elephant, a horse, a bull or cow, an ass, or a camel, shall be made to pay for the hire of it as long as he delays to restore the cattle, having used it according to agreement." Nārada: "He who dwells in a house which he built on the ground of another man, and for which he pays rent, shall take with him, when he leaves it, the thatch, the wood, the bricks, and the like. But if he live, without paying rent, on the ground of another, and there be no agreement, he shall, when he quits it, give the thatch, the timber, and the bricks which he has expended, to the landlord." Rent, hire.

1—Digest 2d, 274-75. 2—Digest 2d, 277. 3—Digest 2d, 278.
4—Digest 2d, 279. Moore's Index, Term Reports 1st, 76. Tomlin, and Burn, tit. "Servants."
6—Digest 2d, 270. 7—Digest 2d, 277, q. v.
8—Digest 2d, 283, where it is attributed to Nārada
9—Digest 2d, 281. q. v. Strange's Elem. 1st, 293.
CHAPTER XII.

Breach of Compact.—(Sanveda Vyaitikrama.)

1. Nárada: “The general rule, settled among irreligious men [Pákhanda], and among citizens [Nágama], and the like, is named a compact; and the title of law concerning disputes arising thereon, is called Breach of compact.” Pákhanda, persons pursuing commerce or the like, [and] deviating from the ordinances of the Vedas. Citizens, those who do not act contrary [to the Vedas]. From the term the like, we must include those skilled in the three Vedas.

2. The part to be taken by the king in these matters is laid down by Brháspati: “Assembling Bráhmans endowed with knowledge of the Veda, Cántriyas [or learned teachers of the scripture,] and priests who keep a perpetual fire for oblations [Agnihotra] let the king establish them in that place, and assign their subsistence.” “Let him grant to them, in his own dominions, houses and land exempt from taxes, delivering by a written grant, that the royal dues are remitted. Exempt: They from whom taxes are not to be taken, are exempt from taxes. Remitted dues: Remitted, abandoned: dues, the fruits of the earth, and the like; meaning, these [are to be remitted] to them. And the laws for these persons, the Cántriyas and the rest, are declared by Yájñavalkya: “Duties which are stipulated, or sensible [for Sámayika may bear either sense,] or prescribed by the king, and which are not inconsistent with their own [regular] duties, should also be diligently observed [by those priests, and enforced by the king.]”

3. Nárada: “Let the king maintain the associations of the Pákhanda, of the Nágama, of joint companies [Creni] of separate trades [Pága,] and of various tribes [Vritta,] and the like, both in a place of difficult access, and in a frequented spot.” Associations of persons of dif-

2—Digest 2nd, 286-286-2. Ellis’s Lectures “Kulika Sabhā from Kulika, heads of tribes or families. A court composed of ancient persons of the same Gotra as the plaintiff and defendant. The Gana, Kula, and Kulika courts took cognizance, especially, of what is termed technically, Sanskara vyaitikrama, all transgressions against the discipline and peculiar customs of the tribe or family; they had, also, jurisdiction, probably to a limited extent, in civil causes between the members of the tribe or family; but they had no jurisdiction in criminal cases, and did not, therefore, resemble the domestic courts of the Romans, in which the Pater-familias presided, and punished the faults of his wife and children even with death.” See Chap. 1st, Sec. 1st, para. 10th.

3—Digest 2nd, 288.

1—Digest 2nd, 287. 2—Digest 2nd, 293. The words of the text are retained, to avoid perplexity. The Mayáka, and Mitákshara, vary in their acceptance of the term Nágama, for which “trader” seems the most common meaning. See Chap. 17th, para. 2d. For the three last terms, see Chap. 1st, Sec. 1st, para. 10th, and references.
different castes for the carrying on of one kind of trade or business between them, are joint companies. Among them again, those who are associated by different kinds of work, are called separate trades. Various tribes, are associations of near kinsmen, connexions, or gentle relations; the same which are also denominated kula, or family. Of the Pākhanda and Naigama, we have before spoken [para. 1.] Associations of all these, from the Pākhandas to the Vṛāta inclusive, are all denominated 'companies.'

4. The punishment for a departure from the rules laid down among them, is declared by Vājñavalkya: "Him who hazzles the property of the company, and him who violates his engagement, let the king banish from the realm, after confiscating all his effects."

CHAPTER XIII.

SECTION I.

Rescission of Purchase.—(Kritānushaya.)

1. Nārada: "He who is dissatisfied with his purchase, after buying a commodity for a just price, is called a rescinder of purchase, [which is] a title of judicial procedure."

2. The limit for examination of an article is fixed by the same author: Milch cattle should be examined within three days; beasts of burden, within five; but the examination of pearls, gems, and coral must be within seven days; of male slaves, within half a month; of females, within one month; of all seeds, within ten days; of iron, and wearing apparel, within one day." Kātyāyana: "Rescission of a sale of land within ten days is permitted, whether to the buyer or the seller." Bṛhaspati: "Within those times, if a blamish be any where discovered in the commodity purchased, it must be returned to the seller, and the purchaser shall take back the price."

3. Kātyāyana: "But an unexamined commodity being bought, and afterwards proved to have a blamish, it must be returned to its owner within the limited time, and not otherwise." If he took the article after personal examination, then, says Nārada: "If a man, having bought for a just

3—Digest 2nd, 397. Reports 2nd, 397.
1—Digest 2d, 309. See Strange 1st, 301-304, for this and the succeeding section.
2—Digest 2nd, 214-15, Reports 1st, 404-5.
3—The same hemistich, and no more is in the Vīratodaya, 134 1st, 1st.
4—Digest 2nd, 315-6. The second reading of which, 'sanjaya,' is followed here.
5—Digest 2nd, 316. 6—Digest 2nd, 309-10.
price any [cloth or other consumable] commodity [except seed grain,] should suspect that he had made a bad purchase, he may return it on that very day to the seller, unless it be diminished.

The buyer who returns it on the second day, shall give [the seller] a thirtieth part of the price; on the third day, twice as much [or a fifteenth]; and, after that, it is absolutely his own.” Nārada: “But a mantle, that has been worn, and is tattered and soiled, yet is bought with those known blemishes, cannot be returned to the seller.”

SECTION II.

Rescission of Sale.—(Vikriya-sampradānam.)

1. Nārada: “When a vendible thing, sold for [a just] price, is not delivered to the purchaser, this is called ‘non-delivery of a thing sold,’ a title of judicial procedure,”

2. Yājñavalkya: “He who, having received the price of a thing sold, delivers not that thing to the buyer, shall be compelled to deliver it together with interest; or, among those who trade to foreign countries, the foreign profit.” Foreign, of another country. Its profit, that is, the profit on a commodity, the produce of a foreign country. The same author: “Should a commodity sold, but not delivered on demand [with tender of payment], be injured by the act of God or of the king, the loss shall fall on the vendor.

3. But again: “And if a loss arise by the fault of the vendee, and the vendor, the vendee to accept the commodity which he has bought, when it is offered, the vendor commits no offence if he sell it to another.”

4. Yājñavalkya says: “That which has been sold by a drunken, or by an insane man; or for a base price; also that which has been sold by one not independent, and by an idiot, (b) must be given up and restored by the purchaser.”

1–2 Digest 2d, 317. 3–Digest 2d, 319-20.

4–Digest 2d, 324. 5–Digest 2d, 324. Reports 1st, 404. The last hemistich of one text is here tacked on to the end of the other.

6–Digest 2d, 327. Reports 1st, 404. 7–This is a text of Bṛhaspati, according to the Vāramidāyas (136–1st, 5th,) and is attributed also to him in the Digest 2d, 325, or at least one very like it. Reports 2d, 118.

(a) By Hindu law a purchaser may recover in an action for breach of a contract to deliver goods not only double the earnest money but also damages for the non-delivery. Almor Cheffee v. Forbesinga Cheffee 1 Mad. H. C. Rap. 9.—Ed.

(b) Where an idiot and foolish man, proved by a reference to his case to be incapable of managing his own affairs, sold his house at a base price, without the knowledge or consent of his relations, the sale was set aside at the suit of his widow, and she was decreed to be put into possession of the house, the purchaser from the idiot paying all costs, but being at liberty to recover for any sums he might prove to have actually advanced to the deceased. Ebmoodas Prisoodar v. Mt. Membameer, 2 Barr. 114. 1 Meri. Dig. 563.—Ed.
Rules for decision: rules must be understood, as referring to a contract made by the seller to this effect: ‘The price being paid, I will give it to you alone, and to no other,’ [as is evident] from the following text of Nārada: ‘This rule has been declared for vendible commodities, of which the price has been paid [or tendered]; but where it has not been paid [or tendered], there is no injury to the buyer by [delaying the delivery] unless there have been a special agreement [as to the times of delivery and payment].’

5. On the subject of selling a damaged article, Yājñavalkya says: The dishonest man, who sells the commodity knowing its blemish, [but not disclosing it], shall pay double the price of it [to the vendor], and a fine, of equal amount [to the king]."

CHAPTER XIV.

Disputes between Master and Herdsman.—(Sadavīpāla vivāda).

1. When damage occurs to kine, or other animals, through the fault of their keeper, Yājñavalkya says: “On the loss [of a beast] by the fault of the herdsman, the fine ordained for him is thirteen panas and a half; and [he shall pay] the value [of the beast] to its owner.” The value of the cow, or whatever animal it may be.

2. The mode of certifying the death of any animal, is thus laid down by Maṇu: “When cattle die, let him carry to his master their ears, their hides, their tails, the skin below their navels, their tendons, and the liquor exuding from their foreheads: let him also point out their marks." Marks, their horns, or other known marks, according to Madana.

3. The portion of ground [to be set apart] to serve as pasture for kine, and the like, is defined by Yājñavalkya: “Let a space be left between village and village, in breadth four hundred cubits; let it be eight hundred cubits round a town, and sixteen hundred round a city." Space [Pariṇāha], land appropriated for pasture of cattle and the like. In the

1—Digest 2d, 319.  2—Digest 2d, 325, where it is attributed to Bhaspati

3—Digest 2d, 243, and the commentary.

4—Chap. 8d, v. 254. Digest 2d, 347. There is a variation in the reading here, anka, marks, for sangā, limbs.

5—Digest 2d, 348.  6—In practice, this is well known, the ground so set apart being termed Kotra in Gājurāt.
same sense also, a similar word [Paribhāra] is issued by Manu: "On all sides of a village or small town, let a space [Paribhāra] be left for pasture, four hundred cubits." Some author has defined a village, as a place where several artificers and husbandmen are found: a town [Kharvata], as a place surrounded with a strong thorn hedge.

4. When the grain or property of another is eaten by cattle, fines must be paid by their owner, according to this ordinance of Vājapeyava: The owner of a female buffalo, doing damage to grain, shall be fined eight māshas; of a cow, half that [amercement]; and of a goat or sheep, half [again] of this amercement." "For cattle eating and lying down in the field, the fine is double the amercement mentioned; it is also the same, if they trespass on preserved lands, and the fine for an ass or a camel, is the same with that for a female buffalo." As much grain as shall be destroyed, so much produced shall be [paid] to the husbandmen; the herdsmen shall be scourged; but the owner of the cattle incurs the fine already declared." Preserved lands, a place for collecting or preserving grass, wood, or the like.

5. An exception to this is stated by Uçanas: "Kine are not liable to fine for trespass on jubiles, and they are equally exempt at the season of obsequies." Vyāsa; the reasons for them.

Exception: with

"O lion [lord] of kings, he whose property has been snatched away and enjoyed by a Brahman, or by a very indigent relation, or by a kine, receives greater reward, than he would obtain from the Vājapeyaya sacrifice." Uçanas: "Neither ancestors, nor deities, taste the offering of that man who demands compensation for corn destroyed by cows."

CHAPTER XV.

Boundary Disputes.—[Śīnu Vivāda].

1. Bhraspati tells the means of knowing boundaries: "The following substances, cow-dung, bone, husks of grain, charcoal, large stones, potsherds, sand, bricks, cows’ hair, cotton, bones, and ashes, having been placed in vessels, shall be deposited under ground at the extremities of the boundary."
2. Vājāvalikya here shows the nature of the witnesses required:

Requisite witnesses.

Men inhabiting a neighbouring village [Skānta], or that in which the disputed ground is situated, being in number either four, eight, or ten, having put on a chaplet of red flowers, and a red dress, and taking some of the earth [on their heads], shall point out the true boundary." Nārada: "A single man shall not determine a disputed boundary, even if he be worthy of confidence; for the weighty office of this business required that such fact be settled by many." Bhāṣapāla: In default of the marks for pointing the boundary, even a single man, who is virtuous and upright, and mutually agreed upon by both parties, having put on a chaplet of red flowers, and red clothes, and taking some earth on his head, and having tasted, may point out the boundary.

3. Kātyāyana: "On three occasions, the act of God or the king is to be looked for: in walking over a boundary, undergoing the ordeal of holy water, and likewise in swearing by holy feet; [in the first] within six weeks; [in the second] a fortnight; and [in the third], within seven days." 1

4. Mānu: "Verguous witnesses who gave evidence as the law requires, are absolved from their sin; but such, as give it unjustly, shall each be fined two hundred paras." Nārada: "Now if neighbouring villagers have spoken what is not true in deciding a [contested] boundary, they shall be fined, all separately, in the middling assessment, by the king." Kātyāyana: "Where many are assembled [for this purpose], and they do not give an unanimous verdict, [or testimony], whether from fear or hope of reward, they shall be made to pay the highest assessment." 2

5. Vājāvalikya: "In default of assessors, or of marks for distinguishing it, the king ought of his own accord to define the boundary." Mānu: "If the boundary cannot be otherwise ascertained, let the king, knowing what is just, [that is without partiality, and] consulting the future benefit of both parties, mark a boundary between their lands: this is a settled law."

1—Chap. 8th, 257.

2.—In the Viramitrodārā (XII. 14th) this is elucidated by another hemistich of the same author: "If it be so delivered from want of knowledge, let the boundary be examined anew; but if there be a contradiction in what they have delivered, they shall be fixed in the highest assessment."

3—Chap. 8th, 335.
6. The same author says: °Reckoning from the time of entry,
even as a house-door, a shop [or market], and other places
may have been enjoyed by any, i.e., according to that
time and manner shall he possess them, and shall not
be removed." Kātyāyana also: °An enclosure; a
drain; a projection, and small apertures, let them not
stop up, or interfere with; let him who stops a permanent water-course
or the site of a house, receive punishment." An enclosure, the foun-
dation of a wall. A drain, a road for the exit of water. A projection,
is, according to Madhava, "a place for sitting in, made of wood or other
materials, not touching the ground, but built out, from a house or other
place." In some copies they read [dharma nishkāsa], °a passage for
smoke, [a chimney]" instead of [dharma nishkāsa] °a drain and a pro-
jection." It then would mean, small apertures, as bull's eyes, or the
like, for the purpose of letting out smoke. By the phrase other places,
we must understand, the walls of other people, and the like.

7. The same author says: °From and after the date of entry [or
possession], such things are not at any time to be made.
Prohibition
against erection
of nuisances.

CCXV. 

8. Bhāspati: °That [road], by which men and animals have
come and gone unprevented, is called a highway
[Sanātana]: it is not to be shut up by any one
whomsoever. Nārada: °Let them not stop up a
thoroughfare [or junction of four roads, Chatuspatha],
a place dedicated to the gods, or the king's highway, [Rājāmarga], by
[making there] a place for sweepings, a pit, a drain, a heap, [of rubbish]
or the like." Kātyāyana: °That place through which all [sorts of]
people are constantly moving, is a thoroughfare [Chatuspatha]: that
which has not at any time been stopped up, is called the king's high-
way."

9. Bhāspati: °Let one nishkīsa be the fine of him, who there
makes either a stoppage [with walls], or a pit [or sink],
or a plantation of trees, and likewise for him who will-
fully voids ordure there." Mean? °He, who shall
drop his ordure on the king's highway, sweep in case
of necessity, shall pay two pannas, and immediately remove the filth."

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1. It is not found in Nārāyaṇa's Institutes, and the Viśvarudhava attributes it, by
implication, to Bhāspati.

2. Chap. 9th, 252
Kātyāyana: "Let him who defiles a pond, a royal garden, or a holy place of water, with ordure, be made to remove the defilement, and be punished in the lowest amercement."

10. Vaiśeṣikā: "For altering the divisions [of joint lands], as well as for transgressing the boundary [of others], and taking away a man's land, let the fine be, in order, the lowest, the highest, and the middling, scale."

11. Manus: 1 "He who, by means of intimidation, shall possess himself of a house, a pool, a field, or a a garden, shall be fined five hundred panas; but only two hundred, if he trespassed through ignorance of the right."

12. Kātyāyana: 2 "The fruit and flowers of trees produced upon the boundary between two fields, are declared to be joint property, pertaining in common to the masters of the two fields." Kātyāyana: 3 "But where the branches of trees growing in one man's field, be spread out over that of another, then he shall be considered as the owner [of their produce], over whose field they are so situated." Vaiśeṣikā: "If a man, not even giving notice to the owner, set up a bridge upon [another person’s] field, the enjoyment of its profits is the right of the landlord, or, on failure of him, of the king."

13. The same author says: "A bridge which diffuses general benefits [must not be put a stop to] where the inconvenience is slight; and a well, which takes off from the land of another, if the ground [so lost] is small, and the supply of water great." 4 Must not be put a stop to, should here be added. Nārada also: "But a bridge in the middle of another man's field must not be objected to, if the benefit be great, and the damage small, and a profit be expected above the less." Nārada: "If any one, without asking the owner, repair a bridge built long before but fallen into decay, 5 that person in such case shall not enjoy the profits of it." Vyāsa: "If any one, having taken a field [in hire] shall neither till it himself nor cause it to be tilled, he shall be made to pay to the owner of the land the vegetable products of that field, and a fine equal to it to the king." 6 Products, profits suitable to the powers of the land.

1—Chap. 8th, 254.

2—3—Hallied, 188. Strange's Elem. 1st, 393.

4—Mit. 65. 1st.—Bridges [Setu] are declared by Nārada to be of two kinds: "Bridges of two sorts are known: the one open, and the other confined: when for the passage of water, it is open; that which is closed, is for the stoppage [of water]."

5—In the Mitakṣarā, it is read Utsānam; in the Vyramitrodasa, Utpannam; the former of which is followed here.

CHAPTER XVI.
SECTION I.

Abuse.—(Vākparushyam).

1. Bṛhaspati: “That is reckoned the first scale in abusive language where, without any thing specific, disgraceful accusation of country, town, or family, is made.” “False accusation, of connexion with the sister, or the mother, of another; [or] of a sin in the minor degree, is called the second degree of wordy abuse, by those skilled in the Čātra.” “Accusation of [using] forbidden food, or drink; the charging with a mortal sin; and spreading abroad very deep secrets, is termed the highest misuse of language.” Without any thing, means, mere mention made, but without specifying any thing so as to identify the thing [or person] meant.” Spreading abroad, divulging.

2. Viṣṇu: “For loud abuse of one of the same class, a man is to be fined twelve panas.” In another Smriti, it is said:

Punishment of it in various cases. “When a couple of persons stand mutually charged with the offence of abuse, and no difference is observable [in their respective guilt], the punishment [the guardian of good behaviour] of both shall be equal.” Nārada: “He who commences an abusive quarrel, shall most certainly be held to be blamable, and also he who in retort is guilty of such improper conduct; but the man who first began is the principal offender.”

3. Manu: “A soldier defaming a priest, shall be fined a hundred panas; a merchant, [thus offending], an hundred and fifty, or two hundred: but [for such an offence] a mechanic or servile man shall be whipped.” Bṛhaspati: “The punishment of a Brāhman for giving abuse to a Kṣatriya, shall be fifty panas; thus, if to a Vaishya, the half of fifty; if to a Čādra, thirteen and a half.” With respect to a Čādra, the same author says: “He who makes the ordinances of religion, and he who joins in reading the Vedas, or is abusive towards Brāhmans, shall be punished by having his tongue cut out.”

1—Macmaken 418. 2—Chap. 8th, 357. Ellis’s Lectures. “We had occasion to observe the misapprehension which prevailed with respect to the exception of Brāhmanas from capital punishment. This is one only of the innumerable misconceptions of their situation in Hindu society, which has obtained among foreign nations from the earliest times. Not the least gross of these, is that which ascribes to the whole body a sacerdotal character; and which Sir W. Jones has unaccountably countenanced, by translating, in the Institutes of Manu, the words used to designate an individual of the first caste [Brāhmana and Vīra] “priest,” and the feminine of them [Brāhmāṇā and Vīrā] “priestess.” The latter mistake is particularly remarkable, as the wives of Brāhmans, though they assist in the private devotions of their family, not only never officiate as priestesses, but have no part in the public ceremonies of religion, except as spectators.” It may be further remarked, that the second and third trises, of
4. Manus: "He shall be fined a hundred [panas], who defames his mother, his father, his wife, his brother, his father-in-law, or his preceptor; and he who gives not his preceptor the way." Brother, his elder brother, because of his companionship with the father, and the rest. According to the Līlāvātī, and other authorities, punishment [should follow abuse] against a mother and the rest, even though they deserved it; of a wife, provided she be not in fault.

5. Yājñavalkya: "Let punishment to the amount of an hundred panas, be inflicted for threatened injury to the arm, neck, eyes, or thigh; and the half of it, for the like injury to the foot, nose, ears, hand, or the like. If this [threat] be uttered by a powerless person, he need only be fined ten panas, but if he have the power to perform his threat, let him be made to give security for the safety of him [threatened]."

6. The same author says: "Any one abusing another thus, 'I have criminal connexion with thy mother, or thy sister,' &c. Indecent abuse, let the king oblige to pay a fine of twenty-five panas. The highest punishment [shall be the portion] for him, who abuses a Brahman learned in the three Vedas, the king, or the gods." Nārada: "A man calling a degraded man fallen; or taxing a thief with being such again, commits no fault: but if falsely, he shall obtain double blame." Yājñavalkya: "He, who contemptuously heaps ridiculous compliments, whether true, or untrue, or ludicrously distorted, upon persons wanting a limb, or diseased in their organs, shall be fined thirteen panas and a half."

7. Upanis: "He who confesses, 'Such a thing was said by me from ignorance, carelessness, envy, or affection; I will not say so again,' may be fairly considered deserving of only half the fine."

SECTION II

Assault.—(Dvandā Pārushya.)

1. Nārada: "Injury inflicted upon the limbs of another, with the hand, foot, weapons, or other thing, and de- Assault, defined. filling him with ashes, or the like, is called actual affray."

Kalastiya and Vaiya, which he translates Soldier and Merchant, no longer exist in a per se state, and that the Soldiers and Merchants of the present day are, in the eye of their own law, lower than the real Gādha, being of the Varna Gadhara, or mixed classes.

1—Chap. 8th, 275, where the reading is 'father, son,' instead of 'father-in-law,' as here, and in the Vīruṇītrodhyāya, and Mitakṣarā.
2. Bhāspatī: "The man who, having received abuse, retorts abuse; or being beaten, returns the blow; and he who beats one doing him some wrong, does by no means thereby become liable to punishment."

3. Kātyāyana: "Bṛigu has ordained, that the highest punishment shall be inflicted for cutting off an ear, a nose, a foot, the eyes, tongue, the penis, or a hand; the middling degree for breaking [or wounding] any of them."

Yājñavalkya: "A fine of ten paṇas is recorded as the punishment for touching any one with ashes, sand, or dust; double that sum is demanded, for touching him with excrement, or the heel, or spittle; these fines to be doubled, if the fault be committed against those of equal as well as superior caste, or against, the wife of another; if the sufferers be of inferior caste, let half the specified fine be levied; but if committed through inadvertence, drunkenness, or the like, it is not punishable."

The heel, the hinder part of the foot. Kātyāyana: "The fine is declared to be four-fold, when the vomited contents of the stomach, or urine, or feces, or the like, are thrown on the lower extremities; six-fold if upon the trunk itself; but eight-fold, if upon the head."

4. Yājñavalkya: "For holding up [threateningly a hand or a foot, the punishment shall be [in order] ten, and twenty, paṇas: the middle scale of punishment is declared for all classes, for mutual raising of weapons."

The same author says: "The punishment of ten paṇas shall be inflicted, for violent pulling of the foot, the hair, the clothes, of the hand, of another; an hundred, for painfully pulling a man about, tightly binding his clothes about him, and trampling him under foot."

The man who causes pain [to another], short of drawing blood, with a stick or the like, shall be fined thirty-two paṇas; double that sum, if blood be produced."

The meaning of pain, and the rest is, that an hundred paṇas shall be levied for [a complicated assault, both] tying a man in his clothes, violently pulling him about, and trampling him under foot. The same author says: "The middle amercement shall be imposed, for breaking a hand, a foot, or a tooth; for tearing the ears or the nose; for laying open a sore, and likewise for beating one till he seems dead: the limb with which any one gives pain to Brāhmans, if not himself a Brāhman, shall be cut off."

The lowest amercement, for raising [that limb, or a weapon] against them, but the half of it, for only touching [weapons] with hurtful intent." Manu: "With whatever member a low-born man shall assault or hurt a superior, even that member of his must be slit, [or cut more or less in proportion to the injury]: this is an ordinance of Manu." "He who raises his hand, or a staff against another, shall have his hand cut." Kātyāyana: "Just as the fines are laid down for abusive language between men in the regu-
lar or inverse order of the classes, even so shall the fines for violent affray be imposed, according to their order [in rank]."

Double fine for many assaulting one.

5. Vishnu: "The fine for every one of many persons beating one, shall, for each, be double of that declared [for a single offender]."

6. Katyayana: In case of injury to the body, or organs, of another at whatever amount they determine the fine, the very same sum shall be given to cause pleasure, and for the cure, [as fixed] by learned men. To cause pleasure, to make satisfaction to the sufferer. The cure, the price of medicines, and the like. By learned men, is meant: 'That must be paid, which is settled by those skilled in the matter.'

7. With reference to beating animals, and the like, Yajnavalkya says: "The fine for giving pain to, or drawing blood from, as well as cutting off the branches [as horns, &c.] of inferior animals, shall be from two pavanas, ascending in order: [of the injury]." "For cutting off their organs of generation, and for causing their death, the second amercement shall be paid, and their value also; a double punishment shall be imposed in the case of superior animals, when ill-treated as above described."

8. In respect of damage to trees, says Manu: "According to the use and value of all great trees, must a fine be set for injuring them; this is an established rule."

CHAPTER XVII.

Robbery.—[Stevan].

1. Narada specifies three degrees, of things liable to be stolen:

Robbery defined; of three degrees.

CCXXII. "All earthenware utensils; a stool, a bed-stead; [all articles made of] bone, [or ivory], wood, or leather; as well as grass, and the like; leguminous grains, and grain ready dressed; are termed inferior articles." "Cloth made from any material except silk, and likewise all cattle, with the exception of kine; all metals except gold, and rice of all sorts; barley and such like [grain], are termed articles of middling estimation." "Gold, precious stones, silken clothes, women, men, kine, elephants, horses, and the property of the gods, the Brahmans, and the king, are the first rate articles."
2. The same author here first exhibits [the nature] of an open thief: "Traders [naigama]; physicians; gamesters; assessors; persons taking bribes, [and] cheats; fortune-tellers [and] professional prostitutes; persons skilled in the arts; counterfeits, and those who perform unlawful acts; arbitrators, [Madhyastha]; false witnesses, and likewise those who gain a living by fraudulent practices, are all of them open thieves." In another Sūtra also we find: "Whenever manifest cheats, persons having recourse to false weights and measures; those taking bribes, or employing fraud; impostors; bad women; as well as counterfeits, and those who live by showing fortunes, are found, all these, and the like, may be known for manifest thieves."

3. Bṛhaspati: "That trader, who shall sell an article, concealing its blemish, mixing it up and making it over again, shall be made to give [an article of] twice its value, and likewise pay a fine equal to the same." "That physician, who, being ignorant of medicine or its invocations, or unacquainted with the nature of disease, yet levies money from those who are sick, deserves to be punished even as a thief." "Those who play with false dice; professional prostitutes; those who seize the king's dues; astrologers, as well as cheats, are deserving of punishment as being all denounced swindlers." "Assessors pronouncing an unjust decision; even so also, those who live by bribery; and those who cheat persons trusting them, are every one of them to be banished." "Those who, not understanding their subject, shall pretend to a knowledge of astrology, or shall foretell prodigies, and likewise expound auspicious omens or the like to mankind, must be strictly kept down." "Those men, who exhibit themselves [as religious mendicants] with a staff, deer's skin, and other requisite accompaniments, and by these means deceiving men, kill 'them, shall be put to death by the king's people.' "Those who, making up a thing of very small value, raise a great price upon it, and they who impose upon other people, deserve to be punished in proportion to the amount." "They who make false gold, precious stones, coral, or the like, shall be made to give back their price to the person who has bought them, and to pay double the amount as a fine to the king." "Persons, acting as arbitrators [Madhyastha], who become corrupt through favour, gain, or other motive, and those witnesses who depose

1—See Chap. 12th, para. 3d. The word is here translated in conformity to the succeeding text of Bṛhaspati, evidently intended by our author to furnish the gloss on it.

2—The word 'Kṣuṇḍrā' for which the Viramitrodāya reads Bhadrā, is translated thus, as in the masculine plural it is meaningless; in the subsequent text of Bṛhaspati, as read in the Viramitrodāya, it bears the same sense, supported by the succeeding text, 'bad women.'

3—See Chap. 1st, Sec. 1st.

4—Perhaps "consultation, advice," would be a better term. The higher classes, when taking medicine, use very appropriate mantras, or formulas, evincing their reliance on the Deity and their medical advisers' skill.

5—Or, as some copies read, "adorned with jewels and fine clothes."
contrary to the truth, shall be made to pay double [the sum depending] as a fine.

4. Vyasā: "When persons are found walking about at night-time in a secret manner, furnished with implements [of theft] or the like, and whose place of abode is not known, they shall be recognized as secret thieves." The same author adds: "Pick-pockets [or shop-lifters], burglars or house-breakers breaking a hole; highwaymen [Panamusha] who rob travellers; those who open bundles [Granthi nochaka], and stealers of women, men, kine, horses; and other cattle, are all reckoned but nine different kinds of thieves." A hole [Sandhi] in a wall or the like.

5. Yājñavalkya: "Let shop-lifters, and those who open bundles, be both made to lose the tongs of their hand; for the second offence, they shall be deprived of a hand or foot." The tongs, the forefinger and thumb. "The robbers, who having broken a hole, commit a robbery at night, then shall the king, having cut off both hands, cause to be impaled with a very sharp stake." Brhaspati: "In like manner, let him cause highwaymen to be hanged, tied by the neck to a tree. He shall cause the fingers of package-openers to be cut off, for apprehension on the first offence; on a second [apprehension], both hands or feet; for the third, they are deserving of vadha." Fingers, the forefinger and thumb.

6. Nārada specifies certain distinctions in the flight of thieves, taking the stolen property with them: "A thief shall by every effort be seized by him in whose district [or premises] he may be furtively concealed. Else, if the trace or footprint be not carried out [of the premises], he shall be made to pay the amount of the loss. If the trace be carried forward from that district, yet have not fallen elsewhere, then they shall cause the neighbourhood, the road-keepers, or even those entrusted with the care of the district to pay the loss." Yājñavalkya also: "The village shall pay, when within its own limits, or wherever the trace goes; the five-village community, if beyond one krota; or again, that of ten villages."

1—Utakopaka. The Mitakshara defines it to be, "those who pilfer by throwing up clothes and the like," books for instance. The Vṛṣṇiśravdaya in commenting on the text above, says, "those who, having satisfied themselves of the ignorance of the owner, get the property out of his possession, by snatching it from him."

2—Sandhi, a hole made in a wall for felonious entry. Sandhichaura, a burglar, a house-breaker.

3—Padam; the same which is called "paglā" in Gujarāt to this day; the custom is in the Dakhan equally well known, under the name of Māga.—Reports 2d, 344.

4—Sāmantā; the same word occurred in the same sense, at Chap. 15th, para. 2d.
7. On the subject of kidnapping women, Vyāsa says: “The woman-stealer shall be burned on an iron bedstead, with a fire of grass; the man-stealer shall be set up where four roads meet, after having his hands and feet cut off.” Brihaspati: “Having cut off the nose of a stealer of kine, and bound him, let them plunge him into the water.” Nārada: “Vadha shall be inflicted on him, who robs another of his all, or who carries off a married woman, or a virgin.” Brihaspati directs that they confiscate all [the wealth] of those who carry off a horse, an elephant, or metals. All; the wealth, must be here supplied. Vyāsa: “Let them cut off, with a very sharp instrument, half the foot of him who carries off [common] animals.” Nārada: “For stealing animals of a superior kind, let his punishment be that of the highest scale, the middle scale for the middle class of animals, and the first [or lowest] scale for such an act in respect of mean animals.”

8. Manu: “Corporal punishment [vadha] shall be inflicted on him, who steals more than ten Kumbhas of grain; for less he must be fined eleven times as much, and shall pay to the owner the amount of his property.” One Kumbha is twenty Prasthas. He again says: “For stealing the most precious gems [as diamonds or rubies], the thief deserves capital punishment [vadha].” Nārada: “Capital punishment [vadha] shall be inflicted for stealing more than a hundred of [any of the following things], gold and silver pieces, or the like: fine clothes, and likewise all precious stone.” Manu: “For stealing gold and silver, or the like, or costly apparel: or more than fifty palas, it is enacted that a hand shall be amputated; for less, the king shall set a fine eleven times as much as the value.”

9. Yājñavalkya: “Having set a mark on a Brāhmaṇa found guilty of such offence, let him be banished from that his native country.” Manu: “[Criminals of] all the classes, having performed an expiation as ordained by law, shall not be marked on the forehead, but be condemned to pay the highest fine.” Yājñavalkya also: “Having caused restitution of the stolen property, they shall cause the thieves to be put to death, by different modes of Vadha.

1—The Vīramitrodāyas reads, “in the ordeal of hot iron, with the fire in his hand.”
2—So the Vīramitrodāyas, according to which this text was inserted in the cārtas.
3—Chap. 6th, v. 320. Kullukā, whose commentary Sir W. Jones follows, divides vadha into three degrees; Mrāṇa, capital; Chheda, membrual, involving loss of limb; and Tāraṇa, corporal. As our law admits not infliction of the second, [though a commutation of it into imprisonment is awarded, where the punishment itself is enjoined by the Hindu Law], vadha must be taken to mean, either Capital, or Corporal punishment, as the case may be. It is used in the latter sense in verse 320, in the former in verse 323. Indeed it is more than hinted, in the commentary on verse 320, that either of the three kinds is to be applied, according to the circumstances of the robbery; for instance, the first, if a Brāhmaṇa be the person robbed, &c.
4—See As. Res. 5th, 367—Wilson, ad verb.
5—Chapter 8th, 323. 6—Chapter 8th, 321—2. 7—Chapter 9th, v. 210.
10. Nárada: “They who grant food and an asylum [opportunity] to thieves flying before pursuit, and they who wink at their escape, though able to stop them, are also their accomplices in the offence.” And therefore, sharers in their punishment.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Heinous offences.—(Sáhasam.)

1. Their nature is declared by Nárada: “Whatever act is by strength performed, by one inflamed with power, [bala] is denominated [Sáhasa] violence, oppression; for strength [Sahas, whence Sáhasa] is also termed power [bala].”

2. Bháspati: “Killing a human being, robbery, handling the person of another man’s wife, and both species of assault, are the four kinds of violence.” Both species, that is, abuse and affray. Nárada: “Spoiling fruits, roots, water, and such things, and agricultural implements, or throwing them away, treading them under foot, or the like, is declared to be the first degree of violence [pratáhamá sáhasa].” “Misusing in the very same way, clothes, animals, food, drink, and household utensils, is denounced as the middle degree of violence [madhyáma sáhasa].” “Malicious practice with poison, weapons, or the like; the handling of another man’s wife, and all other encompassing of life, is called the highest degree of violence [uttáma sáhasa].”

3. Yájñavalkya: “The king shall apprehend sacrilegious house-breakers [Bandigráha]; likewise those who steal horses, and elephants, as well as violent murderers, and cause them to be impaled on a stake.” Bháspati: “Having carefully ascertained who are notorious murderers, and likewise murderers in secret, and having seized all their effects, they are to be killed by different modes of death.”

4. The same author says: “When many persons, filled with rage, beat [to death] one single person, then he who strikes him on a vital part, is declared to be the murderer.”

5. Kátyáyana: “He who commences the quarrel, or takes a part in it, as well as he who points out the road; he who gives an asylum, and he who furnishes weapons, or gives food, to evil doers; so even, he who advised for battle, he who instigated his destruction; one concern-

1—Chapter 16th, Sections 1st and 2d. 2—In most of the copies, this text ran in a plural sense, but in some it was singular, and the Pandits were determined on the adoption of that number, by finding it so in the Viramitrodaya.
ed in the work of deceit; he who speaks harm [of the deceased]; who rejoices [with the murderers]; or prevents not the injury, though possessing the power, are all of them actors in the deed: They shall cause a suitable punishment to be awarded, proportioned to the power [of each to suffer]."

6. Nārada lays down distinctions in the punishment of Brāhmaṇas: "From there being no difference [in the degrees of guilt], the same measure of punishment is laid down for all. That of Brāhmaṇas must be short of vadha; a Brāhman is not liable to undergo vadha: his punishment shall be, shaving of the head, banishment from the city, a plain mark upon his forehead, and parading upon an ass. Vadha must not be inflicted on a Brāhman, even if guilty of felony [ätatāyi]." For, according to Sumanta: 3: "There is no blame for putting to death persons acting feloniously, excepting kine, and Brāhmaṇas." Kātyāyana: Bhūgu says, if among felons, there be one of the highest class, and engaged in austerities and reading the Vedas, then, in that case alone, vadha shall not be inflicted. Vadha is for sinners who are of low class.

7. The same author declares who are felons [ätatāyinas]: 3: "He who uses a sword, poison, or fire, as well as he who raises his hand in imprecation, and he who kills by magic: and also a spy against the king; he who enjoys a married woman contrary to rule; 3 who is diligent in picking out holes [in another man's coat]; all these persons, and the like of them, are to be known as felons." And Vasishtha likewise says: 4: "An incendiary, and a poisoner, one who offensively handles weapons, who robs the wealth of another, as well as he who steals his land, or his wife, are all six of them felons."

8. However, the text of Manu 4: "Let a man without hesitation slay another, [if he cannot otherwise escape], who assails him with intent to murder [ätatāyi], whether young or old, or his preceptor, or a Brāhman deeply versed in the scripture:" and this of Kātyāyana: "To him who shall kill a felon coming with intent to take his life, even though he [the felon] have gone through the Vedas [Vedanta], the sin of the death of a Brāhman does not attach." [require consideration]. The words whether [va], and even [api], relate to the death of all felons with the exception of Brāhmaṇas; because the introduction of the word Brāhman is for the sake of giving greater force to the law [by an extreme example, Kaimutikanyāya]. So, in the Mitākshara it is said: "A Brāhman felon is liable to Vadha; how then

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1—2—Macnaghten, 423.
3—Explain the meaning of "Rape," in a subsequent text, para. 14th.
4—Macnaghten, 423.
5—Chapter 8th, 350. See General note, "Smśi," at the end.
[kīmūṭa] shall any other man [escape].” And we find such a case, both from this text of Gālava(a): “He who kills one, the highest Brāhmaṇa, feloniously attacking him with a raised weapon, does not render himself a Brāhmaṇa’s murderer; did he not kill him, he would really be guilty of a Brāhmaṇa’s murder”; and this of Bṛhaspati: “He who kills a felon, versed in the Vedas and come of a good family, does not commit heinous murder; did he not kill him, he would be guilty.”

9. The following interpretation is given in the Sūtta Chandrikā:

 Doctrine of the Sūtta Chandrikā stated, and approved.

‘That the Brāhmaṇa who comes with a felonious intention of putting another to death, alone deserves Vadha; not the Brāhmaṇa who seizes the land or wife, or other [property] of another. But Kṣatrviyas, or other persons guilty of the aforementioned crimes, are deserving Vadha.’ And this is the right [interpretation], because of the necessity for opposing the vague [or general] sense of the aforementioned rules, of Śaṅkara and Kātyāyana, by the more explicit expression of ‘one feloniously attempting the life of another,’ suggested by these last quoted texts, of Manu, Kātyāyana, Gālava, and Bṛhaspati.

10. However, what Bṛhaspati says: “He who shall refrain from killing a man of superior class, a performer of austere acts of devotion and reader of the Vedas, though liable to Vadha for felonious acts, shall obtain the benefit of one Aṣvamedha(b),” has reference only to a felon distinct from one seeking the man’s own life.

11. And again, the killing of a Brāhmaṇa feloniously seeking the life of another, is forbidden in this age of the world [by the text]: “There must be no killing, even in a just quarrel, of a chief Brāhmaṇa, though seeking one’s life,” which prohibition would be evaded, if Vadha were inflicted according to law: and though all the things now forbidden in the Kali, or present age, had previously received the sanction of [our ancient] enactment, yet: “The learned have declared these laws abrogated in the Kali age.” And in all the commentaries there is a clear line drawn, from the acceptance of the word āstya. Therefore, in the present age of the world, a Brāhmaṇa feloniously seeking the life of another is not liable to Vadha. But for other [offences] a Brāhmaṇa felon, is not in any Yuga liable to Vadha; whilst all other felonious criminals, whether Kṣatrviyas or other class, are in all ages of the world liable to Vadha.

(a) An ancient sage and teacher: according to the Harivṛṣiṇa, a son, and according to the Mahābhārata, a pupil of Vivasvāna—Böhltingk. Roth.—Ed.

1.—The expression Bhṛgusātan, [lit ‘who procures abortion’] is explained in the Viramātridāya, “as having reference to a very superior Brāhmaṇa,” [Uttama Brāhmaṇa vivesa,].

2.—See note to Chap. 16th, Sec. 1st, para. 5d.

(b) Horse-sacrifice.—Ed.

3.—Dharmaruddha; this seems to be the same term which Sir W. Jones has translated “religious war,” in this general note at the end of Manu, Sūtta 2d; the text appears the same.

4.—Nirṛṣya Sindhra, Section 3d.
12. Bīhaspāti declares the punishment for stealing articles of low, middling, and great value: "So, even he who shall destroy or carry off implements of husbandry or flowers, roots, or fruits, is deserving of punishment, above a hundred paṇas, according to his offence. In like manner, he who shall destroy or steal [inferior] animals, clothes, grain, liquids, as well as household utensils, shall be punished by a fine, not less than two hundred paṇas. If women, men, kine, gold, precious stones, as well as the property of the gods, or of Brāhmans, and that of females; [and similar] costly articles, his fine shall be equal to the value of the stolen property. Or, double its amount [even] may be thought equitable by the king, according to the person; or, the thief may be [even] put to death, with a view, to the prevention of [bad example from] his society." Female, a woman's property. The word, Or, has the meaning of 'even.' This text belongs to the Chapter on Heinous Offences, according to Madana, [and not to that on Robbery] from the literal meaning of the words 'shall destroy' and 'thief,' which come together in this place.

13. Yājñavalkya shews the punishment for the original instigator of heinous offences: "He who causes the commission of violence, shall be made to pay a double fine; he also who, by saying, 'I will give [such a reward,'] causes its perpetration, shall be made to pay quadruple its amount." That is, double or quadruple, in proportion to the fine imposed on the actual perpetrator of it.

14. The punishment for him who by force enjoys a virtuous Brāhman, is thus declared by Manus: "A Brāhman who carnally knows a guarded woman without her free will, must be fined a thousand [paṇas]." If the crime be committed against such a woman, by a man of the Kṣatriya, or other class, says Bīhaspāti: "If any one by force enjoy [a woman] then let the king seize the whole of his property, and having cut off his penis and scrotum, afterwards cause him to be carried round [the town] upon an ass." Enjoy, have connexion with the lawful-wife of another man. The following punishment for forcible enjoyment of a married woman, whether of lower or higher caste [than himself] or of equal class, by a man of the Kṣatriya or other tribe, is denounced by Kātyāyana: "When a man has obtained enjoyment of a woman, by seizure of her person, infliction of Vadhā is in that case established, because the act is a transgressing [of the admitted order] of enjoyment."

15. The same author says: "Let the woman who has thus unwillingly been enjoyed, be kept shut up in the house, having her person slovenly, sleeping on the ground, and furnished only with a single ball of food [or with what nature requires.]" He adds: "She who has been enjoyed by a man of low caste is to be put away,
or suffer Vadha.” Here Vadha must be understood, only in case of her consenting to the guilty act.

16. Narada thus declares the punishment of the lowest, middling, and highest crimes [Sāhasa:] “The punishment of it must be in proportion to the crime, but, in the first [or lowest] degree, not less than one hundred [panas.] By those well versed in the law, that of the middle class of crimes, is shown to be not less than five hundred panas. The fine for the highest scale of crime must be nothing short of one thousand [panas.] Vadha, confiscation of every thing [the criminal is worth.] banishment from the city, with branding, and amputation of his limbs, these are the punishments declared for Uttama-sāhasa, or the highest degree of crime.”

17. The command for inflicting Vadha, amputation, and the other punishments named, however, is the province of the prince, and of no other, since to him alone pertains the right to inflict punishment.

CHAPTER XIX.

Commerce with Women.—(Strisangrahāram).

1. The punishment for forcible enjoyment of another man’s wife, as an act of a heinous nature, has been before declared. 1 Bīhaspati declares [that for] the fraudulent enjoyment of a woman of similar caste, being the wife of another man(a): “If a man by fraud enjoy a woman, he shall be punished by full confiscation, and, having been branded with the mark of the pudendum mutilare, let him be afterwards banished from the city.” Full confiscation, that is, confiscation of his all. And this punishment is meant in regard to women of equal class. If she be of lower, the half of it is proper; but in the case of a woman of superior caste, Vadha is enjoined: and accordingly the same author says: “The half of that punishment, which is to be inflicted for connexion with a woman of equal class, is the due of him who enjoys a woman of lower class. But for connexion with a woman of more exalted caste, let the man be put to death.”

2. The several punishments of adultery, with women of the three comparative degrees, lower, equal, and higher [than the adulterer], are laid down by the same author: “The punishment for adultery in each of these three orders, must be applied to each in its degree, the lowest punishment [for the lowest rank], the middling,

1—Chapter 18th, para. 14.

(a) Having sexual intercourse with a woman, with her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married, is made “rape” by the Indian Penal Code, Sec. 375, punishable with transportation or imprisonment and fine.—Ed.
[for the middling], and the highest [for the highest]; for forcible enjoyment in secret, let the middling degree be inflicted."

3. The punishment for a man of bad life, who converses with the wife of another man, is laid down by Manu:¹ "A man, before noted for such an offence, who converses in secret with the wife of another, shall pay the first of the three usual amercements." The punishment for mutual conversation between a man and woman, who have been both forbidden by the father or other relative, is declared by Yājñavalkya: "Let a woman, forbidden so to act, be fined one hundred pamas, but let the punishment for the man be double that sum; but where the prohibition has been given to both, then let their punishment be the same as is inflicted for adultery." The first half of this couplet has reference to prohibition communicated to one of the parties only; and the last half, to a communication of it to both.

CCXXXIV. And adultery in general.

4. Yājñavalkya declares the punishment for adultery brought about through the mutual desire of both: "[For adultery] between persons of equal caste, let the highest fine be imposed: But the middling scale for the same crime with a woman of lower caste; when the woman’s caste is higher, let the man suffer Vadha, and the woman have her ears or other [limbs] cut off.”

5. Kātyāyana: “And in all offences, whatever sum of money is laid down as the punishment of it in a man, the half of it must a woman pay who is guilty of the same; where Vadha is denounced against a man, let a woman’s person be mutilated.”

6. But for connexion with a Brāhmaṇi of loose life, thus says Manu:² "But only five hundred [pamas], if he knew her with her free consent." This relates to a woman of equal caste. On the subject of connexion with women of lower caste, and loose morals, the same author says:³ "A Brāhmaṇa shall pay five hundred pamas, if he connect himself criminally with an unguarded woman of the Vaiṣṇya, Kāśārya [or Kshatriya], or Čuḍara class; and a thousand, [for such a connexion with] a woman of the lowest caste [antya].” However this text:⁴ "A Brāhmaṇa who carnally knows a guarded woman without her free will, must be fined a thousand pamas,” especially intends a virtuous woman. The punishment of a Čuḍara for connexion with a woman of higher caste, is declared by Manu:⁵ "A Čuḍara having an adulterous connexion with a woman of a twice-born class, whether guarded at home or unguarded, [shall thus be punished]: if she was unguarded, he shall lose the part [offending], and his whole substance; if guarded, [and a Brāhmaṇi], every thing, even his life.” If a Čuḍara have criminal connexion with

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¹—Chapter 8th, 554.
²—Chapter 8th, 378, of which the first couplet, as relating to guarded women, was quoted. Chap. 18th, para. 14 and is repeated here below. ³—Chapter 8th, 285.
⁴—Chapter 8th, 375.
⁵—Chapter 8th, 774.
an unguarded Brāhmaṇī, his parts must be cut off, and all his property be confiscated; but, if she be guarded, Vadha is further incurred. It means, that for adultery with a guarded woman, his whole property shall be confiscated, and he be considered deserving of Vadha.

CCXXXV. 7. Gautama: "For adultery with the wife of his preceptor, let a man’s parts be taken away, and all his property be seized; if the woman be guarded, let him suffer further Vadha." Manu: "But, if a Vaśya or Pārthiva [man of the royal class, Kshatriya] commit adultery with a Brāhmaṇī whom her husband guards not at home, the king shall only fine the Vaśya five hundred, and the Kshatriya a thousand." The same author says: 1 "Both of them, however, if they commit that offence with a Brāhmaṇī not only guarded [but eminent for good qualities], shall be punished like ādoras, or be burned in a fire of dry grass or reeds." And again: 2 "If a Vaśya converses criminally with a guarded woman of the Kshatriya or a Kshatriya with one of the Vaśya class, they both deserve the same punishment as in the case of an unguarded Brāhmaṇī." Namely, the same fine which is denounced against connexion with an unguarded Brāhmaṇī. Vasishṭha: "If a man of the royal class [Rājaneya] have criminal connexion with a Brāhmaṇī woman, let him be enclosed with bundles of reeds, and be consumed with fire. Even thus do to a Vaśya, if he have connexion with a woman of the royal class, and likewise to a ādora, if he commit the crime with a woman of the royal, or of the Vaśya, class."

8. Nārada: "He who has criminal connexion with any one of the following women, a mother’s sister, a mother-in-law; a maternal uncle’s wife; a father’s sister; the respective wives of a paternal uncle, a friend, and a pupil; a sister, her friend; a daughter-in-law, a daughter, and the wife of one’s preceptor; every woman descended from the same family, any woman dependant on his protection, the king’s wife, a female devotee, a nurse, a woman who preserves her conjugal duty inviolate, and any woman of the supreme class, is said to be as guilty as the violator of his religious preceptor’s bed. No punishment short of cutting off his parts, is laid down for such a crime as this." Yājñavalkya also: "A man who has connexion with his father’s sister, or his mother’s sister; with his maternal uncle’s wife, and also with his daughter-in-law, with his step-mother, his sister; either with his preceptor’s daughter or his preceptor’s wife, or with his own daughter, is as the violator of his preceptor’s bed; having cut off his privy parts, let vadha be his portion; and the same for the woman, if she were consenting to the act."

9. This punishment however is not to be inflicted on Brāhmaṇas: For, among the texts of Brāhmaṇas, we find: "Let the king impose such a mark as will render his punishment memorable, upon a man when caught in the act of improperly handling..."

1—Chapter 9th, 376-7.
2—Chapter 9th, 332.
another man’s wife, and then banish him.” If one, not a Brāhmaṇa, have criminal intercourse with such women, he is deserving of Vadha, even in the capital degree [Prāṇānta].”

10. Čarkha and Likhita say: “With whatever member any particular offence is committed, let that very member be cut off, whoever the offender be, unless a Brāhmaṇa.” Yājñavalkya declares the punishment of a Brāhmaṇa having connexion with a slave or the like: “The man who has carnal intercourse with slaves kept close, as well as those entertained as mistresses, shall be made to pay, even though their connexion be [in other cases] permitted, a fine amounting to fifty paṇas. Kept close, that is, those forbidden by their master to have commerce with other men.

11. Nārada: “Any woman, not a Brāhmaṇi, who is self-willed, [Svairiṇī] or a downright prostitute, or a slave, and one without a home, may have connexion with a man of higher caste than herself, but not with one of inferior. But, if such a woman be kept as a mistress, [the person intriguing with her] is blameworthy, equally as if she were another man’s wife.” Not a Brāhmaṇi, whose nature is denoted by the adjective self-willed, which means, ‘one, her own mistress, who goes with other men.’

12. The punishment for connexion wilfully effected by a woman, is thus declared by Nārada: “That female who, going to a man’s house, excites his desire by handling him, or the like, and so causes him to lie with her, should be punished, as declared by sages, in half that prescribed for a man [guilty of like conduct.” para. 4.] Yama defines the punishment for women of the Brāhmaṇa and the other classes, who have criminal connexion with a Čātra, or other [man of lower class:] “If a Brāhmaṇi woman, overpowered by desire, submit herself to the embraces of a Vṛshala, let the king cause her to be devoured with dogs, at the place of the slaughterers. If a Brāhmaṇi woman submit herself to the embraces, either of a Vaigya, or of a Kshatriya, her head shall be shaved, and she shall be carried round upon an ass.” Vṛshala, a Čātra. Slaughterers, vendors of flesh or foul; expressing [that she is to be cast out to the dogs] at the slaughter-houses. And this punishment is for continued [or excessive] attachment to such person, according to the Chandīka.

1—Kuhandha, or, “of a headless trunk,” if Kabandha be the correct reading.
2—The Mīr. reads, “antyevasyāt,” shall become even of that lowest caste, and it has here been altered, perhaps, without cause, as some of the manuscripts had the same.
13. Vājñavalkya points out the means of ascertaining the act of adultery: "In cases of criminal conversation, the proof of adultery may be seized, if engaged in playing with the hair of a woman, the wife of another, or at the moment of discovering love-marks [as bites or scratches] and likewise upon the confession of both." From the expression, of both, it cannot, on the confession of only one of the parties, be pronounced that criminal intercourse has taken place.

14. Vājñavalkya propounds slander: "He who asserts blemishes against an [unmarried] woman, shall pay an hundred pāṇas. But for a false accusation, two hundred; for connexion with a beast, he shall pay an hundred, and even the middle scale of punishment, for connexion with a distressed woman, or a cow(1)." Moreover: "If a man enjoy a woman in an improper part(2) or a male, and if he perform natural evacuations before [a woman], he shall be fined the sum of twenty-four pāṇas; and likewise for connexion with a female devotee." Distressed(3) any one in pain, even the man's own wife. We must understand (also), that he who shall perform his evacuations or the like [dirty act] before the face of a woman shall be punished.

CHAPTER XX.

Duties of Man and Wife,—(Strīpudhārma).

1. Now, the punishment for a husband who puts away a wife possessed of good qualities, is declared: "The husband who puts away a wife that is obedient, not evil speaking, dexterous [at her duties], virtuous, and maintaining her conjugal vow, must be kept [in his duty to her] by a fine from the king." Vājñavalkya: "He who forsakes a wife, though obedient to his commands, diligent in household management, mother of an excellent son, and speaking kindly, shall be compelled to pay the third part [of his wealth] or, if poor, to provide a maintenance for that wife."

2. The same author says, with respect to women: "Let the bidding of their husbands be performed by wives; this is the chief duty of a woman. Even if be be accused of deadly sin, yet let her wait until he be purified from it."

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1—Strange's Elem. 1st, 46. 2nd. 36-7.
2—Ayensu, non in vulva; ut, in ore, aut alio [modo obsceno];" second. comm. Mit.
3—The Mit. reads "with a low-caste woman;" 4—Digest 1st, 420. Reports 1st, 62,
CHAPTER XXI.

Gambling,—(Dyuta Samāhvayam.)

1. Yājñavalkya: "[Payment of] that which has been won publicly, in an assembly of gamsters, in the presence of the master of a gaming house, and when the king's share has been paid, shall be enforced: but not otherwise." Publicly, not in secret. In an assembly of gamsters, in a gaming house. Master of a gaming-house, one made, by the king, superintendent of gambling. The interpretation should be thus: 'Whatever has been won [whilst playing] in conformity to these regulations, the prince must cause to be paid, but nothing else.'

2. The same author specifies the punishment for one guilty of fraud in gambling: "The man convicted of [making Punishment of or using] false dice, or of [safely undergoing] ordeal, fraud, by deceit, shall be banished, after branding, by the king." Deceit, fraud. Manu declares the punishment for gambling without permission from the king: "Let the king punish [corporally at discretion;] both the gamster, and the keeper of a gaming-house, whether they play with inanimate, or animate things; and Čudras who adopt the marks of the twice-born." The marks of the twice-born, wearing their string, reading the Vedas, or the like.

3. Yājñavalkya thus assimilates the laws of gambling [Dyutam] and matches [samāhvaya:] "These very rules for Gambling of two kinds. gambling [dyuta] must also be applied in live gambling matches." Live Gambling [Prāṇi dyuṭa] denoting the nature of the match [Samāhvaye.]

CHAPTER XXII.

Sundries (Prakīrṇakam.)

1. Yājñavalkya: "He who either omits, or adds any thing, in writing the king's edicts, or who allows him that has robbed another of his wife to escape, shall suffer the highest amercement: he who does injury to a twice-born man, by feeding him with things not fit to be tasted, shall receive the punishment of the highest scale of crime; that of the middle scale for [a like injury to] a Kshatriya; the lowest, if to a Vaiśya, and the half [of that again] to one born a Čudra." Things
not fit to be tasted, are intoxicating liquors, wine, excrement, or the like. The same author adds: "Let him who deals in adulterated, gold as pure and him who sells unclean meat, have their body made less [by a limb], and undergo the highest punishment." Unclean meat the flesh of cows, or the like. From the use of the particle and, we must understand loss of limb; according to the Mitakshara. Again: "The master of any animal also, whether armed with teeth or horns, who, having the power, still fails to relieve any one in pain from it [when attacked]; shall suffer the punishment of the middle scale of crime; but double, if the sufferer likewise made a noise beforehand." Making a noise, that is, crying out. Manu:¹ "For killing a man, a fine equal to that for theft shall be instantly set; half that amount for large brute animals, as for a bull or cow, an elephant, a camel or a horse. For killing very young cattle, the fine shall be two hundred [panas]; and fifty, for elegant quadrupeds, or beautiful birds [as antelopes, parrots, and the like]. For an ass, a goat or a sheep, the fine must be five silver māshikas,² and one māsha for killing a dog, or a boar." This fine must be understood, to be over and above payment of the value of the animal killed.

Vaiśāvalkya: "He who charges any roaming, gallant as a thief, shall be made to pay fifty panas as a punishment; if he sordidly take money from him, and let him go, then eight times its amount is ordained as the fine." Sordidly take, receive. "Let the king banish, after cutting out his tongue, that man who utters evil wishes against the king, as well as him who openly abuses him, and him who divulges his secret counsels. Evil wishes, for his death or the like. Abuse, by saying, 'May thy reign not last,' or the like. Manu³: "Men who rob the king's treasure, or obstinately oppose his commands, let him destroy by various modes of just punishment; and those who encourage his enemies." Vaiśāvalkya: "The punishment of him who sells what has touched a dead body, and likewise of him who strikes his preceptor, and of him who seats himself in the king's carriage, or throne, is that of the highest scale of crime." What has touched a dead body, funeral clothes, or the like. The same author says: "The punishment of him who puts out both the eyes of another, as well as of him who performs acts hostile to the king, and of him who, being a Čātra, gains a livelihood by the office of a Brāhmaṇa, shall be eight hundred panas." The meaning is, him who puts out both the eyes of another, him who does an act prohibited by the king, and that Čātra who lives by the profession of a Brāhmaṇa. But according to the Mitakshara, *if he assume the Brāhmaṇical string for the purpose of partaking of food at a Čārdha, he shall have a line, resembling the real string, imprinted on his body with a redhot rod.*

¹—Chapter 8th, vs. 290-37-98.
²—As. Res. 5th, 91.
³—Chapter 9th, 275.
The same author propounds the punishment for those who make decrees contrary to justice: "An unjust decision must be revised by the king, and he must, as a punishment, impose a fine double [the loser's fee] on the amount litigated, upon the assessors, together with him who gained [in the first instance]." If a man, though he have justly lost his cause, yet cherish in his mind this idea, "I am not conquered, and again come into Court, let him again lose his cause, and be made to pay a double fine."

In every part of this work, where the amount of fine is left unstated, it must be considered as meaning the number of panas. This pana, again, is the copper one, equal in weight to the Karsha [of 16 Masha], whence the copper pana is denominated karshika [of the Karsha standard], in Dictionaries. One Karsha is the fourth part of a pala. And when there are twice ten kauris, their amount, or joint weight, is called one Kâkini, four of which make one pana. This is the table of the pana standard, according to Bhâskara Achârya.

But with respect to the [punishment enjoined for the] highest scale of crime, and the rest, we find: "When the fine amounts to a thousand panas with eighty more, it then is equal to the highest scale [Uttama Sâhasa]: The half of it is named as the fine for the middling scale, and the half of, that again, is laid down for inferior crimes."

Moreover, if in any of the aforementioned crimes, prevention is not attainable, by fines regulated after the above specified scale, even a greater one may be imposed; according as Apastamba says: "Punishment is said to be for the sake of subduing crime; by it therefore let those bold in crime be brought into subjection." Nârada again points out some exceptions in the punishment of confiscation of a man's all: "Even when confiscation of all a criminal possesses is enjoined, it is not fit that the king should take away his weapons, if a soldier; the beasts of burden or other [conveyance], of those who subsist by carrying for hire; the ornaments, of professional prostitutes; the musical instruments, of musicians; or those implements by which artizans subsist; in short, anything by which any person gains his livelihood." Yâjñavalkya declares the destination of a fine levied through injustice: "What has been obtained through injustice by the king as a fine, having devoted it to Varûya, let him give, with his own hands, increased thirty-fold to Brâhmans." The meaning is, 'let him give thirty times as much to Brâhmans, having vowed it to Varûya, through their mediation.'

1—Chapter 5th. Section 4, par. 8.

2—As. Br. 5th, 95.
Here ends the portion, called Vyavahāra Mayūkha, of the book Bhagvata Bhāskara, written by Nilakantha, own son of Cānakara Bhāṭṭa, he who had traversed the oceans of the mimāṃsa, the head jewel of Paṇḍitas, son of Bhāṭṭa Nārāyanā Sūri, Jagata Guru, as requested by that ornament of the Saṅgara dynasty, Mahāraja Adhirāj, Cṛī Bhāgyavata Deva, the intense adorer of the lotus-eyed God, the firmly seated Rājā of the noted city of Bhareha, situated near the resplendent junction of the Charmanvati and the Tarjīja in the happy Madhyā Deśa.  

1—The last paragraph varies in almost all the copies: some omit it altogether and others take no notice of the place mentioned, which is at the junction of the Chandhel and the Jannu; in the printed copy, part of the passage has been inserted at the end and part at the conclusion of the chapter on inheritance, but is here thrown together.
TWO

TREATISES

ON THE

HINDÚ

LAW OF INHERITANCE.

TRANSLATED BY

H. T. COLEBROOKE, ESQUIRE.

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PREFACE.

No branch of jurisprudence is more important than the law of successions or inheritance; as it constitutes that part of any national system of laws, which is the most peculiar and distinct, and which is of most frequent use and extensive application.

In the law of contracts, the rules of decision, observed in the jurisprudence of different countries, are in general dictated by reason and good sense; and rise naturally, though not always obviously, from the plain maxims of equity and right.

As to the criminal law, mankind are in general agreed in regard to the nature of crimes: and, although some diversity necessarily result from the exigencies of different states of society, leading to considerable variation in the catalogue of offences, and in the scale of relative guilt and consequent punishment; yet the fundamental principles are unaltered, and may perhaps be equally traced in every known scheme of exemplary and retributive justice.

But the rules of succession to property, being in their nature arbitrary, are in all systems of law merely conventional. Admitting even that the succession of the offspring to the parent is so obvious as almost to present a natural and universal law; yet this very first rule is so variously modified by the usages of different nations, that its application at least must be acknowledged to be founded on consent rather than on reasoning. In the laws of one people the rights of primogeniture are established; in those of another the equal succession of all the male offspring prevails; while the rest allow the participation of the female with the male issue, some in equal, other in unequal proportions. Succession by right of representation, and the claim of descendants to inherit in the order of proximity, have been respectively established in various nations, according to the degree of favour, with which they have viewed those opposite pretensions. Proceeding from linear to collateral succession, the diversity of laws prevailing among different nations, is yet greater, and still more forcibly argues the arbitrariness of the rules. Nor is it indeed practicable to reduce the rules of succession as actually established in any existing body of law, to a general or leading principle, unless by the assumption of some maxim not necessarily nor naturally connected with the canons of inheritance.

In proportion then, as the law of successions is arbitrary and irreducible to fixed and general principles, it is complex and intricate in its provisions; and requires, on the part of those entrusted with the administration of justice, a previous preparation by study; for its rules and maxims cannot be rightly understood, when only hastily
consulted as occasions arise. Those occasions are of daily and of hourly occurrence: and, on this account, that branch of law should be carefully and diligently studied.

In the Hindú jurisprudence in particular, it is the branch of law, which specially and almost exclusively merits the attention of those who are qualifying themselves for the line of service in which it will become their duty to administer justice to our Hindu subjects, according to their own laws.

A very ample compilation on this subject is included in the Digest of Hindú law, prepared by Jagannátha under the direction of Sir William Jones. But copious as that work is, it does not supersede the necessity of further aid to the study of the Hindu law of inheritance. In the preface to the translation of the Digest, I hinted an opinion unfavourable to the arrangement of it, as it has been executed by the native compiler. I have been confirmed in that opinion of the compilation, since its publication; and indeed the author's method of discussing together the discordant opinions, maintained by the lawyers of the several schools, without distinguishing in an intelligible manner which of them is the received doctrine of each school, but on the contrary, leaving it uncertain whether any of the opinions stated by him do actually prevail, or which doctrine must now be considered to be in force and which obsolete, renders his work of little utility to persons conversant with the law, and of still less service to those who are not versed in Indian jurisprudence; especially to the English reader, for whose use, through the medium of translation, the work was particularly intended.

Entertaining this opinion of it, I long ago undertook a new compilation of the law of successions with other collections of Hindu law, under the sanction of the Government of Bengal, for preparing for publication a supplementary Digest of such parts of the law as I might consider to be most useful. Its final completion and publication have been hitherto delayed by important avocations; and it has been judged mean time advisable to offer to the public in a detached form, a complete translation of two works materially connected with that compilation.

They are the standard authorities of the Hindu law of inheritance in the schools of Benares and Bengal respectively; and considerable advantage must be derived to the study of this branch of law, from access to those authentic works, in which the entire doctrine of each school, with the reasons and arguments by which it is supported, may be seen at one view and in a connected shape.

In a general compilation, where the authorities are greatly multiplied, and the doctrines of many different schools, and of numerous authors are contrasted and compared, the reader is at a loss to collect the doctrines of a particular school and to follow the train of reasoning by which they are maintained. He is confounded by the perpetual conflict of discordant opinions and jarring deductions; and by the frequent transition from the positions of one sect to the principles of
another. It may be useful then, that such a compilation should be preceded by the separate publication of the most approved works of each school. By exhibiting in an exact translation the text of the author with notes selected from the glosses of his commentators or from the works of other writers of the same school, a correct knowledge of that part of the Hindu law, which is expressly treated by him, will be made more easily attainable, than by trusting solely to a general compilation. The one is best adapted to preparatory study; the other may afterwards be profitably consulted, when a general, but accurate knowledge has been thus previously obtained by the separate study of a complete body of doctrine.

These considerations determined the publication of the present volume. It comprehends the celebrated treatise of Jīmūta-vāhana on successions, which is constantly cited by the lawyers of Bengal under the emphatic title of Dāya-bhāga, or "inheritance;" and an extract from the still more celebrated Mitāksharā, comprising so much of this work as relates to inheritance. The range of its authority and influence is far more extensive than that of Jīmūta-vāhana's treatise; for it is received in all the schools of Hindu law, from Benares to the southern extremity of the peninsula of India, as the chief groundwork of the doctrines which they follow, and as an authority from which they rarely dissent.

The works of other eminent writers have, concurrently with the Mitāksharā, considerable weight in the schools of law which have respectively adopted them; as the Smīti Chandrikā* in the south of India; the Chintāmani, Ratnācara and Vivāda-chandra† at Benares, and the Mayūkha§ among the Marāhättas; but all agree in generally deferring to the authority of the Mitāksharā, in frequently appealing to its text; and in rarely and at the same time modestly dissenting from its doctrines on particular questions. The Bengal school alone, having taken for its guide Jīmūta-vāhana's treatise, which is on almost every disputed point, opposite in doctrine to the Mitāksharā, has no deference for its authority. On this account, independently of any other considerations, it would have been necessary to admit into the present volume either his treatise, or some one of

* By Dvārakā-bhatā. This excellent treatise on judicature is of great and almost paramount authority, as I am informed, in the countries occupied by the Hindu nations of Drāvīra, Taṅgā, and Kārnāṭā, inhabiting the greatest part of the peninsula or Dekhin.

† Vivāda chintāmani, Vyavahāra chintāmani, and other treatises of law by Vāchospatīnīgīra. Vivāda ratnakāra, Vyavahāra ratnākāra and other compilations by Pāpātīs employed by Chandegnāra; Vivāda-chandra by Misāra miśra or rather by his aunt Lakhiminī or Lakhiminī-devī.

‡ Viśvāmitrodaya, an ample and very accurate digest by Mitra miśra. Viśvāmitrodaya, and other works of Kanālikāra.

§ Vyavahāra-mayukha and other treatises by Nīlakantā. 
the abridgments of his doctrine which are in use, and of which the best known and most approved is Raghunandana's Dāyā-tātva. But the preference appeared to be decidedly due to the treatise of Jīmūta-vāhana himself; as well because he was the founder of this school, being the author of the doctrine which it has adopted; as because the subjects, which he discusses, are treated by him with eminent ability and great precision; and for this further reason, that quotations from his work, or references to it, which must become necessary in a general compilation of the Hindu law of inheritance, can be but very imperfectly intelligible without the opportunity of consulting the whole text of his close reasoning and ample disquisitions.

Having selected, for reasons which have been here explained, the Dāya-bhāga of Jīmūta-vāhana and the Mitākṣharā on inheritance, for translation and separate publication, I was led in course to draw the chief part of the annotations necessary to the illustration of the text, from the commentaries on those works. Notes have been also taken from original treatises, of which likewise brief notices will be here given, that their authority may be appreciated.

In the selection of notes from commentaries and other sources, the choice of them has not been restricted to such as might be necessary to the elucidation of the subject as it is exhibited in the English version; but variations in the reading and interpretation of the original text have been regularly noticed, with the view of adapting this translation to the use of those who may be induced to study it with the original Sanscrit text. The mere English reader will not be detained by those annotations, which he will of course pass by.

Having verified with great care the quotations of authors, as far as means are afforded to me by my own collection of Sanscrit law books (which includes, I believe, nearly all that are extant;) I have added at the foot of the page notes of reference to the places in which the text are found. They will be satisfactory to the reader as demonstrating the general correctness of the original citations. The inaccuracies, which have been remarked, are also carefully noticed. They are few and not often important.

The sources, from which the annotations have been chiefly drawn, are the following.

The commentary of Çrīkṛṣṇa Ṭerkālankaṭa on the Dāya-bhāga of Jīmūta-vāhana has been chiefly and preferably used. This is the most celebrated of the glosses on the text. It is the work of a very acute logician, who interprets his author and reasons on his arguments, with great accuracy and precision; and who always illustrates the text, generally confirms its positions, but not unfrequently modifies or amends them. Its authority has been long gaining ground in the schools of law throughout Bengal; and it has almost banished from them the other expositions of the Dāya-bhāga; being ranked, in general estimation, next after the treatises of Jīmūta-vāhana and of Raghunandana.
An original treatise by the same author, entitled Dāya-krama-saṅgraha, contains a good compendium of the law of inheritance according to Jimūta-vāhana’s text, as expounded in his commentary. It has been occasionally quoted in the notes: its authority being satisfactorily demonstrated by the use which was made of it in the compilation of the Digest translated by Mr. Halhed; the compilers of which transcribed largely from it, though without acknowledgment.

The earliest commentary on Jimūta-vāhana is that of Cṛṣikṛṣṇa Achārya Chūḍāmaṇi. It has been constantly in Cṛṣikṛṣṇa’s view, who frequently copies it; but still oftener cites the opinions of Chūḍāmaṇi to correct or confute them. Notwithstanding this frequent collision of opinions, the commentary of Chūḍāmaṇi must be acknowledged as in general, a very excellent exposition of the text; and it has been usefully consulted throughout the progress of the translation, as well as for the selection of explanatory notes.

Another commentary, anterior to Cṛṣikṛṣṇa’s, but subsequent to Chūḍāmaṇi’s, is that of Achyuta Chakravarti, (author likewise of a commentary on the Āḍḍha vivēka.) It is in many places quoted for refutation, and in more is closely followed by Cṛṣikṛṣṇa, but always without naming the author. It contains frequent citations from Chūḍāmaṇi, and is itself quoted with the name of the writer by Mahēcyavara. This work is upon the whole an able interpretation of the text of Jimūta-vāhana, and has afforded much assistance in the translation of it, and furnished many notes illustrating its sense.

The commentary of Mahēcyavara is posterior to those of Chūḍāmaṇi and of Achyuta, both of which are cited in it; and is probably anterior to Cṛṣikṛṣṇa’s or at least nearly of the same date. If my information concerning these authors be correct;* for they appear to have been almost contemporaries; but Mahēcyavara seemingly a little the elder of the two. They differ greatly in their expositions of the text, both as to the meaning and as to the manner of deducing the sense: but neither of them affords any indication of his having seen the other’s work. A comparison of these different and independent interpretations has been of material aid to a right understanding and correct version of obscure and doubtful passages in Jimūta-vāhana’s text.

Of the remaining commentaries, of which notices have been obtained, only one other has been procured. It bears the name of Raghunandana, the author of the Smṛti-tatva, and the greatest authority of Hindū law in the province of Bengal. In proportion to the celebrity of the writer was the disappointment experienced on finding reason to distrust the authenticity of the work. But not being satisfied of its genuineness, and on the contrary suspecting it strongly of bearing a borrowed name, I have made a very sparing use of this commentary either in the version of the text or in the notes.

* Great grandsons of both these writers were living in 1806; and the grandson of Cṛṣikṛṣṇa was alive in 1796. Both consequently must have lived in the first part of the last century. They are modern writers; and Cṛṣikṛṣṇa is apparently the most recent.
The Dāya-tatva, or so much of the Smṛti-tatva as relates to inheritance, is the undoubted composition of Raghunandana; and in deference to the greatness of the author's name and the estimation in which his works are held among the learned Hindūs of Bengal, has been throughout diligently consulted and carefully compared with Jimūta-vāhana's treatise, on which it is almost exclusively founded. It is indeed an excellent compendium of the law, in which not only Jimūta-vāhana's doctrines are in general strictly followed, but are commonly delivered in his own words in brief extracts from his text. On a few points, however, Raghunandana has differed from his master; and in some instances he has supplied deficiencies. These, as far as they have appeared to be of importance, have furnished annotations; for which his authority is of course quoted.

A commentary by Kācirāma on Raghunandana's Dāya-tatva, has also supplied a few annotations, and has been of some use in explaining Jimūta-vāhana's commentators, being written in the spirit of their expositions of that author's text, particularly Crikirsha's gloss; and often in the very words of that commentator.

The Dāya-rahasya or Smṛti-ratnāvali of Rāma-nātha Vidyā-Vāchēśpati, having obtained a considerable degree of authority in some of the districts of Bengal, has been frequently consulted, and is sometimes quoted in the notes. It is a work not devoid of merit: but, as it differs in some material points from both Jimūta-vāhana and Raghunandana, it tends too much to unhinge the certainty of the law on some important questions of very frequent recurrence. The same author has written a commentary on Jimūta-vāhana's Dāya-bhāga, and makes a reference to it at the close of his own original treatise. My researches, however, and endeavours to procure a copy of it, have not been successful. I should else have considered it right to advert frequently to it in the illustrations of the text.

Other treatise on inheritance according to the doctrines received in Bengal, as the Dāya-nirāaya of Crikara bhaṭṭāchārya and one or two more which have fallen under my inspection, are little else than epitomes of the work of Raghunandana or of Jimūta-vāhana: and on this account have been scarcely at all used in preparing the present publication.

The remaining names, which occur in the notes, are of works or of their authors belonging to other schools. These are rarely, I may say never, cited, unless for variations in the reading of original text of legislators; excepting only the Vīranātrdaya of Mitra-miṇḍra; from whose work a few quotations may be found in the notes, contradicting passages of the text. This author, in the compilation mentioned, uniformly examines and refutes the peculiar doctrines maintained by Jimūta-vāhana and Raghunandana: but it did not fall within the design of the present publication to exhibit the controversial arguments of the modern opponents of the Bengal school; and quotations from his work have been therefore sparingly inserted in the notes to Jimūta-vāhana's treatise.
The commentaries on the Miṣṭākṣara of Viṣṇuṇācara are less numerous. Of four, concerning which I have noticed, two only have been procured. The Subodhini by Viṣṇuṇācara bhaṭṭa; and a commentary by a modern author, Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

The Subodhini is a collection of notes elucidating the obscure passages of the Miṣṭākṣara, concisely, but perspicuously. It leaves few difficulties unexplained, and dwells on them no further than is necessary to their elucidation. The commentator is author likewise of a compilation entitled Madana pārījāta, chiefly on religious law, but comprising a chapter on inheritance, a topic connected with that of obsequies. To this work he occasionally refers from his commentary. Both therefore have been continually consulted in the progress of the translation, and have furnished a great proportion of the annotations.

Bālam-bhaṭṭa's work is in the usual form of a perpetual comment. It proceeds, sentence by sentence, expounding every phrase, and every word, in the original text. Always copious on what is obscure, and often so on what is clear, it has been a satisfactory aid in the translation, even where it was busy in explaining that which was evident: for it has been gratifying to find, though no doubts were entertained, that the intended interpretation had the sanction of a commentator. Bālam-bhaṭṭa's gloss in general follows the Subodhini as far as this goes. It has supplied annotations where Viṣṇuṇācara's commentary was silent; or where the explanation, couched in Viṣṇuṇācara's concise language, might be less intelligible to the English reader.

Viṣṇuṇācara's Miṣṭākṣara being a commentary on the institutes of Yājñavalkya, it has been a natural suggestion to compare his expositions of the law, and of his author's text in particular, with the commentaries of other writers on the same institutes, viz., the ancient and copious gloss of Aparārka of the royal house of Śilāra, and the modern and succinct annotations of Sulpani in his comment entitled Dīpakalika. A few notes have been selected from both these works, and chiefly from that of Aparārka.

For like reasons the commentators on the institutes of other ancient sages have been similarly examined; they are those of Medhātithi and Kullūka bhaṭṭa on Manu; Haradatta's gloss on Gautama, which is entitled Miṣṭākṣara; Nanda-paṇḍita's commentary under the title of Vaijayanti, on the institutes which bear the name of the god Vishnu; and those of the same author, and of Mādhava-āchārya, on Parāṣāra.

Nanda-paṇḍita is author also of an excellent treatise on adoption, entitled Dātaka-mīmāṃsā, of which much use has been made, among other authorities, in the enlarged illustrations which it has been judged advisable to add to the short chapter contained in the Miṣṭākṣara on this important topic of Hindū law.

The same writer appears, from a reference in a passage of his gloss on Vishnu, to have composed a commentary on the Miṣṭākṣara under the title of Pratitākṣara. Not having been able to procure that work,
but concluding that the opinions, which the writer may have there delivered, correspond with those which he has expressed in his other compositions, I have made frequent references to the rest of his writings, and particularly to his commentary on Vishnu, which is a very excellent and copious work, and might serve, like the Mitakshara, as a body or digest of law.

All the works of greatest authority in the several schools which hold the Mitakshara in veneration, have been occasionally made to contribute to the requisite elucidation of the text, or have been cited when necessary for such deviations from its doctrine, as it has been judged right to notice in the annotations. It will be sufficient to particularize in this place the Viranitrodaya before mentioned, of which the greatest use has been made; that compilation conforming generally to the doctrines of the Mitakshara, the words of which it very commonly cites with occasional elucidations of the text interspersed, or with express interpretations of it subjoined, or sometime with the substitution of a paraphrase for part of the original text. All these have been found useful auxiliaries to the professed commentaries and glosses.

This brief account of the works from which notes have been selected or aid derived, will sufficiently make known the plan on which the text of the Mitakshara and that of Jumita-vahana have been translated and elucidated, and the materials which have been employed for that purpose. It is hardly necessary to add, by way of precaution to the reader, that he will find distinguished by hyphens, whatever has been inserted from the commentaries into the text to render it more easily intelligible; a reference to the particular commentary being always made in the notes at the foot of the page.

Concerning the history and age of the authors whose works are here introduced to the attention of the English reader, some information will be expected. On these points, however, the notices, which have been collected, are very imperfect, as must ever be the case in regard to the biography of Hindii authors.

Vijnaneavara, often called Vijnana-yogi, the author of the Mitakshara, is known to have been an ascetic, and belonged, as is affirmed, to an order of Samnyasis, said to have been founded by Sankara-acharya. No further particulars concerning him have been preserved. A copy of his work has indeed been shown to me, in which at its close, he is described as a contemporary of Vikramaaditya. But the authority of this passage, which is wanting in other copies, is not sufficient to ground a belief of the antiquity of the book; especially as it cannot be well reconciled with the received opinion above noticed of the author's appertaining to a religious order founded by Sankara-acharya, whose age cannot be carried further back at the utmost than a thousand years. The limit of the lowest recent date which can possibly be assigned to this work, may be more certainly fixed from the ascertained age of the commentary; the author of which composed likewise (as already observed) the Madana-parijata, so named in honor of a prince called Madana-pala, apparently the same who gives title to
the Madana-vinoda, dated in the fifteenth century of the Sambat era.*
It may be inferred as probable, that the antiquity of the Mitakshara
exceeds 500 and is short of 1,000 years. If indeed Dharmavara, who is
frequently cited in the Mitakshara as an author, be the same with the
celebrated Raja Bhujia, whose title may not improbably have been
given to a work composed by his command, according to a practice
which is by no means uncommon, the remotest limit will be reduced by
more than a century; and the range of uncertainty as to the age of
the Mitakshara will be contracted within narrower bounds.

Of Jinauta-vahana as little is known. The name belongs to a
prince of the house of Sila, of whose history some hints may be
gathered from the fabulous adventures recorded of him in popular
tales; and who is mentioned in an ancient and authentic inscription
found at Salset.† It was an obvious conjecture, that the name of this
prince might have been affixed to a treatise of law composed perhaps
under his patronage or by his directions. That however is not the
opinion of the learned in Bengal; who are more inclined to suppose,
that the real author may have borne the name which is affixed to his
work, and may have been a professed lawyer who performed the func-
tions of judge and legal adviser to one of the most celebrated of the
Hindu sovereigns of Bengal. No evidence, however, has been adduced
in support of this opinion; and the period when this author flourished
is therefore entirely uncertain. He cites several earlier writers; but,
their age being not less doubtful than his own, no aid can be at present
derived from that circumstance, towards the determination of the limits
between which he is to be placed. His commentators suppose him in
many places to be occupied in refuting the doctrines of the Mitakshara,
Probably they are right; it is however possible, that he may be there
refuting the doctrines of earlier authors, which may have subsequently
been repeated from them in the latter compilation of Vijnanevara.
Assuming, however, that the opinion of commentators is correct; the
age of Jinauta-vahana must be placed between that of Vijnanevara,
whose doctrine he opposes, and that of Raghunandana who has follow-
ed his authority. Now Raghunandana’s date is ascertained at about
three hundred years from this time; for he was pupil of Vatsudeva
Sarvabhauma, and studied at the same time with three other disciples
of the same preceptor, who likewise have acquired great celebrity; viz.,
Sirinani, Krishnanda, and Chaitanya: the latter is the well known
founder of the religious order and sect of Vaishnavas so numerous in
the vicinity of Calcutta, and so notorious for the scandalous dissolute-
ness of their morals; and, the date of his birth being held memorable
by his followers, it is ascertained by his horoscope, said to be still pre-
served, as well as by the express mention of the date in his works, to
have been 1411 of the Saka era, answering to Y. C. 1480: consequent-
ly Raghunandana, being his contemporary, must have flourished at the
beginning of the sixteenth century.

* 1431 Sambat; answering to A. D. 1375.
† Asiatic Researches, Vol. I. p. 357.
DÁYA-BHÁGA.

A TREATISE ON INHERITANCE,

BY JÍMÚTA VÁHANA.

CHAPTER I.

Partition of Heritage defined and explained. Two periods of partition of the Father's wealth.

1. Partition of heritage, on the subject of which various controversies have arisen among intelligent persons (not fully comprehending the precepts of Manu and the rest) should be explained for their information. Hear it, O ye wise!

2. First, the term Partition of Heritage (dáyabhága) is expounded; and, on that subject, Nárada says, “Where a division of the paternal estate in instituted by sons, that becomes a topic of litigation, called by the wise Partition of Heritage.”

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2. Division of the estate.] Partition is an act adapted to ascertain property; as will be subsequently explained. Division of patrimony by sons, or a distribution of which they are the makers, is partition of heritage. The wealth, in regard to which that is especially instituted, or is executed by the persons making it, with one accord, or by the intervention of arbitrators or the like, is denominated by the wise a subject of litigation. Such is the construction of the text. Gíktíkína.

2 Nárada 13, 1.
3. What came from the father is "paternal," and this signifies property arising from the father's demise. The expressions "paternal" and "by sons" both indicate any relation; for the term "partition of heritage" is used for a division of the goods of any relation by any relatives. Accordingly Nārada, having premised "partition of heritage" as a topic of litigation, (§2) shows under that head of actions, the distribution of effects left by the mother and the rest.† So Māmm, likewise, premising inheritance,‡ but without employing the word father or any other specific term, propounds the division of effects of any relative.

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On the meaning may be, in a controversy or law-suit wherein partition of patrimony is instituted by sons, the subject of litigation is entitled division of heritage. Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Āchārya Ćıkṛṭaṇya, and the rest of the commentators on Jīmālī Vāhana's treatise, exhibit many variations in the reading and interpretation of the passage here cited from Nārada; and have entered into long disquisitions on the different expositions of the text. The principal disagreement is in regard to the relative pronoun.† There is not, however, any essential difference in the results of the various interpretations.

Some, observes Ćıkṛṭaṇya, interpret the pronoun (yatra) in the causative seventh case, making it relate to the term "topic of litigation" and they thus explain the text: "That subject of controversy, an account of which a division of patrimony, or distribution of it by lots, is executed by sons, has been termed partition of heritage."

Mānava, who adopts this interpretation, states the consequent meaning thus: "that topic of litigation, which consists in the ascertainment of property whether effected by arbitrators or by the parties, and, for the sake of which ascertainment, a division of patrimony is executed by sons, such as casting of lots or other act separating property, is called by the sages partition of heritage."

Taking the pronoun in the nominative case, either by so reading it, or by the license which justifies ananalias in sacred writings, the passage is by some explained (as is remarked by commentators) "the division of patrimony, which is instituted by sons, is called partition of heritage."

After noticing the various readings, Ćıkṛṭaṇya adds, "certain writers, however, expound the term patrimony, in the distributive sixth case. Accordingly, the import of the text, consonant to their opinion, is "the portion of the patrimonial estate, for which a partition is instituted by sons, is division of heritage." Agreeably to this interpretation, likewise, the wealth must be understood to be the subject of the action."§

† Mām 9, 103.
‡ Most copies and quotations of the text read it yatra, "where" or "in which." But some read yatu; and others yastu; "but which."
§ The author of the Dāyārāhasya gives the preference to this interpretation.
4. The term "heritage," by derivation, signifies "what is given." However, the use of the verb (dá) is here secondary or metaphorical; since the same consequence is produced, namely, that of constituting another's property after annulling the previous right of a person who is dead, or gone into retirement, or the like. But there is no abdication of the deceased and the rest in regard to the goods.

5. Therefore, the word "heritage" is used to signify wealth, in which property, dependant, on relation to the former owner, arises on the demise of that owner.*

6. Is the partition of heritage a splitting of the divided thing into integrant parts? Or does partition consist in the chattels not being united with the heritage of a co-heir? The first position is not correct; for the heritage itself would be destroyed. Nor is the second accurate: for, though goods be conjoined, it may be said, "this chattel, which was before parted, is not my property, but my "brother's."

7. Nor can it be affirmed, that partition is the distribution to particular chattels, of a right vested in all the co-heirs, through the sameness of their relation, over all the goods. For relation, opposed by the co-existent claim of another relative, produces a right (determinable by partition) to portions only of the estate; since it would be burdensome to infer the vesting and divesting of rights to the

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4. Heritage signifies "what is given." Since the verb to give signifies the will "be this no longer mine," which has the effect of vesting property in another; and since that cannot exist in the proposed case, therefore it here merely signifies any act which has the effect of vesting property in another, such as the demise of the former owner, his retirement, &c. Achyuta.

There is not in this instance a relinquishment on the part of the person deceased, or retired, &c. consisting in the will "be this no longer mine," and operating to annul the former property. Ragh. Dáya-tātra.

5. "Heritage is used to signify." The term heritage signifies by acceptance property vested in a relative, in respect of wealth, in right of relation to its former owner (as son or otherwise), on the extinction of his property. Ragh. Dáya-tātra.

6. The heritage itself would be destroyed. Meaning an inheritance consisting of an individual, as an ox, a slave or the like. If divided by a distribution of parts, the destruction of it would be the consequence. Mahéśvara.

7. Nor can it be affirmed. The author here censures the doctrine of the Mīśak-śarā, Ragh. on the Dāyabhāga.

* Or according to another reading of his passage, "on the extinction of his ownership." For in some copies, and in certain quotations of the passage, it is written tat-svāmyāparam; and several of the commentators appear to have so read it. But Mahéśvara states this as the sense of the phrase, and the other tat-svāmyāparam as the original text.
whole of the paternal estate; and it would be useless, as there would not result a power of alienating at pleasure.

8. The answer is: partition consists in manifesting* [or in particularizing]† by the casting of lots or otherwise, a property which had arisen in lands or chattels, but which was previously unascertained, being unfit for exclusive appropriation, because no evidence of any ground of discrimination existed.

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He canvasses the opinion of the Mathilis. Mahesvara.

8. Partition consists.] Raghunandana, in his Daya-tatra, quoting Jimita Vahana’s definition to refute it, has a little varied the terms of it, by blending both the explanations proposed by that author (§ 8 and 9). "Some," he says, "allow that partition, which takes place by reason of the co-existence of other relatives, who have an equal right of succession; is a particular ascertainment of property arisen in lands or chattels, (extending to a part only, but unfit for special use and appropriation, because grounds of discrimination are wanting!) by the casting of lots or other means, which determine, that a particular chattel belongs to a particular person." To this he objects, that "the definition is not accurate: for how may it be certainly known, since no text declares it, that the lot, for each person, falls precisely on that article which was already his? Again, if wealth be gained, after the father’s demise, by a brother using one of two horses which belonged to the father, is universally acknowledged, that two shares of it appertain to the acquirer; and one to any other co-heir. In such a case, when the original property is subsequently divided, if that very horse be obtained by the acquirer, then, according to the opinion of those who affirm partial rights, the horse was already his: why then should another brother share the wealth gained by him? But, if the horse be obtained by another co-heir, equal participation of wealth so acquired would be proper, since it is gained by the personal labour of the one and by the work of a horse belonging to the other."

Raghunandana then states his own definition. "But, in fact, partition is a distributive adjustment, by lot or otherwise, of the property of relatives vested in them, over the whole wealth, in right of the same relation, upon the extinction of the former owner’s property. The vesting and divesting of property over the whole estate are inferred, in like manner as the vesting of partial rights over portions, and vesting of a common right over the whole, are deduced in the instance of re-union of co-heirs."

Critiksha, in his commentary on the work of Jimita-vahana, endeavours to repel Raghunandana’s objection. He cites his reasoning nearly in the exact words, and replies, "The objection, which is thus proposed by the learned author, is not right. For, according to the opinion of those who contend for the doctrine of partial rights, undivided is the sense of the term common; and, since the nature of it is not changed by denying a general right, the objection, alleged by the opponent, cannot be valid."

After thus endeavouring to vindicate his author, Critiksha proceeds to state the concurrent opinions of Hariadhin, Vijnāneśvara, Vācheṣpati Miśra and others who main-

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* So the term, here employed, is explained by Chūdhārāni.
† Achyuta and Critiksha expound the term “making it positive, that a certain thing appertains to a certain individual.”
‡ So the sentence is supplied by the commentator Kārīrāna Vācheṣpati, who remarks, that the observation in the text is made, “because no partition would be necessary were there no other relative.
§ As used in texts concerning participation in acquired property. For example, “When a man acquires wealth by valor, relying on any common vehicle or weapon, the brethren shall be sharers in it.” This note is suggested by an equivalent insertion in the passage itself, as quoted by the commentator on the Daya-tatra.
9. Or partition is a special ascertainment of property, or making of it known [by reference of a particular share to a particular person.]*

10. Even in the case where a single article, as a female slave, a cow, or the like, is common to many, the property is severed by separate use, in carrying burdens, or in milking, during specific periods, in turn, as directed by Vīhaspati. "A single female slave should be employed on labour in the houses [of the several co-heirs] successively, according to the number of shares—and water of wells or ponds is drawn for use according to need [without stint]—such property [as is regularly not divisible] should be distributed by equitable adjustment; else it would be useless [to the owners]." These three half stanzas occur in many places, [as quotations from this author] though not found in their regular order [in his institutes of law.†]

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tain, that "partition does annul a previous right and become the cause of the property, as inferred in the instance of partition made by a father;" adding reasons, which are similarly cited by the commentator on the Dāya-tātra, with the remark, "that the opinion delivered by Raghunandana is conformable to that doctrine." Whence also Jagannātha, in the digest of Hindu law, concludes, that "Raghunandana's opinion is indirectly admitted even by Čṛkitśa." 9. Or partition is &c.] This abridged definition of partition is intended by the author for a literal interpretation of the term viśhīga, conformably with its derivative sense: assuming, that the radical verb, bhāj, signifies to make known; either "because roots have numerous significations," according to the remark of Achyuta; or "because that import is deducible from the proper meaning of the verb bhāj, to serve or adore," as stated by Medāvigna in his note on this passage.

By reference of a particular share to a particular person.] So Čṛkitśa completes the sentence. He adds "the making of property known, here signifies the casting of lots or other operation tending to the ascertainment of the right."

10. As directed by Vīhaspati.] Raghunandana, in the Dāya-tātra, citing the same text as propounding a distribution by difference of times, remarks, that "the rise and extinction of various periodical rights to the same individual, must evidently be here admitted: or else a restriction of the general property vested in all."

Čṛkitśa asks, "if the articles be sold by the possessor during his own turn, without the consent of the other periodical owners, does not the buyer obtain the complete property for all the periods?" He replies, "No: such interest only as the vendor held, is vested by the purchase in the buyer; and thus the purchaser, standing in the place of the seller, has the use of the article in turn with the other proprietors."

"In the houses of the several co-heirs successively,"] According to some copies of Raghunandana's Dāya-tātra, the reading is "on successive days" dīne dīne, instead of gīte gīte "in the houses successively." But the latter is the reading of the passage as cited in other compilations. The whole passage, as it is here quoted by Jimānāvahana, consists of portions of three different stanzas; which in Vīhaspati's text are remote and in a reversed order; according to the quotation of the text in the Śrīmā-Chandrikā Kulpalara and Ratnakara.

* Čṛkitśa.
† Čṛkitśa.
11. Does it not follow from the text of Nārada, ("let sons regularly divide the wealth when the father is dead") which authorizes sons to divide their father's effects after his decease,* that sons have not property therein before partition? nor can partition be a cause of property, since that might be misunderstood as extending even to the goods of a stranger.

12. The answer is this: since it is the practice of all people to call an estate their own, immediately after the demise of their father or other predecessor; and the right of property is acknowledged to vest without partition in the case of all sons; the demise of the relative is the cause of property. Consequently there is no room for any misconstruction.

13. Acquisition is the act of the acquirer; and one, who has the state of ownership dependent on acquisition, is the acquirer. Is not birth therefore, as the act of the son, rightly deemed his mode of acquisition? and have not sons, consequently, a proprietary right, during their father's life, (even without his being degraded or otherwise disqualified;†) and not by reason of his demise? and therefore is it declared "in some cases birth alone (is a mode of acquisition;‡) as in the instance of a paternal estate."

14. That is not correct; for it contradicts Manu and the rest. "After the [death of the] father and the mother, the brethren, being assembled, must divide equally the paternal estate: for they have not power over it, while their parents live."§

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11. Does it not follow &c.] Does partition ascertain a pre-existent right? Or does it create the right itself? To both these doctrines objections are here proposed. Sons have not property before partition: for the father's property, suggested by the relative case in the phrase, "their father's effects;" is an obstacle to it. Consequently partition cannot be the ascertainment of a pre-existent right. Čākrodha.

Therefore, the property of the father, though deceased, would subsist until partition took place. Such is the import of the objection. Admitting this, and the inference that property arises from partition alone, and that the father's property is thereby divested; what arm ensues? The author replies "partition cannot be a cause of property." Mahāyana.

Nor can it extinguish a former right. For it might else be supposed, that, if strangers cast lots for the goods of one with whom they are unconnected, the property of the owner would be thereby annulled, and the right vested in the strangers. Čākrodha.

* Nārada, 13. 2.
† Čākrodha furnishes this clause.
‡ Supplied on the authority of Čākrodha and other commentators.
§ Manu, 9, 103.
15. Manu, (§ 14.) denies the son's right in his father's life time.

16. It should not be argued, that the text intends want of independence, like another passage of the same author, concerning acquisitions by a wife or son: for there is no evidence of property then vested; but, in the other instance, dependence is rightly supposed to be meant, since property is suggested by the phrase "what they earn" or acquire.

17. The son's property in his own gains is requisite to his performance of religious rights there with.

18. Dévala denies the son's rights in the goods of his father yet living.

19. No authority declares a right by birth.

20. Besides, if sons had property in their father's wealth, partition would be demandable even against his consent: and there is no proof, that property is vested by birth alone; nor is birth stated in the law as means of acquisition.

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17. Besides it would contradict the revealed law.] It would contradict those passages of scripture which prescribe certain fasts and other religious rites to be observed by women. Mahévarā.

Neither should it be argued, that the religious rites may be accomplished with goods given for the purpose by the husband or father, &c. For, on that supposition, the husband's relinquishment would vest property in his wife. But, in like manner as the right vests in him immediately upon his wife's receipt of any thing from another person, so does it vest in him on her receipt of goods from himself. Črikṣula.

18. Free from defect.] Raghunandana, in the Dāya-tattva, interprets "free from defect," not degraded, and cites Nārada (12. 3.) "If the father be lost, or no longer a householder, &c." § 82.

19. Nor is birth stated in the law as means of acquisition.] The author apparently alludes to a passage of Gautama cited in the Mitakshāra, and which expressly declares "by birth alone a man takes ownership of wealth; so the holy instructors maintain." Accordingly the commentators, Ācyula and Črikṣula, question the authenticity of the text: and indeed it is not found in Gautama's institutes. Črikṣula says "the text of Gautama, which is cited in the Mitakshāra, is unauthorized; or, if it be authorized, it relates to the case of one whose father dies while the child is in the mother's womb."  

* Manu, 8, 416.
20. In some places it is alleged: but there, by the mention of birth, the relation of father and son, and the demise of the father are mediately indicated as causes of property.

21. The right of one may consistently arise from the act of another: for an express passage of law is authority for it; and that is actually seen in the world, since, in the case of donation, the donee's right to the thing arises from the act of the giver; namely, from his relinquishment in favor of the donee who is a sentient person.

22. Neither is property created by acceptance; since it would follow, that the acceptor was the giver; for gift consists in the effect of raising another's property; and that effect would here depend on the donee, in like manner as a votary, though making a relinquishment of a thing offered to a deity, is not a sacrificer; but the priest alone is so denominated, as performing the act of presenting its relinquishment, which act was the purpose of the ceremony termed a sacrifice. Besides the word gift occurs in passages of law as signifying something antecedent to acceptance.

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This commentator adds as a reason, "Else a father who had male issue, would not be independent in regard to his own goods." He subjoins an interpretation similar to that which occurs in the Deyasitra of Raghunandana, where the passage is explained in an entirely different sense upon an altered reading of it; and, after proposing another exposition of it, he concludes thus: "It must be therefore understood to be the implied sense, that, because the relation of birth is superior to every other, a son, standing in that relation, has the right of succession to his father's wealth immediately on the extinction of his father's right."

Raghunandana's interpretation is this. The text of Gautama, which is cited in the Mitakshara, signifies, "the venerable teachers maintain, that, on the extinction of the father's property, his son, not any other relative, may take his goods, because sons have a right to the wealth of their natural father by the very relation of birth, by which they are his issue, and which is superior to every other relation." It does not mean, that sons have a right by birth in their father's wealth, while his own property in it subsists; for that would contradict the text of Dvarata.

20. In some places.] That is, in some books, birth is so alleged. An authentic passage of this import, by a worldly writer, does occur. Qkritshana.

21. From relinquishment in favour of a sentient person.] Since no right of ownership arises from mere relinquishment, such as the letting loose of a young bull [as a general] the author adds the condition "in favour of one who is a sentient person." Qkritshana.

22. The word gift occurs in passages of law.] The particular passage of law which is here instanced, and the initial words of which are quoted by the author, is completed, with some variation, by the commentators Achyuta, Qkritshana and Maheqvara. "Intending in his mind a proper object of his liberality, let the giver pour water on the ground [to ratify his donation.] The ocean has its bounds; but a gift has no termination."
23. Is not receipt acceptance? For the affix, in
the word svikâra, implies a thing becoming what it
before was not; and the act of making his own (evar
known) what before was not his, constitutes appropri-
ation or acceptance (svikâra). How then can prop-
erty be antecedent to that?

24. The answer is, though property had already arisen, it is now
by the act of the donee, subsequently recognizing it
for his own, rendered liable to disposal at pleasure:
and such is the meaning of the term ‘acceptance’ or
‘appropriation.’ From its association with teaching,
and assisting at sacrifices, receipt (pratigraha) is,
without question, a mode of acquisition, though it do
not immediately create property: for, in the case of
assisting at sacrifices and so forth, property in wealth
so gained arises solely from the gift of the reward.

25. Survival may constitute the
right of succes-
sion.
Either that, or
demise must do so.

26. Hence [that is, because property is not vested in sons, while
the father lives: or because property is not by birth,
but by survival: or because the demise of the ance-
stor is a requisite condition.] the passage before cited,
beginning with the words “after the [death of the]
father,” being intended to declare property vested at
that period, [namely at the moment of the father’s de-
ceased] recites partition which of course then awaits
the pleasure [of the successor.] For it cannot be a

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23. The affix implies.] The affix Chivi, which affects the first member of the
compound term svikâra, bears the import here stated.

26. Recites partition.] The recital of partition is intended as an indication of pro-
erty arising at that period. Çrîkrama.

By the passage above cited (Manu, 9, 104.) it is not understood, that partition
must be made of the death of the father: but it is signified, that property, which
authorizes partition, takes effect from his demise. Mahêvâra.

If property be truly vested at that period, then partition at pleasure follows of
course.

For a precept teaches only what was not otherwise known. Mahêvâra.

* Manu, 10:76, and many similar passages, in which these are mentioned as three
modes of earning wealth.
† Çrîkrama and Achyuta. ‡ Chudâmani. § Mahêvâra.
|| Manu, 2, 104, vide Supra § 14.
* So all the commentators interpret this passage.
precept, since the same result [respecting the right of partition, at pleasure,] was already obtained [as the necessary consequence of a right of property.]

27. Nor can it be a restrictive injunction. For, as that is contrary to the text of Manu "Either let them thus live together; or let them dwell apart for the sake of religious merit;" and as it produces visible consequences only [not any unseen or spiritual result,] it can neither be an injunction for an immediate partition, nor a limitation of the time.

28. Besides, partition would be admissible, only at the moment immediately following the father's decease and not at any later period; for there is not in this instance, as in that of a sacrifice on the birth of a child, an objection analogous to the hazard of the new born infant's life; and partition to be made at any time after the father's demise, while the sons live, and at their pleasure, is already obtained [as a necessary result of obvious reasoning, without need of a special precept for the purpose.]

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An explanatory recital is introduced, for greater clearness, where the same result was already obtained from reasoning or authority. Chudamaani.

27. Nor can it be a restrictive injunction. If it can be understood as a precept, it should not be taken as an explanatory recital. It may therefore be a restrictive injunction. Appreaching this objection, the author obviates it. Crikshana.

If it cannot be an injunction; for Manu, by authorizing their living together, gives a sanction to their omission of partition. Mahêryâra.

Being followed by no spiritual consequences attendant on the performance or on the omission of it, partition cannot be restricted by a hundred texts. Crikshana.

The option cannot be restricted by a hundred passages. Chudamaani.

28. Besides partition. Supposing it to be a limitation of time intended for spiritual ends; the author proceeds in his reasoning. Time subsequent to the father's decease may be the moment immediately following it, or any time subsequent. On the first interpretation, the author says, Partition would be admissible only at the instant immediately following it. The condition being exclusive, it would be inadmissible at a subsequent period. Might not partition nevertheless take place at a subsequent time, in like manner as the sacrifice directed to be performed when a child is born, and which should accordingly be celebrated immediately after the birth of the infant, is deferred until the period of uncleanness ends? The author replies to that. Since the period of uncleanness begins immediately after the section of the navel string, the sacrifice should be first performed like other rites on the birth. But Gobhin directs, that the breast shall be given after the section of the string; and that if he deferred for so long a time, the infant's throat will be parched and his life endangered. On account of this objection, a postponement takes place. But no such objection exists in the present instance.

* Chudamaani.  § Mahêryâra.
‡ Manu, 9. 111. Vide Instra. § 87.  ¶ Crikshana.
29. Therefore, the text of Šrama must be argued [by you*] to intend the prohibiting of partition, although the son's right subsist during the life of the father. But that is not maintainable. For it would thus bear an import not its own.

30. Hence the texts of Šrama and the rest [as Dēvala § 18†] must be taken as showing, that sons have not a right of ownership in the wealth of the living parents, but in the estates of both when deceased. One position is conveyed by the terms of the text; the other by its import (a).

31. More demise is not exclusively meant: for that intends also the state of a person degraded, gone into retirement, or the like; by reason of the analogy, as occasioning an extinction of property.

32. Accordingly Nārada says: “When the mother is past child-bearing, and the sisters are married, or if the father be lost, or no longer an householder, or if his temporal affections be extinct.†

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Taking the second interpretation; partition after the death of the father is at the pleasure of the successor. Thus, since sons have not a right of ownership prior to their father's demise, partition could not be then supposed; and it follows, even without a precept declaring it, that the time for partition must be subsequent to his decease. The limitation is therefore superfluous. Čṛkṣṇa.

30. One position is conveyed by the terms &c.] One position, namely the want of right, during the parent’s life, is expressed by the terms of the text: it is conveyed by the words “they have not power &c.” The other, namely ownership after the parent’s demise, is the import deducible from the right of partition. Čṛkṣṇa &c.

31. Gone into retirement or the like.] The order of a hermit, as well as the extinction of worldly affections, is here comprehended under the term “or the like.” Čṛkṣṇa.

32. Accordingly Nārada says.] For since partition is recited, being here understood from the preceding passage in which it was premised, (Nārada 13. 2.) this indicates the departure of property from the father and the rise of property vested in sons. Čṛkṣṇa.

* So Čṛkṣṇa supplies the text. Mahāvyasa says, “by you, who aver property dependent on birth.”
† Raghunandana.
‡ Nārada.

(a) Compare secs. 25, 26 Supra, c. iii, s. i. 19 infra. Mit. c. i. s. iii. i. Šrama. ix. 104, 105. If a son die before his father, the Bombay Sadr Court seem to have held that the father’s wife will succeed on his death in preference to his son’s widow; but if the father die first, then the son’s wife is heiress on her husband’s death and the mother-in-law gets only maintenance. Rameshwar v. Umam. I Borr. 415.—Ed.
33. "Lost" signifies degraded: "no longer a householder," having quitted the order of a household.* If the reading be "when he is exempt from death," then the sense is "when being exempt from death (that is alive,) he is devoid of affections." The variation in the reading is unfounded.

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33. Lost signifies degraded &c.] Raghunandana, in the Dāya-śatva, copies the first part of this gloss; and adds, therefore, that if the right of property be annihilated by death or by degradation, or by quitting the order of a householder, sons are entitled to partition; and so they are, even though the right of property remain, if the father be devoid of wish for wealth which appertains to him.

The concluding part of Jīmūta-vāhana's gloss is construed by Mahēśvara as censoring the reading which had been just mentioned. But most commentators understand it as an allusion to another not specified. Achyuta remarks, that three several variations of the text are exhibited in the Prakāṣa and other compilations. According to the first (nīvṛtte chaś' pi ramanāt), the meaning is "if he be destitute of virile power." In the two last (visnusēkṣa chāgaraṇe and nirvāśā chaśāy avarane) both first terms have the same import with the concluding term. The variation in the reading is groundless, says this author, being wanting in many books.

The reading preferred by Jīmūta-vāhana, and in which he is followed by Raghunandana, is vināsate vāṃśa avarane "lost, and no householder." The variation, noticed by him in the text, is nīvṛtte vāś' pi ramanāt, "exempt from death," and the authority for it is Halāyudha, according to a remark of Chandaśevara in the Vivāda ratiṃkara.

Critikṣuha observes, "when such is the reading of the third verse of the stanza, then it is an epithet of "one devoid of affections." The author uses the words, "when" and "then" to indicate his disapprobation. The reason is, that the epithet is superfluous. The author's allusion to a reading not specified is referred by this commentator to one of those exhibited in the Prakāṣa, as before mentioned: viz. nīvṛtte vāś' pi ramanāt.

But the author of a commentary bearing the name of Raghunandana, considers the author's censure as relative to a term in the text, nīvṛpte (devoid of affection) a supposed reading for vināasate (lost). This however appears to be a mistake, as is remarked by Achyuta, for no such reading occurs.

In the same commentary it is further observed, that, in the Vivāda Chintāmāṇi, the text is read nīvṛtte ramanāt chāpi (when the sexual passions have ceased.) The remark is true. But that is only a transposition of the common reading (nīvṛtte chaś' pi ramanāt) which occurs in the Māhābhārata and many other compilations, and which is defended by the author of the Vivāda ratiṃkara against Jīmūta-vāhana's supposed rejection of it, or of the equivalent reading (nīvṛtte chaś' pi ramanāt.)

The author of the Dāya rāṣṭra follows the reading ascribed by Chandaśevara to Halāyudha, and noticed by Jīmūta-vāhana. He says, "while the father is exempt from death, that is, alive, there are two periods of partition: one, "when the mother is incapable of bearing issue;" the other, "when the father is devoid of affections." He quotes Jīmūta-vāhana's reading of the text and interpretation of it; and proceeds thus: "If the father be no householder," that is, if he become an anchorite or ascetic, and "if he be devoid of affections," if he do not care for his wealth; if there be a relinquishment on his part through aversion from trouble, though he continue to be a householder; then, the father's voluntary relinquishment, his quitting the order of a householder, and his degradation from his class, are declared to be causes of enmallling his property."*

* The commentators notice another reading of this passage: gīḍhasthāguṇamārā, "not preserving the order of a householder;" instead of gīḍhasthāguṇamārā, without the order of a householder.
34. Here also, to show, that the sons' property in their father's wealth arises from such causes as the extinction of his worldly affections, this one period of partition, known to be at their pleasure, is recited explanatorily: for the recital is conformable to the previous knowledge; and the right of ownership suggests that knowledge.

35. Since any one partcienor is proprietor of his own wealth, partition at the choice even of a single person is thence deducible; and concurrence of heirs, suggested as one case of partition, is recited explanatorily in the text "the brethren being assembled &c." Else, since assembling implies many, there could be no distribution between two; for no passage of law expressly propounds a division between two co-heirs.

36. Is not the eldest son alone entitled to the estate, on the demise of the co-heirs? and not the rest of the brethren? for Manu says: "The eldest brother may take the patrimony entire; and the rest may live under him, as under their father." And here eldest intends him who rescues his father from the hell called Put; and not the senior survivor. "By the eldest, as soon as born, a man becomes father of male issue, and is exonerated from debt to his ancestors; such a son, therefore, is entitled to take the heritage. That son alone, on whom he devolves his debt, and through whom he tastes immortality, was begotten from a sense of duty; others are considered as begotten from love of pleasure."§

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There are other variations in the reading of this important text, which it appears unnecessary to notice, as they do not concern Jinta-tatha's exposition of it.

34. To show, &c.] Literally 'From showing' (jyaapant; ) that is, for the purpose of 'showing' (jyaapanda.) Crikshna.

In the manner before explained; by means of declaring partition. Achyuta.

The recital is conformable to the previous knowledge.] How is it a recital of what was known to be at their will; since will is not even mentioned? The author replies, "It is conformable to the previous knowledge." Without will, there is no partition; therefore, by declaring partition, will is suggested. The recital of partition conforms to that. Malagvara.

35. At the choice of a single person.] At the choice of one out of many. Achyuta.

Since he has full power in right of ownership, partition by the choice of one is an inference of reasoning. Crikshna.

36. Who rescues his father from the hell Put.] This is an allusion to a passage of Manu and others.|| Vide infra. C. 11. Sec. 1. § 31.

* Manu, 9, 104. Vide Supra, § 14.
† Manu, 9, 105.
‡ Vide Supra. C. 5, § 6. & C. 11, Sec. 1. § 31.
|| Manu, 9, 138. Vishnu 15, 43.
37. Not so: for the right of the eldest [to take charge of the whole] is pronounced dependent on the will of the rest. Thus Nārada says: "Let the eldest brother, by consent, support the rest, like a father; or let a younger brother, who is capable, do so: the prosperity of the family depends on ability."* By consent of all, even the youngest brother, being capable, may support the rest.(b) Primogeniture is not a positive rule. For Manu declares: "Either let them thus live together, or let them live apart for the sake of religious merit: since religious duties are multiplied apart, separation is, therefore, lawful."† By the terms "together or apart," and "for the sake," he shows it optional at their choice.

38. Two periods of partition are admitted.

39. But three periods must not be admitted: one, when a father dies; another, when he is devoid of worldly regards, and the mother's courses have ceased; and a third by his own choice, while the mother continues to be capable of bearing children, and the father still retains temporal affections. For, if the cessation of the mother's courses be joined, as a condition, with the extinction of the father's worldly inclinations, it might be concluded, that partition could not take place among sons, however desirous of it, when the father becomes a hermit (his temporal propensities being extinguished;) since the cessation of the mother's courses cannot yet have happened [while she is still between thirty and forty years of age;§] for the noble age, as ordained by Manu,§ is twelve years for a girl to be married to a man aged thirty, and eight years for one to be espoused by a man aged

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38. Thus there are two periods of partition.] Although the annulment of the father's property, by his own relinquishment, must necessarily be admitted, in the instance of partition by his choice; since partition, mentioned by the author, could not else take place; nevertheless two periods are stated by discriminating the cessation of property from the will to divide it. In fact, since it is an easier explanation, the period when the father's right ceased without special intention of investing another with the property, is the only reason of the son's succession to the heritage. There are not two periods of succession: for that would be a troublesome exposition. This mode of interpretation is consonant to Čāndāmani's opinion. Čāndāmani.

The notion entertained by a certain writer, that the only period is when the father's property ceases, must be rejected as absurd. Achyuta.

(b) See further as to management c. iii. 8. 15 infra: 2 Coleb. Dig. 189, 528, 533; 1 Strange H. L. 189; 2 Id. 323, 332, 342; 1 Moel. Dig. 444: as to debts incurred by a manager and the distinction when one of the members is a minor, see Humoonampera Chand v. Mt. Babooe Manraj Komoeree, 6 Mop. I. A. C. 393; Tagatavandra Mudali v, Peli Amudal, 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 393.—Ed.

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* Nārada, 13. 5. † Manu, 9. 111. ‡ Čāndāmani. § Manu, 9. 94.
twenty-four; and the age prescribed for entering into another order is fifty years.

40. If it be said, the extinction of passions, without any condition annexed to it, marks the period for a division of the father's estate; that is denied; for it might be thence inferred, that partition would not take place, although the father were a degraded person, if he were not at the same time devoid of temporal regard.

41. Four periods must else be admitted: viz. demise, degradation, disregard of worldly objects, choice.

41. But, if this be pronounced to be another period of partition, then four distinct periods would arise: 1. the demise of the father; 2. his degradation; 3. his disregard of secular objects; 4. his own choice.

42. The alleged power of sons to make a partition, when the father is incapable of business [by reason of extreme age, &c.] has been asserted through ignorance of express passages of law [to the contrary.] Thus Harita says: "While the father lives, sons have no independent power in regard to the receipt, expenditure and bailment of wealth. But, if he be decayed, remotely absent, or afflicted with disease, let the eldest son manage the affairs as he pleases."† So Sankha and Likhita explicitly declare: "If the father be incapable, let the eldest manage the affairs of the family, or, with his consent, a younger brother conversant with business. Partition of the wealth does not take place, if the father be not desirous of it, when he is old, or his men-

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But when the father, for the sake of obviating disputes among his sons, determines their respective allotments, continuing however the exercise of power over them, that is not partition: for his property still subsists, since there has been no relinquishment of it on his part. Therefore, the use of the term partition, in such an instance, is lax and indeterminate. Čārkṣasa. *

39. But three periods must not be admitted.] The author here opposes the doctrine maintained in the Mitakṣara; as is remarked by the commentators Ačyuta, Čārkṣasa and Maleçevara.

Čārkṣasa observes on the author's argument: "Since a damsel, twelve years old, being married to a man aged thirty, will be only thirty-two years of age when he is fifty; and a girl of eight, being espoused by a man of twenty-four, will have attained only thirty-four years, when her husband reaches fifty; it must follow," says the author, "that partition could not take place. But this reasoning is not accurate: for the postponement of partition is admissible, lest sons born after his retirement, if his passions be not extinguished, and his wife accompany him to the wilderness under the option allowed by the law, should be thus deprived of a maintenance. But, if he retire to the wilderness at the later period described by the legistors, there is nothing to prevent partition at that time, since the cessation of the mother's courses must have previously taken place!"

* Čārkṣasa. † In the Vivāda-ratnakara this is read Kāmadāné, "if he be prodigal," (or bestow wealth, according to his mere pleasure;) and the Prakāśa is cited for the other reading, Kāma dáne "as he pleases, (or with the father's consent,) if he be decayed (that is, poor.)"

‡ Manu, 9. 3. § Manu, 9. 2.
tdal families are impaired, or his body is afflicted with a lasting disease. Let the eldest, like a father, protect the goods of the rest; for [the support of] the family is founded on wealth. They are not independent while they have their father living, nor while the mother survives."

43. These two passages, forbidding partition when the father is incapable of business, or when he labours under a lasting disorder, direct that the eldest son should superintend the household, or a younger son who is conversant with business. The text last cited, therefore, runs "not if the father desire it not," and it was by mistake that it was written "if he be incapable of business, partition of the wealth takes place, &c."

44. Therefore two periods only are rightly affirmed: one, when property ceases by the owner’s degradation from his tribe, disregard of temporal matters, or actual demise; the other by the choice of the father, while his property still subsists.

ANNOTATIONS.

42. Thus Harita says]. The passages, cited in the text, have been here translated, in conformity to the interpretations of Jinaṭa-vāhana’s commentators; they are differently explained by other compilers; and in some places read differently.

43. And it was by mistake, that it was written. It does not clearly appear where Jinaṭa-vāhana found the reading which he here censures. Chākṣuṣaṇi, Achyuta, and Črikṣuṣa understand the erroneous reading to have consisted in the substitution of one phrase for the other (kāryākāmāṇaḥ pītārī instead of na tvākāmāṇaḥ pītārī). But Mahāyāna supposes the error to have consisted in the interpolation of the erroneous passage, including the words "partition of the wealth." According to him the text means "not if the father desire it not, when he is old, &c." na tvākāmāṇaḥ pītārī and the words "partition of wealth if he be incapable of business" (kāryākāmāṇaḥ pītārī tvākāmāṇaḥ) are an interpolation which is here condemned. Neither of these variations occur in the text, as cited by the authors of the Kalpatara, Kṛṣṇapāla and Vīrāntrodavaya, who all agree with Jinaṭa-vāhana in the reading of this passage. But a different text is quoted from Śukha in the Māksaśāra, Śrikṛṣṇadriṣṭa, Chākṣuṣaṇi, Mahāyāna, and Vīrāntrodavaya; and its import is the reverse of the one above cited.

44. When the mother is past child-bearing.] Mother here denotes generally any wife of the father. Črikṣuṣaṇa.

Since the condition is stated by way of illustration, it infers generally the impossibility of further male issue. If therefore it be possible, that the father should have issue by another wife, partition should not be made. Achyuta.

Even then, when the father’s wife is incapable of bearing issue, partition is by the father’s choice. Črikṣuṣaṇa.

* It is ascribed to Harita, instead of Śukha, by the compiler of the Vīyavāhāra Mayūka.
45. The condition "when the mother is past child-bearing,"* regards wealth inherited from the paternal grandfather. Since other children cannot be born by her, when her courses have ceased, partition among sons may then take place: still, however, by the choice of the father. But, if the hereditary estate were divided while she continued to be capable of bearing children, those, born subsequently, would be deprived of subsistence. Neither would that be right: for a text expresses, "They who are born, and they who are yet unbegotten, and they who are actually in the womb," all require the means of support: and the dissipation of their hereditary maintenance is censured.†

46. It is because there are two periods of partition, in the case of the father's wealth, that Manu, Gautama and others, avoid the word "dead," and use the term "after."‡ Since the father's right then ceases, the term "after," is employed to express that sense. Hence this is one period of partition. Another, regulated by his choice, while he does retain worldly affections, is indicated by the text "as a son born after the division, &c."§

47. The condition "and when the sisters are married,"‖ does not intend a distinct period, but inculcates the necessity of disposing of them in marriage: as the text of Nárada. "What remains of the paternal inheritance over and above the father's obligations and after payment of his debts, may be divided by the brethren; so that their father continue not a debtor;"¶ is intended to inculcate the obligation of paying the father's debts, not to regulate the time of partition.

ANNOTATIONS.

46. This is one period of partition. The period when property ceases, is one of the periods of partition.] The other, different from the cessation of property, is the moment of the father's choice. Čṛṣṭāna.

It is the moment of his will to divide his property. Aṣṭyūta.

47. Over and above the father's obligation.] Or sums, of which payment had been promised by him. Aṣṭyūta.

* Nárada, 13, 3.

† Vyāsa. The close of this passage is read otherwise in the Mitākṣara Sūtraśāra, Prakāśa, Chitāmāṇi, &c., viz., "No gift or sale should be made." Raghunandana in the Dāya-tattva, Čṛṣṭāna, and Vidyāvācheśpati in the Dāya- rahatsız, copy Śimara-vāhana's reading of the passage.

‡ Manu, 9, 101. Gautama, 28, 1.

§ Manu, 9, 216. Nárada, 13, 42.

‖ Nárada, 13, 3.

¶ Nárada, 3, 32.
48. From that text of Nārada, it results, that co-heirs, making a partition, may apportion the debts of their father or other predecessor, with the consent of the creditors, or must immediately discharge the debts. For such is the purpose of ordaining a partition of the residue after payment of debts. Accordingly Yājñavalkya propounds the distribution of a mother’s wealth, remaining over and above her debts. “Daughters share the residue of their mother’s property, after payment of her debts: and the male issue, in default of daughters.”* This will be fully considered under the head of debt.†

49. Or the restriction may signify, that the mother’s effects should be shared by the sons, if their sisters have been given in marriage: but, if they be unmarried, the inheritance is held in common with them. This will be explained in due time.‡

50. Conclusion. The periods for dividing the father’s possessions are two.

ANNOTATIONS.

49. The mother’s effects.] Other than such as were received by her at her marriage: for it will be shown, that the son’s right of succession to such goods is subsequent to the daughter’s son. Čṛitiksha.

50. It is thus established, &c.] When partition is made by the father, his choice only is requisite, if the estate were acquired by himself; but if it be an estate inherited from ancestors, his will, joined with the circumstance of the mother being past child-bearing, is required. Čṛitiksha, Daśakrama.

† The author refers to his treatise on debt, which is not extant; if indeed it were ever completed.
‡ See chapter 4.
§ Čṛitiksha.
|| Maheśvara.
CHAPTER II.

Partition, made by a Father,—of property ancestral,—and of his own acquisitions.

1. Vṛhaspati authorizes partition when parents are dead, or when no more issue may be expected.

2. This passage does not relate to the father's wealth; for the text, concerning the exclusive right of a son born after partition,† would be without relevancy: since there can be no son born when the woman is past child-bearing. Nor can it be supposed to relate to the mother's goods: for she would thus be stripped of her wealth. The condition, that she be past child-bearing, must then relate to the estate of the grandfather or other ancestor.

3. Neither can the circumstance of her being past child-bearing, be a cause of partition, independently of the owner's choice.

4. If it be asked, 'admitting a choice, whose must it be?' The answer is, 'the father's;' as deduced from the text of Gautama: "After the [demise of the] father, let sons share his estate. Or while he lives, the mother be past child-bearing, and he desire partition." ‡

ANNOTATIONS.

1. If the mother be past child-bearing.] The word mother intends a step-mother also: for there is an equal possibility of her bearing other sons. From the mention of the mother’s being past child-bearing, it appears, that the text relates to the grandfather's estate, not the father's: for the succession of a son born after partition is in this case provided for. Ragh. Dāya-tātra.

(c) See as to the alienation of ancestral estate, 2 Colch. Dig. 98; 1 Strange H. L. 290; 1 Macn. Princ. H. L. 2, 4, et seq. 4, 6; 1 Macn. Cons. H. L. 4, 5, 242, 340; 2 S. D. A. Rep. 214 in Dāyabhāsana Śriprapaṇa 96, referred to in 1 Manl. Dig. 38.—Ed.

* Vide infra, C. 3. § 1.
† Manu, 9. 216. Nārada, 13, 44.
‡ Gautama, 28, 1—2.
5. Hence [since such is the import of Vīhaspati’s text*] the decease of both parents is one period for the partition of the grandfather’s estate;† and since “parents” are here exhibited in the dual number, a division of the father’s estate, among brothers of the whole blood, ought [in strictness‡] to be made only after the decease of the mother.

6. The mention of the mother’s demise, does not here imply partition of her goods; since the phrase “even while they are both living” cannot relate to the mother’s separate property. It must be understood as relating to the property of another person; for the legality of partition in the instance of survival is there propounded, (as appears from the word even,) in the same case, in which the demise of both parents was declared a reason of distribution. The death of the mother must not be expounded as relative to her goods. This subject will be fully considered in its place.§

7. One period as above. The other by the choice of the father, provided the mother be past child-bearing.

7. Therefore the death of both parents is one period for partition of an estate inherited from a grandfather or other ancestor, and the other is by the choice of the father when the mother is past child-bearing.

8. A division of it does not take place without the father’s choice; since Manus, Nārada, Gautama, Baudhāyana, Čankha, and Likhita, and others, (in the following passages, “they have not power over it,”|| “they have not ownership while their father is alive and free from defect,”¶ “while he lives, if he desire partition,”,** “partition of heritage by consent of the father,”†† “partition of the estate being authorized while the father is living,” &c.) declare without restriction, that sons have not a right to any part of the estate, while the father is living, and that partition awaits his choice: for these texts, declaratory of a want of power, and requiring the father’s consent, must relate also to property ancestral; since the same authors have not separately propounded a distinct period for the division of an estate inherited from an ancestor.

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* Črikšña.  † Črikšña.  ‡ Manus supplies this limitation of the text.  § Chapter 4.  || Manus, 9, 104. Vide, § 14.  ¶ Cited as from Nārada, but is part of a passage of Dāyana.  ** Gautama, 28, 2.  †† Baudhāyana.  ‡‡ Čankha, and Likhita.
9. The text of Yājñavalkya ("The ownership of father and son is the same in land which was acquired by his father, or in a corrobory, or in chattels,"*) properly signifies, as rightly explained by the learned Udyota, that, 'when one of two brothers, whose father is living, and who have not received allotments, dies leaving a son; and the other survives; and the father afterwards deceases; the text, declaratory of similar ownership, is intended to obviate the conclusion, that the surviving son alone obtains his estate, because he is next of kin(d). As the father has ownership in the grandfather’s estate: so have his sons, if he be dead. There is not in that case, any distinction founded on greater or less propinquity; for both equally confer a benefit by offering a funeral oblation of food, as enjoined at solemn obsequies.' Such is the author’s meaning.

10. And a great grandson, whose father is dead, shares with his uncle the grandfather’s estate.

11. But, if sons had ownership, during the life of their father, in their grandfather’s estate, then, should a division be made between two brothers one of whom has male issue and the other has none, the children of that one would participate, since [according to your opinion †] they have equally ownership.

ANNOTATIONS.

9. The learned Udyota.] It is not agreed, who is the author here cited by Jīmūta-vāhana. The commentator Chādāmāni says, 'some author or compiler so named.' Maheqvara retains the name exhibited in the text and calls him Udyota. But Črīkṣāna hints, that his appellation is Divākara. While Ashyuta interprets the phrase as commemorative of an unnamed writer: and Raghuṇandana, or the commentator who has assumed his designation, intimates, that the author himself has here delivered his own doctrine. Udyota is again mentioned in another place. Vide C. 11. Sect. 6. § 32.

The text of Yājñavalkya is thus expounded in Raghuṇandana’s treatise entitled Dāya-tattva. ‘In regard to the land, a corrobory, or slaves, though acquired by the grandfather; as the father has the property of them, in right of his being the person who presents a funeral oblation at solemn obsequies, so, if his property cease by death or other cause, his sons have a right, though their uncle survive, so much as should have been their father’s share.’

(d) Where a Hindu died possessed of real property and leaving a son and grandson an equal right descends to each and not to the son alone. Duvashankar Kassoreya v. Brijnudh Mukherjund, Sel. Rep. 41, cited I Morl. Dig. 307.—Ed.

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 122. † Maheqvara. ‡ Črīkṣāna.
12. It should not be objected that such cannot be the meaning of the text, as not being the subject premised: for the case of grandsons by different fathers, was the proposed subject.

13. A "corrody" (\textsuperscript{9}) signifies what is fixed by, a promise in this form, "I will give that in every month of Kartiki."

14. "Chattels." From their association with land, slaves must be here meant.

15. Or the meaning of the text (\S 9) may be, as set forth by Dharavyava, 'A father, occupied in giving allotments at his pleasure, has equal ownership with his sons in the paternal grandfather's estate. He is not privileged to make an unequal distribution of it, at his choice, as he is in regard to his own acquired wealth.'

16. So Vishnu says "When a father separates his sons from himself, his will regulates the division of his own acquired wealth. But, in the estate inherited from the grandfather, the ownership of father and son is equal."* 

17. This is very clear. When the father separates his sons from himself, he may, by his own choice, give them greater or less allotments, if the wealth were acquired by himself: but not so, if it were property inherited from the grandfather; because they have an equal right to it. The father has not in such case an unlimited discretion.

\section*{Annotations.}

12. Was the proposed subject.] It was the subject of the preceding passage in Yajnavalkya's text.†

13. A corrody.] The author explains corrody (nibandha) as signifying any thing which has been promised, deliverable annually, or monthly, or at any other fixed periods. Čṛkṣṇa.

Raghunandana, in the Dāya-tātra, cites from the Kalpataru this definition, "A fixed amount granted by the king or other authority, receivable from a mine or similar fund."

14. Slaves must be meant.] Immoveables and bipeds are mentioned together in a subsequent text. From that association, it is inferred, that the term chattel here intends biped or slave. Chudāmāni.

For if the term intend substance in general, the mention of land and corrody, and the specific notice of chattels, would be superfluous. Acharita.

15. As in regard to his acquired wealth.] He may not in this case, as in the distribution of his own property, (for there he had the option,) give unequal shares to his sons. Dāya-tātra.

* Vishnu, 17. 1—2. Vide Infra. § 55. and § 76.
† Yajnavalkya, 3, 121.
18. Hence [since the text becomes pertinent by taking it in the sense above stated,† or because there is ownership restricted by law in respect of shares, and not an unlimited discretion;§] both opinions, that the mention of like ownership provides for an equal division between father and son in the case of property ancestral, and that it establishes the son's right to require partition, ought to be rejected.

19. Other texts similarly forbid an equal division.

20. It is consequently true, [since the texts above cited do not imply co-ordinate ownership,†] that the father has his double share of wealth inherited from the grandfather or other ancestor; and that a distribution takes place at the will of the father only, and not by the choice of his sons.

21. "If the father recover paternal wealth [seized by strangers, and§] not recovered [by other sharers,|| nor by his own father]], he shall not, unless willing, share it with his sons: for in fact it was acquired by him."** In this passage, Manu and Vishnu, declaring that he shall not, unless willing, share it, because it was acquired by himself, seem thereby to intimate a partition among sons even against the father's will, in the case of here-

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18. Both opinions ought to be rejected.] The opinions, here rejected, are those of the author of the Mitakshara and others. Čṛkṣraṇa and Aṣṭuta.

19. Other texts.] A text of Ṭhaspati, concerning the equal power of father and son over property moveable or immovable, acquired by the grandfather, is here alluded to. Maheqvar.

Such text must be interpreted as forbidding an equal distribution of the grandfather's property, among the grandchildren, by the father. Čṛkṣraṇa.

20. Has his double share.] It is true, that he has two shares, since passage, which will be hereafter cited, authorize him to reserve a double allotment when partition is made in his lifetime. Čṛkṣraṇa, Chāḍimaṇi, and Aṣṭuta.

At the will of the father.] By the text of Gauṭama before cited (§ 4.) partition depends on the father's choice. Čṛkṣraṇa, &c.

21. And not according to his own pleasure.] Not according to his mere will; but as choice governed by dread of sin inclines. Thus it must be understood, that, if they be able to subsist by other means, there is no offence in his giving them no share of land or similar property recovered by him. For it is the unequal distribution of patrimony not so retrieved, that is prohibited. Čṛkṣraṇa.

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* Čṛkṣraṇa and Aṣṭuta. † Maheqvar. ‡ Aṣṭuta.
§ Čṛkṣraṇa. || Čṛkṣraṇa and Aṣṭuta.
¶ Maheqvar. ** Manu 9, 209.
his free will, does not authorize the sons to demand partition of other patrimony against his will.

But here also, the meaning is, that a father, setting about a partition, need not distribute the grandfather's wealth which he retrieved: but must so distribute the rest of it, and not according to his own pleasure. Those authors do not thereby indicate partition at the choice of sons.

22. The father has ownership in gems, pearls and other moveables, though inherited from the grandfather, and not recovered by him, just as in his own acquisitions; and has power to distribute them unequally, as Yajñavalkya intimates. "The father is master of the gems, pearls and corals, and of all [other moveable property:] but neither the father, nor the grandfather, is so of the whole immovable estate.”

23. Since the grandfather is here mentioned, the text must relate to his effects. By again saying "all" after specifying "gems, pearls, &c." it is shown, that the father has authority to make a gift or any similar disposition of all effects, other than land, &c., but not of immovable, a corrobory and chattels [i.e. slaves]. Since here also it is said "the whole," this prohibition forbids the gift or other alienation of the whole, because [immovable and similar possessions are] means of supporting the family. For the maintenance of the family is an indispensable obligation; as Manu positively declares. "The support of persons who should be maintained is the approved means of attaining heaven. But hell is the man’s portion if they suffer. Therefore [let a master of a family] carefully maintain them.”

24. The prohibition is not against a donation or other transfer of a small part not incompatible with the support of the family. For the insertion of the word "whole" would be unmeaning [if the gift of even a small part were forbidden].

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23. By again saying "all." The separate use of the term "all" must be meant to suggest gold and other moveables. For it cannot be an epithet of gems, &c., since it does not agree in number. Črīkṣaṇa.

* Cited also as a passage of Yajñavalkya by Črīkṣaṇa in the Dāya-krama, and Raghunandana in the Dāya-tātra. But the quotation in the Mitākshara, (whence it has been evidently taken,) is anonymous.

† Črīkṣaṇa. ‡ Not found in Manu’s Institutes. § Črīkṣaṇa.
25. From the express mention of immoveables, a prohibition is inferred by the analogy exemplified in the loaf and staff, against the gift or other transfer of a cow or of slaves.

26. But, if the family cannot be supported without selling the whole immovable and other property, even the whole may be sold or otherwise disposed of: as appears from the obvious sense of the passage; and because it is directed, that a man should by all means preserve himself.

27. It should not be alleged, that by the texts of Vyāsa (“A single parcerer may not without consent of the rest, make a sale or gift of the whole immovable estate, nor of what is common to the family.” “Separated kinsmen, as those who are unseparated, are equal in respect of immoveables: for one has not power over the whole, to give, mortgage or sell it.”) one person has not power to make a sale or other transfer of such property. For here also [in the very instance of land held in common,†] as in the case of

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28. The loaf and staff.] This example of analogy, to which frequent allusion is made in argumentative writings, is variously stated. According to one explanation, the reasoning, exemplified by it, is analogy drawn from association. According to another, it is an argument a fortiori. A loaf having been left suspended on a staff, the loaf is missing and the staff is observed to have been gnawed by rats: it is concluded, that the loaf has been devoured by them. A staff being thrust through loaves, these are necessarily brought by bringing the staff. Other explanations are given: but the result is similar. Čirikṣaṇa, Maheśvara, &c. Also Rāga. Dāya-tāvā. Vide infra. C. 3. § 15. in notes.

A prohibition is inferred.] The prohibition extends to a cow and slaves, because they are exhibited in conjunction with land. (Yājñavalkya 2. 122.) Maheśvara.

Because the three are yoked together. Čirikṣaṇa.

29. As appears from the obvious sense, &c.] For the obvious sense of the passage indicates the obligation of maintaining the family.

In like manner, if there be no land or other permanent property, but only jewels or similar valuables, he is not authorized to expend the whole: for the reason holds equally. But the declaration of a power over moveables supposes the existence of both sorts of property. It should be so understood. Čirikṣaṇa.

30. It should not be alleged, &c.] To refute Chardeśvara’s doctrine, that gift without the consent of co-heirs, is invalid; and that such gift, though actually made, must be set aside, as the mere semblance of donation; the author states it by way of objection. Čirikṣaṇa, Achyuta on Dāya-Bhāga. Kāpurāṇa on Dāya-tāvā.

The author here imagines an objection to the opinion which he himself entertains, that a gift or other alienation made by an unseparated brother, or co-heir, is valid like a transfer made by a father. Rāga. on the Dāya-bhāga.

In fact, the requiring of the assent of co-heirs in the case of separated brethren, is for the purpose of ascertaining the fact of partition and settling the limits, like the consent of townsmen and neighbours. Therefore the transfer is valid without the concurrence of a separated co-heirs: as has been shown in the Mitākṣara. Rāga. Dāya-tāvā.

* Both stanzas are here ascribed by Jīmu-tāvāna (and similarly by Čirikṣaṇa) to Vyāsa; but the second is cited in the Ratnākara as a passage of Vīhaspati.

† Čirikṣaṇa Dāyakrama.
other goods, there equally exists a property consisting in the power of disposal at pleasure (c).

28. But the texts of Vyāsa (§27) exhibiting a prohibition, are intended to show a moral offence: since the family is distressed by a sale, gift or other transfer, which argues a disposition in the person to make an ill use of his power as owner. They are not meant to invalidate the sale or other transfer.

29. So likewise other texts (as this, "Though immovable or bipeds have been acquired by a man himself, a gift or sale of them should not be made by him, unless convening all the sons," ) must be interpreted in the same manner. For here the words "should" "be made"

must necessarily be understood.

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On the question whether goods held in common may or may not be alienated by one of the partners, some maintain, that joint property may not be given away by one partner, because joint or common property is mentioned in a text of Manu among things not fit to be given. It is accordingly declared by two passages of Vyāsa, that a single partner has not power to make a gift or other alienation. The notion of these writers is, that a sale or other transfer made by the will of a single partner is invalid, because all have property in the whole wealth; for they maintain a common right to the whole, vested in all. That is wrong: for a common property vested in all is denied by the author of the Dāya-bhāga, because there is no proof of it. Črikṭahāra, Dāyakrama.

Separated kinsmen.] This is according to the reading in the Mitākshara, Dāya-bhāga, Dāya-tatwa, Vīcārtinodaya, &c. But in the Suttrikhandikā, Pārijāta, Kalpataru, Ratnācara, Chintāmāni, &c., the reading is Dāyādās, "heir," instead of Sāpiṭāk, "kinsmen." However, Chandegura remarks, "heir" here signifies sons, &c. And the term is so explained by the author of the Prakāga.

28. Not to invalidate the sale.] Since there is not a general property of the whole, a community of rights, consisting in there being numerous owners to the same thing, does not exist; and community signifies only the state of not being separated. But here it is the notion of the author of the Dāya-bhāga, who maintains a several right to a part vested in each person, that nothing prevents a donation or other transfer of the co-partner’s own share, even before partition, since a common property is already vested in him. Črikṭahāra, Dāyakrama.

29. Must be understood.] It should not be asked why may not the words understood be "is" "valid" or "is" "possible"? Were it so, the verb could not be governed by the same term with the participle ("convening") Črikṭahāra on Dāya-bhāga.

(c) The opinion of Jagannātha (9. Cols. Dig. 56, 215) and of the authors quoted by him on the general question of alienations by one of several co-partners without consent of the rest, decidedly is that the sale or transfer is valid so far as concerns the seller’s own share, but not so for the shares of his co-heirs who were not consenting. Simata-vāhana is not so explicit; but it does not appear from his text or the observations of his commentator that his doctrine can be understood as going any further than to maintain the sale or alienation by a father of a family, for the whole patrimony, without consent of his sons, or by a co-heir for his own share of the inheritance, without the assent of the co-partners, 1 Mori. Dig. 40. p. 1.—Ed.

* The passage here cited is not found in Manu’s institutes, and is quoted by most compilers from Vṛhaspati. The author of the Vivāda Chandra has silently introduced into it, a reading, which, if genuine, would make it confirm the contrary doctrine. For, as read by him, the passage in question enumerates void gifts.

† Cited in the text.
30. The precept is infringed, but the transfer is not null.

30. Therefore, since it is denied, that a gift or sale should be made, the precept is infringed by making one. But the gift or transfer is not null: for a fact cannot be altered by a hundred texts (a).

31. Accordingly [since there is not in such case a nullity of gift or alienation.] Nārada says: "When there are many persons sprung from one man, who have duties apart, and transactions apart, and are separate in business, and character, if they be not accordant in affairs, should they give or sell their own shares, they do all that as they please, for they are masters of their own wealth." (b)

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30. A fact cannot be altered by a hundred text.] If a Brāhmaṇa be slain, the precept "slay not a Brāhmaṇa," does not annul the murder: nor does it render the killing of a Brāhmaṇa impossible. What then? it declares the sin. Ragh. on Dāya-bhāga.

31. Nārada says.] The passage of Nārada's institutes, here cited, is otherwise interpreted by different compilers; and is generally understood as declaring the separate and independent right of co-heirs, who have made a partition. It is so expounded in the Smṛti-khandrika, Ratudaka, Chintāmāni, Viramitrodaya, &c. But, in the present quotation, it is apparently understood as relating equally to divided and undivided shares.

The author of the Viramitrodaya giving a summary of this doctrine, says, "Jimūtvāhana, having cited two passages of Vṛṣa (§27), affirms, that they are not intended to incapacitate a single co-heir for making a sale or gift; since he has property defined to be a power of disposal at pleasure, in the case of immovable, precisely as in that of other effects; and since those texts cannot declare null an actual gift consisting in the relinquishment of the property; for the fact cannot be altered by a hundred texts. But the prohibition is levelled against wicked persons, and is intended to declare the alienation sinful, because it is injurious to the family, if there were no sufficient cause for the alienation, such as the distress of the family or the like. So the texts (§29) relative to separated co-heirs must be explained as above. Accordingly, Nārada authorizes generally a sale or any other alienation (§31). Since the text specifies the reason, "because they are masters of their own wealth," it relates to immovables; for it would be impertinent.

Çrīkṛṣṇa and Achyuta on the Dāya-bhāga of Jimūtvāhana, Kāçirāma on the Dāya-tātva and Raghunandana, remark on Nārada's text (13. 14). "This relates to gift or alienation by a well disposed man. But the prohibition was relative to an ill disposed person. [Consequently there is no contradiction.]" It is here expressly declared, that the gift or alienation is valid without consent of heirs. And thus the prohibition of gift or sale of the whole estate, unless in distress, must be understood as especially regarding immovables (land, &c.) rather than chattels (gems, pearls, coral, &c.). But, if this relate to a man's own acquisitions, the preceding text (§29) would be impertinent. [For he had of course power over them, since they were acquired by himself.] (a)

(a) See Āhavand Rāi v. Āhavand Rāi, 1 S. D. A. Rep. 2 and Colebrooke's note 1 Morl. Dig. 38. See too, 1 Strange, H. L. 24.—Ed.

(b) Each of the holders of separate shares of one hereditary zamindār may sell his share to whom he pleases, and the other sharers have no necessary right of pre-emption; Ramrajan Singh v. Chander Narain Rai, 1 S. D. A. Rep. 1, see Colebrooke's note 1, Morl. Dig. 38.—Ed.

* Nārada, 13, 42-43. Several variations occur in the reading of this passage; particularly in the third and fourth verses of the first stanza; as Sanyuk, well, for Tīthaka, apart; and Kṛtyeshu for Kāryeshu.

† Çrīkṛṣṇa and Achyuta.

‡ Achyuta.

§ Kāçirāma on Dāya-tātva.
32. We resume the subject. Thus, for the reasons before stated, since the equal participation of father and son in the estate of the grandfather or other ancestor would be incongruous; and since it cannot be intended by the text (§ 9) to confer on sons a right to demand partition; that text must either be meant to prevent an unequal distribution depending solely on the father's pleasure, [according to Dharmavara's interpretation; § 15.] or it must intend the equal right of a nephew whose father is deceased, to share with his uncle; [conformably with the other exposition. § 9.]

33. Thus [since sons have not power to require partition §] a division even of wealth inherited from the grandfather must be made by the sole choice of the father. But, with this difference, that it is requisite, the mother should have ceased to be capable of bearing issue: whereas, in the instance of his own acquired property, partition takes effect without that condition. But, after the demise of the father, it takes place equally in the case of both sorts of property [the father's estate or the grandfather's || without distinction.

34. Therefore the periods of partition are two, even in the case of wealth inherited from ancestors.

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32. We resume the subject.] The sons have not a right to participate equally with the father in the grandfather's estate, and that partition is not exigible at the will of grandsons, are positions which constituted the subject under consideration. Chēḍāmaṇi and Čṛkṛshṇa.

Partition of the estate of a paternal grandfather or other ancestor, was the subject. Achyuta.

Since equal participation would be incongruous.] For a reason which will be subsequently stated. Čṛkṛshṇa.

For it is provided by positive institute || (§ 35.) that the father shall have two shares of such property. Mahēgyara.

Since it cannot be intended &c.] For the reasons before mentioned. Čṛkṛshṇa.

34. The periods are two.] The cessation of the father's property, by death or otherwise, and the father's own choice, provided the mother be incapable of bearing more children, are the two periods here meant. But in fact, whether it be an hereditary estate, or his own acquired property, the time of the father's property ceasing is the only admissible period of partition. The distinction is, in the case of dividing the grand-father's estate, that the circumstance of the mother's being incapable of bearing more children is associated with it. This should be understood; for, even in the instance of a distribution made by the father, his property in the share receivable by his son is annulled by his own relinquishment. Else, if the father's property subsist, his goods could not become heritage, nor he subject to partition; since his sons have no previous vested right. Čṛkṛshṇa.

* Mahēgyara reads * since the ordaining of equal participation, &c. would be incongruous; inserting the word Viṣṭāna, which is omitted by Čṛkṛshṇa in his reading, of this passage.

† Mahēgyara. ¶ Conformably with Udyota's exposition. Mahēgyara. § Čṛkṛshṇa.

|| Chēḍāmaṇi.

35. In such case, if the father voluntarily make a partition with his sons, he may reserve for himself a double share of property ancestral. Vihaspati, saying, "The father may himself take two shares at a partition made in his life time;" and Nârada,* "Let the father, making a partition, reserve two shares for himself; do so ordain, without restriction.

36. Besides, a double share of the grand-father’s wealth is the father’s due by this [following†] argument.

37. Deductions of a twentieth part (with the best of all the chattels) and of half a twentieth, and of a quarter thereof, are propounded by a passage of Manu: ("The portion deducted for the eldest is the twentieth part of the heritage, with the best of all the chattels; for the middlemost, half of that; for the youngest a quarter of it,"‡) and shares increased by one portion, by half of one, and by a quarter, are propounded by other passages of the same author: ("If a deduction be thus made, let equal shares of the residue be allotted: but if there be no deduction, the shares must be distributed in this manner; let the eldest have a double share; and the next born, a share and a half; and the youngest sons each a share: thus is the law settled."§) Gautama likewise, after directing, that "A twentieth part shall belong to the eldest, besides a pair [of goats or sheep], a car, together with beasts that have teeth in both jaws, and also a cow and bull;" (i.e. a pair of goats, or the like,

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35. Without restriction.† According to the author’s own doctrine, the double allotment concerns hereditary property only, and is consequently propounded with discrimination of cases. But, according to the opinion of his opponent, who admits the double share in the case of the father’s own [acquired] property, the allotment of such share is here declared in regard to the grand-father’s estate also, since there is no specified restriction of it to the father’s wealth. Ragh. on Dâya-bhâga.

36. By this argument.‡ Having in the preceding paragraph shown, that a double allotment for the father is ordained by express passages of law, the author proceeds to show by the following reasoning, that, since a double share is allotted to the elder brother, two shares must a fortiori be given to the father who is entitled to greater reverence. Mâheçvara.

37. Middlemost.¶ Here the word middlemost intends the next after the eldest and those born after him are all comprehended under the term youngest. Çrikshuṇa.

A pair of goats &c.] Or of sheep or other cattle. But kine are separately mentioned. Çrikshuṇa.

Provided the cattle be numerous.] But if they be few, the distribution should be adjusted in proportion to the deduction receivable by the eldest. Çrikshuṇa.

A house.] A habitation other than that which is the father’s abode. For so Çankha ordains. Çrikshuṇa.

* Nârada, 13. 12.
† Çrikshuṇa, Çrikshuṇa, &c.
‡ Manu, 9. 119.
§ Manu, 9. 116—117.
|| Gautama, 28. 5.
a car with horses or other beasts having teeth in both jaws, and a bull together with a cow; all this shall belong to the eldest; and after directing, that "Cattle blind of one eye, or aged, dwarfish, or disfigured, shall belong to the middlemost, if there be more than one;" (i.e. aged or old, dwarfish or stunted, disfigured or having a distorted tail; these shall appertain to the middlemost, provided the cattle be numerous;) and after further directing, that "A sheep, grain, iron, a house, and, together with a cart, one of each sort of quadruped, shall be given to the youngest; all the residue shall be equally divided;" (i.e. a sheep and other things, as specified, shall be allotted to the youngest; but let the brethren divide equally the whole of the residue;) has by the following passage allotted to a double share to the eldest: "Or let the first born have two shares, and the rest take one apiece." 

38. It must not be argued, that the eldest has a double share allotted to him as the acquirer of the wealth. For the allotment of two shares is directed "if there be no deduction:" now a deduction could not be supposed in the case of an acquisition; and, since the middlemost and youngest are not, inasmuch as they are acquirers of the property, distinguished from the eldest, the assigning of a share and a half, or other less portion, [as a share and a quarter,] to them, would be incongruous, and the use of the term "eldest," &c. would be impertinent.

39. Accordingly, in the case of a partition between an appointed daughter and a true legitimate son, Manu ordains, "A daughter having been appointed, if a son be afterwards horn, the division of the heritage must in that case be equal, since there is no right of primogeniture for the woman." (§) Thus propounding equal partition, because there is no right of primogeniture in this instance by reason of her sex, the author thereby intimates, that a male would have had a double share [in right of his being eldest.] 

40. In regard to what is said, that as in the instance of the Holâka, a passage of revelation to this effect, "The Holâka ought to be performed," is assumed for the justification of the practice of celebrating that festival which

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39. Accordingly.] Since priority of birth determines the right to a superior allotment. Achyuta.

Since the right to a double share is founded on primogeniture. Črikṣeṇa.

40. As in the instance of the Holâka.] The author proceeds to refute the opinion of some writer, who reconciles the matter on the principle of the reasoning taught under the head of Holâka. Mahayava.

It is the 8th topic in the third chapter of the first book of Jainaśa's Mûndasa. Vide infra, C. 6, Sect. 1.—§ 22.

* Gautama, 28. 6. † Gautama, 23. 7—8. ‡ Gautama, 28. 9—10.
than is necessary, does not authorize the assumption, that the precept relates to an acquirer.

is in use among the Práchyaś; (for it can be sufficiently justified by such a passage; and one, containing the word Práchya or other restrictive term, need not be supposed, since the proof of it would be burdensome;) so, in this case likewise, a passage of revelation in these words, "Let the acquirer take a double share," must be inferred, and not one containing the word "eldest" or other restrictive term. That argument is not right; for, in the one case, the practice observed by the Práchyaś can be justified by a general precept of revelation, which must be presumed to that end. It should not be alleged, that one containing the term Práchya must be supposed for the sake of justifying the omission of that festival by others than Práchyaś. Omission, consisting in non-performance, is no fit reason for presuming a lost revelation. But, here, since Manu and the rest use the word "eldest," a passage of scripture containing that term ought to be presumed to justify its insertion; not one exhibiting the word "acquirer;" since there is no necessity for assuming this: nor is there any special authority for the proof of one containing both terms. It should not be alleged, that, since it is necessary to suppose a revelation for the purpose of authorizing the acquirer's double share in other cases, that may be the origin of the law in this case also, for it is an easy conclusion, and the word "eldest" may signify the acquirer. The reverse is equally possible; for if, a revelation containing the term "eldest" be supposed, even the word "acquirer" might just as well be presumed to signify eldest, since there is no ground of preference. Besides, on the same principle of facility, a supposed passage of scripture, containing three, four, or more terms, may be any how inferred from reasoning; and the terms of the whole law may be made to relate to it, by interpreting them according to analogy and metaphor; and thus may you demonstrate your skill in the law. Therefore, since an established practice, or a sentence of memorial law, from which a passage of scripture is to be inferred, may be sufficiently justified by assuming a passage in which the particular practice is described, or the words of the law are contained; more should not be presumed. And such is the import of the reasoning, instanced under the head of Holakā.

41. Accordingly [since primogeniture and acquisition are severally, and independently of each other, reasons for the allotment of a double share.\*] Vasishtha, having distinctly assigned two shares to the

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The Holakā is the festival of spring (Vasanta,) and is observed by the Práchyaś. Çrikshaṇa.

It is called Holakā or Holi. The Práchyaś are the orientals contrasted with the Udéhyas, or people of the north, and Dákshinayás, or people of the south. The celebration of the Holi is peculiar to the eastern Hindus, as the festival or worship of Kañjáraka is peculiar to the southern Hindus. See Çrikshaṇa, &c.

41. Would be impertinent.\*] For two passages of one author cannot signify the same thing; since one of them would be superfluous. Çrikshaṇa.

\* Çrikshaṇa and Achyuta.
eldest brother, and two to the acquirer. Rately propounds the allotment of two shares to the acquirer. Thus, after premising "Partition of heritage among brothers," he says: Let the eldest take two shares;† and at no great distance adds: "He, amongst them, who has made an acquisition, may take a double portion of it."‡ Two shares being thus ordained by this author in right of acquisition, his direction for a double allotment, to be given to the eldest brother, would be impertinent.

42. The right of taking a double share, too, is not confined to the case of primogeniture. Thus, Vṛhaspati says: "The eldest by birth, by science, and by good qualities, shall obtain a double share of the heritage, and the rest shall share alike: but he is as a father to them." If the allotment of two shares were only in right of acquisition, the mention of birth, science, and good qualities, would be useless.

43. The allotment of two shares concerns partition among brothers of the whole blood only, or of the half blood only. The deduction of a twentieth, &c., regards the half blood, as is hinted by Vṛhaspati.

44. Since partition among sons born of several wives, equal by class, is here stated as preceded by a deduction, it follows, that the doctrine of a double share relates to the case of whole brothers: and this is proper, for the elder brother has the greater weight among his brethren, from the circumstance of his being of the

43. This double portion is applicable to the case of partition among whole brothers [or among half brothers only;§] and the deduction of a twentieth part for the eldest is relative to partition among brothers of both the whole and the half blood. For Vṛhaspati says: "All sons of regenerate men, born of women equal by class, should share alike after giving a deduction to the eldest."||

44. For this being restricted to the half blood, the other relates to the whole blood.

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43. All sons of regenerate men.] Kulāka Bhaṭṭa infers from this and the following passage of Manu's Institutes, (9, 157) that no deduction is allowed in favor of the first-born at a partition among the sons of a Čādha man. Śaṁśaṇa's commentators, Chudāman and Čṛkṛṣṇa, oppose that doctrine, and assert the right of a Čādha's eldest son to the established deduction. But Raghunandana, in the Dīya-tāla, supports Kulāka Bhaṭṭa's opinion. The arguments are long.

* Vasiśṭha, 17. 36.
† Vasiśṭha, 17. 37.
‡ Vasiśṭha, 17. 42.
§ Čṛkṛṣṇa and Achyutā.
|| Manu, 9, 156. Though here cited from Vṛhaspati; but it is quoted from Manu in the Dīya-tāla, Kalpatura, Ratnācara, &c.
45. The deduction also of one in ten cows, &c., must not be made. So Manu declares: "Among brothers successful in the performance of their duties, there is no deduction of the best in ten, though some trifle, as a mark of greater veneration, should be given to the firstborn."

46. By the reasoning thus set forth, if the elder brother have two shares of the father's estate, how should the highly venerable father, being the natural parent of the brothers, and competent to sell, give or abandon the property, and being the root of all connexion with the grandfather's estate, be not entitled, in like circumstances, to a double portion of his own father's wealth? Vīhaspati, extending to the eldest son the right to a double share because he is like a father, as expressed in a passage above cited (§ 42,) does thereby intimate a maxim, that the father shall have two shares: and the maxim is actually propounded by Vīhaspati; for he ordains such an allotment in general terms: "The father may himself take two shares at a partition made in his life-time."† So Nārada says: "Let the father, making a partition, reserve two shares for himself; and the mother shall take an equal share with her sons, if her husband be deceased."‡

47. A father, distributing the goods, may take two shares for himself. The construction of the sentence is not, "A father, distributing his own goods, may take two shares:" for that would contradict the doctrine before stated.

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45. Successful in the performance of their duties.] It is here understood, that all have equal good qualities. But, if endowed with superior qualities, the eldest has his regular deduction. Chāḍāmāni.

The meaning is "though successful." But, if incapable, the rather shall there be no deduction. Mahēyāra.

46. Extending to the eldest son.] By ascribing to the firstborn equality with the father, it is implied, that, in like manner as the father has a right to two shares, when a partition of his own father's estate is made by him with his sons and grandsons, so is the eldest son entitled to a double portion of his own father's wealth, when partition is made among brothers. Çīkīśma.

47. That would contradict it.] It would be inconsistent with a passage of Vishnu above cited (§ 10) and with the text of Hārīta (§ 57.) Çīkīśma and Mahēyāra.

It would contradict the foregoing reasoning (§ 36, &c.) in regard to a double share of the grandfather's property. Aehyuta.

It would be at variance with the argument, that, if an elder brother have two shares, when the grandfather's estate is divided, surely the father should have as much, Chāḍāmāni.

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* Manu, 9. 115.
† Already cited, § 35.
48. There cannot be equal participation of father and sons in the patrimony. For either the goods must be in common, and consequently there could be no partition.

49. Now, if the case were so, [that is, if sons were entitled to share their father allotments of equal amount, while his property continued;] the eldest, together with his son, would have four shares, if two must be allotted to his son, at the same time that two are allotted to the eldest himself in right of primogeniture; and one share only would belong to another brother. Thus, if the eldest brother have many children, and equal portions must be assigned to them as to their father, a mere trifle would remain for a younger brother, which would be in contradiction to great authorities.

50. As for the text of Vṛhaspati: “In wealth acquired by the grandfather, whether it consist of moveables or immovables, the equal participation of father and of son is ordained:” its meaning is, that the participation shall be equal or uniform, and the father is not entitled to make a distribution of greater or less shares at his choice, as he may do in the instance of his own acquired goods. It does not imply, that the shares must be alike.

51. Or it relates to a son of two fathers (one natural and one adoptive.)

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It would be incompatible with the right of reserving more or less [than a regular allotment] of his own acquired property. Ragh. on Dāya-bhūga.

The last explanation is wrong, for this doctrine has not been before stated. Achyuta. 48. In common.] A single article, becoming the subject of two rights of property predicated of two persons, is property in common. Črikṣatama.

51. Or the text may relate.] Jetikāmapi understands the author to propose the second interpretation [which is founded on a text of Čakka, as by him explained;] because this passage of Vṛhaspati propounds the father’s want of independent power in regard to all property moveable or immovable, and is consequently irreconcilable to other texts which allow his dominion over gems, pearls and the like, but deny his independence in regard to immovables, a corroy or pension, and slaves. But Črikṣatama and Achyuta restrict moveables in this place to signify slaves; and thus reconcile those texts. They expound “equal” as it were equally. As the father is a sharer, so is the son.

(a) See 1 Strange, H. L. 2d.—Ed.

* Maheśvara. † Achyuta. ‡ Maheśvara.
52. The text of Yajñavalkya has been already expounded (§ 9.)

52. The passage, which declares that "the ownership of the father and son is "the same," has been already expounded (§ 9. &c.)

53. Moreover, it is said, if that father be eldest, as rescuing his own father from the misery to which a childless person is doomed, it is assuredly reasonable, that he should have an allotment twice as great as his own sons, in the same case in which he would have double the allotment of his brothers, because he was as a father to them, for it is through him, that his sons are connected with the hereditary property. But if he be not the eldest son of his father, he takes only an equal share with his sons.

54. That is not accurate. For, since a share and a half, or other specific allotment, is ordained for the middlemost and other sons, it is assuredly fit, that the father should have a double share, in right of paternity; and it is not proper on the part of yourself and the holy writers, to direct the equal participation of father and son in general terms.

55. Besides, the allotment of two shares to the father is not properly applicable to his own acquired wealth; as appears from the circumstance, that the distribution of it follows his choice. The precept regarding that allotment would be superfluous, since he may, at his choice, have either more or less than two or three shares. Nor can the text be restrictive, for it would contradict Vishnu, who says: "When a father separates his sons from himself, his own will regulates the distribution. But, in the estate inherited from the grandfather, the ownership of father and son is equal."*

56. The meaning of this passage is, 'In the case of his own acquired property, whatever he may choose to reserve, whether half, or two shares, or three, all that is permitted to him by the law: but not so, in the case of property ancestral.'

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59. Already expounded.] In the two modes above stated, (§ 9. and 15.) Achyuta.

Conformably to the opinion of Dhārṣṭrya and others (§ 15.) Maheśvara.

53. The misery to which a childless person is doomed.] The hell called Put. (Vide C. IV, Sect. 1.—§ 31.) Achyuta.

54. It is fit he should have a double share.] Since it is not reasonable, that in the same case in which the middlemost has a share and a half, and the rest have other appropriate portions, the father should in right of paternity have less, namely, a single share. Čākṣaṇa.

* Vishnu, 17. 1.—2. Vide Supra. § 18.
57. Accordingly Hārīta says: "A father, during his life distributing his property, may retire to the forest, or enter into the order suitable to an aged man; or he may remain at home, having distributed small allotments and keeping a greater portion: should he become indigent, he may take back from them."

58. By this text the father is authorised to distribute a small part, and to reserve the greatest portion of his wealth. "The order suitable to an aged man," intends retirement.

59. As for the text of Čankha and Likhita, "If he be son of one father (ekaputram) he may allot two shares to himself," the sense of it is this: 'The word ekaputra means son of one man: it is not a compound epithet signifying one who has an only son; for that mode of construction prevails less than the other. "A son of one man" is a true legitimate son. The father, being such, is entitled to a double share: not so one who is (kṣetraja) issue of the soil, though he be the father of the family. But the text before cited (§ 9.), declaratory of the equal ownership of father and son, must be explained as intending a father who was (kṣetraja) issue of the soil or wife.

60. The offspring of the soil is indeed son of two fathers. Baudhāyaṇa declares him so: "The son who is begotten by another on the authorized wife of a man deceased, impotent, or distempered, is son of the soil. He is considered as son of two fathers, as partaking of both families, and as heir to the wealth and obsequies of both."

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It is not proper to direct equal participation in general terms.] For the proper direction is, that the father of a son, who has only one parent, should have double share, but the father of a Kṣetraja, or other offspring of two fathers, should have a single share. Čākṣūṣṭa.

57. The order suitable to an aged man.] If the period for becoming an anchor is arrived, let him become an anchor; if the period for the order suitable to old age or that of a resigned recluse is come, let him make his resignation: or if neither of these be the case, the author declares: he may remain, having distributed allotments, having given them to his sons or other descendants. But if that, which he reserved, be wasted by consumption or use, he may take back for his maintenance from his sons to whom he gave allotments. Čāyāraṇya.

Should he become indigent.] Should the property reserved by him be expended. Ācārya.

Should he have consumed all his wealth. Čākṣūṣṭa.

59. If he be son of one father.] This is Āṃśika-vāhana's interpretation. But Čāndegyana and the authors of the Smṛti-Chandrika and Vivāda-Chandra, follow the other exposition, "If he be father of one son," and Väčeshāpi Mīra, with the author of the Madana raśna and others, adopting this exposition, explains "one" as signifying excellent, and pre-eminent, or, in short, virtuous.
61. The meaning of this is, that the son begotten by another person on the wife of an impotent man or the like, with the husband's consent, is termed (kshetraja) the son of the soil.

62. So Nārada says: "The produce of seed, which is sown in a field with permission of a proprietor, is considered as belonging to both the owner of the seed and the proprietor of the soil."

63. Hence [since the compound epithet is a construction not to be preferred] and because the term (ekaputra) ought to be made significant in the passage in question, as an epithet of the agent in the sentence, the notion, that it is vaguely used as an epithet of the subject, is confuted.

64. Besides, one, who continually explains in a vague sense, terms used by authors transcendentally wise, as Manu, Gantama, Daksha and the rest, only demonstrates his own unsettledness.

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That mode of construction prevails less than the other.] According to a maxim of grammar, that mode of composition, in which the principal term is no member of the compound epithet, must be preferred to the more perspicuous composition in which the principal term is a member of the compound word. This maxim is here alluded to: and the author accordingly considers "son of one" to be a simpler explanation than "he who has one son."

61. The son begotten by another person; A son begotten by another person on the wife of a deceased man; or begotten on the wife of an impotent man with his consent. Cfr. Brahmana.

A son begotten or procreated by another on the wife of a deceased man, is one description of Kshetraja, or son of the soil; another is a child begotten by a different person on the wife of a man not deceased, but impotent or the like, being authorized, that is, being sanctioned by the impotent husband. Permission having been granted to another man to procreate a son, the child was sanctioned. The author explains the second description of son of the soil. But the first is not explained by him, being considered as sufficiently clear. Mahesvara.

63. And because.] "And" must be here supplied. In some copies, the reading actually is so. Mahesvara.

As an epithet. Being an epithet of the agent, it is a condition of the action in question. Achyuta.

The notion that it is vaguely used, is confuted.] "Let the father, being (ekaputra) parent of one son, allot two shares to himself." In this precept, the allotment of two shares is the act to be done; and the father is the subject of it. Consequently the circumstance of his being ekaputra is an epithet of the subject, vaguely employed. Therefore, if there be many sons, the father still takes two shares. This notion, entertained by others, is here confuted. Mahesvara.

* Nārada, 12. 57.
† Mahesvara. Vide § 59.
65. A father has two shares even of his son’s acquisitions. As ordained by Kātyāyana, who allot two shares or a moiety to the father.

66. Exposition of this text.

67. It must not be explained thus: ‘From the acquisition of both son and wealth, the father becomes entitled to two shares; but from no acquisition of a son, the owner keeps the whole.’ For it is admitted, that when partition is made with brothers, one, who even has not got a son, takes two shares, as the gainer of the wealth; how then can he keep the whole? It must therefore be affirmed, that, if any relative exist, who is entitled to participate, the acquirer has two shares; but, if there be none, he keeps the whole: and thus the specific mention of father and son becomes unmeaning, like the singing of a drunkard. Besides, acquisition is an act causing property; and it is a contradiction to say that it does not produce property, since it has been expressly declared to do so [by the wise.] Neither is it true, that a son is the property of his father. For the contrary is shown under the head of gift of a whole estate. The term acquisition would be therefore metaphorical in regard to sons, and literal in respect of wealth. But that is inadmissible in the instance of a single term once uttered.

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65. The expression is general.† Being applicable without restriction to any property but that which was acquired by himself. Maheśvara.

Of his son’s acquisition of wealth.‡ Of the wealth acquired by his son. Čṛikṛṣṇa, &c.

A mother also.† This relates to the father’s wealth. Achyuta.

That wealth, of which the son takes a share, when his father is deceased, must be here intended. Therefore the son’s acquired wealth is excluded. Maheśvara.

67. From the acquisition of both son and wealth.] The ambiguity arising from the use of the term acquisition, and that in the ablative case, instead of the relative, gives occasion to the author to go into a further disquisition on the meaning of the text.

For the contrary is shown under the head of gift of a whole estate. For if there appears, that the prohibition against giving away a son is founded on reasoning, inasmuch as a son is not the property of his father. Čṛikṛṣṇa.

* Nārada, Vide § 35 and § 46.
† Vṛhaspati. Vide § 35.
‡ Achyuta and Čṛikṛṣṇa.
68. It must not be argued, that the precept would be superfluous, 
since the son's right to a double share is demonstrable, 
because the wealth was acquired by him; and since 
the father's right to two shares is also deducible independently of this text; [and#] their equal participation may be thence inferred. The precept is significant: since, without this text, there is no ground for concluding a father's right to two 
shares of his son's wealth.

69. Besides, if the term "acquisition of wealth" be interpreted as 
relating to the father's goods, his right of taking two 
shares, or a moiety, at his choice, would be inapplicable, for his power of taking according to his pleasure, and the exercise of his will, are unrestricted. He may choose to take a share and a half, or one and a quarter, or three quarters of one share. How then are only two cases stated? That it cannot 
intend a restriction [to these two cases;†] nor relate to the father's own goods, has been already shown [from two passages before cited; ‡] and it is as fit that he should have a moiety of his son's acquired wealth, as it is that he should have two shares of such wealth.

70. Nor does the text intend his taking a moiety of two shares, 
or in other words a single share. For moiety and 
share being relative terms, imply a something of which 
they are parts: and, since they are equal in regard 
to the person and to the act of taking, they cannot 
relate to each other. As the interpretation, which takes the relative term "double share," in construction with "acquisition of wealth" in 
the ablative, is unexceptionable, it is also right to construe the word 
moiety with it; for the terms are contiguous. A moiety of the wealth, therefore, is meant; not a moiety of two shares, or in other words a 
single share: for it would be improper, while the obvious term, "a single share," might have been used, to employ a term, which does not 
express that sense. A moiety of the wealth, then, is the right inter-
pretation.

71. Either a 
moiety, or a dou-
ble share, is allotted, according as 
the patrimony has, 
or has not, been 
used in making 
the acquisition.

71. Here, the father has a moiety of the goods 
aquired by his son at the charge of his estate; the son, 
who made the acquisition, has two shares; and the 
rest, take one a piece. But, if the father's estate have 
not been used, he has two shares; the acquirer, as 
many; and the rest are excluded from participation.

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In the instance of a single term once uttered.] For it is a maxim, that a term, 
uttered once, conveys a single meaning; and it would be inconsistent to give it two 
different senses at the same time. Çrikṣaṇa.

* Ačhyuta. 
† Çrikṣaṇa. 
‡ Çrikṣaṇa. See Viṣṇa, cited § 16, and 55, and Hārīta quoted § 67.
72. Or a moiety is allowed, if the father possesses good qualities. But two shares in right merely of paternity.

73. Recapitulation. A father may take two shares of inherited property; and of wealth acquired by his son. He may reserve as much as he pleaseth of his own acquisitions.

74. Among his sons, he may make the distribution (a), either by giving [to the first-born] or withholding [from him] the deduction of a twentieth part of the grandfather's estate. But, if he make an unequal distribution of his own acquired wealth, being desirous of giving more to one, as a token of esteem, on account of his good qualities, or for his support on account of a numerous family, or through compassion by reason of his incapacity, or through favor by reason of his piety; the father, so doing, acts lawfully.

75. Yājñavalkya declares it: "A lawful distribution, made by the father, among sons separated with greater or less allotments, is pronounced [valid]." So Vṛhaspati: "Shares, which have been assigned by a father to his sons, whether equal, greater, or less, should be maintained by them. Else they ought to be chastised." Nārada likewise: "For such has been separated by their father with equal, greater, or less allotments of wealth, that is a lawful distribution; for the father is the lord of all."†

76. Since the circumstance of the father being lord of all the wealth, is stated as a reason, and that cannot be in regard to the grandfather's estate, an unequal distribution, made by the father, is lawful only in the instance

ANNOTATIONS.

73. The meaning of the texts.] Nārada's (§ 35.) &c., Mahāvarta.

74. The father, so doing, acts lawfully.] Thus an unequal distribution among sons, without any of the reasons for it here specified, is not lawful even in the case of his acquired property. Ācārya.

76. That cannot be in regard to the grandfather's estate.] Although the father be in truth lord of all the wealth inherited from ancestors, still the right here meant is not merely ownership, but competency for disposing of the wealth at pleasure: and the father has not such full dominion over an estate ancestral. Ācārya.

(a) See I Strange, H. L. 24. — 82.

† Nārada, 13. 13.
quired wealth: as is ordained by Vishnu.
of his own acquired wealth. Accordingly Vishnu says,
"When a father separates his sons, from himself, his
own will regulates the division of his own acquired
wealth. But in the estate inherited from the grandfather, the ownership of father and son is equal." *

77. As a superior allotment, in the form of a deduction, is indicated by a passage of Yajnavalkya, ("When the father makes a partition, let him separate his sons according to his pleasure; and either dismiss the eldest with the best share; or, if he choose, all may be equal sharers,"†) how is any other unequal distribution here ordained? The answer is, such cannot be the meaning, for the text would be impertinent, since a superior allotment, resulting from the deduction of a twentieth part, is admissible when partition is made by brothers after the demise of the father.

78. Perhaps the text is propounded for the purpose of legalizing an equal distribution made by the father, without the authorized deductions? No: for then a less allotment only is declared lawful, as made by the father; and the word greater would be impertinent.

79. Besides, if the mention of greater or less shares here intend the regulated deductions, the second verse of the stanza ("let him separate his sons according to his pleasure," ) becomes superfluous; for that, which was to be declared, is fully specified in the three other verses of that text. But, according to our interpretation, the phrase, "let him separate his sons according to his "pleasure," relates to his own acquired wealth; while the allotment of the best share, and an equal distribution, both regard an estate inherited from the grandfather. There is consequently nothing superfluous.

ANNOTATIONS.

77. The text would be impertinent.] As distinguishing partition made by a father from a division made by brothers, the text declaring valid a lawful unequal distribution would be impertinent. Consequently that passage (Yajnavalkya, 2127,) does not intend greater or less allotments, as with or without deductions; but it relates to a distribution of unequal shares made according to the father’s pleasure. Çritisvôtra.

78. For then a less allotment only is declared lawful.] An equal share assigned by the father is less in comparison with a share to which a deduction is added as is practised among brothers. Çritisvôtra.

* Vishnu, 17, 1–2. Vide supra, § 16 and § 56.
† Yajnavalkya, 21115.
Moreover, two modes of partition after the death of the father are actually declared by Vṛhaspati in these words: "Partition of two sorts is ordained for co-heirs: one, in the order of seniority; the other, by allotment of equal shares." By saying "in the order of seniority," the author indicates specific deductions. Equal participation is the other mode. Now, since two sorts of mutual partition among brothers are thus expressly declared, there would be no distinction between that and a distribution made by a father.

So Nārada says: "The father, being advanced in years, may himself separate his sons; either dismissing the eldest with the best share, or in any manner as his inclination may prompt."*

The unequal distribution, here intended, appears evidently to be different from that, which consists in giving the best share to the first born; since the author, having noticed the allotment of the best share to the eldest, again says "or as his inclination may prompt;" thereby distinctly authorizing any unequal distribution, which the father, for reasons before mentioned, may think proper to make.

But the text of Nārada, which expresses, that "A father, who is afflicted with disease, or influenced by wrath, or whose mind is engrossed by a beloved object, or who acts otherwise than the law permits, has no power in the distribution of the estate;"† relates to the case where the father, through perturbation of mind occasioned by disease or the like, or through irritation against any one of his sons, or through partiality for the child of a favourite wife; makes a distribution not conformable to law. Nevertheless, unequal partition is lawful, when grounded on [either of the four ‡] reasons above mentioned.‡

Thus Kātyāyana says: "But let not a father distinguish one son at a partition made in his lifetime, nor on any account exclude one from participation without sufficient cause."

Let him not distinguish one by the allotment of a greater portion, nor exclude one from participation by depriving him of his share, without sufficient cause. [This

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Since the meaning is even one son.] The particle must be here understood, being inferred from reasoning. Āchārya and Čākṣara.

* Nārada, 13. 4. † Nārada, 13. 16. ‡ Maheśvara. ¶ ¶ 74.
It does not relate to authorized specific deductions; for the distinguishing of sons by allotting to them the prescribed deductions [of a twentieth, and half or a quarter of a twentieth,] extends to many [viz. eldest, middlemost, and youngest;] and is not confined to one. One son should not be distinguished without cause. But, for a sufficient reason, it may be done. Since the meaning is "even one son." The distinguishing of one, [as here forbidden.] has no reference to specific deduction; but intends a distribution made according to the father's more pleasure, as before explained.

86. When partition is made by desire of the sons, no unequal distribution should be made.

So Manu.

87. The regular specific deductions should, however, be allowed.

88. Conclusion.

86. However, when sons request partition in the father's lifetime, an unequal allotment should not be granted by him. Manu declares it. "Among undivided brethren if there be an exertion in common, the father shall on no account make an unequal distribution in such case."

87. But the regular deduction ought in this instance to be allowed by the father. For it is not of the nature of an unequal distribution; and the allotment of greater or less shares is alone forbidden.

88. Thus partition made by a father [has been explained.]

ANNOTATIONS.

86. Manu declares it.] The passage of Manu here cited is understood otherwise by his commentator Kallika Bhatta, and by numerous compilers. Çrīkṛṣṇa supports the interpretation, which Śrīnātha-vāhana had in view in this citation.

* Çrīkṛṣṇa.
† Çrīkṛṣṇa.
‡ Mahāyāna.
§ Manu, 9. 215.
CHAPTER III.

Partition by Brothers.

SECTION I.

Partition improper in the Mother’s life-time—Management of the affairs during the continuance of the family partnership—Any one co-partner may insist on separation—Right by representation admitted as far as the third degree.

1. Partition among brothers, after the demise of the father, is next explained. That partition is pronounced to be not lawful, among brothers of the whole blood, while the mother lives, although the ownership of wealth be vested in them by the death of their father. For the text (“after the father and the mother,” &c.*) propounds a division of the paternal estate among brothers of the whole blood subsequent to the demise of both parents.

2. It does not intend a distribution of the mother’s goods, after her demise. For partition of the patrimony only is suggested by the term paternal; and there is no authority for interpreting it parental.

3. Besides, it would be a repetition: for the division of the maternal estate, on the death of the mother, is subsequently noticed by Manu in a separate text.†

4. Thus Yājñavalkya says “Let sons divide equally the effects and the debts, after the death of both parents. But daughters share the residue of their mother’s property, after payment of her debts; and the [male] issue in default of daughters.”‡

ANNOTATIONS.

1. That partition is not lawful.] The partition is valid, but is not morally right. Çrīkṛṣṇa.

Partition is not lawful while the mother survives. If it be nevertheless made, a share is ordained for the mother. Ragh. Dāya-tatva.

By declaring it unlawful, it is intimated, that partition is not laudable, while the mother is living; not that it is null. Kāśirāma on the Dāya-tatva.

† Manu, 9, 192. Vide C. 4.
5. Since the latter half of this passage shows, that sons have no right of participation in the mother’s goods, if daughters exist; but, if none exist, then sons have the right of succession, being intended by the term “issue,” the father’s estate only can be meant, in the former half of the text, by the word “parents?” for otherwise there would be tautology.

6. The author, declaring that brothers may divide after the death of the father and mother, pro- pounded a time subsequent to the demise of both as a fit period of partition; and the association [of their deaths] appears therefore to be designedly expressed.

7. According Čaṇkha and Ėāhita say, “Since the family is supported on the inheritance, sons are not independent: but as it were under the authority of a father, so long as the mother lives.” They are not independent of their mother; they are not com- petent to make a partition.

8. Vyāsa very explicitly declares it. “For brethren a common abode is ordained, so long as both parents live: but, after their decease, religious merits of separated brethren increase.”

9. Since the author forbids the separation of brethren by commanding them to live together, and prohibits partition with one whose father and mother are living, the association of their survival is not positively intended in the phrase “so long as both parents live.” Therefore, if one parent be living, partition is not lawful; but it is so, when both are dead.

10. Thus Vṛhaspati says: "On the demise of both parents, partition among brothers is allowed: and, even while they are both living, it is right if the mother be past child-bearing.”

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**ANNOTATIONS.**

6. The author, declaring... on the particle “and” as marking the association of the terms, that Manu before cited is the author intended.

9. The association of their survival is not positively intended.] If the association, suggested by the dual member in the phrase, “so long as both live,” were positive, dwelling together would not be requisite in consequence of the survival of one; partition might therefore take place while the mother was living, and might be even claimed on her death while the father was yet living. The author therefore declares it not to be positively intended. Črīkṣhaṇa.

* Vide supra. C. 2. § 1.*
11. Since partition while the mother is living cannot be relative to the mother's particular property, and since the authorized partition after the demise of both parents, which is indicated by the particle in the phrase "even while they are both living," is thus pronounced to be proper; partition among brothers after the death of parents is evidently relative to the father's wealth.

12. Accordingly Vyāsa propounds partition, in the mother's lifetime, made with reference chiefly to her: "If there be many sons of one man, by different mothers, but equal in number, and alike by class, a distribution among the mothers is approved." So Vyāpasī says: "If there be many sprung from one, alike in number, and in class, but born of rival mothers, partition must be made by them, according to law, by the allotment of shares to the mothers".

13. Since there is no difference in the sons' share, for they are equally numerous, and of the same tribe, partition is to be made by an allotment to the mother, not to the sons. Therefore, as in the case of other wealth of the mother's, so in this instance [of the father's wealth, which is become their property,] sons have not independent power to make a partition among themselves, while the mother lives; but, with her consent, the partition is lawful.

14. Separation is pronounced by Gautama, &c., to be laudable, supposing the mother's demise.

15. If then they desire to remain unseparated, the eldest brother, being capable of the care and management of the estate, may take the whole; and the rest should live under him, as under a father. Thus Mahān says: "The eldest brother may take the patrimony entire; and the rest may live under him as under their father." So Gautama: "Or the whole may go to the first-born; and he may support the rest as a father." From the

ANNOTATIONS.

13. For they are equally numerous and of the same tribe.] If they were of different tribes, the share would be unequal; viz. four, three, two, and one, in the order of the classes. If they were not equally numerous, inequality in their rights, as sons, might be apprehended. Chādānāu.

15. The casting of the lot and staff.] To saw the staff was difficult for the man; but, if that were accomplished, the casting of the lot, which was attached to it, was easy. So, in other cases, according to the circumstances of them, if one of associated things be true, the other may be rightly inferred. Rag. Dāya-latva. Vide supra. C. 2. § 28.

À Śāhūnta and Ćhākānūn,  
† Gautama, 28. 1.  
‡ Mahān, 9. 105.  
§ Gautama, 28. 8.
Nārada declares consent to be necessary. And a younger brother, being most capable, may have the charge of the estate and family.

16. Any one co-heir may require partition.

17. As appears from the provision in Kātyāyana's text, for securing the shares of minors and absentees, who of course have not consented.

18. The rule of distribution among sons extends equally to them and to grandchildren and great-grandchildren in the male line. There is not here an order of succession following the order of proximity according to birth. For those three persons, the son, grandson, and great-grandson, do not differ, in regard to the presenting of two oblations at solemn obsequies, one which it was in-

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16. As before intimated.] For it was declared, in treating of partition, that any one person is complete owner of his own wealth. Chāṇa, Chāṇā, Chāṇā, &c.

17. Such as have not attained majority.] Whose age does not exceed fifteen years. Āritāku.

As well as those who are absent.] It is here explicit, that partition takes place without their consent. Āritāku, Chāṇā, &c.

18. In regard to the presenting of two oblations, &c.] Where two persons are connected by a common oblation, the one partner of the oblation presented at the other's obsequies. (Vide infra, C. II. Sect. 1. § 38.) Mahābhārata.

* Nārada, 13. 5.
† Achyuta.
‡ In the Vṛtmiśātaka, where the whole passage of Jinasāvatāra is quoted, this text is ascribed to Vīśnu. It is not, however, found in Vīśnu's Institutes.

(2) Accordingly where the proprietor of a taṇḍak in Benares died, leaving three sons and the first son died, leaving a son, the plaintiff, and afterwards the second son died without leaving male issue; and the plaintiff sued the defendant, the third son, for a partition and his share; and there were surviving besides the parties, two widows of the second son, it was held that the defendant and defendant each took a moiety by inheritance and that the widows should receive maintenance. *Balfour*, Sing v. *Shankarhock Sing*, 1 S. D. A. Rep. 59, 1 Mod. Dig.—Ed.
By reason of benefits conferred by them on the
ancestors of ancestors

Devala hints at this: *

And so do Čanka, Likhita, and Yama.† A father, a grandfather, and a
great-grandfather, welcome a new born son, as birds
the holy fig-tree, reflecting "he will give us contentment with honey, and
meat, and [especially the flesh of] rhinoceros, and with milk, and
with rice and milk, in the season of rains, and under the asterism Magha." From the mention of the great-grandfather, it appears, that
"son" here intends a descendant as low as great-grandson. Thus,
since such a descendant confers benefits on his ancestors up to the greatgrandfather, by presenting oblations to the manes, the descendant
within the degree of great-grandson has an equal right of inheritance

19. Not however those, whose fathers are living; for they make no
offerings to the manes.

20. The arbitrary allotment, which a father may make, is not
permitted among brothers.

21. Grandsons, whose father is deceased, are entitled to just so much as would have been his share.

Hence it is that the son and grandson, whose own fathers are living, have no right of succession; for they do not present oblations to the manes, since they are incompetent to the celebration of solemn obsequies.

20. After the death of parents, the special distribution, which might have been made by a father, cannot have effect among brethren. But all the rest, as before explained, must be here again admitted.

21. If there be one son living, and sons of another son [who is deceased] then one share appertains to the surviving son, and the other share goes to the grandsons, however numerous. For their interest in the wealth is founded on their relation by birth, to their own father; and they have a right to just so much as he would have been entitled to.

ANNOTATIONS.

Hence it is that the author adds this as a further proof, that the daughter's son, though within those degrees, does not inherit jointly with son's sons. Chāḍāmati and Achyuta.

20. The special distribution.] The allotment of unequal portions on account of of piety and so forth. Chāḍāmati and Achyuta.

21. For their interest is founded on their relation by birth.† The right of succession is not founded solely on the gift of a funeral oblation; but also on the relation by birth as son or grandson. Else the daughter's son might be supposed to have an equal title. Achyuta.

* Pippala. Species religiosa.
† This is the reading of all the collated copies of Kavita-vāhana; but the transcript of this passage in the Vīramitrodaya exhibits the name of Gautama.
22. The text, which expresses "Among the issue of different fathers, the allotment of shares is according to the fathers,"* does not relate to this case [of partition between uncle and nephew†.] For the whole estate belonged to the uncle’s father, and therefore the whole would belong to him, and no part of it, to his nephews. Or, if partition is to be made as between father and son, under the direction for the allotment of shares according to the fathers, the uncle would have two shares because a father has a right to a double portion; and the nephews would have a single share. But this is contrary to the approved usage of the wise.

23. But intends partition between cousins whose fathers died before their grandfather.

23. The purport of the text, however, is this. If there be a numerous issue of one brother and few sons of another, then the allotment of shares is according to the fathers.

SECTION II.

Partition with or without specific deductions—Provision for the Mother; and for the Sister.

24. Two modes of partition among brothers are authorized; one with, the other without, specific deductions.

24. In the next place, [after defining the periods, when partition among brothers may take place,] two modes of partition among brethren alike by class are propounded; namely, either with specific deductions of a twentieth and so forth, or else an equal division.

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23. The text does not relate to this case. Does it signify, that the same share, which would have been the father’s, is the son’s? or does it direct, that partition be made as between father and son? The author successively refutes both these interpretations. Cṛṣṭikṣaṇa.

A variation in the reading of the text is noticed by Viśveśvara Bhāsa in his commentary on the Mitākṣarā, which obviates all ambiguity: viz. "whose fathers are deceased" (Pratīṣṭhā-kāyaṁ) instead of "whose fathers are different" Aukakā-pūrkaṁ.

24. Either with specific deductions.] Partition with regulated deductions has been already stated (Mauna, 3. 112.) Vide O. 2. § 37: The author proceeds to adduce authority for an equal division. (§ 20.)

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 131. † Mahāvīra. ‡ Cṛṣṭikṣaṇa.
25. Harita ordains an equal distribution without deductions, in the following passage, after speaking of a father: "If he be dead, the partition of inheritance should be made equally." So Uçanas says, "This rule of partition is declared for brethren of various tribes, being born of women of classes below the father's; but the distribution among brothers born of women of the same tribe is ordained to be made equally." Thus Paithinasi says, "When the paternal inheritance is to be divided, the shares shall be equal." Yajñavalkya also declares, "Let the sons divide equally the effects and the debts, after the death of both parents."* Thus, there are two modes of distribution: namely with or without specific deductions.

26. It must not be argued, that the practice of equal partition is indispensable, as the only mode authorized by law. For the brethren may consent to the deductions by reason of great veneration for the eldest.‡ An option exists like that of making or omitting partition.

27. Accordingly, since persons of the present day [who are younger brother+] entertain not great veneration for their elders, equal distribution is alone seen in the world; as also because elder brothers desiring of deducted allotments are now rare(§).

28. If one of the co-heirs, through confidence in his own ability, deeming his share of the wealth inherited from the father, grandfather or other ancestor, something should be given to him, be it only a prastha(¶) of rice, on his separation, for the purpose of obviating any future cavil on the part of his son or other heir. Thus Nana says, "If any one of the brethren has a competence from his own occupation and desires not the property,

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27. Like that of making or omitting partition.] Entrusting the estate to the management of the eldest brother, the rest live under him as under a father; this is omission of partition. Separation is the making of partition. Mahāyāna.

28. Any future cavil on the part of his son.] Or recourse to litigation on the plea, that his father did not relinquish his share. Mahāyāna.

* Yajñavalkya, 2, 118. Vide supra. § 4.
† Çīkṣāšāstra.

(+) See 1 Str. H. L. 133, 193. 2 Coleb. Dig. 551: 2 Macn. Princ. H. L. 17: 1 Murl. Dig. 205, 489.—Ed.

(‡) Forty-eight double handfuls.—Ed.
he may be debarred from his share, giving him some trifle in lieu of maintenance.” So Yājñavalkya; The separation of one who is able to support himself, and is not desirous of participation, may be completed by giving him some trifle.”

29. When partition is made by brothers of the whole blood, after the demise of the father, an equal share must be given to the mother. For the text expresses, “The mother should be made an equal share.”

30. Since the term mother intends the natural parent, it cannot also mean a step-mother. For a word employed once cannot bear the literal and metaphorical senses at the same time.

31. The equal participation of the mother with the brethren takes effect, if no separate property had been given to the woman. But, if any have been given, she has half [a share]. And, if the father makes an equal partition among his sons, all the wives [who have no issue] must have equal shares with his sons. So Yājñavalkya declares: “If he make the allotments equal, his wives, to whom no separate property has been given by their husband, or their father-in-law, must be rendered partakers of like portions.” To a woman, whose husband marries a second wife, let him give an equal sum, as a compensation for the supersession, provided no separate property have been bestowed on her; but, if any have been assigned, let him allot half.”

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A different interpretation of the passages here cited, which is maintained by the author of the Prakāṣa, and which disagrees with the Mitakshara and other authorities, is confuted by Čṛṣṭiṣṭa and Ācārya.

31. But if any have been given, she has half. Although this property relates to the case of a superseded wife, yet it may be so assumed in the present case also; conformable with the maxim, that the sense of the law, as ascertained in one instance, is applicable in others also, provided there be no impediment. Chādāmaṇī.

If the reasoning be equally applicable, an interpretation of law, ascertained in one case, is admitted in another. Therefore, a son must give, both to his mother and step-mothers, allotments equal to half his own share, if separate property have been bestowed on them, because that is ascertained to be the law in the case of partition made by the father. Mahāyudha.

Provided no separate property have been bestowed on her. This is the reading of the text, as it is cited by the author of the Tattva. In many copies of Jñātīvalām, the reading is “them” (yāsām) for “her” (yasyāt). It is an error of the transcriber; for the context requires the singular number; Mahāyudha.

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* Manus, 9. 207. † Yājñavalkya, 2. 117.
‡ Viśva-pātī. It is the sequel of the passage cited in Ch. 2. § 35.

(o) 1 Morl. Dig. 393. According to Bengal law a stepmother does not inherit to her stepson, Naraināc Bīrāc v. Hirkiskar Bar, 1 S. D. A. Rep. 20; and other cases mention in 1 Morl. Dig. 394.—Ed.
3. By the word “kindred” her father and mother are denoted. Hence the meaning is this: anything received subsequently to the marriage, from [maternal or paternal uncles or other*] persons who are related through the father or the mother, or from those two parents themselves; or so received from the husband, or from his family, namely, her father-in-law and the rest; is a gift subsequent. But the term ‘kindred,’ in the text of Vishnú, intends maternal uncles and others; for the father and the rest are specified by the appropriate terms: either the husband, or the parents, inherit that which was received at the time of the nuptials, according to the difference between marriages denominated Bráhma, &c., and those called Ácura and so forth.

4. Manu and Kátyáyana describe the separate property of a woman. “What was given before the nuptial fire, what was presented in the bridal procession, what has been conferred on the woman through affection, and what has been received by her from her brother, her mother, or her father, are denominated the sixfold property of a woman.”† So Nárada says: “What was given before the nuptial fire, what was presented in the bridal procession, her husband’s donation, and what has been given by her brother or by either of her parents, is termed the sixfold property of a woman.‡

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From the family of her kindred.] Several variations in the reading of the text have been remarked; the most material of which is at the close of it, here read, bandhu-kulâ tâthå, similarly from the family of her kindred;* but in the Mitakshara, &c. Pitâ-kulâ tâthå, ‘from her father’s family;’ and in the Ratnákara and other compilations, Sva-kulâ tâthå, ‘from her own family.’ The text is cited again, Section 3, § 16.

3. From his family, namely her father-in-law, &c.] It thus appears, that a present given to a woman by her son, which is noticed in Vishnú’s text (§ 1.), is not [technically] included among gifts subsequent, since the son cannot be here comprehended under the terms “kindred” and “family of the husband,” in the sense in which they are here used; for the son’s relation is immediate. Çrkíśña.

Either the husband or the parents inherit.] The meaning is this: the technical term “gift subsequent” is useful relatively to the brother’s succession to property, under that denomination, left by a childless woman. But the brother is not heir to what was received by her at the time of her nuptials: since the husband is successor in the instance of a marriage celebrated in one of the five forms called Bráhma, &c., and the parents are so in the other three marriages named Ácura, &c. or, on failure of them, the brother-in-law and so forth. Hence the term would be useless, if its signification were general. Or, if the contrary term were taken as comprehending it, a limitation must be argued in the text which specially declares the succession of the husband and the rest; because it would contradict the passage concerning the brother’s right of succession. Thus, under the maxim “prevention is better than remedy;” (literally “better not touch mud than wash it off,”) the use of a term which obviates that difficulty was proper. Çrkíśña.

4. Conferred on the woman through affection.] This passage is read differently in most quotations of the text: “given in token of love,” dattam cha priti karman, in place of dattam cha pritiṣṭah striyaḥ.

* Çrkíśña.
† Manu, 9. 104.
‡ Nárada, 13, 9.
5. Kātyāyana explains this: "What is given to women at the
time of their marriage, near the nuptial fire, is cele-
brated by the wise as the women's peculiar property
bestowed before the nuptial fire. That again, which
a woman receives while she is conducted from the
parental [abode, to her husband's dwelling:] is instan-
ced as the separate property of a woman, under the
name of gift presented in the bridal procession."

6. Since the term "parental" is derived from a complex expres-
sion, of which one member only is retained, the presents,
which she receives from the family of either her father or
her mother, while she is conducted to the house of her
husband, are gifts presented in the bridal procession.

7. "Her husband's donation" (dāya) is wealth given (datta) to her
by her husband; [not, as the word might be supposed
to signify, the heritage of her husband.] For Manu
and others [viz., Kātyāyana and Vīshnūt] notice that
which is given (datta) to her by him, without mention-
ing his donation (dāya,) and Nārada specifies donation
(dāya,) without any separate notice of given (datta.)

8. In other instances also, "husband's donation"
is used for wealth given by the husband. Thus Kā-
tyāyana says, "Let the woman place her husband's
donation as she pleases, when he is deceased: but,
while he lives, she should carefully preserve it, or else
[if unable to do so] commit it to the family."(a)

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6. One member only is retained.] The term paītākā may signify paternal, as derived
from pitā, father; or parental, as deduced from the complex expression mātī pitā, father
and mother, retaining the single term pitā, according to a grammatical rule for reject-
ing the feminine word in such instances. Pañini, 1. 2. 70.

This is according to a reading of the text, which is countenanced by the Ratakāra,
and Chintāmanī: but the Smṛti-Chandrīka and Mātākādha, read pitār grhīt 'from the
father's house,' instead of paītākā 'from the parental [abode].'

From the family of either her father or her mother.] Is not the father's house
properly signified by the word "parental?" For the mother's abode is the same with
the father's. What use then is there in interpreting the term as signifying parental
instead of paternal? The author shows the use of that interpretation. It comprehends
the case of her being carried from the house of her paternal grandfather, or from that of
her maternal grandsire and so forth. Mālecvara.

7. Her husband's donation.] Gift is the literal interpretation of the word dāya.
Inheritance, or succession to the estate of a deceased person in right of relation to him,
is a metaphorical sense of the same term. Ragh. on Dāya-bhāga.

8. Thus Kātyāyana says.] The passage of Kātyāyana, here cited, is explained by
Chanḍeṣvara and Vācheṣṭa Miṣra, conformably with the opinion of the author of the
Prakāsa, as intending property which has devolved on a widow by the death of her
husband leaving no preferable heir; as well as property accruing to her, during his life-time,
by his consent: the first part of the passage being referred to the one; and the second

* Achyuta, ṇritisna, &c.  † Ākritasna.  ‡ Achyuta, Ākritasna, &c.
(a) See 1 Morl. Dig. 312.
9. The meaning of the passage is this: wealth given to her by her husband, she may dispose of, as she pleases, when he is dead; but, while he is alive, she should carefully preserve it. This is intended as a caution against profusion.

10. So the text of Vṛṣaṛ, concerning the limits of the value which may be given by her husband, exhibits the same term. A present, amounting to two thousand (pāṇas) at the most, may be given to a woman, out of the wealth: and whatever property is given to her by her husband, let her use as she pleases. As far as two thousand [pāṇas] a present may be given to a woman, but not more. In answer to the question by whom given? the construction refers to the word husband contained in the text; and one not contained in it must not be assumed. Thus the term (dāya) 'may be given' retains the literal sense of the verb (dā) to give. But, since so much as is her deceased husband's estate, belongs to the widow, the sense becomes metaphorical [under another interpretation]; and that is not reasonable.

11. And whatever property is given to her by her husband, let her use as she pleases. Hence [since the text relates to a gift made by her husband, and not to an allot-

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to the other subject. The close of the passage is interpreted, as directing the widow to commit herself to the care of her husband's family, if there be no property left by him. Hālāyudha and Pārīṣa are cited as authorities for the different interpretation adopted in the text.

Commit it to the family.] Entrust it to her husband's family; as her mother-in-law, sister-in-law, &c. Mahēqvara.

If she herself cannot preserve it, let her commit it to, or place it with the family. Some authors interpret this, 'if she cannot subsist on that wealth, let her commit herself to the family'; that is, taking refuge with the family, let her pass the time with them. Črākṣaṇa.

This is a wrong interpretation, for it is inconsistent with the premises. Achyuta.

10. A present amounting to two thousand at most.] Copies of this as of other compilations differ in the reading of the first words; which in some transcripts stand Dvīśaḥasra-pāṇa dāyaḥ; in others, Dvīśaḥasraḥ pāro dāyaḥ, or Dvīśaḥasra-pāro dāyaḥ, but in the text of the Mahābhārata, whence apparently the passage is taken, Trisāhasra-pāro dāyaḥ, 'three thousand at most.' The second is the reading, which agrees best with the remarks of Chandegvara and Mitramīqra on the text.

So much as is her husband's estate.] The whole estate of her husband who dies leaving no male issue. Mahēqvara.

11. Hence the alleged conclusion must be rejected.] A different interpretation of the first part of Vṛṣaṛ's text makes it relate to an annual allotment to a woman for her maintenance, which is restricted by that passage not to exceed the sum specified. The Prakāśa, quoted by Chanțeçvara, and the Vijramitrodaya, give this construction to

* Mahēqvara.

† A passage nearly resembling this quotation occurs in the Mahābhārata, Dana-
dūrana, 46, 23.
ment delivered to her by an umpire adjusting the succession;[*] the alleged conclusion, that the widow is competent to take so much of the property of her husband, who has died leaving no male issue, as amounts [pañás,] and not the whole estate, must be rejected by the wise.

12. This subject will be resumed in another place.

13. Yājñāvalkya explains [a woman’s property:§] “What has been given to a woman [before or after her nuptials,†] by the father, the mother, the husband or a brother, or received by her at the nuptial fire, or presented to her on her husband’s marriage to another wife, [as also any other separate acquisition.] is denominated a woman’s property.”[¶]

14. That wealth, which is given to gratify a first wife by a man desirous of marrying a second, is a gift on a second marriage: for its object is to obtain another wife [with the assent of the first.](a)

15. So Devala says: “Her subsistence, her ornaments, her perquisite, and her gains, are the separate property of a woman. She herself exclusively enjoys it; and her husband has no right to use it, unless in distress.”**

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the text, and do not consider it as relating to a widow who has of course a provision out of her husband’s estate. The interpretation, which Jīmatā-vāhana refutes, is not found in any of the compilations now received as authority.

15. Subsistence.] What remains of that which is given for her food and raiment. Gains.] Interest on loans, and so forth. Chudāmani and Čṛkśṭha, &c. Perquisite.] This will be explained under the head of succession to a woman’s separate property. Chudāmani.

[* Maheśvara.
† Čṛkśṭha and Achyuta.
‡ Chudāmani and Čṛkśṭha, &c.—Vide C. 11.
§ Čṛkśṭha and Achyuta.
|| Čṛkśṭha, &c.
¶] Yājñāvalkya, 2.144.
** The first term of this text is read Vṛd̄hi in the Siṃhadvandrikā and is interpreted ‘wealth given by the father or other person for increase of prosperity.’ The Madana-ratna and other authorities read and interpret, as here, Vṛt̄i ‘wealth given by the father or others for subsistence.’

(a) See I Str. II. L, 33. 3 Coleb, Dig. 555.
16. Vyāsa also: "Whatever is presented at the time of the nuptials to the bridegroom, intending [the benefit of the bride:] belongs entirely to the bride; and shall not be shared by kinsmen."

17. Intending.] Designing, that it shall appertain to the bride. It is not meant, that the property becomes her's, even without such intention. Accordingly the time of nuptials is here stated illustratively; and not as the sole motive. For the will of the giver is the cause of the following authentic text does not specify, that it must be at the time of the nuptials. What is presented to the husband of a daughter, goes to the woman, whether her husband live or die; and, after her death, descends to her offspring." Here the giver's intention is not specified; because it is implied by the word daughter.

18. Since various sorts of separate property of a woman have been thus propounded without any restriction of number, the number of six, [as specified by Manu and others.] is not definitely meant. But the texts of the sages merely intend an explanation of woman's separate property. That alone is her peculiar property, which she has power to give, sell, or use, independently of her husband's control.

19. Kātyāyana expresses this rather concisely: "The wealth, which is earned by mechanical arts, or which is received through affection from any other, [but the kindred,] is always subject to her husband's dominion. The rest is pronounced to be the woman's property."

20. Over that, which has been received by her "from any other" but the family of her father, mother, or husband, or has been earned by her in the practice of a mechanical art, [as spinning or weaving,†(a)] her husband has dominion and full control. He has a right to take it, even though no distress exist. Hence, though the goods be her's, they do not constitute woman's property; because she has not independent power over them.

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These terms are otherwise interpreted in the compilations of other schools, as the Rātudāraka, &c. viz. Gains.] Wealth received from kindred. Ratn. Received from any person as an offering to gratify Gauri, or some other goddess. Virumitr. Perquisite.] Wealth given to a maiden on account of soliciting her in marriage. Ratanūraka.

*( Vide § 4. Čeκriska,
† Maheरvara,
(a) 1 Merl, Dig, 259, 595, 596. 1 Strange’s II, L, 26, 31,
21. But in other descriptions of property excepting these two, the woman has the sole power of gift, sale or other alienation. So Kātyāyana declares: "That which is received by a married woman or a maiden, in the house of her husband or of her father, from her husband or from her parents, is termed the gift of affectionate kindred. The independence of women, who have received such gifts, is recognised in regard to that property; for it was given by their kindred to soothe them, and for their maintenance. The power of women over the gifts of their affectionate kindred is ever celebrated, both in respect of donation and of sale according to their pleasure, even in the case of immovable."

22. What is obtained from kind relations, [meaning persons of her father's family or her mother's,\(^*\)] is the gift of affectionate kindred.\(^b\).

23. But in the case of immovable bestowed on her by her husband, a woman has no power of alienation by gift or the like.\(^c\). So Nārada declares: "What has been given by an affectionate husband to his wife, she may consume as she pleases, when he is dead, or may give it away, excepting immovable property."\(^d\) It follows from the specific mention of "given by a husband," that any other immovable property, except such as has been given to her by him, may be alienated by her. Else if this text forbid donation in the case of immove-

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21. From her husband.] This reading of the text is conformable to the quotation in the Kalpataru and other compilations. But the Mitākshara reads "from her brother," bhrātū, instead of "from her husband" bhūtān, and is followed by Chandeyvara and many others. Another variation occurs in the first verse of this stanza, read by Chandeyvara Kanyayā sārdana "with a maiden," instead of Kanyayā vāpi, "or by a maiden." It is censured as an erroneous reading by Vācçapāli Miṣra.

23. From the specific mention of "given by a husband."\(^e\) The author of a commentary, to which is affixed the name of Rāghunandana, remarks in this place: "Hence it is true, that a woman is entitled to give away even immovable property received by the demise of her husband." As the doctrine, which is here hinted, is opposed by the whole current of authorities, and receives no countenance from Rāghunandana himself, in his undoubted work the Dāya-tatva, this passage cannot be considered as of weight to shake the opposite doctrine, which denies the widow's right of alienation unless under very peculiar circumstances. The authenticity of the commentary itself, as a work of Rāghunandana, is more than doubtful. It is of no celebrity: and is suspected to be the work of some later writer, who has assumed Rāghunandana's name and designation.

\(^*\) Dāya-tatva.

\(^{†}\) Not found in Nārada's Institutes, but cited in the Mitākshara, Ratnakara, &c.

\(a\) See 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 57: 1 Strange H. L. 28.—Ed.

\(b\) See 1 Morl. Dig. 260.—Ed.

\(c\) See 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 91: 1 Morl. Dig. 259.—Ed.
ables in general,*] the preceding passage concerning the power of women in respect of donation and of sale, "according to their pleasure, even in the case of immovable," would be contradicted.

24. However, if the husband have no means of subsistence, without using his wife's separate property, in a famine or other distress, he may take it in such circumstances: but not in any other case(a). So Yājñavalkya declares: "A husband is not liable to make good the property of his wife, taken by him in a famine, or for the performance of a duty, or during illness, or while under restraint."† Kātyāyana, again, denies the right of the husband to do so in any other circumstance: "Neither the husband, nor the son, nor the father, nor the brothers, can assume the power over a woman's property to take it or to bestow it. If any one of these persons by force consume the woman's property, he shall be compelled to make it good with interest, and shall also incur a fine. If such person, having obtained her consent, use the property amicably, he shall be required to pay the principal, when he becomes rich. But, if the husband have a second wife and do not show honor to his first wife, he shall be compelled by force to restore her property, though amicably lent to him. If food, raiment and dwelling be withheld from the woman, she may exact her due supply, and take a share [of the estate] with the co-heirs."

25. If the husband, having taken the property of his wife, live with another wife and neglect her, he shall be compelled to restore the property taken by him. If he do not give her food, raiment, and the like, that also may be exacted from him by the woman.

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24. She may exact her due supply.] She may take wealth (for the term aśa signifies wealth) sufficient for food and raiment, &c. She shall obtain from her husband as much as may be ordered by the king. But, if her husband be dead, let her receive an allotment from his co-heirs. Maheśvara.

She may exact her own; that is, her due supply of food and raiment. She may take from the co-heirs of her husband, that is, from her brother-in-law and the rest, a share, or the portion appertaining to her husband. Some interpret the text; 'She may exact from her husband's co-heirs her own allotment, consisting of food, raiment, &c.' This is, however, an erroneous interpretation; for the same meaning is deducible from the single term aśa, "her own." Č rifkaṇa.

25. If neglected by her husband, she may exact a provision from him.

26. Thus a definition of woman's property has been propounded.

*C rifkaṇa. † Yājñavalkya, 2, 148.
(a) See 1 Strange II. L. 27.—Ed.
SECTION II.

Succession of a woman's children to her separate property.

1. Mānu propounds the succession to a woman's property.

1. In the next place partition of woman's property is explained. On that subject Mānu says, "When the mother is dead, let all the uterine brothers and the uterine sisters equally divide the maternal estate."*

2. Since this suggests the participation of brother and sister, connected in the sentence by reciprocation, although the conjunctive compound do not there occur, by means however of the conjunctive particle, which bears the same import [and is contained in the text], the meaning of the passage must be this; 'Let sisters and brothers of the whole blood share the estate.'

3. Vṛhaspati likewise expresses assemblage by the conjunctive particle in the following passage. "A woman's property goes to her children; and the daughter is a sharer with them, provided she be unaffianced; but, if married, she shall not receive the maternal wealth."

3. So Vṛhaspati declares.

4. Cānkha and Likhita ordain their equal participation.

4. Here the term children intends sons: and they share their mother's goods with unbetrothed daughters. So Cānkha and Likhita say, "All uterine brothers are entitled to the wealth equally; and so are unmarried sisters."

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2. By reciprocation. The grammatical terms here employed, and the author's reasoning, will be better understood after consulting a note subjoined to the Mitākṣarā on inheritance (2. 11.), where the very doctrine is asserted which Jīmūta-vāhana controverts.

The conjunctive particle.] The particle cha, with which the conjunctive compound corresponds in import; according to Pāṇini (2. 2. 9.)

3. She shall not receive the maternal wealth.] The close of the stanza is read differently in other compilations, lobhate māna-mātrikam, "She receives a mere token of respect," instead of na labhen mātrikam dhanaṁ, "She shall not receive the maternal wealth." This reading, which is peculiar to Jīmūta-vāhana, is disapproved by his commentator Adhyuta, who gives reasons for preferring the other; supported as it is by the authority of the Ratnākara, Sūti-Chandrakā, &c.

* Mānu, 9. 192.
5. Since the son is mentioned first in all these passages, he has a right to the succession to his mother's wealth, whatever be his state [initiated or uninitiated*]: and the conjunctive particle, which likewise occurs in every one of those texts, denotes assemblage.

6. A passage of Devala is conclusive against one who persists in the controversy notwithstanding the foregoing reasons. It is as follows: "A woman's property is common to her sons and unmarried daughters, when she is dead; but, if she leave no issue, her husband shall take it, her mother, her brother, or her father."

7. Here it is expressly declared, that the mother's goods are common to the son and unmarried daughter: and if the maiden daughter were exclusively entitled to the whole of her mother's estate, notwithstanding the existence of her brother;† the special texts of Manu and others [which will be cited,‡] concerning the (Yavutaka) wealth given at the nuptials, would be unmeaning; since she would have the right in all cases indiscriminately.

8. But if one should propose this solution: 'the ordaining of equal partition is fit, if the brother and sister have alike a right of succession to their mother's property; but, if sisters only inherit equally, or, on failure of them, brothers only, the declared equality would be impertinent, since it might be deduced, without such declaration, from reasoning, because no exception to it has been specified;' he might be thus answered [by an obstinate antagonist:§] 'It is no less impertinent to declare equality, on the assumption, that brother and sister inherit; since their parity may be in like manner deduced from reasoning.' [The antagonist might proceed to say][¶] 'Besides, how is it impertinent? since, in the case of brothers inheriting alone, [upon failure of sisters,†] the term "equal" is unquestionably pertinent, as it obviates the supposition, that deductions of a twentieth and the like shall be allowed in the instance of the mother's estate, as in that of the father.' Therefore, the half learned person [who argues, that the declaration of equality would be impertinent,**] must be disregarded by the wise, as unacquainted with the letter of the law, and with the reasoning [which has been here set forth.††]

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6. A passage of Devala is conclusive, &c.] Literally, is a choker for an obstinate wrestler.

8 With the letter of the law.] With the text above cited. (§ 6.) Čṛikṣeṣuṇa.

* Čṛikṣeṣuṇa and Achyuta. † Čṛikṣeṣuṇa and Achyuta. ‡ Čṛikṣeṣuṇa and Achyuta. § Maheṣvara. ¶ Ibid. §§ Ibid. ** Ibid. †† Čṛikṣeṣuṇa.
9. But for the cause above stated, the son and maiden daughter have a like right of succession. On failure of either of them, the goods belong to the other. On failure of both of them, the succession devolves, with equal rights, on the married daughter who has a son, and on her who may have issue. For, by means of their sons, they may present oblations at solemn obsequies.

10. Hence, [since the right is founded on the presenting of oblations at solemn obsequies, *] the daughter's son is entitled to the property, on failure of the daughters above described: for the text of Manu expresses, "Even the son of a daughter delivers him in the next world, like the son of a son." † Neither a barren nor a widowed daughter inherits; for these present not oblations at solemn obsequies, either in person or by means of their offspring. Accordingly [since the daughter's right of succession is founded on benefits conferred through the means of her male issue; ‡ or since neither the barren nor the widowed daughter's right of equal succession is recognized §] Nárada says, "On failure of the son, the daughter inherits; for she equally continues the lineage." ||

11. But, if there be a son's son and a daughter's son claiming the succession, the son's son has the exclusive title; for it is reasonable, since the married daughter is debarred from the inheritance by the son, that the son of the debarred daughter shall be excluded by the son of the person who bars her claim.

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9. For the cause above stated.] Because the word "equally" is not pertinent. Ragh. on Dā'ya-bhāga.

On failure of both of them.] Both the son and maiden daughter. Maheśvara.

The succession devolves—on the married daughter.] And not, as in the instance of wealth given at nuptials, according to a subsequent definition of it, devolving in default of a maiden daughter, or one betrothed; or for want of such, on a married daughter; since there is no authority for that order of succession in this case. Chādāmani and Crikirsha.

10. The daughters above described.] A daughter who has a son; and one who may have issue. Maheśvara.

Delivers him in the next world.] Since the parity of reasoning holds, the masculine gender is not here exclusive. Maheśvara.

11. Debarred from the inheritance by the son.] The prior right of a daughter's son, in the case of wealth which was given at nuptials, is thus indicated; for, in that instance, the son is debarred from the inheritance by the married daughter. Crikirsha.

12. On failure of all these abovementioned, including the daughter's son [and the son's grandson, *] the barren and the widowed daughters both succeed to their mother's property; for they also are her offspring; and the right of others to inherit is declared to be on failure of issue.

13. But the text of Gautama, "A woman's separate property goes to her daughters-unmarried, and to those not actually married;† that of Närada, "Let daughters divide their mother's wealth; or, on failure of daughters, her male issue;‖ a passage of Kâtyâyana, "But, on failure of daughters, the inheritance belongs to the son;" as also one of Yâjñavalkya, "Daughters share the residue of their mother's property, after payment of her debts; and the male issue succeeds in their default;§ relate only to the (yautuka) wealth given at nuptials; for these passages contradict the text of Devala above cited (§ 6.) Accordingly [since it is in the case of wealth given at nuptials, that the unmarried daughter has the prior right of succession;|| or has the exclusive right;||] Manu says, "Property given to the mother on her marriage "(yautuka,) is the share of her unmarried daughter."***

14. Here yautuka signifies property given at a marriage: the word yuta, derived from the verb yu to mix, imports "mingling;" and mingling is the union of man and woman as one person; and that is accomplished by marriage. For a passage of scripture expresses "Her bones become identified with his bones, flesh with flesh, skin with skin."†† Therefore what has been received at the time of the marriage, is denominated Yautuka.‡‡

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12. Including the daughter's son.] And the son of the son's son; for the right devolves on him, next after the daughter's son, since he confers great benefits on his ancestor. Çrikrśna.

14. Here yautuka signifies, &c.] This interpretation is opposed by the author to that which is proposed by the Kalpātaru, where the term is explained as signifying 'Savings effected by her good management out of what has been given to the woman, for the purpose of providing bread, pot-herbs, &c.' Achyuta.

This alleged interpretation is not found in the Kalpātaru; but the term is there explained 'Wealth given to a woman by her father and the rest, at the time of her nuptials.'

* Çrikrśna.
† Gautama, 28. 22.
‡ Närada, 13. 2.
§ Yâjñavalkya, 2. 118.
|| Çrikrśna.
¶ Achyuta.
*** Manu, 9. 131.
†† Vēda.
‡‡ This is written both Yautuka, and Yautaka, Vivramīrodaya.
Accordingly [since the term signifies wealth received at the time of the marriage;*] Vasishtha says, "Let the females share the nuptial presents (pārīnāyya) of their mother."† For pārīnāyya signifies wealth received at a marriage (pārīnayana).

As for a passage of Manu, "The wealth of a woman, which has been in any manner given to her by her father, or let the Brāhmaṇī damsels take; or let it belong to her offspring;"‡ since the text specifies "given by her father," the meaning must be, that property, which was given to her by her father, even at any other time besides that of the nuptials, shall belong exclusively to her daughter: and the term Brāhmaṇī is merely illustrative [indicating, that a daughter of the same tribe with the giver inherits.][§] Or, lest the term should be impertinent, the text may signify that the Brāhmaṇī damsels, being daughter of a contemporary wife, shall take the property of the Kṣatriyā and of other wives dying childless, which had been given to them by their fathers. The precept, which directs, that "the property of a childless woman shall go to her surviving husband;" does not here take effect. Such is the meaning of the passage; for else [according to the preceding interpretation] all the texts [which declares the equal right of the son and daughter, to inherit their mother's property in certain cases,†] would be incongruous.

It must not be argued, that the succession of the daughter's sons, on failure of the daughter, is shown by Nārada and others [as Yājñavalkya, &c.][**] because the word "issue" is connected in construction with daughter, which is the nearest term. For the word daughter, as signifying a distinct [viz. female][††] progeny, requires a parent for its correlative, and must not be connected in construction with "son" another progeny suggested by the term "issue": since [both terms] alike [need a correlative indicating the parent.][‡‡]

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Wealth received at a marriage.] And not, as the term is interpreted in the Kalpataru and other compilations, "furniture, mirrors, cots, and the like." Çrikṣaṇa.

According to the Vīramitrodvaya, the word, as read by the authors of the Kalpataru and Vivāda-chintāmāni, is different from Jīmūta-vāhana's reading, viz. pārīnāyya, for pārīnayana. But Jīmūta-vāhana's commentators have remarked no difference in the reading, but only in the interpretation.

For the word daughter, as signifying progeny, requires a correlative.] The single term daughter cannot, in the same phrase, successively signify the progeny and the parent; namely progeny in respect of the mother, and parent in respect of the male issue. Çrikṣaṇa, &c.

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* Aćchuta.
† Vasishtha, 17. 40.
‡ Manu, 9. 108.
§ Maheśvara.
|| Çrikṣaṇa.
** Maheśvara. Vide § 13. ¶¶ Çrikṣaṇa and Aćcūta.
§§ Ibid.
18. Nor should [the word*] "issue" be expounded metaphorically, from the appropriate sense, [as signifying male, and "daughter" female; neglecting the relation to a parent indicated by these terms.†] For all the terms [viz. "daughter," repeatedly occurring in various texts;‡ or issue, or other equivalent word;§ or daughter, and issue, and, in the text of Kâtyâyana, son;||] may be taken in their literal acceptation by connecting them with "mother," and the word "daughter" is acknowledged to bear the literal sense as connected with the term "mother."

19. Neither should the construction of the sentence be alleged to be "issue of the daughter" suggested by the pronoun in the phrase "her issue." (§ 13.) For the pronoun would refer to her as daughter, [not as mother;] since the meaning of the original term is such.

20. Besides, the word "daughter," in the text of Yâjñavalkya (§ 13), having the termination of the first or nominative case, and the pronoun "their" having that of the fifth ablative, cannot be connected with the term "issue," by construction which requires the sixth or relative case. But this term governs the word "mother" notwithstanding the intervention of mediate terms. Thus then, with the certainty, that "issue of the mother" is here intended, it is reasonable to interpret issue of the mother [as signifying son?] in the texts of Nârada and Kâtyâyana: for there can be no contradiction [since the passage must be presumed to be grounded on the same revelation.**]

21. Moreover, conformably with the text of Baudhâyana "Male issue of the body being left, the property must go to them;"†† and because [the son, as immediate issue of the mother, is] nearer of kin [that the daughter's son, who is a mediate descendant;‡‡] it is reasonable, that the son born of her body should have the right of succession to his mother's property, and not the daughter's son, who is a mediate descendant not born of her person.

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21. A mediate descendant, not born of her person.] This is according to the common reading of the text, nângajajyayahita-daughter; as interpreted by Mahêçvara. But he notices a variation of the reading, nângajajyayahita-daughter, which he expounds "A mediate descendant through the daughter born of her person."

* Mahêçvara. † Çrikṣirâ, Chudāmani Adhyuta.
‡ Râgh. on Dáya-bhûga. § Chudâmani.
|| Çrikṣirâ. ¶ Mahêçvara.
‡‡ Mahêçvara.
22. Hence a woman's separate property, received by her at her nuptials, goes to her daughter; and not to her sons [if there be a daughter.\(^*\)] and the text of Gautama (§ 13.) is intended to explain the order of succession in this case [of an inheritance devolving on the female issue.\(^\dagger\)]

23. First, the woman's property goes to her unaffianced daughters. If there be none such, it devolves on those who are betrothed. In their default, it passes to the married daughters [as indicated by the conjunctive particle in the text.\(^\dagger\)] For the right of the female issue generally is suggested by the term "daughters" [in Gautama's text § 13.]; and the special mention of "unaffianced" and "unmarried," which follows, is pertinent as declaratory of the order of succession [and not as a limitation of the preceding general term.\(^\S\)]

24. Thus Yājñavalkya says, "The separate property of a childless woman married in the form denominated Brāhma or in any of the four [unblamed forms of marriage] goes to her husband: but if she leave progeny it will belong to her daughter: and in other forms of marriage, [as the Aśura, &c.,] it goes to the father [and mother, on failure of issue."

25. Here, in certain forms of marriage termed Brāhma, &c., what has been received by a woman at the nuptial fire, goes after her death, first to her daughters [not, like property received at any other time but that of her nuptials, to her sons as well as her daughters\(^\dagger\)]. Again, the right devolves first on the maiden daughter [conformably with the text above cited;\(^**\)] if there be none, it descends to the betrothed daughter; or for want of such, it goes to a married daughter [including even a barren or a

** ANNOTATIONS. 

22. The text is intended to explain the order of succession.] Not to exclude the affianced and married daughters. Achyuta.

23. Pertinent as declaratory of the order of succession.] Both Črīkitsha and Achyuta notice a variation in the reading of Jīmūta-vālakya's text in this place; but they deduce the same import, though in different ways.

The order of succession is this: first the property goes to the maiden daughter; then to one betrothed; for she is superior to the married daughter, because she belongs to the same original family (gotra) with her parents. On failure of such, the property devolves on the married daughter; that is, on one who has a son, or who may be expected to have offspring. If there be none such, it goes to any other daughter. Črīkitsha and Achyuta.

24. Or in any of the four.] Including that denominated Brāhma, in any of five unblamed forms of marriage. Črīkitsha.

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\(^*\) Črīkitsha and Maheśvara.

\(^\dagger\) Črīkitsha and Achyuta.

\(^\S\) Achyuta.

\(^\dagger\) Achyuta.

\(^\S\) Achyuta and Črīkitsha.
widowed one:* or, on failure of all daughters, it devolves on the son. For the husband's right of succession is relative to property of a wife who leaves no issue whatever.

26. The right of the married daughter, too, on failure of the unaffianced one and the rest, has been hinted by Vihaspati using the term "unaffianced" (§ 3.)

27. It should not be alleged, that this text of [Yajnavalkya] above cited § 24.] does not relate exclusively to wealth received at nuptials; but is applicable to any property, whether obtained then or at any other time, and appertaining to a woman espoused by such forms of marriage. For the preceding passage, [which is declaratory of a brother's right of succession,§] would have no pertinency, [since, even in that case, the husband or the father would inherit under the text in question: ||] and it would disagree with Manu; for he says, "It is admitted, that the property of a woman married by the ceremonies called Brāhma, Daiva, Ārsha, Gândharba and Prāţāpāya, shall go to her husband, if she die without issue. But her wealth, given to her on her marriage in the form called Āsura or either of the other two (Râkhsha and Pañisacha,) is ordained, on her death without issue, to become the property of her mother and of her father." Here, the subsequent terms, "wealth given to her," are understood in the preceding sentence. Therefore, by thus connecting the terms, "wealth given to her at the nuptial ceremonies, &c." the text appears to relate to property received at her marriage, and not generally to any property whatever.

28. So Yama, saying "Wealth, which is given at the marriages called Āsura, &c. [is acknowledged to belong to the parents, if the woman die without issue,"**] appears to intend nuptial presents exclusively: that is, wealth which is given while the marriage ceremony lasts, having been commenced but not being finished.

29. It must not be argued, that the denominations of Brāhma, &c. regard the woman [who is married by such ceremonies;†† and that the text concerns any property be-

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27. Any property appertaining to a woman espoused by such forms.} The author is here opposing the doctrine of the Mitakeshvar; as is remarked by Črikśrama.

* Chājāmapi.
† Črikśrama, Chājāmapi, &c.
‡ Yajñavalkya, 2, 145. Vide Sect. 3 § 10. § Črikśrama, &c.
|| Črikśrama and Achyula.
¶ Maunu, 3. 196 and 197.
„†† Mahegyara.
any property belonging to a woman married in such a form; but to properly given to her at a marriage celebrated in such form, longing to her; the designations being relative to the person:*] because there is no other rule provided for the descent of a childless woman’s property received by her before her nuptials, or after them. For the rule of succession, in the case of property received before or after marriage, will be fully stated, conformably with express laws.

SECTION III.

Succession to the separate property of a childless Woman.

1. Succession to a childless woman.

1. The heirs of the property of a woman who dies childless are next propounded.

2. "The separate property of a childless woman married in the form denominated Brāhma, or in any of the four [unblamed forms of marriage,] goes to her husband."†

3. The four forms of marriage, at the head of which is that called Brāhma, are here intended. Those four are the Daiva, Arsha, Prājāpatya, and Gāndharba. With the Brāhma, they make five. For Manu has specified five: namely “the ceremonies called Brāhma, Daiva, Arsha, Gāndharba and Prājāpatya.”‡ Wealth, which has been received by a woman while her marriage in any of those forms is celebrated, devolves on her husband, if she die without issue. Here issue signifies progeny.

4. It is not right to interpret the text as signifying, that any property of whatever amount, which belongs to a woman married by any of those ceremonies termed Brāhma, &c., whether received by her before or after her nuptials, devolves wholly on her husband by her demise. For the terms employed in the text (§ 2.), signifying ‘at mar-

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4. For the terms employed in the text indicate time.] To make the reasoning in this place more intelligible, it is necessary to remark, that in the original of the passage under consideration, the word has a termination (that of the seventh or locative case,) which properly denotes the site or place of the act. Now a wedding cannot strictly be

* Achyuta.
† Yajñavalkya, 2. 146. Vide Sect. 2 § 24.
‡ Manu, 9. 196. Vide Sect. 2 § 27.
riages in the form denominated Brāhma, &c. indicate time; and, if the word Brāhma, &c., [in Manu’s text:*] intended the woman [who is expressed in such form,†] those terms [as expressive of the married person‡] would have been exhibited in the singular number and sixth or relative case: for the pronoun, denoting the woman, is exhibited in that case and number, in the [subsequent] passage; “But her wealth, given to her on her marriage, &c.”§ If the time of nuptials be indicated the term as the metaphorical sense from relation to [time] present. But, if the woman be intended, it has the metaphorical meaning from relation to the past ceremony of marriage. Now this, being a less approved mode of construction, is not the proper one. Neither is it true, that the terms Brāhma, &c., do signify the woman who is espoused: for they are used by Manu and the rest as importing the marriage celebrated in such form. Thus Manu, having premised these words “Now learn compendiously the eight forms of the nuptial ceremony;”¶ enumerates “the ceremony of Brāhma, of the Devas, of the Rishis, of the Pañjāpatis, of the Asuras, &c.”** So Nārada says, “Eight forms of marriage are ordained for the perfecting of the several tribes: the first of them is the Brāhma.”†† Vishnu in like manner says, “Marriages are of eight sorts, the Brāhma, the Daiva, &c.”‡‡

5. Viśvarūpa’s exposition of the text continued.

5. Therefore the observation of Viśvarūpa, that the text relates to woman’s property received at the time of the nuptials, should be respected.

6. But a woman’s property, received at a marriage in the form called Asura and the like, her mother may take on her demise, though her husband be living; and, on failure of the mother, the father. For that order of succession results from the text, “Her wealth is ordained to become the property of her “mother and of her father,”§§ If then joint succession were intended, the author would have said, “become the property of her two parents.” And, as the father’s right of inheritance is declared to be on failure of the mother in the case of a maiden’s property, the same is fitting in this instance also.

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the site of the gift; and therefore, conformably with the syntax of the language, the author considers time to be indicated as a secondary or metaphorical meaning of the inflected word. He supports his interpretation by an argument which may be thus stated: the relation of the marriage to the time of its celebration renders this, metaphorically, the site of the donation; and that is an easier construction than making the moral relation, which results from the celebration of a marriage, the site of the eventual succession.

6. Her mother may take on her demise.] It must be consequently understood, that the term father, in a passage of Yaśñavalkya, “In other forms of marriage, it goes to the father,”¶¶ signifies parents: one term only being retained of the phrase “father and mother,” Çrikṣṇa and Aohyayu.

* Vide Sect. 2, § 24. † Çrikṣṇa. ‡ Mahēśvara. § Vide Sect. 2, § 27.
7. A passage of Baudhāyana on succession to a maiden's property.

7. Accordingly Baudhāyana says, "The wealth of a deceased damsel let the uterine brethren themselves take. On failure of them, it shall belong to the mother; or, if she be dead, to the father.

8. The property of a maiden has been thus explained, [and the subject will not be resumed under a distinct head.]*

9. It must not be argued, that, in this case [of wealth received at nuptials†] as in that of a maiden's property, the brother has the prior right. For no text ordains it: and the succession of the mother and father only [not the brother‡] is expressly declared.

10. But wealth received by a woman after her marriage, from the family of her father, of her mother, or of her husband, goes to her brothers, [not to her husband.§] as Yājñavalkya declares: "That which has been given to her by her kindred, as well as her fee or gratuity, and any thing bestowed after marriage, her kinsmen take, if she die without issue."

11. Given by her kindred.] Presented to her by her father or mother [during her maidenhood.¶] Hence [since the words "given by kindred" intend given by the father and mother,**] their sons, who are her brothers, are the kinsmen here signified.

12. That is confirmed by Vṛddha Kātyāyana, who says "Immoveable property, which has been given by parents to their daughter, goes always to her brother, if she die without issue." For it appears, that the brother's right of succession is founded simply on her leaving no issue [which is the case equally of a maiden, as of a childless wife.††]

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10. Received after her marriage from the family of her father, &c.] Property intended by the term Auvadhiya or 'gift subsequent' is here described by circumlocution. Čhāḍāmaṇi and Čṛiktśaṇa.

11. Their sons, who are her brothers, are the kinsmen here signified.] Conformably with the etymology of the term bandhava kinsmen, or offspring of (bandha) kindred, explained as signifying her father and mother. Čṛiktśaṇa and Āchyaṇa.

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* Čṛiktśaṇa and Āchyaṇa. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.
§ Čṛiktśaṇa &c. ¶ Yājñavalkya, 2. 145. †† Čhāḍāmaṇi and Čṛiktśaṇa.
** Čhāḍāmaṇi. ††† Čṛiktśaṇa and Čhāḍāmaṇi.
13. In general, as affirmed by Viṣṇu-pāṇa, the brother inherits a woman's property.

14. Since he inherits the immovables, he must a fortiori succeed to moveables.

11. Under the term "immovables," the same must be true of other property [such as described in the passage of Yājñavalkya above cited, ] by the argument a fortiori, exemplified in the lotf and staff.

15. By the phrase "given by her kindred" (§ 10.) is signified that which was given to her by her parents during her maiden state. For any thing received by her, subsequently to her nuptials, is comprehended under the denomination of (anvādheyah) 'gift subsequent;' and either the husband, or the parents, inherit that which was presented at the time of the wedding.

16. Kātyāyana describes a gift subsequent: "What has been received by a woman from the family of her husband, and at a time posterior to her marriage, is called a gift subsequent; and so in that which is similarly received from the family of her kindred."†

17. From the family of her husband.] From her father-in-law and the rest. From the family of her kindred.] From that of her father and mother.

18. Another definition of gift subsequent.

19. Explanation of fee or perquisite by the same authority.

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**ANNOTATIONS.**

19. Received of workmen. ] The passage is translated conformably to the interpretation of Jñāna-vāhana and his commentators, Āchārya, Aṣṭavakara, and Mahāyāna, and it seems to have been understood in the same sense by the authors of the Rāja-kāra and Vivāda-chandra. But it is difficult to reconcile this meaning with the construction of the sentence. The passage is accordingly explained in quite a different sense by the authors of the Śrī-hadntikā, Madanaratan, &c. "The price of house, furniture, carriages, &c. received in trust for the bride, is her fee or perquisite." There is a variation in the reading of the text adapted to these different interpretations. Jñāna-vāhana rendering karmāṇāṃ 'workmen;' and the Śrī-hadntikā, &c. karmāṇāṃ, 'works.'

* Ch. 2. § 25, † Cited before: Section 1 § 2.
20. What is given to a woman by artists constructing a house or executing other work, as a bribe to send her husband or other person (of her family) to labour on such particular work, is her fee. It is the price of labour since its purpose is to engage [a labourer].

21. Or a fee is that which is described by Vyāsa, “What is given to bring the bride to her husband’s house, is denominated her fee.” That is, what is given by way of bribe or the like to induce her to go to the house of her husband.

22. This fee, [as described in both the passages above cited,*] occurs indiscriminately in any form of marriage, whether that termed Brahma or another. Such, or any similar property of a childless woman, her brothers inherit.

23. But it does not intend a gratuity (Culka) presented to damsels at marriages called Asura and the rest. For that gratuity is restricted to the particular form denominated Asura [and does not occur in the rest.†] Accordingly it is said, “The Asura marriage is grounded on the receipt of wealth; the Gāndharba, on reciprocal connexion; the Rākshasa, on seizure in war; and the Paigācha is where the bride is obtained by fraud.”

24. Hence, since there is no gratuity at the Rākshasa marriage, nor at the other (viz, the Paigācha marriage,) the conclusion, deduced from association with nuptial gratuity, that only such property goes to the brother as was received under the Asura and other similar marriages, must be rejected: as also because that is not the separate property of the woman; for only wealth received by the father or other person [who gives the girl in marriage] is denominated a gratuity. Thus Mann says, “Let no father, who is wise, receive a gratuity however small, for giving his daughter in marriage; since the man, who through avarice, takes a

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20. It is the price of labour.] Culka properly signifies price; though it has become necessary to translate it fee, perquisite, or gratuity.

21. What is given to bring the bride.] Chandāmani notices a variation in the reading of Vyāsa’s text; āhātām for āhātām, “what is brought [while the bride is going] to her husband’s ‘house’;” instead of “what is given to bring her to husband’s house.”

22. Occurs indiscriminately in any marriage.] The term fee does not here denote the gratuity (Culka) received at an Asura marriage. (Vide § 23.) Čṛkṣaṇa.

23. It does not intend a gratuity at marriages called Asura.] The author here refutes the ancient doctrine as set forth by Chandaṇa. Čṛkṣaṇa.

* Chandāmani.
† Čṛkṣaṇa, &c.
‡ Yājñavalkya, L. 61. Vide Mann, 3. 37—34. § Chandāmani.
(a) I Śrī. L. L. 31.—Ek. (b) Thid. 39.—Ek.
gratuity, is a seller of his offspring."* Father is here a general expression [intending the person who gives away the damsel.]† Therefore, a brother, or any other person, accepting a present [for giving a girl in marriage.] is a receiver of a gratuity. Consequently, a gratuity (Çulka) is that which is accepted by the father or other person [so disposing of the damsel.]

25. Hence [since the gratuity belongs to the giver of the damsel, and not to the damsel herself,‡] the argument is refuted, which has been thus proposed; that, as a woman's separate property received in the form of a gratuity (Çulka) is possible only in an Asura marriage, therefore the gifts of kindness and a gift subsequent, which are specified in the same passage § 10, shall also be inherited by the brother, provided they are relative to an Asura marriage.

26. But, since property received as a fee or perquisite (Çulka) in the manner described § 18 and 21., is possible under every form of marriage, the brother is heir in all such instances; conformably with the text [of Yajñavaalkya.§] For it contains no restriction [to any particular form of marriage,] not to that called Asura in particular.¶

27. Thus the text of Gautama also conveys the same import with that of Kåtyåyana. (§ 12.) It is as follows: "The sister's fee belongs to the uterine brothers; after them, it goes to the mother; and next to the father. Some say, before her."**

28. The meaning of the passage is this: in the first place that property goes to her brother of the whole blood. But, on failure of them, it belongs to the mother. In her default, it devolves on the father.†† Some say before her. This is stated as the doctrine of others.

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27. And next, to the father.] Jñänatavāhana reads and interprets this passage of Gautama differently from other compilers, by whom it is cited. The clause "and next, to the father," which Çrikśūra reads in Jñänatavāhana's quotation, is not found in Gautama's text as exhibited in his institutes; nor is it noticed by his scholiast; nor inserted in ancient quotations of this passage; nor read by Achyuta in Jñänatavāhana's text. The scholiast, with Halāyudha, Chandeśvara and others, explains this passage 'The sister's gratuity belongs to the uterine brothers, after [the death of] the mother; some say before [her demise.]' an interpretation, which, as Achyuta observes, is rejected by Jñänatavāhana.

28. Some say before her.] Some hold, that it devolves on the father next after brothers; and on the mother after him. Çrikśūra.

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†† This sentence is wanting in some copies of Jñänatavāhana.
29. Therefore, the property goes first to the whole brothers; if there be none, to the mother; if she be dead, to the father; but, on failure of all these, it devolves on the husband. Thus Kātyāyana says, “That, which has been given to her by her kindred, goes, on failure of kindred, to her husband.”

30. By saying “on failure of the kindred,” [or of the father and mother,*] the failure of brothers is likewise indicated. For, since the parent’s right of succession is in default of brothers, [the failure of the preferable claim] must be concluded by the argument a fortiori exemplified in the case of the leaf and staff †

31. On failure of heirs down to the husband, this rule again is provided, which Vṛhaspiṭi thus delivers, “The mother’s sister, the maternal uncle, the father’s sister, the mother-in-law, and the wife of an elder brother, are pronounced similar to mothers. If they leave no issue of their bodies, nor son [of a rival wife] nor daughter’s son, nor son of those persons, the sister’s son and the rest shall take their property.”

32. Both son and daughter are here signified by the terms “issue of the body.” For they, bar every other claimant. By “son” is meant the child of a rival wife. For a passage of law expresses, “If, among all the wives of the same husband, one bring forth a male child, Manu has declared them all, by means of that son, to be mothers of male issue.”‡ Nor is the term “son” an epithet of “issue of the body;” for it would be superfluous; and the sister’s son or other remote heir would have the right of succession, though a son [or a grandson§] of a contemporary wife be living.

33. If there be no legitimate son or daughter, nor a grandson in the male line, nor a son of a rival wife, the right of succession devolves on the daughter’s son.

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Halāyudha’s interpretation. Some hold, that it devolves on the brothers, though the mother be living, [is thus set aside. Acīyuta.

29. Given to her by her kindred.] Given by her father and mother. Acīyuta.

32. The child of a rival wife.] The son of such a wife; including also the sister of such son; for the gender is here employed inclusively; and, by means of her offspring, she becomes the giver of funeral oblations to the husband of the woman and his ancestors to the third degree. Čṛkṣāpa.

Including also adopted sons. Acīyuta, &c.

33. Nor a grandson, nor a son of a rival wife, the succession devolves on a daughter’s son.] This passage is sanctioned by Čṛkṣāpa; who shows by very satisfactory

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* Rāghunandana, &c. † Vide C. 2 § 25. ‡ Manu, 9, 183. § Acīyuta, Mahāyāna.
34. By the pronoun in the phrase “sons of those persons” (§ 31.),
the woman’s own issue and the child of a rival wife
are signified. Therefore, their sons have a right to
inherit; not the son of a daughter’s son also, for he is
excluded from the obligation of food at obsequies.

35. For want then of sons and other linear heirs as here specified,
and in default of brothers or other preferable claimants,
including the husband, the inheritance passes to the
sister’s son and the rest, although kinsmen, as the
father-in-law, the husband’s elder brother, or the like,
be living. For the text (§ 31.) bears no other import; and the chief
purpose of indicating, under the head of inheritance, the competency
to present funeral oblations, as is done by describing the women as
similar to mothers, and certain persons as standing in the relation to
them of sons, is to suggest the right of succession to their property.

36. Hence, since the text enumerates “sister’s son,” &c., if the order
of succession consequently be, first the sister’s son,
then the husband’s sister’s son, next the child of the
husband’s younger brother, afterwards the child of the
husband’s elder brother, then the son of the brother,
after him the son-in-law, and subsequently the younger brother-in-law,
the right would devolve last of all on the younger brother of the hus-
band, contrary to the opinion and practice of venerable persons. There-
fore, the text is propounded, not as declaratory of the order of inher-
itance, but as expressive of the strength of the fact, [namely of the
benefits conferred.] Thus it is declared by Manu, under the head of
inheritance, “To three ancestors must water be
given at their obsequies; for three is the funeral ob-
lation of food ordained: the fourth is the giver of ob-
lations; but the fifth has no concern with them.” In
like manner Yajñavalkya shows succession to property
in right of the funeral oblation: “Among these [sons
of various descriptions] the next in order is heir, and
giver of oblations, on failure of the preceding.” The son’s preferable
right too appears to rest on his presenting the greatest number of bene-

cficial oblations, and on his rescuing his parent from hell. And a

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reasoning, that the daughter’s son ought to inherit before the son of a contemporary
wife. Achuta considers the reading of the text to be questionable; and Moharana
pronounces it to be spurious. He also rejects the words “nor a grandson” as unneces-
sary and improperly introduced in this place. Bhatmendrak, in the Dasa-stava,
copying Jaimini-shastra’s argument, omits this passage altogether; and the author of
the Viramitrodhaya has substituted one of quite different import.

34. By the pronoun ...... the woman’s own issue and the child of a rival
wife are signified.] The pronoun refers not to the nearest term “daughter’s son,”
but to the remote terms “issue of the body” and “son of a contemporary wife.”

Viramitrodhaya.

* Gritkshna and Chitamanu, [1 Strange, H. L. 128.—64.] † Manu, 9, 186.
‡ Yajñavalkya, 9, 158.
passage of Vṛddha Cātūṣṭapa expressly provides for the funeral oblations of these women: “For the wife of a maternal uncle or of a sister’s son, of a father-in-law and of a spiritual parent, of a friend and of a maternal grandfather, as well as for the sister of the mother or of the father, the oblation of food at obsequies must be performed. Such is the settled rule among those who are conversant with the Vedas.”

37. This then is the order of succession, according to the various degree [of benefit to the owner of the property**] from the oblation of food at obsequies. In the first place, the husband’s younger brother is entitled to the woman’s property; for he is a kinsman (Sapinda,) and presents oblations to her, to her husband, and to three persons to whom oblations were to be offered by her husband. After him, the son either of her husband’s elder or of his younger brother, is heir to the separate property of his uncle’s wife; for he is a kinsman, and presents oblations to her, to her husband, and to two persons to whom oblations were to be offered by her husband. On failure of such, the sister’s son, though he be not a kinsman (Sapinda,) inherits the separate property left by his mother’s sister, because he presents oblations to her, and to three persons, (her father and the rest,) to whom oblations would have been offered by her son. In default of him, the son of her husband’s sister (for it is reasonable, since the husband has a weaker claim than the son, that persons claiming under them should have similar relative precedence;) is heir to the property of his uncle’s wife; because he presents oblations to three persons to whom they were to be offered by her husband, and also presents oblations to her and to her husband. On failure of him, the brother’s son is the successor to his aunt’s property, for he presents oblations to the father, to her grandfather, and to herself. If there be no nephew, the husband of her daughter is heir to his mother-in-law’s property, since he presents oblations to his mother, mother-in-law and father-in-law.

38. The text (§ 31.) indicates heirs, not their order of succession.

39. If these fail, the husband’s father, elder brother, &c. inherit.

40. It must not be supposed, that this text (§ 31.) is applicable where a failure of kinsmen (Sapinda) exists: for, in this chain of successors, the husband’s younger brother, and his son, and the son of the husband’s elder

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* Mahesvara.  
† Mahesvara.
brother, have been specified; and the husband's father
and elder brother, who are nearer of kin, have been
omitted.

41. Therefore, the practice of preferring the father-in-law to the
younger brother-in-law, or of regulating the succession
in the order specified in the passage above cited,
§ 31.† which has been introduced for want of comprehend-
ing the text of Vīresvāti, § 81. † or those of Manu
and Yajñavalkya§ and of understanding the true sense

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SUMMARY.

The settled order of succession to the separate property of a woman is as follows.

In the case of property left by a maiden, the right devolves first on the uterine
brother; or, if there be none, on the mother; but, if she be dead, on the father.

It is the same in respect of property left by a betrothed damsels, excepting what
was given by the bridegroom: for he has a right to whatever he gave.

In regard to the property of a married woman, which was received at her marriage,
her maiden daughter has the first claim; and, next, a brother's one; but, on failure of
both these, her married daughters, who have, or are likely to have, male issue, inherit
together; or, on failure of either of them, the other takes the succession: if there be
none of either description, the barren and the widowed daughters have an equal right;
and, on failure of one, the other succeeds. Next the right devolves, in order, on the
son, the daughter's son, the son's son, the great-grandson in the male line, the son of a
contemporary wife, her grandson and her great-grandson in the male line, with this
difference, that, according to the author of the work (Madhava-vaśiṣṭha), the right of
the daughter's son follows that of the contemporary wife's son.

In the next place, if the property were received at the time of nuptials, celebrated
in one of the five forms denominated Brāhma, &c., the order of successors is husband,
brother, mother and father. But, if it were received at nuptials in one of the three
forms called Āsura, &c., the order is mother, father, brother and husband.

Then the husband's younger brother; after him, the son of the husband's younger
brother, and the son of his elder brother; next, the sister's son; afterwards, the hus-
band's sister's son; then the brother's son; after him, the son-in-law; next, the father-
in-law; subsequently, the elder brother-in-law. In the next place, kinsmen allied by
funeral oblations (sāpindas) in the order of proximity; after them, kinsmen connected
by family (sakālyas) and, lastly, such as are allied by similar oblations of water (saman-
ņodakas).

In the case of property given by the father at any other time but the wedding, a
maiden daughter succeeds in the first instance; next a son; then a daughter who has,
and one who is likely to have, male issue; after them, the daughter's son, the son's son,
the great-grandson in the male line, the son of a contemporary wife, and her grandson
and great-grandson in the male line: next to these, the barren and widowed daughters
inherit together; afterwards the succession proceeds as before described in the case of
property received at nuptials denominated Brāhma, &c.

But, in the instance of property not received at a wedding, and other than such as
is given by the father, the son and unmarried daughter inherit together; or, on failure
of both of them, the daughters, who have, or may have, male issue; and, afterwards,
the son's son, the daughter's son, the great-grandson in the male line, the son of the con-
temporary wife, her grandson and great-grandson in the male line, are rightful claimants
in succession; next to these, the barren and widowed daughters inherit together; and
lastly the order is, as before, the same with that of property received at Brāhma nuptials.

† Maheśvara.   † Ākṛtīkṣa.   § Maheśvara.   § Ākṛtīkṣa.
of the law, must be rejected as destitute of reason and authority, by those who [like us *] submit to demonstration.

42. Thus has succession to the separate property of a childless woman been explained.

CHAPTER V.

Exclusion from Inheritance.

1. In the next place, persons incompetent to inherit are specified, for the purpose of making known, by the exception, competent heirs. On this subject Aṇḍastamba says, “All co-heirs, who are endowed with virtue, are entitled to the property. But he, who dissipates wealth by his vices, should be debarred from participation, even though he be the first born.”

2. This passage is read by Bālaka in a confused manner and contrary sense: “But he, who acquires wealth by his virtuous conduct, being the eldest son, should be made an equal sharer with the father.” That reading is unauthorized.

3. Another passage. A man expelled for crimes is incapable of inheriting.

3. Expelled from society.] Deemed unworthy of intercourse. In consequence of offences, or degradation from class, water is not drunk in company with him. Chādāmakā and Čtrīṣkṣaṇa.

Formally banished, with the ceremony of kicking down a jar of water, as described by Yājñavalkya. Ačyuta.

Excluded on account of wickedness, by all his kinsmen, from the oblation of food and libation of water. Maheśvara.

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* Maheśvara.

† Cited in the Viṣṇumālādya as a passage of Aṇḍastamba; but, in the Viśāda-Chiṇḍāṅga and Sāndhya-sara, it is referred to Čaukha; and in the Rañjana, Śaṅkha-Chaṇḍriñā, &c., to Čaukha and Likhita.
(a) See 1 Moir. Dig. 336.—54.
4. So Viśnupati says, "Though born of a woman of equal class, a son destitute of virtue is unworthy of the paternal wealth. It is declared to belong to such kinsmen, offering funeral oblations [to the owner,*] as are of virtuous conduct. A son redeems his father from debt to superior and inferior beings. Consequently there is no use for one who acts otherwise. What can be done with a cow which neither gives milk, nor bears calves? For what purpose was that son born, who is neither learned nor virtuous? A son, who is devoid of science, courage and good purposes, who is destitute of devotion and knowledge, and who is wanting in conduct, is similar to urine and excrement."

5. Apastamba says, "A son, who diligently performs the obsequies of his father and other ancestors, is of approved excellence, even though he be uninitiated; not a son who acts otherwise, be he conversant even with the whole Veda."

6. "Since a son delivers his father from the hell called putra therefore he is named putra by the self-existent himself."†(a) By this and similar passages, great benefits are stated, as effected by means of a son. His connection with the property is therefore the reward of his beneficial acts. If then he neglect them, how should he have his hire? Accordingly Manu says, "All those brothers, who are addicted to vice, lose their title to the inheritance."‡

7. So [the same author:] "Impotent persons and outcasts are excluded from a share of the heritage; and so are persons born blind and deaf, as well as madmen, idiots, and dumb, and those who have lost a sense [or a limb.]

8. The impotent person is described by Katyāyana: "The man is called impotent, whose urine froths not, whose fees sink in water, and whose virile member is void of erection and of semen."

9. The term 'born' is connected in construction with the words 'blind' and 'deaf.' One, who is incapable of articulating sounds, is dumb. An idiot is a person not susceptible of instruction.

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4. Destitute of devotion and knowledge.] Some copies of Jīmūta-vāhana read generosity (dine) in place of knowledge (jñāna or vijñāna), which is the reading of other copies, as well as of the quotations occurring in various compilations.

7. Those who have lost a sense or a limb.] Literally an organ; explained by some a sense as that of smelling, or of sight, etc., but by others a limb, as the hand, foot and so forth.

‡ Manu, 9. 214. § Manu, 9. 201. [1 Morl. Dig. 338.]

(a) Putra or putra is formed from the root Pū (whence the Latin puter) by the suffix tra.—Ed.
10. Yājñavalkya says, “An outcast and his issue, an impotent person, one lame, a madman, an idiot, a blind man, a person afflicted with an incurable disease, [as well as others similarly disqualified,] must be maintained; excluding them however from participation.”* One, who cannot walk, is lame.

11. Although they be excluded from participation, they ought to be maintained, excepting however the outcast and his son. That is taught by Devaka: “When the father is dead [as well as in his lifetime†] an impotent man, a leper, a madman, an idiot, a blind man, an outcast, the offspring of an outcast, and a person wearing the token [of religious mendicity,] are not competent to share the heritage. Food and raiment should be given to them, excepting the outcast. But the sons of such persons, being free from similar defects, shall obtain their father’s share of the inheritance.” A person wearing the token of mendicity is one who has become a religious wanderer or ascetic.

12. By the term outcast, his son also is intended; for he is degraded, being procreated by an outcast. That is confirmed by Baudhāyana, who says, “Let the co-heirs support with food and apparel those who are incapable of business, as well as the blind, idiots, impotent persons, those afflicted with disease and calamity, and others who are incompetent to the performance of duties: excepting however the outcast and his issue.”

13. On this subject, Nārada says, “An enemy to his father, an outcast, an impotent person, and one who is addicted to vice [or has been expelled from society,] take no shares of the inheritance even though they be legitimate; much less, if they be sons of the wife by an appointed kinsman.”‡

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10. As well as others.] This is a part of the text as read by the Mitākshara, Śruti-chanḍikā and Ratnākara. But Jaimuta-vāhana and Vācheśpati Miśra read āra ‘afflicted,’ in place of ēḍya ‘others.’

11. Excepting the outcast and his son.] Meaning a son begotten after the degradation of the father. Āriṣṭāguna.

12. Wearing the token of mendicity.] The term lini is understood by Jaimuta-vāhana as signifying a person who has entered into a religious order, of which he wears the symbol. But other compilers (as the authors of the Ratnākara, Śruti-chanḍikā, &c.) explain it a hypocrite and impostor, or a sectary and heretic.

13. One who is addicted to vice.] So the term, as read by Jaimuta-vāhana, is explained by his commentator Moheśvara. In the Prakṣa it is read upapatisa instead of supapatīka, and is similarly explained, according to the quotation in the Ratnākara.

* Yājñavalkya, 2, 141. † Śruti-chanḍikā. ‡ Nārada, 13, 21.
14. Kātyāyana ordains, that “The son of a woman married in irregular order; and begotten on her by a kinsman, is unworthy of the inheritance; and so is an apostate from a religious order.”

15. If a woman of superior tribe be espoused after marrying one of inferior class, both marriages are contrary to regular order. Interpretation of his text. The son of either of these women, being eshta-trija or issue of the wife, pronounced by a kinsman authorized to raise up issue to the husband, is unworthy of the inheritance. But a son begotten by the husband himself, being of the same tribe, on his wedded wife espoused in irregular order, is heir to the estate: so likewise is a son begotten by the husband on a wife dissimilar in class but espoused in regular gradation.

16. That is declared by Kātyāyana: “But the son of a woman married in irregular order, may be heir provided he belong to the same tribe with his father: and so may the son of a man, belonging to a different [but superior*] tribe, by a woman espoused in the regular gradation. The son of a woman married to a man of inferior tribe, is not heir to the estate. Food and raiment only are considered to be due to him by his kinsmen. But, on failure of them, he may take the paternal wealth. The kinsmen shall not be compelled to give the wealth received by them, not being his patrimony.”

17. A possibility exists of an impotent man, and the rest as above enumerated (§ 7), espousing wives. “If the eunuch and the rest should at any time desire to marry, the offspring of such as have issue, shall be capable of inheriting.”† Issue signifies offspring.

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But the reading, which is there preferred, as well as in the Kañpatara, is uppāpātī, signifying ‘expelled from society for heinous crimes;” and the word is written avapātīka in the Śrītūr-dhārika, but interpreted in the same sense, Rakshanandana reads, as Jinnīna-vāhana, uppāpātīka, and expounds it ‘one stained with sins.’

14. Son of a woman married in irregular order, and begotten on her by a kinsman.] This version is conformable to Jinnīna-vāhana’s interpretation (§ 15.), which is copied in the Vīmadrādaya. But in the Śrītūr-dhārika, Ratnakara and Chintāmāni, the members of the sentence are separated: “The son of a woman married in irregular order is unworthy of the inheritance; and so is the son of a woman espoused by her kinsman, as well as an apostate from a religious order.”

15. Begotten on a wife dissimilar in class, but espoused, in regular gradation.] Begotten by a man of superior tribe on a woman of inferior class. Çrītātman.

16. Food and raiment only.] This is Jinnīna-vāhana’s reading, gṛhaḥbhādramātram. But the Śrītūr-dhārika and Ratnakara read gṛhaḥbhādram aṣṭāntam “food and raiment for life.”

* Chintāmāni.
† Manu, 9, 262.
18. It must not be objected, how can they contract marriages, since the eunuch, not being male, is incapable of procreation, and the dumb man and the rest [or those born deaf or blind] are degraded for want of initiation and investiture, because they are unapt for [the preparatory] study? The eunuch may obtain issue from his wife by means of another man; and a person unfit for investiture with the sacred thread is not degraded from his tribe for want of that initiation, any more than a Chādra.

19. Sons of disqualified persons inherit, if free from similar defects.

This is confirmed by a passage of Yājñavalkya:

"Their sons, whether legitimate or the offspring of the soil, are entitled to allotments if free from similar defects. Their daughters also must be maintained until provided with husbands. Their childless wives, conducting themselves aright, must be supported; but such as are unchaste, should be expelled; and so indeed should those who are perverse."

20. Conclusion.

Thus it has been explained, who are persons incompetent to inherit.

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Not being his patrimony.] The commentators, Çrikṣaṇa and Achyuta, state another reading in the first instance; śvāpitrīyam "[their] own patrimony" instead of apitrīyam "not [his] patrimony." They notice, however, this last reading, as one which may have been intended by the author. It is that which the Sūtra-chandaṅkha, Ratnakara and other compilations exhibit. Çrikṣaṇa and Achyuta deduce the same meaning in both ways of reading the text. But Mahāyāna understood the passage differently; "The kinsmen shall not be compelled to give up to him wealth received by them being his own patrimony; they shall not be compelled to share it with him; but he must be maintained by them with food and raiment. Chūḍāmaṇi, again, follows the other reading, but with a different interpretation: 'The kinsmen shall not be compelled to give up his father's wealth, received by them, though not their patrimony.'

19. As the case may be.] A dumb man or the like may have either natural offspring or issue raised up to him by his wife. But the impotent can only have issue so raised. Çrikṣaṇa.

Allotments according to the pretensions of their fathers.] Such allotment as their fathers would have had if capable of inheriting. Achyuta.

Such share as should have belonged to their respective fathers, according as these may be either sons of a Brāhmaṇī woman, or of a Kūṭārīṇi, or of a woman of another tribe. Çrikṣaṇa.

* Yājñavalkya, 9, 142 and 143.
CHAPTER VI.

Effects liable, or not liable, to Partition.

SECTION I.

1. In the next place, effects which may be divided, and such as are exempted from partition, are here explained. On that subject Kātyāyana says, “What belonged to the paternal grandfather, or to the father, and any thing else [appertaining to the co-heirs, having been] acquired by themselves; must all be divided at a partition among heirs.”

2. And any thing else.] Here the particle ‘and’ is connected, in the sentence, with the term ‘themselves;’ viz., ‘acquired by themselves;’ or, as implied by the conjunctive particle, acquired by another person; but his acquisition must have been made through the common property [or else by joint personal labour*]. Such is the meaning.

3. Separate acquisitions are not to be shared; according to Manu and Vishnu.

4. Since the patrimony is not used, there is no exertion on the side of the others, through the means of the common property; and, since it was obtained by the man’s own labour, there is no corporal effort on the part of the rest: it is, therefore, the separate property of the acquirer alone; for the phrase: “it was gained by his own exertion,” is stated as a reason.

5. So Vyāsa ordains: “What a man gains by his own ability, without relying on the patrimony, he shall not give up to the co-heirs; nor that which is acquired by learning.”†

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1. To the paternal grandfather.] Meaning any relation in general. Āśīrya and Āśīrya.

* Chudāmāni and Āśīrya.
† Manu, 9. 223. Vishnu, 18. 12. Ādica Infra, § 31. The second half of the stanza is read otherwise in the Mitāksharā, Ch. I, Sect. 3, § 10.
‡ Vide infra, § 35.
6. Since it is expressed in general terms, “what he gains solely by his own ability,” all property, so acquired, being his own, is not common. But, as the gains of science, though obtained by the man’s own ability, are shared by parecnoris equally or more proficient in knowledge, the phrase “nor that which is acquired by learning,” is subjoined for the sake of excluding illiterate or less learned parcenors.

7. So Yājñavalkya directs: “Whatever else is acquired by the co-parcenor himself, without detriment to the father’s estate, as a present from a friend, or a gift at nuptials, does not appertain to the co-heirs.”

8. Here, the mention of “a present from a friend” and so forth is intended for illustration only; since it is in such modes that acquisitions are usually made without expenditure.

9. So Manu likewise says: “Wealth, however, acquired by learning, belongs exclusively to him, who acquired it; and so does any thing given by a friend, received on account of marriage, or presented as a mark of respect.”

10. Vyāsa delivers a similar precept: “Wealth gained by science, or earned by valour, or received from affectionate kindred, belongs at the time of partition, to him [who acquired it] and shall not be claimed by the co-heirs.”

11. Gift of affectionate kindred explained.

What is obtained through favour or the like, from a father, uncle, or other kind relations, is received from affectionate kindred.

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6. His own.] Acquired with his own wealth and by his own labour only. Çrikṣṇa.

7. Not common.] Not liable to be shared with the rest of the brothers. Çrikṣṇa.

9. Exclusively.] An illiterate person, and one of inferior learning, are thus excepted. Çrikṣṇa.

9. On account of marriage.] Received from a father-in-law, on account of becoming his son-in-law. Çrikṣṇa.

As a mark of respect.] Obtained by officiating as a priest. Çrikṣṇa.

As a mark of respect at the time of giving a madhumaka. The interpretation of the word madhumapika, by Mathārajya and Gōvinda-raja, who explain it “wealth gained by officiating as a priest,” is erroneous, since that is gained by science (See Kātyāyana.) Kulākā Bhaṭṭa.

11. Received from affectionate kindred.] Since property, termed Saṃdāyika, is exempt from partition as being the separate property of a woman (C. 5. Sect. 1. § 31.), the author expounds the term otherwise. Maheṣvara.

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 119. Vide infra. § 33.
† Manu, 9, 206. Vide infra. § 31.
‡ Vide Sect. 2. § 1.
12. Nārada similarly says, "Excepting what is gained by valour, the wealth of a wife, and what is acquired by science, which are three sorts of property exempt from partition; and any favour conferred by a father."

13. What was received at the time of obtaining a wife is here called the "wealth of a wife," meaning effects obtained on account of marriage. Excepting these acquisitions (§ 12), let him divide other property: for this phrase is here understood, as expressed in another sentence.

14. By these and other similar passages, the circumstance of the property having been acquired by valour or the like, is not stated as a sufficient reason for its being exempt from participation; since a distribution even of property so acquired, is expressly ordained in certain cases. Thus Vyāsā directs a partition of effects so gained, with the use of the common goods. "The brethren participate in that wealth, which one of them gains by valour or the like, using any common property, either a weapon or a vehicle. To him two shares should be given: but the rest should share alike." So Nārada ordains: "He, who maintains the family of a brother studying science, shall take, he be ever so ignorant, a share of the wealth gained by science."

15. Since the term "maintained" is exhibited in the singular number, if the family of the brother, who is studying science, be made to prosper by another brother at the expense of his own wealth, or by the labour of his body, then he also has a title to property gained by that science.

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12. The wealth of a wife.] Since the separate wealth of a wife cannot be supposed liable to partition, (for it is her peculiar property,) the author expounds the text otherwise. Čṛkritsha.


15. Since the term is exhibited in the singular number.] For it may be inferred from the use of the singular number, that the act is independent of any thing else. This independency is an independence of the common property, as well as of the separate property of their brothers or co-heirs. Hence, if the support were afforded by two, or by three, unlettered co-heirs, all these shall participate. Čṛkritsha.

By exhibiting the term in the singular number, an exception to the joint property is indicated, and not exclusion of other brothers supporting the family by their labour, or by the expenditure of their own wealth. Hence two such brothers would also take a share of the property gained through science. Mahāvīra.

* Nārada, 13, 6. Vide infra, § 33.
† Nārada, 13, 4.
‡ Nārada, 13, 10.
16. So [the same legislator says,] "A learned man need not give a share of his own acquired wealth, without his consent, to an unlearned co-heir: provided it were not gained by him using the paternal estate."*

17. The word "paternal" intends joint property. What has been gained by him without using that, a learned man need not give up, against his will, to an unlearned co-heir. But to a learned or instructed co-heir, he must give a share of any thing acquired by him, even without the use of joint property. Accordingly Gautama says, "His own acquired wealth, a learned man need not give up, against his inclination, to unlearned co-heirs."†

18. What is gained by his personal labour on his separate funds, being his own acquired property; he need not give up, if he be unwilling to surrender it, unto unlearned co-heirs: but he must yield it to learned brethren.

19. This, however, relates only to the gains of science. So Katyayana declares: "No part of the wealth, which is gained by science, need be given by a learned man, to his unlearned co-heirs: but such property must be yielded by him, to those who are equal or superior in learning."

20. The word learning, expressed in the text, [and occurring there once only †] is connected with both terms, "equal" and "superior." Therefore, it must be yielded to such as are equal or superior in learning: but those who are less learned, or who are unlearned, have no right to participate.

21. Since it appears from these and other texts, that partition does or not take place; in the case of wealth acquired by science, value, or the like, according as joint property is or is not employed; and since this alone is the reason; a revealed maxim, containing that term only, must be inferred in words such as these, divide

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16. Using the paternal estate.] This regards the employment of funds otherwise than for food and raiment: for wealth must be used for such purposes even by a person remaining at home. Chulaman and Çritiksha.

17. Intends joint property.] Else, there would be no partition, if the estate of the grandfather or other ancestor were used.

19. This relates only to the gains of science.] For any other property, acquired by himself, need not be surrendered, either to learn or unlearned co-heirs. Çritiksha.

21. Since this alone is the reason.] Since the making of the acquisition with or without the use of such property is alone the reason: since acquisition with the use of it is a ground of partition; and without such use, a ground of exemption from partition. Çritiksha.

* Nârada, 13, 11. † Gautama, 28, 28. ‡ Çritiksha.
A passage of scripture, to that effect, may be supposed.

22. This is confirmed by the Mīmāṃsā.

23. Or the same meaning may be deduced from reasoning [without the trouble of inferring the origin of the rule from a lost passage of scripture]. That, which is acquired by a person, belongs exclusively to him, so long as he lives; if there be no special rule [to the contrary]: but, where the exertion of one is merely through the joint property, and the other contributes to the acquisition by his person and wealth, it is a rule suggested by reason, that the one shall have a single share, and the other two. Hence likewise it follows, that, if the joint stock be used, shares should be assigned to each person in proportion to the amount of his allotment, be it little or much, which has been used.

24. Moreover the text of Kātyāyana [is similarly founded on reason.] "When brethren separated in regard to the patrimony, and subsequently living anew together, make a [second] partition, he, from whom an acquisition has proceeded, shall again take a double share."

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The general maxim which must be inferred.] One, as above stated, which does not contain the terms "gained by valour, &c." For it would be needless trouble to assume a maxim containing these terms, in such form as follows; "divide that which is gained by valour or the like without use." Čṛkṣṭhaṇa.

22. Reasoning taught under the head of Holāka.] It is the 8th topic (sādhikarana) of the 3rd chapter of the 1st book. The purport of it may be thus stated: the Holāka or festival of the spring (Vasantotsava) is celebrated by the Pṛthvyas or eastern Indians; and, in like manner, other observances are peculiar to other people: that is, (as remarked by commentators) Uddāsana-yajña, which consists in driving a bull after worshipping him, is practised by the Uddāsas or northern Indians; and the Aḥuṇābaka or worship of certain trees, or other particular objects, as deities, by the Dakṣinātayas or southern Indians. These local usages are concluded to be founded on some precept; and the precept is inferred to be a general one, not a special one restricted to the particular people among whom the usage prevails. Vide C. 2. § 40.

23. In proportion to the amount of his allotment.] In the case of wealth gained with the use of the common stock of brothers ranking in different tribes, the use has been of four shares appertaining to the son of the Brāhmaṇ wife, and three, two and one shares belonging to the sons of the Kshatriya and the rest. In such an instance, their shares of the gain should be assigned in exact proportion to their respective allotments of the stock. Čṛkṣṭhaṇa.

* Makeyana, A sûya, &c.
25. This is expounded by Črikara as signifying, that, ‘a re-united partner, who has made an acquisition with the use of the joint stock, shall have two shares; and the rest, one apiece.’

26. Hence it appears to be the opinion both of the saint and of the commentator, that wealth, gained with no use of the common funds, appertains exclusively to the acquirer, even in the instance of a reunion of co-partners; and that such wealth is not joint property: since no special allotment is directed in the case of a gain made without use of joint stock.

27. Such being their meaning, the same is equally proper for the unseparated co-partner, as for the reunited one: because residence in the same abode [which implies a junction of property*] is equally pertinent as a reason, when separation has not yet taken place, as when it has been annulled. Since the text is likewise pertinent, as directing, that the acquirer shall have two shares of an acquisition made with the use of common property, it is not right to restrict it to the case of reunited partners; for the reasoning, taught under the head of Holáká, † opposes that restriction.

28. Besides, it is an uncontested rule, that an acquirer, as such, shall have two shares of wealth gained by the use of joint funds (a): for that allotment has been ordained by a text [of Vyása] above cited (§ 14) in the single case of the use of common stock. It is not reasonable to assign two shares only in the instance of an acquisition made by personal exertion upon separate funds: but something more [than two shares] would be reasonable; either the whole, or something less [than the whole].§ Here, since something less [than the whole] has not been directed either by sages or by

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ANNOTATIONS.

26. Of the saint and of the commentator.] Of the saint: that is, of Kātyāyana: for, after specifying residence in the same abode, he propounds a double share, if the joint stock have been used; and does not direct an allotment in the case of wealth acquired with no use of common funds. Of the commentator: that is, of Črikara: for he has expressly so interpreted the text. Črikāśaṅkha.

27. For reasoning opposes that restriction.] As a precept of revelation is inferred in these terms, ‘the Holáká should be performed,’ to authorize the observance of that festival; and not one containing the term Prāśaḥya indicating the particular people who practise it; so a precept of revelation is inferred in these terms ‘the acquirer shall take two shares of wealth gained with the use of common property;’ not one containing the term ‘reunited partner,’ as a restrictive epithet of the acquirer. Črikāśaṅkha.

28. Where that does not exist.] Where neither the use of the joint funds, nor a common exertion of the rest of the brethren, exists; either of which would be a reason for the participation of the co-heirs. Črikāśaṅkha.

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* Črikāśaṅkha and Ačarya. † Vide § 22. ‡ Chāḍāmāni and Črikāśaṅkha.
§ ‘Ibid. || ‘Ibid. (a) See i Morl. Dig. 480.—Ed.
compilers; and since it appears, that the rest of the brethren participate [in one case] on account of the employment of their common stock; it is fit, that their participation should be null [in another case] where that does not exist.

29. The rule, that the acquirer shall have twice as much as the rest, must be grounded on reasoning; otherwise, [if its foundation in a passage of scripture is to be assumed, * and reasoning is not to be taken as its ground; †] it would be necessary either to insert in the maxim of revelation in question, the condition of a gain made [by the father who is declared entitled to two shares, ‡] or else to establish separately the title [of an acquirer to a double share.§]

30. And the conclusion is true.

30. It is therefore true, that wealth gained without use of joint stock belongs to the acquirer alone, not to the rest of the co-parceners.

31. Moreover, a general maxim [of scripture]** to this extent, "Let all share what is gained by an unseparated co-parcener," cannot be inferred. For an exception to wealth acquired by valour or the like [without use of the joint stock] does occur. Thus Manu says, "Wealth, however, acquired by learning, belongs exclusively to him, who acquired it: and so does any thing given by a friend, received on account of marriage, or presented as a mark of respect."*** So Manu and Vishnu

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29. Otherwise it would be necessary to insert, &c.] If it be not founded on reasoning; the condition, that he be the acquirer, must be inserted in the revealed maxim "Let the father reserve two shares for himself." If then a passage of scripture be assumed in this form; "let the father, who has made an acquisition, reserve two shares:" a father, who had not made an acquisition, would not have a double share; nor would a brother or other co-heir, who was the acquirer of the property, have a double allotment. The author therefore adds, "or else to establish separately the title." The distinct right of an acquirer, independently of paternity or other particular relation must be separately established. Consequently, since it would be troublesome to infer a foundation in scripture on both points, it is right to ground the rule on reasoning.

31. Moreover a general maxim, &c., cannot be inferred.] If the rule were founded on reasoning, the acquirer's allotment should be proportionate to his exertion: and a general direction for his taking a double share would consequently be improper. Hence it is right, that the acquirer's double portion should be grounded on a general maxim of revelation in these terms, 'the acquirer has two shares of what is gained before partition, and the rest have one apiece:' accordingly, it is seen in the practice of the world, that, in the instance of wealth accepted as a present, though it be gained without use of joint stock, all participate on the sole ground of its being acquired by an unseparated co-parcener. Weighing this opinion of Čikara's, the author censures it.

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* Mahapatra. † Čikāshana. ‡ Čikāshana, Chaḍānami, &c.
§ Ibid. ‖ Mahapatra. ‖ Čikāshana and Chaḍānami.
** Manu, 9, 200. Vide supra, § 7.
ORDAIN, "WHAT A BROTHER HAS ACQUIRED BY HIS LABOR, WITHOUT USING THE PATRIMONY, HE NEED NOT GIVE UP WITHOUT HIS ASSENT; FOR IT WAS GAINED BY HIS OWN EXERTION."

32. WITHOUT USING.] THIS IS CONNECTED LIKEWISE WITH WEALTH ACQUIRED BY LEARNING; FOR, IN SUCH INSTANCE ALSO, A PREcept, ORDAINING PARTITION OF JOINT FUNDS HE USED, DOES OCCUR.

33. THus YAJñAVALKYA SAYS: "WHATEVER ELSE IS ACQUIRED BY THE CO-PARCEner HIMSELF, WITHOUT DETERMINATION TO THE FATHER'S ESTATE, AS A PRESENT FROM A FRIEND, OR A GIFT AT Nuptials, DOES NOT APPARENT TO THE CO-HEIRS. Nor shall he, WHO RECOVERS HEREDITARY PROPERTY, WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN AWAY, GIVE IT UP TO THE CO-PARCEners: Nor WHAT HAS BEEN GAINED BY SCIENCE."† SO NÁRADA; "EXCEPTING WHAT IS GAINED BY VALUE, THE WEALTH OF A WIFE, AND WHAT IS ACQUIRED BY SCIENCE, WHICH ARE THREE SORTS OF PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM PARTITION; AND ANY FAVOUR CONFERRED BY A FATHER."‡ LIKEWISE VYÁSA: "WEALTH GAINED BY SCIENCE, OR EARNED BY VALUE; OR RECEIVED FROM AFFECTIONATE KINDRED, BELONGS, AT THE TIME OF PARTITION, TO HIM [WHO ACQUIRED IT] AND SHALL NOT BE CLAIMED BY THE CO-HEIRS."

34. INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT.] RECEIVED FROM AFFECTIONATE KINDRED.] OBTAINED FROM KIND RELATIONS.

35. WHAT IS GIVEN BY THE PATERNAL GRANDFATHER, OR BY THE FATHER, AS A TOKEN OF AFFECTION, BELONGS TO HIM [WHO RECEIVES IT] NEITHER THAT, NOR WHAT IS GIVEN BY A MOTHER, SHALL BE TAKEN FROM HIM. WHAT A MAN GAINS BY HIS OWN ABILITY, WITHOUT RELYING ON THE PATRIMONY, HE SHALL NOT GIVE UP TO THE CO-HEIRS, NOR THAT WHICH IS ACQUIRED BY LEARNING."||

ANNOTATIONS.

32. WITH WEALTH ACQUIRED BY LEARNING.] WITH THE GAINS OF SCIENCE MENTIONED IN THE PRECEDING TEXT. (MANU, 9. 208). ÇRÎKÎRNA.

THE TERM, 'GAINS OF SCIENCE,' CONTAINED IN THE PRECEDING PASSAGE OF MANU, IS HERE UNDERSTOOD. MAHEÇVARA.

ONE COMMENTATOR READS IN JHUna VÁHANA'S TEXT AMUHAYATÁ "IS UNDERSTOOD," WHERE THE OTHER READS SAMUHAYATÁ "IS CONNECTED." HENCE A DIFFERENCE IN THEIR MANNER OF STATING THE SAME MEANING.

A PRECEPT ORDAINING PARTITION DOES OCCUR.] ALLUING TO A PASSAGE ABOVE CITED (§ 15) CONTAINING THE RESERVATION, "PROVIDED IT WERE NOT GAINED BY HIM USING THE PATERNAL ESTATE." ÇHÎTUJÂNA AND ÇRÎKÎRNA.

33. HEREDITARY PROPERTY.] THIS COMPREHENDS ANY COMMON PROPERTY. THE SAME RULE CONSEQUENTLY HELD GOOD IN REGARD TO THE WEALTH OF THE BRETHREN, WHICH THEY THEMSELVES ACQUIRED ÇRÎKÎRNA.

34. OBTAINED FROM KIND RELATIONS.] THIS IS NOT TAUTOLOGY; BUT MERELY INTENDED TO REMIND THE READER OF A PRECEDING REMARK. (VIDE § 11). MAHEÇVARA.

* MANU, 9. 208. Vishnu, 16. 42. Vide supra. § 3.
† YAJñAVALKYA, 2. 119 and 120. Vide supra. § 7.
36. By this, excepting, under these and other texts, in regard to all the tribes and all the classes of mixed or of medi-
ate origin, wealth acquired, without use of the joint
stock, by the acquiree's own ability; whether effected
by means of any science, or received from affectionate-
kindred (being given by a relative) or obtained from a friend, or at
nuptials, or with a token of respect; or gained by valour (that is, by
combat or the like) or earned by labour (that is, by agriculture, ser-
vice, merchandise, &c); every acquisition [made without use of joint
funds*] is excepted: therefore, since there can be none other, the [alleg-
ed] precept has no pertinence.

37. Or a case or two [of acquisition made without use of the
common stock†] may be, in some manner, assumed, to
which the precept may relate. Still those cases should
have been declared by express words: since it would
have been easy for the sages to have said, *divide cer-
tain property gained by an unseparated co-partner;* and such property
would be readily understood, under its own name; better too than by
using a long and circuitous expression, like this [*wealth acquired
before partition,‡*] other than the gains of valour, &c. [acquired without
use of joint funds;§* for it is burdensome. And, if the present be in-
tended as an exception, all the sages ought to specify every excepted
term: for, without that, the meaning of "other than such" would be
unexplained: and the restrictive words of the sages would conse-
quently appear as idle as the prattle of children. But, if it be intended
for illustration, then some one instance is negligently propounded by
one author; and another by another writer; and the omission of spe-
cifying the whole is right.

38. Therefore the maxim is, *divide wealth ac-
quired with the use of the common stock;* and parti-
cular terms, as the gains of valour, &c., are inserted in
the texts as instances.

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36. The tribes., The four tribes, Brâhmana, &c.
Class of mediatic origin.] The Ambalâs, the Karâna, &c.
Class of mixed origin.] Râthâkâra, &c. Ćrikshama and A śh uta.
The alleged precept has no pertinence.] The precept alleged by the opponent
must run thus: *divide what is gained by an unseparated co-heir, other than the several
specified sorts acquired by valour and so forth without use of joint funds.* But that
has no pertinence. It has no such object as required a precept to reach it. The reason
is stated: "Since there is none other:" that is, since there is no case which was not
provided for by reasoning. The partition of wealth gained by the use of joint stock,
being deducible from reasoning, was not a case unprovided for Ćrikshama.

37. A case or two may be assumed.] A treasure, found by an unseparated co-
partner, is one instance; and the receipt of any thing given by a stranger, through
consideration, occurs as another. Since a partition of these gains is no
 deducible from reasoning, for they were not obtained by the use of joint property, how can it be
said, that the precept has no pertinence? The author proposes this doubt. Ćrikshama.

* Ćrikshama and Châdānanda. † A śh uta. ‡ Ćrikshama. § Ćrikshama.
39. Not any property acquired before separation.

39. Hence the declaring of property common, merely because it was gained by an unseparated co-heir, is not grounded on authority.

40. Besides, the text of Yājñavalkya, (“Nor shall he who recovers hereditary property, &c.” § 33) is acknowledged by you likewise, as signifying, that, if one recover the property of the father, grandfather, or other ancestor, which has been taken away by any person, it appertains to him alone, not to the rest. Thus, [the author] denying the right of unseparated co-heirs in the property, because it has been recovered, although a trace of the former right exist, denies the remoter title of the rest to wealth originally gained by the man himself.

41. It has been said by Črikara, “If wealth, acquired without using the patrimony, belong exclusively to the acquirer, then effects, received in a present, can never be shared with another brother; for the receipt of a present cannot be attended with expenditure of paternal wealth. It is indeed alleged, that valuables are employed, at the receipt of gifts, for the gratification of the donor; as a heifer or the like in the purchase of sacrificial materials; or as milk for the support of life, during the sacrifice denominated Jyotishṭoma. Here the valuables are not employed for the gratification of the giver, since his gratification, by the receipt of other effects, is not requisite for a donation, the intention of which is spiritual; and, as the act of receiving is momentary, nourishment for the person, who accepts the present, is not requisite, as it is during the tedious celebration of the Jyotishṭoma, for him who by that ceremony seeks celestial bliss.”

ANNOTATIONS.

[Id as the prototyle of children.] If it be severally declared “divide wealth other than the gains of science;” “divide acquisitions other than those of valor;” and so forth; a knowledge is not thus obtained of what is meant by “property acquired before partition, other than particular specified sorts,” so as to distinguish what is liable to partition. Consequently, since it does not determine the proposed question whether a partition of such property shall or shall not take place, it is meaningless, and therefore similar to the prototyle of children. Črikṣuṣa.

40. Denying.] If the reading be nirākūravat (in the neuter,) the text of Yājñavalkya is the agent in the sentence. But, if nirākūrvam (in the masculine,) Yājñavalkya himself is so. Maheṣvara.

Unseparated co-heirs.] For the text, containing no restriction, relates to co-heirs whether separated or not separated. Črikṣuṣa and Āekuṭa.

For, since the construction of the text is “He shall not give up, at the time of partition, that which he recovers,” unseparated co-heirs are of course inferred, from its being understood to precede partition. Čakṣumapi.

Originally.] With no trace of a former right. Črikṣuṣa and Maheṣvara.

41. As a heifer or the like.] A heifer, one year old, is directed by rituals to be given for the purchase of the Soma or moon plant (Aselepsis acida) required for a sacrifice, at which the juice of that plant is drunk.

As milk during the Jyotishṭoma.] A Brāhmaṇa is allowed to drink milk during the celebration of the Jyotishṭoma, which lasts five days. This sacrifice is performed by followers of the Vēdas, for the specific reward of happiness in heaven,
42. That is futile: for instances often do occur, in the world, of expenditure of wealth, by giving presents to induce a donation; and, in the present age, wealth received in gifts is similar to that which is earned by service. Accordingly it is said, "In the Kali age, [gifts are made] to a follower."

43. And as for what is alleged [by the same author], that 'gratification is no cause of receipt of presents, having no such operation, since long attendance is the cause; and wealth, therefore, is not the occasion of such receipt 'through the medium of gratification;' that is still more futile: for long attendance and the rest become causes of the receipt of presents, through the medium of gratification; and, according to the diversity of men's dispositions, [gratification] is seen to arise, in the mind of one, from pecuniary gifts; of another, from long attendance or the like; of some, from the mere evining of particular qualities. If the effect be not produced, for want of an attendant circumstance, it must not be hence concluded to be no cause; since, as is observed accordingly, gratification is produced by means which are not invariable.

44. It has been further urged [by the same author], 'If [it be alleged,] that wealth mediately accomplishes the receipt of presents, being employed during attendance; since receipt cannot take place without contiguity;

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42. Expenditure of wealth by giving presents.] By presenting agreeable things, &c. or, if the receiving be upadana (instead of upahara,) by giving bribes, &c. Çrkrshna.

Wheat received in gifts is similar to that earned by service.] Since a donation is obtained by long attendance, the expenditure of wealth is sometimes requisite for the support of life. Çrkrshna.

A follower.] One constant in attendance; an earnest solicitor. This is connected with the terms [gifts are made]; for it is said 'In the first age, gifts are made by going to seek an acceptor; in the second, they are presented to one invited for the purpose; in the third, to one who solicits them; in the fourth to a constant follower.' Çrkrshna.

43. Since long attendance is the cause.] Since presents are also seen to be obtained by long attendance, gratification does not operate towards the receipt of presents; and consequently is not the cause. Çrkrshna.

Through the medium of gratification.] Only through that medium; not by their own independent power. Therefore gratification is not unoperative. Çrkrshna.

If the effect be not produced, &c.] The particular disposition of the person is a concomitant circumstance. If the proper disposition be wanting, gratification is not produced. There is consequently no unoperativeness of it as a cause. But some say, this is an answer to the question, how can gratification be a cause of receipt of presents, since, in some instances, no present is obtained, though gratification be produced? Çrkrshna.

[By means which are not invariable.] It is effected by various means, which are independent of each other. Çrkrshna.

44. If it be alleged.] In some copies of the text, 'If (yad) is found; and that reading is right. In other copies it is omitted; but must be supplied. Mahesvara.

Çrkrshna and Mahesvara.
nor can this be without nourishment: that is denied; for nourishment, used for the support of life, previous to the celebration of a Jyotishtoma or other religious ceremony, would immediately serve for that ceremony, since the Jyotishtoma could not take place without previous support of life: all food would, therefore, be intended for religious ends, not for human purposes: and consequently wealth, which supplies it, would be designed for sacrificial uses; and the means of acquiring it would also be meant for the same end; and thus the maxim, that the acquisition of wealth itself, and food, are adapted to human purposes, would be contradicted."

45. That is most futile: for, although it mediately contributes to the celebration of the Jyotishtoma, food obviously

45. Repelled serves the immediate purpose of satisfying hunger; and being designed for human uses, it contributes to religious ends; but there is no proof of its being intended for such ends; nor does its so contributing operate towards such a result. How then should it follow, that acquisition of wealth, wealth itself, and food, are adapted to religious purposes?

46. Hence, [because it was not intended for that purpose, though it contribute to the result,* or for the reason which will be stated,+] there is no room for the reproach, 'If wealth be acknowledged to contribute to the receipt of presents, by means of nourishment previous to such receipt, then, since no acquisition of wealth can be made without nourishment from the time of the receiver's birth, every mode of gain would be accompanied with detriment to the patrimony; and the restriction, "without using the patrimony," (§ 3.) would therefore not be inserted.' For, lest the restriction become superfluous, the text is understood to signify employment of wealth other than an expenditure of it adapted to nourishment and similar use.

ANNOTATIONS.

45. There is no proof of its being intended for such ends.] Of its being meant for such purposes; of its being designed for sacrifices. Gṛtkṣaṇa.

For there is no proof of food being intended for such ends; that is, for sacrifices. Maheṣvara.

No proof of the acquisition of wealth being intended for such ends; that is, for sacrificial uses. Aṣṭhūṭa.

The commentator proceeds to notice variations in the reading of the text, which do not, however, materially alter the sense.

46. Hence ] Because it was not intended for that purpose, though it contributes towards it. But some interpret "hence" for the reason subsequently stated; that is, lest the restriction become superfluous, &c. Gṛtkṣaṇa.

Aṣṭhūṭa is the author who so interprets it. Cāṭṭāṇi gives the other explanation.

The text is understood to signify.] Maheṣvara remarks with disapprobation a different reading, (vahamārṭhayat for vaḥamārṭhayam;) from which, however, by supplying a sentence, he deduces the same meaning.

* Cāṭṭāṇi and Gṛtkṣaṇa. † Aṣṭhūṭa and Maheṣvara.
47. Moreover, an expenditure of wealth for nourishment or otherwise, must necessarily be made even by a person remaining at home; and such expenditure is not designed for the acquisition of wealth: but its having been actually intended for that purpose is a requisite [to its being the cause of the gain.\(^2\)] consequently the supposition does not go too far.

48. Accordingly [since its being actually intended for the purpose is positively required; its merely contributing to that end is not sufficient;\(^+\)] Vīgarāda has said, 'When wealth is not acquired by giving [or using] paternal property, it is declared [by the sages\(^\|$\)] not to be common, any more than wealth received on account of marriage: it becomes not common, merely because property may have been used for food or other necessaries; since that is similar to the sucking of the [mother's] breast.

49. Hence, [because its being actually intended for that purpose is a requisite to its being the cause of the acquisition,\(^\$\)] though much wealth, belonging to the father, have been expended in festivity at the son's initiation, or at his wedding, what is obtained by him in aims during his austerities as a student, or received on account of his marriage, is not common; for that expenditure of wealth was not made with a view to gain.

50. The purpose must have been gain, to render the acquisition common.

50. It is, therefore, demonstrated, that wealth, acquired by means of joint stock used for the express purpose of gain, is common property; and no other is so.

51. The same import may be deduced by abridging the substance of what has been expressed, after various disquisitions, by Jitendra, who says, 'Whatever is acquired on separate funds is several property. For the sake of perspicuity, [gains of science and other particular sorts\(\|$\)] are specified by way of example, in these and other words,

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47. The supposition does not go too far.] There is not ground for supposing, that wealth, expended for nourishment, is the cause of an acquisition. \(^2\) Mahāyāna.

48. Not acquired by giving paternal property.] It is thus expressly declared, that the expenditure must have been actually intended for that purpose. \(^+$\) Gītrāṇa.

51. But even these sorts of wealth become common.] Such sorts of wealth, being gained by science, valour, or the like, are joint property, if attended with a sufficient cause of a joint right. Though the wealth be of such sort, it is common property. \(^\|$\) Gītrāṇa.

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\(^2\) Mahāyāna, \(^+$\) Gītrāṇa, &c., \(^\|$\) Mahāyāna, \(\|$\) Gītrāṇa.
"Wealth, however, acquired by learning, belongs exclusively to him who acquired it."* Such sorts of property are exempted from partition, because they are separate: but even these sorts of wealth become common, if there be a sufficient cause of a joint right. This also has for the sake of a ready comprehension, been in certain instances described [in the writings of sages†] by the circumstance of joint stock used; in others, by that of united exertion made; in some, by that of common relation.'

52. It has been, likewise, said by Báloka, 'The rest cannot have a right to wealth gained by one brother through science, or similar means; [being acquired without use of joint funds, and independently of the exertions of the rest ‡] since there is no argument for it.

53. The practice of dividing wealth gained by receipt of presents without, expenditure of joint property, which is observed to prevail among virtuous people, is not unsuitable, whether founded on the mutual affection of the brethren, or on a mainly sentiment. Or [it may be thus accounted for:] people, observing the partition of wealth received in presents, (for presents are in general gains of science; and, as such, the participation of co-heirs equally or more learned is ordained by a passage of law, though the property have been acquired without use of joint funds;) and not knowing, that this partition of the gains of learning is made under a special rule respecting science, but erroneously supposing the partition to take effect because the wealth was gained by an unseparated co-heir, have done so of their own accord. It is not, however, founded on uniform practice. There is consequently nothing incongruous.

54. But, as for the text of Manu, ("After the death of the father, if the eldest brother acquire any wealth, a share of that belongs to the younger brothers; provided they have duly cultivated science."§) the meaning of it is this; under another text, placing the eldest and younger brothers in the

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ANNOTATIONS.

By the circumstance of joint stock used.] For example, 'The brethren participate, &c.' (Vysáṣṭi). Vide § 14.

By that of united exertion made.] As in the text, 'If all of them, being unlearned, &c.' (Manu, 9, 205.)

By that of common relation.] For instance, "After the death of the father and the mother." (Manu, 9, 104.) Vide C. 1. § 14.

And thus, if any thing be given to one, expressly in consideration of his being the son of a person named; all the sons of that person are entitled to partake. Črīkṣaṇa and Aṣchyuta.

54. If the eldest brother acquire any wealth.] If he alone acquire it by his labour with a separate stock. Črīkṣaṇa.

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* Manu, 9, 206. Vide § 9. † Aṣchyuta. ‡ Črīkṣaṇa. § Manu, 9, 204.
relation of father and son. ("As a father should protect his sons, so should the firstborn cherish his younger brothers; and they should behave to their elder brother, like children to their father, conformably with their duty respectively."*) the younger brothers have a title in the wealth of the eldest, though obtained without use of joint stock, as they have in their father’s acquisitions. But there is this difference: that even the unlearned sons are entitled to their father’s acquired property; but the learned brothers only have a right to participate in the wealth gained by the eldest.

55. This interpretation is right; for the terms of the text would else become meaningless: expressing ‘after the death of the father’ ‘if the eldest brother, &c.,’ ‘provided they have duly cultivated science.’

56. Consequently it was an inaccurate assertion, that another unseparated brother participates, on the sole ground of the acquisition being made by an unseparated co-heir.

SECTION II.

Definitions of the various sorts of acquisitions, &c., exempt from partition.

1. On this [occasion, or among topics hinted,†] the gains of 1. Gains of science are explained. Upon that subject Kātyāyana science described by Kātyāyana says, “What is gained by the solution of a difficulty, after a prize has been offered, must be considered as acquired through science, and is not included in partition [among co-heirs]. What has been obtained from a pupil, or by officiating as a priest, or for [answering] a question, or for determining a doubtful

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Placing brothers in the relation of father and son.] After the death of the father; for the text occurs under that head.

Younger brothers have a title in the wealth of the eldest.] Not in that which is acquired by the middlemost. Čṛkṣṇa.

55. For the terms of the text would else become meaningless.] They would be superfluous, if the younger brothers had a right, simply as such, to the gains of the eldest generally. Čṛkṣṇa.

After the death of the father.] Hence it appears, that the younger brothers do not participate in the separate acquisitions of the eldest, made while the father was living. Čṛkṣṇa, &c.

1. On this.] Among those sorts of partible property. If the reading be arra, “here” instead of itara, “there,” the sense is, ‘on this opportunity.’ Čṛkṣṇa.

* Manu, 9, 192.
† Čṛkṣṇa.
point, or through display of knowledge, or by [success in] disputation, or for superior [skill in] reading, the sages have declared to be the gains of science and not subject to distribution. The same rule likewise prevails in the arts; for the excess above the price [of the common goods], and that which is gained through skill by winning from another a stake at play, must be considered as acquired by science, and not liable to partition. So Vṛhaspati has ordained."

2. First sort. A prize for the solution of a difficulty.


4. Third sort. Fee for officiating at religious rites.

5. These are fees, not gratuities.


7. Fifth sort. A reward for clearing a doubtful point or for deciding a litigated question.

8. Sixth sort. A reward for display of science.

2. If you solve this well, I will give you so much money; after such an offer, if one solve the difficulty and obtain the prize, it is not subject to distribution.

3. From a pupil.] From a person instructed by the acquirer.

4. By officiating as a priest.] Received as a fee or gratuity from a person employing him to officiate at a sacrifice.

5. These are fees, not presents; for they are similar to wages or hire.

6. So, a question relative to science being resolved, if any one, through satisfaction, give anything which had not been previously offered.

7. Also what is obtained by clearing the doubts of one, by whom an offer has been thus made: "To him, who removes my doubts on the meaning of this passage, I will give this gold." Or [it may signify a fee, such as] the sixth part or the like, received for a correct decision between two litigant parties, who apply for the determination of a dubious and contested point.

8. Likewise, what is received in a present or the like for displaying his knowledge in the sacred ordinances and so forth.

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The excess above the price.] Having taken gold or the like belonging to the joint stock, and having made bracelets or similar things, the value, which is thus superadded by the skill of the artist to the price of the gold, &c., is an acquisition made through science. Čṛkṣṭhama.

By winning a stake at play.] A wager, previously staked, which is won by superior skill in play. Čṛkṣṭhama.

5. These are fees.] To obviate the seeming tautology in the subsequent mention of a present obtained through the display of learning, after noticing a reward for resolving a difficult question; the author says "it is a fee, not a present." It is not obtained by the mere acceptance of a gift. Čṛkṣṭhama.

6. A question relative to science being resolved.] A proper answer having been given to a question proposed.
9. So, in a contest between two persons respecting their knowledge of sacred ordinances, or in any other controversy whatsoever concerning their respective attainments, what is gained by surpassing the opponent.

10. Likewise, where a single article is to be given, and there are many competitors, what is received for reading in a superior manner.

11. Also, what is gained by painters, goldsmiths and other artists, through skill in the arts and so forth.

12. In like manner, what is won by beating another at play.

13. All this is exempt from being shared with the rest of the co-partners. The meaning is as follows: whatever is acquired by any [skill or] science, belongs to the acquirer, not to the rest. For illustration only, it has been stated at large by Kātyāyana, to obviate the error of Čūkara and others.

14. Hence, [since it is enumerated by Kātyāyana among the gains of science;[*] what is obtained in a present by displaying and making known his own knowledge, is also an acquisition made by science; for a present is given to a learned man on account of his learning.

15. So Yama; “A man endowed with science, regular in [the performance of his] duties, contented, patient, with subdued passions, of strict veracity, grateful, disinterested, kind to cows, careful of them, generous, a performer of sacrifices, and a priest, the sages pronounce to be a worthy object. But a present should not be conferred on such as neglect rigid observances, or are ignorant of holy texts, or merely live by their class: for a stone transports not a stone [over the stream].”

ANNOTATIONS.

9. [Gained by surpassing the opponent.] Received on terminating the contest by demonstrating the proposition: having been previously staked by the disputant, or being generously given by the king. Čūkrīśna.

13. [For illustration.] For an example of wealth gained by science without use of joint funds. Čūkrīśna and Ačhyuta.

The error of Čūkara and others.] Their mistake in supposing an acquisition to be subject to partition simply because it was obtained by an unseparated co-partner. Čūkrīśna.

* Čūkrīśna and Ačhyuta.
16. The present is given on account of learning.

16. For, it is in right of his learning, that he is a fit object of gifts; and unlearned men are unworthy objects.

17. Hence, what has been alleged by some one, that the gains of science signify such gifts [only] as are received on account of teaching; must be rejected as having been said for want of seeing the text above cited: and because the word science (vidyā) being derived from the root vid to know, signifies any knowledge [or skill.]

18. As for what is objected by Čṛikara, that 'by pronouncing wealth received in presents to be the earning of science, receipt of presents, instruction of pupils, and assistance in sacrifice, are confounded,' that is very futile; since, although presents and the rewards of teaching and assisting in sacrifices, and other particular sorts, be connected as being equally gains of science; yet the several sorts are not confounded: for still the rewards of teaching and of sacrificing are not presents; and it is an uncontested truth, that a black bull, a red or a pied one, or other individuals, though equally bulls, are not confounded.

19. Accordingly, [as they are not confounded,† or because things generically similar are specifically different; therefore,]

19. His argument refuted. since [it may be asked] 'how does the sage, by pronouncing what is received from a pupil or for officiating as a priest to be the earning of science, fail in discriminating the rewards of teaching and of sacrificing? the allegation [of their being confounded,§] merely by way of offering an objection, must be rejected.

20. Kātyāyana propounds the gains of valour, &c. "When [a soldier] performs a gallant action, despising danger; and favour is shown to him by his lord pleased with that action; whatever property is then received by him, shall be considered as gained by valour. That and what is taken under a standard, are declared not to be subject to

ANNOTATIONS.

17. For want of seeing the text above cited.] Meaning the text of Kātyāyana.

(§ 1.) Čṛikara.

It must be rejected as inconsistent with the sense of the above cited text of Yama.

(§ 18.) Mahēśvara.

This commentator appears to have read vachanārthādārjanāt 'from seeing the purport of the text;' in place of vachanādārjanāt 'for want of seeing the text.'

18. By pronouncing wealth received in presents to be the earning of science.] Čṛikara's meaning is, that, if the fee for assistance in sacrificing be a gain made through science, because it is by science that the man was fitted for officiating; and if the reward of teaching and the receipt of presents be so likewise; then all three, being the gains of science, are confounded. Čṛikara.

* Čṛikara.
† Āchārya.
‡ Čṛikara.
§ Čṛikara.
distribution. What is seized [by a soldier] in war, after risking his life for his lord and routing the forces of the enemy, is named spoil taken under a standard."

21. Nuptial presents explained by the same author.

21. "But wealth received on account of marriage is considered to be that which has been accepted with a wife.

22. Exposition of the text.

22. The meaning is, received at the time of accepting a bride.

23. Other sorts, not liable to partition, enumerated by Manu and Vishnu.

23. So Manu and Vishnu state other sorts of property exempt from partition. "Clothes, vehicles, ornaments, prepared food, water, women and furniture for repose or for meals, are declared not liable to distribution."*

24. Explanation of the passage.

24. Clothes.] Personal apparel and raiment intended to be worn at assemblies.

Vehicles.] Carriages or horses and the like.

Ornaments.] Rings and so forth.

Prepared food.] Sweetmeats, &c.

Water.] Contained in a pond or well; as suited to use.

Women.] Other than female slaves.

Furniture for repose or for meals.] Beds and vessels used for eating and sipping [or drinking] and similar purposes.

ANNOTATIONS.

A black bull.] Kila, the term here used, signifies blue, and is frequently employed in the sense of black; but the sort of bull intended by that term, in the selection of a steer to be consecrated and let loose at obsequies and on certain other occasions, is one of a red colour, with brown head and tail, and with white hoofs and horns.

A red one.] Kapila: When applied to a cow, this term signifies one of the colour of lac dye, with black tail and white hoofs.

22. Received at the time of accepting a bride.] This is indefinite: for the same must be likewise understood of other property received in consequence of becoming a son-in-law. Çrikshna.

24. Suited to use.] Adapted to employment. As much should be taken by each person as will supply his wants. There is not, in this instance, a restriction of equal shares. Çrikshna.

* Other than female slaves.] Since the partition of a female slave is directed by Vrahaspati, ("A single female slave should be employed in labour, in the house of the several co-heirs successively, &c.") the author says, "other than female slaves." Çrikshna.

Female slaves.] Meaning women kept for enjoyment. Mahaçvara.

Accordingly Gautama says, "No partition is allowed in the case of women connected with one of the partners." Ačyuta.

Furniture for repose, &c.] The words are yaga-kåhema-prachaman cha. The Rat-

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Manu 9, 219. But not found in Vishnu's Institutes. Vide C. I. § 10,

Vide Mitâkshara, C. I. Sect. 4. § 92.
25. So Vyāsa: "A place of sacrifice, a field, a vehicle, dressed food, water and women, are not divisible among kinsmen, though [transmitted] for a thousand generations.

26. A place of sacrifice.] The spot, where sacrifices are performed; or else an idol: not wealth obtained by sacrificing; for that has been noticed as being the earning of science.

27. Thus Kātyāyana: "The path for cows, the carriage road, clothes, and any thing which is worn on the body, should not be divided; nor what is requisite for use, or intended for arts: so Vihaspati declares."

28. Requisite for use.] What is fit for each person's use; as books and the like in the study of the Vedas, &c. That shall not be shared by ignorant brethren. So what is adapted to the arts, belongs to artists; not to persons ignorant of the particular art.

29. Also Čankha and Likhita: "No division of a dwelling takes place; nor of water pots, ornaments, and things not of general use, nor of women, clothes, and channels for draining water. Prajāpati has so ordained."

30. A house, garden or the like, which one of the co-heirs had constructed within the site of the dwelling place, during the father's life-time, remains his indivisible property: for his father has assented by not forbidding the construction of it.(a)

31. So, even property inherited from the paternal grandfather, which has long been lost, and is not recovered by the rest through inability, or through aversion from [the efforts requisite for its] recovery, belongs exclusively to the father, if recovered by him on his own funds, and by his own labour; and is not common property.

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nākara expounds yoga-keśema the counsellor and priest; and prachāra the path for cows and other cattle, &c. Adhyuta.

These terms are otherwise explained in the Mitākṣara. C. 1. Sect. 4. § 23.

28. As books; &c.] If there be other effects of equal value with the books, these shall be retained by the learned brethren; and other chattels shall be taken by the illiterate co-heirs. This must be inferred. Else, if the hereditary property consist in books only, the illiterate heirs might be deprived of subsistence, if they had no right of participation. Črikṣaṇa.

29. Things not of general use.] As books for illiterate persons and so forth. Črikṣaṇa.

Channels for draining water.] Raghunandana reads āpām prachāra-rathyānām "water, vessels and roads," in place of āpām prachāra-rathyānām, "channels for draining water."

(a) Sect I Morl. Dig. 486.—Ed.
32. As declared by Manu. Such property belongs to the person recovering it.

32. Thus Manu ordains: "If a father recover the property of his father, which remained unrecovered, he shall not, against his will, share it with the sons, since in fact it was acquired by himself."*

33. Property appertaining to his father, not recovered by the sons; not retrieved by them. The other readings, anavāpya and anavāpyam [in place of anavāptam] are unfounded.

34. Vihaspati says, "Over the grandfather's property, which has been seized [by strangers] and is recovered by the father through his own ability, and over [any thing] gained by him through science, valour or the like, the father's full dominion is ordained. He may give it away at his pleasure, or he may defray his consumption with such wealth; but, on failure of him, the sons are pronounced entitled to equal shares."

35. Exposition of the text.

35. Through his own ability.] The author thus indicates a separate personal exertion.

36. And of the preceding passage (§ 32.)

36. In both texts, the term "father" is indefinite for a reason [of the precept] is stated; "since in fact it was acquired by himself." (§ 32.)

37. The rule is the same in regard to property recovered and acquired. Except land.

37. Thus the rule must be understood in instances of any such hereditary property, other than land, exactly as in the case of property not hereditary, but acquired by the man himself.

38. Čankha propounds a special rule regarding land. "Land, inherited in regular succession, but which had been formerly lost, and which a single [heir] shall recover solely by his own labour, the rest may divide according to their due allotments, having first given him a fourth part."

**ANNOtATIONS.**

33. The other readings are unfounded.] For, according to one reading, something must be understood; and according to the other, a term must be taken in a secondary acceptation. Čikitsaṃ.

34. Equal shares.] The specifying of equal shares forbids the deduction of a twentieth part for the eldest. Čādāmanī and Čikitsaṃ.

35. He may defray his consumption with such wealth.] All the copies, which have been collated, agree in reading bhūgaṇ caiva tāvā doṣāhā, he may defray his consumption with that wealth. But, in every other compilation, as the Kātakarā, Smitāchārdikā, Rajapāta, etc., the reading is bhūgaṇ instead of bhūgaṇ. "He may make a distribution of such wealth."

* Manu, 9, 209.
39. By the term "solely" the author intimates, that neither common funds were used nor joint personal exertions made. Still it does not become the separate property of the person retrieving it; but a fourth part of the land recovered must be given to him in addition to his regular allotment; and because there is no reason for supposing it to be vague.

40. Thus have been explained both, what is divisible and what is exempt from partition.

CHAPTER VII.

On the participation of sons born after a partition.

1. The share of a son born after the partition of the estate is now declared. On that subject Manu and Nárada say, "A son, born after a division, shall alone take the paternal wealth; or he shall participate with such [of the brethren] as are reunited with the [father]."*

2. If the father, having separated his sons, and having reserved for himself a share according to law, die without being re-united with his sons; then a son, who is born after the partition, shall alone take the father’s wealth; and that only shall be his allotment. But, if the father die after re-uniting himself with some of his sons, that son shall receive his share from the re-united co-heirs.

3. Gautama also pronounces him heir to his father’s share.

39. In addition. The meaning of the text is, 'having given a fourth part of the land in addition, to the person who recovered it, all the co-heirs, together with him, shall take equal shares.' It is not understood from the term "the rest," that a fourth part only shall be given to him; for it would be an unequal rule, since the person, recovering the land, would receive less than his co-heir, if there be one or two sharers unconcerned in the recovery. Çrīkṛṣṇa.

2. Having reserved a share according to law.] It is thus hinted, that, if the father, through ignorance of the law, have made a partition in which he took a very small share for himself, his son, afterwards begotten, shall receive a due allotment from the brethren. Çrīkṛṣṇa.

* Manu, 9. 216. Nárada, 13. 43. † Gautama, 26, 27.
4. He, of whom the conception was subsequent to the division of the estate, is a son begotten after partition; being procreated by a person, who is separated [from co-partners:] for, without conception, there is no procreation. Therefore, if the sons were separated [from the father] while his wife was pregnant but not known to be so, the son, who is afterwards born [of that pregnancy] shall receive his share from his brothers.

5. Not one only, but even many sons, begotten after partition, shall take exclusively the paternal wealth. Thus Vṛhaspati says: "The younger brothers of those, who have made a partition with their father, whether children of the same mother, or of other wives, shall take their father's share. A son, born before partition, has no claim on the paternal wealth; nor one, begotten after it, on that of his brother."

6. One, born previously to the partition, is not entitled to the paternal estate: nor one begotten by the separated father, to the estate of his brother. So the same author declares: "All the wealth, which is acquired by the father himself, who has made a partition with his sons, goes to the son begotten by him after the partition. Those, born before it, are declared to have no right; as in the wealth, so in the debts likewise, and in gifts, pledges and purchases.

7. Under the term "all," wealth, however considerable, which is acquired by the father, goes to the son begotten by him after partition.

8. "They have no claims on each other, except for acts of mourning and libations of water."

ANNOTATIONS.

4. Shall receive his share from his brothers.] This must be understood where the father remains separate, having reserved for himself what ought to be reserved by him, and having given the residue to his sons. But, if the father be dead, the shares of him and of the brethren must be thrown together, and divided, according to law, by all the brothers. However, Chādāmāni directs a new partition by mixing the whole of the effects, although the father be living; because the double share, or other allotment reserved by him, was not according to law. In the case supposed, if a share were previously set apart for the child in the womb, the wife's pregnancy being known, all shall participate in the father's allotment [after his demise] provided there be no son begotten after the partition. But, if the father himself, though apprized of the pregnancy, has given shares to his sons, in virtue of his power as owner, the child in the womb has no right to participate, since their property in those shares is complete: he has a right only to the father's allotment; and, if there be a son begotten after the partition, he is entitled to partake equally with him. Gṛkrṣna.

6. Which is acquired by himself.] It is thus intimated, that what is acquired, through personal labour, on separate funds, by the father who is re-united after partition with another son, belongs also to the son begotten after the partition, and not to the re-united pareners. Gṛkrṣna.
9. By specifying "Acts of mourning and libations of water" only the author excludes the remoter pretensions to a participation in wealth.

10. This is applicable only to the case of wealth acquired by the father. But, if property inherited from the grandfather, as land or the like, had been divided, he may take a share of such property from his brothers: for partition of it is authorized, [only] when the mother becomes incapable of bearing more children. [Consequently, since the partition is illegal, having been made in other circumstances, it ought to be annulled.]*

11. That is declared by Vishnu: "Sons, with whom the father has made a partition, should give a share to the son born after the distribution."†

12. So Vājñavalkya: "When the sons have been separated, one afterwards born of a woman equal in class, shares the distribution. His allotment must positively be made out of the visible estate corrected for income and expenditure."‡

13. That must relate to hereditary property.

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ANNOTATIONS.

10. Land or the like.] A corollary and shares are intended by the terms "or the like," for gems, pearls, &c., are similar to a man’s own acquired wealth. Čṛkṣaṇa.

11. Must positively.] The particle va is affirmative; and what has been consumed is consequently excepted. Čṛkṣaṇa, &c.

The particle signifies "or" and denotes a regulated alternative. If there be evidence of the income and expenditure, the allotment shall be made, out of the "visible estate; if not, it must be grounded on a reference to the amount originally distributed, Maheovara.

The visible estate.] The wealth forthcoming. Achyuta.

The remainder after allowing for income and expenditure: or that which is forthcoming. Maheovara.

13. For the reason abovementioned.] That which was stated; ‘because distribution is authorized when the mother becomes incapable, &c.’ Therefore, whether pregnancy were known or not; the partition being illegal, which has been made, of the grandfather’s estate, without the mother’s being incapable of bearing more children, it ought to be annulled; and the two last cited passages will relate to the distribution of such property; but the preceding texts of Manu and the rest regard the father’s own acquired wealth. The contrary must not be supposed. Čṛkṣaṇa.

* Čṛkṣaṇa. † Vishnu, 17. 3. ‡ Vājñavalkya, 2, 123.
CHAPTER VIII.

On the allotment of a share to a co-parcener returning from abroad.

1. The participation of one, who arrives after the distribution of the estate, is next declared. On this subject Vīhārpati says, "Whether partition have, or have not, been made; whenever an heir appears, he shall receive a share of whatever common property there is. Be it debt, or a writing, or house, or field, which descended from his paternal ancestor, he shall take his due share of it, when he comes, even though he have been long absent."

2. "If a man leave the common family, and reside in another country, his share must no doubt be given to his male descendants when they return. Be the descendant third, or fifth, or even seventh, in degree, he shall receive his hereditary allotment, on proof of his birth and name."

ANNOTATIONS.

1. Whether partition have or have not been made.] By the rest, who remain in the country. So the text must be supplied. Achyuta.

Whatever common property.] Which has descended from his ancestor. Achyuta.

2. Or even seventh.] The particle "or" (va) connects this with other degrees not mentioned but included with the seventh. Therefore descendants, as far as the seventh in degree, returning from a foreign country, participate: not so the eighth or other remotest descendant. Accordingly, the text which expresses, that "The right to participation ceases with the seventh "person," relates to this subject. Griśkhæva.

Be he the third, or fifth, or even seventh.] The particle "or" is here employed in an indefinite sense. If therefore, at the time of the demise of the ancestor and owner, a descendant, within the degree of great grandson, be the eldest of the male issue living; then, since the property devolves in regular succession on the progeny, the descendant, even beyond the seventh degree, may have a good title. But, if the eldest of the [surviving] male issue be the son of the great grandson; then, since he is destitute of title, being debarred from offering a funeral oblation, his son, though fifth in descent, has not the right of succession. Achyuta.

The foregoing is cited, without mention of the author's name, by Griśkhæva, who replies, "That is not right: for, were it so, there would be no difference in the cases of one who remained at home and of one who went abroad; and the text would consequently be superfluous. Accordingly a separate revelation must be presumed as the ground of that text. This should be considered by the wise."

The close of Griśkhæva's reply bears allusion to the sequel of Achyuta's argument, in which it is said, "As for the supposition, that the rights of third, fifth, &c. are determined according to the greater or less distance of the place; but, since the succession is ordained to extend as far as the seventh in degree, it extends no further; and accordingly another passage of law expresses, that inheritance stops beyond the seventh in descent: That is wrong, for it would be necessary to assume another foundation of it [in scripture]; and the rule would be irrelevant, since no determination could be formed, as there is no ground for selection of particular distances."
3. "To the lineal descendants, when they appear, of that man, whom the neighbours and old inhabitants know by tradition to be the proprietor, the land must be surrendered by his kinsmen.

4. Under this text; the heir [of a co-parcener] long absent shall take his due allotment, after making himself known to the old inhabitants settled on all sides.

5. Conclusion.

Such is the participation of one arriving after a division.

CHAPTER IX.

On the participation of sons by women of various tribes.

1. Partition among sons of the same father by different women; some equal to himself by class, others married in the direct order of the tribes, is now described.

2. Marriage is allowed with women in the order of the tribes, as well as with those of equal class; for Manu says, "For the first marriage of the twice born classes, a woman of the same tribe is recommended; but for such, as are impelled by desire, those following are preferable in the order of the classes. A Čūdrā woman only must be the wife of a Čūdrā; she and a woman of his own tribe [are the only wives] of a merchant; they two, and a woman of his own class, are alone eligible for a man of the royal [or military] tribe; and those [three] and a woman of his own rank [may be wives] of a priest."

3. A Čūdrā woman only.] The particle "only" is connected with every member of the sentence; for that term, expressed immediately before, is understood with the words "she," "they two," and "those three." The meaning is, that marriage in the inverse order of the tribes must by no means be contracted.

4. But for such, as are impelled by desire, these, &c.] This indicates an alleviation of offence, not entire exemption from blame.

* Manu, 3, 12.—19.
5. Čankha and Likhita declare, "Wives must be espoused. Women of like class are preferable for all persons." This is stated as the principal rule. The succeeding one follows: "Four wives of a Brāhmaṇa are allowed in the direct order; three, of a Kshatriya; two, of a Vaiṣya; and one, of a Cúdrā."

6. And explained.

7. Pāṇini shows, that marriage is here meant.

8. Interpretation of its text.

9. Of the rest] Of the Kshatriya, &c. in their order, three, two, and one, may be allowed.

10. It thus appears, that the texts are applicable to the instance of such a woman married in regular gradation. Hārita's text also, which coincides with that of Manu and the rest, relates to a woman espoused. Thus he says, "No other is so sacrilegious, as is the husband of a woman of the servile tribe; for that Brāhmaṇa is slain by the child, which he himself begets on her." Accordingly [since marriage with a Cúdrā woman, and procreation of issue by her, are offences;†] Čankha omits the Cúdrā in describing a wife eligible for a twice born man. "A Brāhmaṇa, a Kshatriya, and a Vaïṣya are propounded as the allowed wives of a Brāhmaṇa; a Kshatriya and a Vaïṣya, of a Kshatriya; but a Vaïṣya is ordained the only wife of a Vaïṣya; and a Cúdrā, of a Cúdrā."

ANNOTATIONS.

6. The numbers refer to the tribes.] Therefore, the marriage of a Brāhmaṇa with five or six Brāhmaṇas is not prohibited. Çeṣṭhaṇa.

The meaning is, that five or six wives, similar to the husband himself in class, are not forbidden to a man of the sacerdotal or other tribe. Arhyata.

* Manu, 3, 15—17.  
† Çeṣṭhaṇa.
11. But adultery with such a woman is comparatively venial.

11. Hence these evils do not ensue on the procreation of offspring upon a Cūdrā woman, not married to [the Brāhmaṇa] himself: but a venial offence is committed, and a slight penance is requisite, as will be shown.

12. Manu propounds the distribution among sons of four classes.

12. Partition among sons by wives from various tribes, is propounded by Manu.

"Let the venerable son take three shares of the heritage; and the son of the Kshatriya wife, two shares; the son of the Vaśya wife, a share and a half; and the son of the Cūdrā wife, may take a share. Or let a person, conversant with law, divide the whole collected estate into ten parts, and make a legal distribution by this [following] rule: let the venerable son receive four parts; the son of the Kshatriya, three; let the son of the Vaśya have two parts; and let the son of the Cūdrā take a single part."* 

13. Two modes are propounded on the supposition of some [superiority of] good qualities [in the sons belonging to regenerate tribes,† or in the Cūdrā's son.]‡

14. On this subject Vishnu has delivered rules: "If there be sons of a Brāhmaṇa, by women of the four tribes,"§ &c., down to the concluding passage, "On this principle, shares should be distributed in other cases likewise."[""

ANNOTATIONS.

11- Not married to himself.] That is, married to another man. It does not, therefore, contradict what is subsequently said, ‘This passage (Manu, 9. 179.) supposes the Cūdrā to be unmarried.’ Črikaṇa.

13. On the supposition of some good qualities.] In the sons belonging to the regenerate tribes. This phrase must be here understood. Achyuta.

According to the good and bad qualities of the Cūdrā’s son. Some say, on the supposition of some good qualities in the sons belonging to regenerate classes. Črikaṇa.

Of the two modes, that, by which a greater portion is allotted to him, that by the other, should be selected in favor of the person, who is superior in good qualities. Chūdmāni.

If the first mentioned be respectively superior in good qualities, the distribution must be made in ten parts.

It should be here understood, that he, who is superior by his good qualities, shall take out of the whole estate the share allotted to a person of his tribe, according to the distribution in ten parts; and the residue shall be taken by the rest, sharing it according to the distribution in seven and half parts; but the share of him, who is superior in good qualities, must be omitted [in this further partition.] However, should the Cūdrā’s son be superior in virtue, the mode of allotment by seven and a half shares must be followed: since he would have a less portion, if the mode of distribution in ten parts were observed. Mahēśvara.

14. Down to the concluding passage.] Vishnu’s text has not been inserted by this author, through fear of proximity. Črikaṇa.

* Manu, 9. 161.—153. † Achyuta. ‡ Črikaṇa.
§ Vishnu, 18, 1. ‖ Vishnu, 18, 40.
15. The son of a Brāhmaṇa by a Kshatriya wife, if eldest of all by birth and superior in virtue, shall be an equal sharer with the Brāhmaṇa son: and the son of a Brāhmaṇa, or of Kshatriya, by a Vaiśya wife, shall, in like circumstances, be an equal participator with the Kshatriya son. ViṣṇuPURĪ directs: “The son of a Kshatriya wife, being elder by birth, and endowed with superior qualities, shall have an equal share with the venerable son of the Brāhmaṇa; and, in like manner, the son of a Vaiśya wife shall share equally with the soldier.” So Baudhāyana says, “Of the sons by a woman of equal class and by one of the next inferior tribe, if this son of the wife one degree lower [than her husband] be [the most] virtuous, he may take the allotment of an eldest son. For a virtuous brother is the supporter of the rest.”

16. Even the Cūdrā’s son has that right.

17. But land, which has been acquired by the father, through acceptance [of a pious donation,] shall belong to the son of the Brāhmaṇa exclusively, not to the Kshatriya son and the rest: and the house, and hereditary field, appertain to the sons of regenerate classes, not to the Cūdras. So ViṣṇuPURĪ declares: The sons of the Brāhmaṇa shall take land which was received as a pious gift; but all the sons of twice-born classes shall have the house, as well as the field, which has descended from ancestors.

18. All sons, belonging to regenerate tribes, have a right to hereditary acquisitions gained both by the paternal grandfather and by the paternal great-grandfather; for it is expressed without restriction, “descended from ancestors.” But, in the case of land obtained by acceptance [of a donation,] since the right of the Kshatriya’s son and the rest is denied, that of grandsons and other descendants [claiming through such sons*] is [properly†] unacknowledged.

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It is more fully cited by Achyuta, as well as by Črīkrishṇa: but the insertion of it in these notes is not judged necessary.

18. Grandson, &c.] The grandsons of the Kshatriya or other inferior wife, Črīkrishṇa.

Is unacknowledged.] Dissent from their right is correct. So the sentence must be supplied. For, since the nearer relative has no title, it follows, by reasoning a fortiori, that the relative’s relative has none. Črīkrishṇa.

* Črīkrishṇa † Ibid,
19. This is declared by Viśhāpataḥ: "Land, obtained by acceptance of donation, must not be given to the son of a Kshatriya or other wife of inferior tribe: even though his father give it to him, the son of the Brahmāṇi may resume it, when [his father is] dead." And thus [since the text of Viśhāpataḥ has the same foundation,] land, obtained by acceptance of donation, is the same which has been termed [by Manu] land received as a pious gift (brahma-dāya): for the study of the Vedas (here signified by the term brahma,) and the knowledge of their meaning, have been propounded as qualifications for the receipt of gifts.

20. It is not land which has been received as a present, according to the text of Manu: ("To priests returned from the mansion of their preceptors, let the king show due respect; for that holy mode of showing respect by kings, is pronounced unperishable.") Since this assumes the form of a token of respect.

21. Or else, this land is excepted by the one author, as the other is by the other.

22. But the land of a Brahmāṇi is not universally a holy heritage (brahma-dāya): for it is expressly declared, that sons of twice-born classes have a right to the hereditary field; and the Čudra is alone excluded. So a passage of law expresses: "The son, begotten on a Čudrī woman by any man of a twice-born class, is not entitled to a share of land; but one, begotten on her, being of equal class, shall take all the property [whether land or chattels]; thus is the law settled."

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19. A pious gift.] In the phrase brahma-dāyāgata, in the text of Viśh Mat Manu; which has been translated "received as a pious gift." As qualifications for the receipt of gifts.] For a proper object of donations is so described. (Vide C. 6. Sect. 2. § 15.)

21. This is excepted by the one author as the other is by the other.] This, meaning a respectful present, is excepted by one, namely by Viśhaṇi; and land received in a pious donation, by the other, namely by Viśhaṇi Manu. Hence, both sorts descend from the father to the son of the Brahmāṇiwife. Chādāmāṇi.

This, which is in the form of a respectful present, is excepted by one, namely, by Manu; and the other, meaning land received as a pious gift, by the other, that is, by Viśhaṇi; and thus both sorts of land belong exclusively to the Brahmāṇi's son. Čikṣra and Ačhyuta.

22. A Čudrī woman.] Properly Čudrī is the wife of a Čudra; and Čudrā woman of the Čudra tribe. (Vārtika 1—2. on Pāṇini 4. 1. 4.) But this distinction is not observed in the text here quoted.

Being of equal class.] A son begotten by a Čudra man on a Čudrā woman. Chādāmāṇi and Čikṣraṇa.

* Chādāmāṇi. † Čikṣraṇa. ‡ Manu, 7. 82.
§ Chādāmāṇi and Čikṣraṇa. || Viśhaṇi cited in the Ratnākara.
23. The Čudrā’s son cannot inherit land however acquired.

24. A Čudra, being the only son of a Brāhmaṇa, is entitled to a third part [of the inheritance]; and [if the remaining] two parts go to the Sapiṇḍas; or, on failure of them, to the Sakulyas, or, if there be none, to the person who performs the obsequies. So Devala ordains: "A Nisháda, being the only son of a priest, shall have a third part [of the heritage]; and let the kinsman, near or remote, who performs the obsequies [for the deceased, take the two [remaining] shares.

25. The son, begotten by a Brāhmaṇa on a Čudrí, is termed a Nisháda. The difference between the Sapiṇḍa and Sakulya (the near and the remote kinsman) will be explained [under the head of succession to the estate of a man who leaves no son.]

26. If a Čudra be the only son of a Kshatriya or of a Vaigya, he takes half of his estate; and the next heirs, according to the order of succession subsequently explained in regard to the estate of one who has no male issue, shall take the other half. So Vishnu says, "A Čudra, being the only son of any twice-born man, takes half his property; and the other half goes where the estate of a childless man would devolve."

27. Here the right to a third part, or the succession to half the estate, must be understood as restricted to the instance of a person endowed with science, morality and virtue. For Manu says, "Whether he have sons, or have no sons, by other wives, no more than a tenth part must be given to his son by a Čudría wife." Since more than a tenth part is by this text forbidden, although there be no son belonging to a regenerate tribe; it appears, that the preceding text relates to an excellent only son by a Čudría woman. As for the prohibi-

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26. Only son of any twice-born man.] Here the term twice-born relates to two classes, the Kshatriya and the Vaigya; not to the Brāhmaṇi; since Devala, (§ 24) ordaining a third part of the Brāhmaṇi’s estate [for the Čudra son,] opposes that construction. Črikṛṣṇa and Ashyuta.

27. It must be explained, &c.] For it is said, ‘that only, which his father may give him, shall be his.’ Črikṛṣṇa.

Through his father’s favour.] If that, which has been so received, be equal to a tenth part, nothing more should be given to the Čudría’s son. Črikṛṣṇa.

* Črikṛṣṇa, Vide C. 11.  † C. 11.  ‡ Vishnu, 18. 32.  § Manu, 9. 134.
tion of his participating in the estate, as declared by Manu; ("The son of a Brāhmaṇa, a Kshatriya, or a Vaiṣya, by a woman of the servile class, shall not share the inheritance: whatever his father may give him, let that only be his property.") It must be explained as implying, that the property, received by him through his father's favour, amounts to a tenth part of the estate.

23. A passage of Vṛhaspati expresses, "The virtuous and obedient son, borne by a Čauḍrā woman, to a man who has no other offspring, should obtain a maintenance; and let the kinsmen take the residue of the estate:" which signifies, that something should be given, to enable him to practise agriculture or some other profession adapted to earn a subsistence; but to one deficient in good qualities, food and other necessaries, as means of subsistence, may be given, in consideration of his behaving with humility and obedience like a pupil. Thus a passage of Manu declares, "A son, begotten through lust on a Čauḍrā woman by a man of the priestly class, is even as a corpse though alive; and is thence called a living corpse (pāraṇācāva)."

These [two] passages imply, that the Čauḍrā woman is unmarried. For a husband is enjoined to approach his wedded wife once in the proper season; and conception takes place then only, not on subsequent intercourse. Thus Yājñavalkya says, "Also passages of Yājñavalkya, &c.

If a brother die without male issue, let another approach the widow once in the proper season:" and Manu ordains, "Having espoused her in due form, she being clad in a white robe, and pure in her moral conduct, let him approach her secretly once in each proper season, until issue be had." The first intercourse being the cause of pregnancy, the mention of "once" may be intended for a secular purpose: else, it must be supposed to be meant for a spiritual end. Accordingly, in the practice of the world, months are counted from the day of the first intercourse, as well for regulating auspicious observances, as for determining the performance of ceremonies restricted to particular months, as the Punsavana and Simantonnayana. Hence, the expression "A son begotten through lust on a Čauḍrā," must relate to the child of an unmarried Čauḍrā (a).

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23. These two passages.] The two texts last cited. Čṛkshaṇa.

That the Čauḍrā woman is unmarried.] Not married to any one: but kept for sensual gratification. Čṛkshaṇa.

For a husband is enjoined to approach his wedded wife once, in the proper season.] Consequently, since a single intercourse in proper season, which is the cause of pregnancy, is enjoined, the procreation of a son, which is its consequence, is also enjoined: for the injunction was propounded for that very purpose. Čṛkshaṇa.

Ceremonies restricted to particular months, as the Punsavana and Simantonnayana.]

* Manu, 9, 155.  
† Manu, 9, 178.  
‡ Not found in the institutes of Yājñavalkya.  
§ Manu, 9, 70.  
(a) See 1 Morl. Dig. 310, note 6.—Ed.
29. But the son of a Çûdrā, by a female slave or other unmarried Çûdrā woman may share equally with other sons, by consent of the father. Thus Manu says, "A son, begotten by a man of the servile class on his female slave, or on the female slave of his slave, may take a share of the heritage, if permitted: thus is the law established." (b).

30. Without such consent, he shall take half a share, as Yâjñavalkya directs: "Even a son, begotten by a Çûdrā on a female slave, may take a share by the choice of the father; but, if the father be dead, the brethren should make him partaker of half a share."†

31. Begotten on an unmarried woman, and having no brother, he may take the whole property; provided there be not a daughter's son. So Yâjñavalkya ordains: "One who has no brothers, may inherit the whole property, for want of daughter's sons."‡ But, if there be a daughter's son, he shall share equally with him: for no special provision occurs: and it is fit, that the allotment should be equal; since the one, though born of an unmarried woman, is son of the owner; and the other, though sprung from a married woman, is only his daughter's son.

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The first of the ceremonies here named is celebrated at the close of the third month of pregnancy. It consists of the following prayer recited by the husband, addressing his pregnant wife. "Male are Mitra and Varuna (the sun and the regent of the sky); male are the twin sons of Aërisf; male are fire and air; may the child in thy womb prove male." The recital of this prayer is preceded by burnt offerings of clarified butter. The other ceremony mentioned should be performed in the fourth, sixth or eighth month of the pregnancy. The husband decorates his wife's head with mimus, ornaments and other articles, reciting divers prayers for a fortunate gestation.


On the unespoused concubine of his male slave. Çrûkâshna.

30. The brethren. The sons by a wedded wife. Mahêgârâ.

31. Having no brother. His father having left no son by a wife. Achûyuta.

He being born of an unmarried woman and having no brother born of a wedded wife. Mahêgârâ.

* Manu, 5. 179. † Yâjñavalkya, 2. 134. ‡ Yâjñavalkya, 2. 130.
(b) See I Mor. Dig. 310; "Mon. I. A. Ca. 35. — Ed.
CHAPTER X.

In the participation of sons by adoption.

1. If a true legitimate son be born after the appointment of a daughter to raise up issue, the distribution to be made between them is here propounded.

2. In such a case, the appointed daughter and the legitimate son take equal shares; nor is the appointed daughter entitled to a deduction of a twentieth part in right of seniority. So Manu declares: “A daughter having been appointed, if a son be afterwards born, the division of the heritage must, in that case, be equal: since there is no right of primogeniture for the woman.”

According to Manu.

For the appointed daughter does not herself perform the functions of an eldest son; but, through her son, presents funeral oblations: as is hinted by Manu: “He, who has no son, may appoint his daughter in this manner to raise up a son for him: saying, the child which shall be born of her, shall be mine for the purpose of performing my obsequies.”

3. It must not be supposed, that, if the appointed daughter first bear a son, and a legitimate son of her father be afterwards born, her son should have the allotment of an eldest son: for he is considered as a son’s son.

Her son is considered as a son’s son.

Her son is considered as a son’s son.

4. As for the text of Vājistha, which declares the son of an appointed daughter to be an adopted son: (“This damsel, who has no brother, I will give unto thee, decked with ornaments; the son, who may be born of her, shall be my son.”) whence it appears, that both

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   *Manu, 9. 127.*  
   *Manu, 9. 126.*  
   *Vājistha, 17. 16.*  

(c) Sūt. 1 Mori, Dig. 18. n. 9. - Ed.
the appointed daughter and her son are [denominated] sons: this designation of him as a son must, (since it contradicts Manu; and since the oblation of a funeral cake is the only quality of a son, which he possesses; be figurative: for, through him, the appointed daughter, offers the funeral oblation; and thus one actually is such, and the other is so by his means.

5. The distribution before-mentioned must be understood in the case where the legitimate son and the appointed daughter are of the same tribe: but, if they be of dissimilar classes, a distribution between them must be made as between legitimate sons appertaining to different classes: for the true son and the appointed daughter are equal.

6. But, if a daughter, being actually appointed, become a widow without having borne a son, or if she be ascertained to be barren, she has not, in that case, a right to her father's wealth: since the appointment was made for the sake of a son, who may perform obsequies; and, on failure of that, she is similar to any other daughter.

7. In a partition among sons of the wife and the rest with a true legitimate son, such of them, as are of the same class with the [adoptive] father and superior by tribe to the true son, whether they be sons of an appointed daughter, or issue of the wife, or offspring of an unmarried damsel, actually offers the oblation; the other, or the appointed daughter, does so, through him; that is, through the son of the appointed daughter. Chudamani.

One.] The son of the appointed daughter. The other.] The appointed daughter considered as a son. By his means.] By means of her son. Crikshya.

One.] The son of the appointed daughter. The other.] The appointed daughter, considered as a son. If the reading be (feminine instead of masculine) anyasya, the sense is, 'another, namely the appointed daughter.' Ayukta.

One actually.] The true legitimate son is of course, in right of his birth, a son. The other.] The son of the appointed daughter. By these means.] By presenting a funeral oblation like a son. Mahavara.

6. She is similar to any other daughter.] It is thus intimated, that, as in the case of a barren daughter, who was not appointed, the next heirs take the inheritance; so they do, in the instance of such a daughter, who had been appointed. Chudamani and Crikshya.

7. Superior by tribe to the true son.] If the true son be issue of a woman of the military or of the commercial class; then, the son of the wife, or other subsidiary son, being born of a Brāhmaṇī, is superior by tribe. Chudamani.

Son of an appointed daughter.] Since the appointed daughter herself is equal to the true legitimate son, she is not included in this enumeration. Chudamani.

Begotten by himself.] "Issue begotten by a man himself" comprises 1st, the surasa, or true legitimate son; 2d, a paurusha, or son by a twice married woman; 3d, a pārṇa or son of a priest by a woman of the servile class; 4th, the putrikā, or appointed daughter: these are all begotten by the man himself. "Issue procured by another man" intends the kshetraś, or son of the wife and so forth. " Sons received for adoption" are 1st, dattë, a son given; 2d, krita, one bought; 3d, sadhuśa, the son of ANNOTATIONS.
or secretly produced, or abandoned [by the natural parents,] or received with a bride, or born of a twice-married woman, or given, or self-given, or made, or bought; shall be entitled to the third part of the share of a true son. So Devala, after having described the twelve sons, expressly declares, “These twelve sons have been appointed for the purpose of offspring: being sons begotten by a man himself, or procreated by another man, or received [for adoption] or voluntarily given. Among these, the first six are heirs of kinsmen, and the other six inherit only from the father: the rank of sons is distinguished in order as enumerated. All these sons are pronounced heirs of a man who has no legitimate issue by himself begotten: but, should a true legitimate son be afterwards born, they have no right of primogeniture. Such, among them, as are of equal class [with the father,] shall have a third part as their allotment; but those of a lower tribe must live dependent on him supplied with food and mincet”(a).

8. The true legitimate son and the rest, to the number of six, are not only heirs of their father, but also heirs of kinsmen; that is, of Sarpindas and other relations. The others are successors of their [adoptive] father, but not heirs of collateral relations (Sarpindas, &c.)

9. They take the whole estate of a father, who has no legitimate issue by himself begotten; but, if there be a true son, such of them, as are of the same tribe with the father, take a third part(b).

10. Since the appointed daughter is equal to the true legitimate son, the same order of distribution must be observed in her case.

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A pregnant bride; 4th, kāmīna, a son born of an unmarried damsel; 5th, kātriṇa, a son made. “Voluntarily given” signifies presented unsought: comprehending 1st, the apaviddha, or son rejected [by his own parents]; 2d, svayampratigata, one who comes of his own accord; and 3dly, gādhaptama, a son secretly produced. Čṛikṣāma and Čhāyāma.

Among these, the first six are heirs.] The first six, from the true legitimate son to the son rejected by his natural parents, are heirs of kinsmen; that is, of uncles and the rest. The others, from the son of a pregnant bride, to the son bought, are heirs of the [adoptive] father alone. Mahēpuruṣa.

Such among them as are of equal class.] The Keshāraja or issue of the wife, being son of a Brāhmaṇa, of a Brāhmaṇi, is superior by tribe compared with the legitimate issue of a Vaiśya wife, and belongs to the same class with the [adoptive] father. So, in other instances. Čṛikṣāma.

10. The same order of distribution.] If there be an appointed daughter, the rest share a third part only. Čhāyāma.

The same order of distribution, that is, the allotment of a third part, which has been directed for them at a division with the legitimate son, takes effect at a partition with an appointed daughter. For this very reason, the appointed daughter is exhibited first in the enumeration of twelve sorts of sons. Čṛikṣāma.

* This commentator appears to have read putrikāyāṃ api instead of putrikāyā api.

(c) See 1 Strange, II, L. 93.—Ed. (d) See 1 Mor. Dig. 398.—Ed.
11. But those [adopted sons] who are inferior by class to the father, yet superior to his legitimate son, shall take the fifth or the sixth part of a legitimate son’s share, according to their good qualities, or the want of such qualities. Thus Manus says: “Let the legitimate sons, when dividing the paternal heritage, give a sixth part, or a fifth, of the patrimony to the son of the wife.”

12. Since all adopted sons are, in Devaka’s text, § 7, equal to the wife’s son, the term Kesātāja (son of the wife) is, in Manus’s text, indefinite [and comprehends other descriptions of sons.]

13. But such as are inferior by class to the father, and to their brother, his legitimate son, are entitled only to food and raiment. So Manus declares: “The legitimate son is the sole heir of his father’s estate: but, for the sake of pity, he should give a maintenance to the rest.” Thus Katyāyana says, “If a legitimate son be born, the rest are pronounced sharers of a third part, provided they belong to the same tribe [with the father]; but, if they be of a different class, they are entitled to food and raiment only.”

14. The term “the rest” in the text of Manus, as well as the phrase “if they be of a different class” in that of Katyāyana, signify one of inferior tribe: conformably with the text of Devaka. (§ 7.)

15. Manus states the distribution between a true son, and the issue of the wife produced without due authority. “If there be two sons, a legitimate one, and the son of a wife, claiming the estate of the same person, each shall take the property which belonged to his father; and not the other.”

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11. According to their good qualities, &c. According as they have good qualities, or are deficient in them. In fact, it is fit, that the adopted son, inferior by class to the father, but belonging to the same tribe with the legitimate son, should have a sixth part; or, if he belong to a superior tribe, a fifth: else, no allotment being specified for one inferior to the father but equal to the legitimate son, there would be a deficiency in the provisions of the law. Grihastha.

12. Since all are equal, for equal allotments are propounded for them. Grihastha.

13. Pity.] Commiseration: for the sake of that. Therefore his own choice, not their right, is the motive for giving them a maintenance. Here maintenance signifies a subsistence. Grihastha.

Sharers of a third part.] The Mitakshara, with certain other authorities, reads “a fourth part.” See Mitakshara on inheritance C. 1. Sect. 11. § 25.

* Grihastha and Acharya notice a variation in the reading, (Gunavadagunastya, and Gunavadagunaspēksyasya,) which does not, however, make any material difference in the sense. + Manus, 9. 164.

§ Manus, 9. 163. § Manus, 9. 163.
16. Let each receive the wealth of him, from whose seed he sprung; and let not the other take it, who sprung from the seed of another person. Accordingly Nārada says, “If two sons, begotten by two fathers, contend for the wealth of the woman, let each of them take that which was his father’s property; and not the other.”∗

17. The wealth, appertaining to the woman, which was given to her by the respective fathers, let the son of each father severally take; and not the other. It would be needless to enlarge.

CHAPTER XI.

On succession to the estate of one who leaves no male issue.

SECTION I.

On the Widow’s right of succession.

1. Opinions vary as to the order of succession on failure of male issue.

1. In regard [to succession†] to the wealth of a deceased person, who leaves no male issue, authors disagree, in consequence of finding contradictory passages of law.

2. Thus Vihaspati says, “In scripture and in the code of law, as well as in popular practice, a wife is declared by the wise to be half the body of her husband, equally sharing the fruit of pure and impure acts. Of him, whose wife is not deceased, half the body survives. How then should another take his property, while half his person is alive? Let the wife of a deceased man, who left no male issue(‡) take his share, notwithstanding kinsmen, a father, a mother, or uterine brother, be present.” Dying before her husband, a

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17. The wealth appertaining to the woman.] The wealth of the woman, in Nārada’s text, signifies property which has come into her hands [by inheritance.] For, if it were her own peculiar property, they would have equal shares of it. Mahāyāna.

2. Partaker of his consecrated fire.] After her decease her body is burnt with fire taken from his consecrated hearth. Mahāyāna.

∗ Manus, 9, 191. and cited from his institutes by numerous compilers; but referred by Jimita-vahana and Raghunandana to Nārada. It is not, however, found in the institutes of this author.
† Cfr. Srāvaka.
‡ Vide infra, § 54.
(‡) Sec 6 Moc. I. A. Ca. 44: 1 Strange. H. L. 131: 1 Morl. Dig. 262, 310 — F2.
virtuous wife partakes of his consecrated fire; or, if her husband die [before her, she shares] his wealth: this is a primeval law. Having taken his moveable and immovable property, the precious and the base metals, the grains, the liquids, and the clothes, let her duly offer her monthly, half-yearly, and other funeral requets. With presents offered to his manes, and by pious liberality, let her honour the paternal uncle of her husband, his spiritual parents and daughter’s sons, the children of his sisters, his paternal uncles, and also ancient and unprotected persons, guests and females [of the family].

3. By these seven texts Vihaspati having declared, that the whole wealth of a deceased man, who had no male issue, as well the immovable as the moveable property, the gold and other effects, shall belong to his widow, although there be brothers of the whole blood, paternal uncles, [daughters,†] daughter’s sons and other heirs; and having directed, that any of them, who become her competitors for the succession, or who themselves seize the property, shall be punished as robbers; totally denies the right of the father, the brothers and the rest to inherit the estate if a widow remain.

4. In like manner Yajñavalkya says, “The wife and the daughters, also both parents, brothers likewise and their sons, gentiles, cognates, a pupil and a fellow-student: on failure of the first among these, the next in order is indeed heir to the estate of one, who departed for heaven leaving no male issue. This rule extends to all persons and classes.”‡ Thus affirming the right of the last mentioned on failure of the preceding, the sage propounds the succession of the widow in preference to all the other heirs.

5. So Vishnu ordains: “The wealth of him, who leaves no male issue, goes to his wife; on failure of her, it devolves on daughters; if there be none, it belongs to the father; if he be dead, it appertains to the mother; on failure

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Let her duly offer.] The causative verb is used in the original, with the sense of the simple verb, according to the remark of Chudama and Grijaham.

Monthly, half-yearly, &c.] The text is read by Achuta “yearly, half-yearly” vatsa shu-māsākādikam; and he notices as a variation the other reading, “monthly, half-yearly” māsa-shu-māsākādikam. Raghunandana on the contrary states the former as a variation, considering the latter as the common reading of the text.

3. By these seven texts.] The passage above cited comprises seven stanzas.

4. Leaving no male issue.] This implies failure of son’s son, son’s son, and son of the grand-son. For these are equally givers of funeral oblations at periodical obsequies. Ragh. Dāya-tatva.

5. Devolves on daughters.] Some copies of Jīmūta-vāhana insert a sentence; “If there be none, it descends to daughter’s sons.” This clause is not noticed by

* Vide infra, § 63. † Chudāmāni. ‡ Yajñavalkya, 2. 136.—157.
of her, it goes to the brothers; after them, it descends to the brother's sons; if none exist, it passes to the kinsmen (bandhu); in their default, it devolves on relations (sakulya); [failing them, it belongs to the pupil:*] on failure of these, it comes to the fellow student: and, for want of all those heirs, the property escheats to the king; excepting the wealth of a Brāhmaṇa.†

6. By this text, relating to the order of succession, the right of the widow, to succeed in the first instance, is declared. It must not be alleged, that the mention of the widow is intended merely for the assertion of her right to wealth sufficient for her subsistence. For it would be irrational to assume different meanings of the same term used only once, by interpreting the word wealth as signifying the whole estate in respect of brothers and the rest, and not the whole estate in respect of the wife. Therefore, the widow's right must be affirmed to extend to the whole estate.

7. Thus Viṣṇu says, "The widow of a childless man, keeping unsullied her husband's bed, and persevering in religious observances, shall present his funeral oblation and obtain [his] entire share."(b)

8. "His" is repeated or understood from the words "his funeral oblation," for that term alludes to her husband. The meaning therefore is, 'the wife shall obtain her husband's entire share; not 'she shall obtain her own entire share;' for the direction, that 'she shall obtain, would be impertinent, in respect of her own complete share. Since the

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Vishnu's commentator; nor inserted by various compilers, though it be admitted by Raghunandana, who also makes another addition in a subsequent part of the text, respecting the pupil.

If there be none, it belongs to the father; if he be dead, it appertains to the mother.] In the text, as it is exhibited in the Ratnākara, Chintamani, and other compilations, these sentences are transposed: a reading which is censured by Achyuta and Āryārāma commenting upon this passage.

If none exist, it passes to kinsmen; in their default, it devolves on relations.] The words bandhu and sakulya, here translated kinsmen and relations, are read in this order by the scholiast of Vishnu and by the author of the Kulpataru and most other authorities. But the terms are transposed in the Madana-rāma. Either way, the same order of succession is intended: first the near kindred, sapindas, and sāgovas; and last the more remote kindred.

7. His entire share.] In the commentary on Jñāna-vāhana which bears Raghunandana's designation, another reading of the text is noticed: viz., kṛṣṇa-vāhana 'the entire estate' instead of kṛṣṇa-aṇgām 'the entire share.' That reading is contemned by the Ratnākara and Chintamani; and if it be the genuine text, the whole of Jñāna-vāhana's argument in the subsequent paragraphs (to § 13) falls to the ground. But the Vīranītrodaja and Sūtra-chandrikā agree with Jñāna-vāhana in the reading of this passage.

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* Ragh. Dāya-tetr.
† Vishnu, 17. 4.—18.
(b) See I Strange, II. L. 191: 1 Morl. Dig. 306, 318.—Ed.
intention of the text is to declare a right of property, it ought not to be interpreted as declaring such right in regard to the person's own share; for that is known already from the mention of it as that person's share, [and it need not therefore be declared.]

9. Nor should it be said, that the intention of the text is to authorize the taking [or using] of the goods, [not to declare the right of property; for the taking or using of one's own property is a matter of course.

10. Nor can the text be supposed to intend a positive injunction [that she should take her own share.] For its purpose would be spiritual; and, if it were an injunction, a person who commanded and other particulars [as in the omission &c.] must be inferred.

11. It is alleged, that, as in the passage, "let a son, who is neither blind nor otherwise disqualified, take an entire share," [the meaning is,] not his father's entire share, but his own complete allotment; so, in this instance likewise, the terms are [interpreted as] relative to the widow's own complete allotment. That is not accurate; for since there is no such passage of law as that stated, the example is inapplicable; or admitting that there is, still, since for the reason before mentioned it would be impertinent as a precept, [the alleged example!] will be rightly interpreted as relative to the father's share.

12. Accordingly [since the scope of the precept cannot be to declare a right of property in a person's own wealth;] the sages do, in all instances, propound the right of a different person [as heir] to the wealth of another [who is his predecessor; for example, that of sons to the paternal estate; and that of widows and the rest to the goods of a man who leaves no male issue; and so in other cases. They do not needlessly bid a person take his own share.

13. It is alleged, that by the mention of the relative, the correlative is suggested; and thus, when the word mother does not intend her share.

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11. Relative to the father's share. Māhāvīra censures this reading, [which is Çrikśema's] and substitutes for pitraçśekham, putraçśekhaṃ "relative to the husband's share." On this reading, the whole passage must be translated, 'since for reasons before mentioned it would be impertinent as a precept, [the text § 7] will be rightly interpreted as relative to the husband's share.'

* Çrikśema. † Çrikśema. ‡ Chaḍāmāni, Çrikśema, &c. § Çrikśema.
§ Chaḍāmāni and Ashvata. ¶ Çrikśema. || Çrikśema.
the maxim is applicable where the correlative is not specified: and thus, when it is said "call Pittha's mother," neither the mother of the messenger, nor of the sender, is supposed to be meant. In like manner, since the correlative is here indicated by the pronoun in the phrase, "his funeral oblation," how can the word share refer to the wife? And the incongruity of supposing the text to be an injunction, has been already shown (§ 10.)

14. Conclusion in regard to the interpretation of the passage (§ 7.)

14. Therefore, it is demonstrated, that Vāhat Manu (§ 7.) declares the widow's right of taking his [that is, her husband's] entire share(c).

15. Passages of various authors, which declare the contrary of the widow's right of succession, are the following. Čankha, Likhita, Pāñjikāna and Yama say, "The wealth of a man, who departs for heaven, leaving no male issue, goes to his brothers. If there be none, his father and mother take it; or his eldest wife, or a kinsman (sagotra), a pupil(b), or a fellow student."

16. Which prefers the brothers and the parents to the wife.

16. Here, in contradistinction to the preceding text the succession of the father and another, if there be no brother, or that of the wife, if they be both dead, is propounded.

17. So Devala ordains: "Next let brothers of the whole blood divide the heritage of him who leaves no male issue, or daughters equal [as appertaining to the same tribe]; or let the father if he survive, or [half] brothers belonging to the same tribe, or the mother, or the wife, inherit in their order. On failure of all these, the nearest of the kinsmen succeed."

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14. Vāhat Manu declares the widow's right of taking her husband's entire share.] On failure of male issue, the widow succeeds to the whole estate, whether joint or several, and consisting of immovables or moveables. So Jñānta-vāhana and the rest maintain. However, [Vâchespatī] Maṇḍava holds, that, in the case of separate property, the widow inherits; but, in the instance of undivided wealth, the brothers are heirs, and the widow only, shares food and rainment. Kāñjāna on Dāya-tatva.

15. Eldest wife.] In the Kalpataru and Ratnakara the text is read patni vajyeshtā "a wife, not eldest:" that is, according to Chandeśvara's interpretation, 'fulfilling some but not all the duties of a faithful widow.' This reading is noticed in Raghuvamāna's commentary, but with a different interpretation; viz., 'youngest wife.' In the Virami-todaya the text is written jyeshtān vā patni; which removes all ambiguity, and confirms the version of Jñānta-vāhana's reading, patni vajyeshtā.


Being capable of the succession. This excludes one degraded or otherwise disqualified. Čikrāshaṇa and Kāñjāna.


(c) See I Morl. Dig. 310. (b) I Morl. Dig. 320.
18. Which places the brothers first and the widow last.

18. Here the contradiction is, the brother being placed first of all the heirs, and the widow last.

19. That cannot be reconciled, referring the brother’s succession to the case of union, and the wife’s to the instance of separation.

19. Some reconcile the contradiction by saying, that the preferable right of the brother supposes him either to be not separated or to be re-united; and the widow’s right of succession is relative to the estate of one, who was separated from his co-heirs, and not re-united with them.

20. That is contrary to a passage of Vīhaspati, who says, “Among brothers, who become re-united, through mutual affection, after being separated, there is no right of seniority, if partition be again made. Should any one of them die, or in any manner depart [by entering into a religious order,†] his portion is not lost, but devolves on his uterine brother. His sister also is entitled to take a share of it. This law concerns one who leaves no issue, nor wife, nor parent. If any one of the re-united brethren acquire wealth by science, valour, or the like, with the use of the joint stock,‡ two shares of it must be given to him, and the rest shall have each a share.” §

21. Here, since re-union of parceners is specified at the beginning and at the close, of the text, the intermediate passage, “his share is not lost, but devolves on his uterine brother,” must be understood as relating to a re-united parcener. And the author, saying “this law concerns one who leaves no issue, nor wife nor parent,” declares the right of a re-united uterine brother as taking effect on failure of son, daughter, widow and parents. How then does [the re-united brother§] bar the widow’s title to the succession?

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18. Some reconcile the contradiction by saying: The doctrine of the Maithila school is here stated. Mahévara.

20. His sister also is entitled to a share.] His unmarried sister, whose father is deceased, is entitled to take out of her deceased brother’s share, a portion or allotment to defray the expense of her marriage. But, if it cannot be defrayed with that, she may likewise take from the surviving brother. Mahévara.

If unmarried, she takes a portion sufficient to defray the charges of her nuptials. Achyuta.

If a widow, she receives a maintenance. Achyuta.

Some say, that, if she be a widow, she receives a maintenance. Crikrshna.

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* Crikrshna and Achyuta.
† Chudamani.
‡ In this passage, (as it stands in the Bhamraka and other compilations, there are several variations of the reading: but not materially affecting the sense.
§ Mahévara.
22. Besides the text expresses, that "his share is not lost," and the expression is pertinent in regard to unseparated parencers and re-united co-heirs, since the lapse of the share might be supposed, because the property, being intermixed with another brother's effects, is not seen apart; but the property of a separated co-heir being distinctly perceived in a separate state, what room is there for supposing its lapse? Therefore, these texts [of Vṛhaspati * vide § 20] relate to re-united co-heirs.

23. Moreover, the inference, that the texts of Čankha and others above cited, (§ 15 &c.,) which declare the preferable right of the brother before the widow and the rest, relate to a re-united brother, [as well as an unseparated, one;†] must be drawn either from the authority of a text of law or from reasoning. Now it is not deducible from a text of law; for there is none which bears that meaning expressly; and the passages, concerning the succession of the re-united parencers (sect. 5. §13,) containing special provisions regarding the brother's succession, cannot intend generally, the right of a brother to inherit [to the exclusion of a widow.‡]

24. Since the texts of Vṛhaspati just now cited (§ 20) contradict that inference; for the brother's right is there declared to take effect, in the case of re-union, on failure of son, daughter, widow and parents; brethren not re-united must be the subject [of those passages of Čankha, &c., § 15.] That alone is right; and they do not relate to [unseparated and] re-united brethren.

25. But it is said, this inference is deduced from reasoning. Thus, in the instance of re-union, [or in that of a subsisting co-parencery.§ the same goods, which appertain to one brother, belong to another likewise. In such case, when the right of one ceases by his demise, those goods belong exclusively to the survivor, since his ownership is not divested. They do not belong to the widow: for her right ceases on the demise of her husband; in the like manner as his property devolves not on her, if sons or other [male descendants] be left.

26. That argument is futile. It is not true, that, in the instance of re-union [and of a subsisting co-parencery.] what belongs to one, appertains also to the other parener. But the property is referred severally to unascertained portions of the aggregate. Both parencers have not a proprietary right to the whole; for there is no proof to establish their ownership of the whole: as has been before shown [when defining the term partition of heritage.¶](a) Nor is there any proof of the position, that the wife's right in her husband's property, accruing to her from her marriage, ceases on his demise. But the cessation of the widow's

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* Črikāsha, &c.  † Maheṣvara.  ‡ Maheṣvara.

(a) See Vṛisasvāmi Grāmaṇī v. Agnivesvāmi Grāmaṇī, 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 478.—Ed.
right of property, if there be male issue, appears only from the law ordaining the succession of male issue.

27. If it be said, that the cessation of her right, in this instance also, does appear from the law which ordains the succession of the re-united parents; the answer is, no, for it is not true that the text relates to re-united parents; since the law, which declares the brothers' right of succession, may relate to re-united brethren. If it be true, that the widow's right of ownership ceases by the demise of her husband who was re-united with his co-heirs; and the widow's proprietary right does so cease, provided the law relate to the case of re-united brethren. Thus the propositions reciprocate.

28. Besides, if the texts of Çankha, Likhita and the rest, (§ 15 &c.) relate to unseparated or re-united parents, they must be interpreted as signifying, that the wealth of one, who is either unseparated or re-united, goes to a brother who is so; or, if there be none such, the two parents take it. In that case, a question may be proposed, shall parents, who are separated and not re-united, take the heritage? or, parents who are either unseparated or re-united? Here the first proposition is not admissible; for how can the claim of parents, who are separated and not re-united, be preferred to the wife's, since they are excluded by her; under the passage before cited? Nor is the second proposition maintainable; for all agree, that a father, being unseparated or re-united, takes the heritage in preference to an unseparated or re-united brother.

29. Moreover, as in the instance of the estate of one, who was separated from, and not re-united with, his father and his brother, the father has the right of succession before brothers, because he has authority over the person and wealth of his son; since he gave him life; (for their identity is affirmed in holy writ, where it is said "he himself is born a son."**) and because the deceased, by participating [with the manes of the grandfather and great-grandfather] in funeral offerings, partakes of two oblations of food which his father must present to the grandfather and great-grandfather [at the same time that none are presented by his brother;†] for sons do not offer the half-monthly oblations of food, while their father lives; so the same [preference of the father before the brother] is fit in the other instance [of the estate of one who is either unseparated or re-united.][§] Or, since they are alike

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29. [Alike in respect of coparcenary and re-union.] A variation in the reading of this passage is noticed by Maheqvara, viz. sanshātāvatayoh for sansargayoh; but no material difference results from it in the import of the passage.

‡ Çrikshya.
§ Çrikshya, Achyuta, &c.
in respect of co-parcenary and re-union, the equal right of father and son would be proper, not the postponement of the father’s claim to the brother’s.

30. Further, the dual number, expressing that ‘parents, who are unseparated or re-united, take the heritage,’ is unsuitable: for there is neither partition, nor co-parcenary, with the mother; and consequently no re-union of estates; since Vihaspati says. * He, who being once separated, dwells again, through affection, with his father, brother, or paternal uncle, is termed re-united.* He thus shows, that persons, who by birth have common rights in the wealth acquired by the father and grandfather, as father [and son] brothers, uncle [and nephew] are re-united, when, after having made a partition, they live together, through mutual affection, as inhabitants of the same house, annulling the previous partition, and stipulating, that “The property which is mine, is thine; and that, which is thine, is mine.” The partnership of traders, who are not so circumstanced, and only act in concert on an united capital, is no re-union. Nor are separated co-heirs re-united merely by juncture of stock, without an agreement promulgated by affection as above stated. Therefore, since neither re-union nor co-parcenary with a mother can exist, how is the contradiction in regard to the succession devolving on her before brothers, to be reconciled?

31. In the next place the manner, in which the difficulty is removed by the wise, will be stated. From the texts of Vishnu (§ 5.) and the rest [as Yajnavalkya, &c.,† § 4.] it clearly appears, that the succession devolves on the widow, by failure of sons and other [male descendants.] and this is reasonable; for the estate of the deceased should go first to the son, grandson, and great-grandson. Thus Manu and Vishnu say, “Since a son delivers [prayate] his father from the hell called Put; therefore he is named puttra by the self-existent himself.”‡ So Harita says, “A certain hell is named Put; and he, who is destitute of offspring, is tormented in hell. A son is therefore called puttra, because he delivers

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31. The manner in which the difficulty is removed by the wise.] By Halayudha and others who maintain the same doctrine with us. Çrikshama and Achyuta.

* Vide infra. C. 13. § 8.  † Chādhana and Çrikshama.

his father from that region of horror." In like manner Caukhya and Likhita declare, "A father is exonerated in his life-time from debt to his own ancestors, upon seeing the countenance of a living son: he becomes entitled to heaven by the birth of his son, and devolves on him his own debt. The sacrificial hearth, the three Vedas, and sacrifices rewarded with ample gratuities, have not the sixteenth part of the efficacy of the birth of an eldest son." Thus Manu, Caukhya, Vaiśiṣṭha, Likhita and Hārīta ordain, "By a son, a man conquers worlds; by a son’s son, he enjoys immortality; and, afterwards, by the son of a grandson, he reaches the solar abode." So Yājñavalkya says, "The attainment of worlds, immortality and heaven depend on a son, grandson and great-grandson."

32. Thus the proprietary right of sons and the rest is expressly ordained, as already inferrible from reasoning; because the wealth, devolving upon sons and the rest, benefits the deceased: since sons or other male descendants produce great spiritual benefit to their father or ancestor from the moment of their birth; and they present funeral oblations, half-monthly, in due form, after his decease. So Manu declares the right of inheritance to be founded on benefits conferred: "By the eldest son as soon as born, a man becomes the father of male issue, and is exonerated from debt to his ancestors; such a son, therefore, is entitled to take the heritage."§

33. From the mention of it as a reason ("therefore," &c.) and since there can be no other purpose in speaking of various benefits derived from sons and the rest, while treating of inheritance, it appears to be a doctrine to which Manu assents, that the right of succession is grounded solely on the benefits conferred.

34. Accordingly [since benefits are derived from the great-grandson as well as from the son] the term "son" [in the text of Manu, ¶ § 32. or in that of Vishnu,** § 5. or in those of Yājñavalkya, &c.,††] extends to the great-grandson; for, as far as that degree, descendants equally confer benefits by presenting oblations of food in the prescribed form of half-monthly obsequies.

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The attainments of worlds, immortality and heaven:] There is a difference in the reading of the text, lokaśāntyan dīvāna pratītih "Immortality in the world and the attainment of heaven," instead of lokaśāntya-dīvāna pratītih "Attainment of worlds, immortality and heaven." A corresponding difference of interpretation is found in the commentaries of Viśnucarita, Aparākṣa and Stulāpāni.

32. Expressly ordained, as already inferrible from reason.] Ordained by a passage of the Veda founded on reason. Qākhṣya.

* The first stanza occurs in the institutes of Atri. 53.
† Manu, 9, 137. Vaiśiṣṭha, 17. 5. Also Vishnu, 15. 45.
‡ Yājñavalkya, 1. 78. § Manu, 9. 109. Vide supra. C. 1. § 36.
¶ Maheśvara. ¶¶ Chādāmāṇi. ** Maheśvara. †† Ačyuta.
35. Else [if it were not inferrible from reason, or if Manu did not mean, that the right of succession rests upon benefits conferred;] the word son could not quit its proper sense [for a larger import and a passage, declaratory of the grandson's right, must be somehow assumed. But, admitting that such a passage may be assumed [as inferrible from the declared right of a daughter's son considered as a son's son;] still there is no separate text concerning the great-grandson.

36. His right rests on the benefits conferred by him.

37. Therefore the great-grandson's right of succession is founded on benefits derived from him; and the word son is of comprehensive import.

38. Accordingly Baudhâyama says, "The paternal great-grandfather and grandfather, the father, the man himself, his brothers of the whole blood, his son by a woman of the same tribe, his son's son and his great-grandson: all those, partaking of undivided oblations, are pronounced sāṇiḍhas. Those, who share divided oblations, are called sākalyas. Male issue of the body being left, the property must go to them. On failure of sāṇiḍhas or near kindred, sākalyas, or remote kinsmen, are heirs. If there be none, the preceptor, the pupil, or the priest, takes the inheritance. In default of all these, the king [has the escheat.]"

39. Exposition as participating in the offerings at obsequies; and since the son and other descendants, to the number of three, present oblations to the deceased [or to be shared by his manes] and he, who, while living, presents an oblation to an ancestor, partakes, when deceased, of oblations presented to the same person; therefore, such being the case, the middlemost [of seven,] who, while living, offered food to the manes of ancestors, and when dead partook of offerings made to them, became the object to which the oblations of his descendants were addressed in their lifetime, and shares with them when they are deceased, the food which must be offered by the daughter's son and other [surviving descendants beyond the third degree.] Hence those [ancestors,] to whom he presented oblations, and those [descendants,] who present oblations to him, partake of an undivided offering in the form of (pintha) food at obse-

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Suggested by reason and also ordained in express terms. Mahēṣvara.

37. Partaking of undivided oblations. The terms of the text are interpreted very differently in the Ramakara.

*Śrīkṛṣṇa and Achyuta. † Mahēṣvara. ‡ Śrīkṛṣṇa, Achyuta and Mahēṣvara, *Mahēṣvara. ‡ Mahēṣvara.
quies. Persons, who do partake of such offerings, are sapindas. But one distant in the fifth descendent of a person gives an oblation to the fifth in descent, nor shares the offering presented to his names. So the fifth in descent neither gives oblations to the middle person who is distant from him in the fifth degree, nor partakes of offerings made to him. Therefore three ancestors, from the grandfather's grandfather upwards, and three descendants from the grandson's grandson downwards, are denominated sakuyas, as partaking of divided obligations, since they do not participate in the same offering.

39. The relation of sapindas regards inheritance.

39. This relation of sapindas [extending no further than the fourth degree,†] as well as that of sakuyas, has been propounded relatively to inheritance.

40. Accordingly [since the right of succession to property is founded on competence for offering obligations at obsequies,‡] Manu likewise, after premising: "Not brothers, nor parents, but sons are heirs of the father," proceeds, in answer to the question why to declare, "To three must libations of water be made, to three must oblations of food be presented; the fourth in descent is the giver of those offerings; but the fifth has no concern with them."§

41. But for mourning and other purposes, the relation of sapindas extends to such as partake of the remains of obligations; for that relation is defined in the Markaṇḍeya puraṇa as founded on participation in the wippings of offerings. "Three others, from the grandfather's grand sire upwards, are declared to be partakers of the residue of obligations; they, and the person who performs the religious rite, being seventh in descent, constitute that relation, which is termed by the holy sages kin within the seventh degree."

41. For mourning and other purposes, the relation of sapindas is more comprehensive; according to a passage of the Markaṇḍeya puraṇa.

42. Accordingly Manu likewise has said, when treating of uncleanness by reason of mourning, &c. "The relation of sapindas ceases with the seventh person [in ascent or descent,§] and that of samānādakas ends only where birth and family names are no longer known."¶ Else this passage would be in contradiction to the text before cited: "To three must libations of water be made, &c." (§ 39.)

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39. This relation has been propounded relatively to inheritance. † But those, who partake of the remains of obligations, bear the same designation [of sapindas] relatively to mourning, marriage, &c. [Suddhi-latva and Dīya-latva.

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* Čīkṣaṇa and Achyuta.  † Malayavarta.  § Manu, 9. 185.
¶ Markaṇḍeya puraṇa, 23. 4. In the Story of Madālakṣit.  ‚ Manu, 5. 66.
43. But, on failure of heirs down to the son's grandson, the wife, being inferior in pretensions to sons and the rest, because she performs acts spiritually beneficial to her husband from the date of her widowhood, (and not, like them, from the moment of their birth,\(^a\)) succeeds to the estate in their default\(^b\). Thus Vyāsa says, "After the death of her husband, let a virtuous woman observe strictly the duty of continence; and let her daily, after the purification of the bath, present water from the joined palms of her hands to the name of her husband. Let her day by day perform with devotion the worship of the gods, and especially the adoration of Vishnu, practicing constant abstinence. She should give alms to the chief of the venerable for increase of holiness, and keep the various fasts which are commanded by sacred ordinances. A woman, who is assiduous in the performance of duties, conveys her husband, though abiding in another world, and herself to a region of bliss."\(^c\)

44. Since by these and other passages it is declared, that the wife rescues her husband from hell; and since a woman, doing improper acts through indigence, causes her husband to fall to a region of horror; for they share the fruits of virtue and of vice; therefore the wealth devolving on her is for the benefit of the former owner: and the wife's succession is consequently proper.

45. Hence [since the wife's right of succession is founded on reason,\(^d\)] the construction in the text of Čaṅkha, &c., (§ 15.) must be arranged by connexion of remote terms, in this manner, "The wealth of a man, who departs for heaven leaving no male issue, let his eldest [that is, his most excellent] wife take; or, in her parents take it: on failure of them, it goes to the brothers." The terms "if there be none [that is, if there be no wife]"

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43. The wife being inferior to sons, because she performs acts spiritually beneficial from the date of her widowhood. Chāḍāmaṇi's interpretation of his author's meaning is followed in this version. Adepta deprecates it; and maintains, that the performance of acts of spiritual benefit is here stated as the reason of the widow's succession; and her incapacity for presenting oblations at the half-monthly oblations is the reason of her inferiority to sons, and of the consequent postponement of her claim. His explanation, and the reasoning by which it is supported, are related by Čīrīṣhna and Mahāyogara.

Let her daily perform with devotion the worship of the gods.\(^e\) And show hospitality to guests." So the text is read in the Viśvamitrodaya; viz., devātāsūlī pañjara instead of devādaṇa cha pañjara. Other variations in the reading of the text occur, but which are unimportant.

\(^{a}\) Chāḍāmaṇi, Čīrīṣhna and Mahāyogara. \(^{b}\) Čīrīṣhna. \(^{c}\) Čīrīṣhna. 

\(^{\text{§ Viśvamitrodaya.}}\) \(^{\text{∥ Raghunāṭaka.}}\) (a) See 1 Morl. Dig. 316—Ed.
which occur in the middle of the text (§ 12.) are connected both with
the preceding sentence "it goes to his brothers," and with the subse-
quent one "his father and mother take it." For the text agrees [with
passages of Vishnu and Yajnavalkya, * § 4 and 5, which declare the
wife's right; ] and the reasonableness of this has been already shown
(§ 43.)

46. The assumption of any reliance to the condition of the
brothers as unseparated or as re-united, not specified
in the text, is inadmissible, being burdensome and un-
necessary. § 47. Therefore the doctrine of Jitendra, who
advises the right of the wife to inherit the whole prop-
erty of her husband, leaving no male issue, without
attention to the circumstances of his being separated
from his co-heirs, or united with them, (for no such
distinction is specified,) should be respected.

47. The rank of wife belongs in the first place to a woman of the
highest tribe; for the text [of Čakula, & c.] expresses,
that "the eldest wife takes the wealth," (§ 15 and
45.) and seniority is reckoned in the order of the
tribes. Thus Manu says, "When regenerate men take
wives both of their own class and others, the prece-
dence, honour and inheritance of those wives must be
settled according to the order of their classes." Therefore
[since seniority is by tribe,**] a woman of equal class, though
youngest in respect of the date of marriage, is deemed eldest. The

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47. The rank of a wife belongs in the first place, &c.] Çkritshna remarks, that
Chāṇḍāsya expounds this whole paragraph differently, from the sense in which he him-
selves has explained it. According to Chāṇḍāsya, Yajnavalkya and Vishnu (§ 4 and 5.)
claim that the estate of a childless man shall go to his wife. Čakula (§ 15.) adds
the condition, that she be the eldest wife. Manu (§ 17.) restricts the rank of eldest
wife to a woman of equal class; and states the purpose to be her personal attendance,
&c. In the passage cited from Vishnu, (§ 17.) that is extended to a woman of the next
following tribe. Therefore, to render all these passages consistent, it appears
that the eldest wife succeeds, and Yajnavalkya; if the rest was the word wife for one
competent to inherit, and it further appears from passages to be hereafter cited, (§ 48.)
that brothers and the rest inherit the estate, giving only a maintenance to women who
are not of that rank, it follows, that the rank of wife is restricted to the woman of equal
class and to one of the next following tribe. Çkritshna on the other hand admits, in
concordance with Achyuta, that, in case of the utmost distress, a woman of the Vaisya
tribe, being married to a Brāhmaṇ, may be employed by him in religious offices. It
should follow, that she may be capable of inheriting. This, however, is not expressly
stated.

Though youngest in respect of the marriage.] Upon the death of the first wife, who
is a Brāhmaṇ, and after a marriage with a Kshatriya, another Brāhmaṇ, who is subse-
duently espoused, is "one youngest in respect of the date of marriage." Else [if the
Kshatriya were the first wife] the marriages would be in the inverse order of the classes;
which is forbidden. Chāṇḍāsya, Achyuta and Çkritshna.

* Chāṇḍāsya, Achyuta and Çkritshna. † Mahorevara. ‡ Vide § 19.
§ Çkritshna. ¶ Achyuta, Çkritshna and Mahorevara.
** Manu, 9. 85. **‡ Çkritshna.
rank of wife (patni) belongs to her; for she alone is competent to assist in the performance of sacrifices and other sacred rites. Accordingly, Manus says, "To all such married men, the wives of the same class only (not wives of a different class by any means) must perform the duty of personal attendance, and the daily business relating to acts of religion. For he, who foolishly causes those duties to be performed by any other than his wife of the same class, when she is near at hand, has been immemorially considered as a mere Chandala begotten on a Brahmana."** But, on failure of a wife of the same tribe, one of the tribe immediately following [may be employed in such duties.] Thus Vishnu ordains, "If there be no wife belonging to the same tribe, he may execute the business relating to acts of religion] with one of the tribe immediately following, in case of distress. But a regenerate man must not do so with a woman of the Čādrā class."† "Execute business relating to acts of religion," is understood from the preceding sentence. Therefore a Brahman is lawful wife (patni) of a Brahmaṇa. On failure of such, a Kshatriya may be so, in case of distress; but not a Vaishya, nor a Čādrā, though married to him. A Kshatriya woman is wife of a Kshatriya man. In her default, a Vaishya woman may be so, as belonging to the next following tribe; but not a Čādrā woman. A Vaishya is the only wife for a Vaishya: since a Čādrā wife is denied in respect of the regenerate tribes simply.

48. In this manner must be understood the succession to property in the order in which the rank of wife is acknowledged. Therefore, since women actually espoused may not have the rank of wives, the following passage of Nārada intends such a case. "Among brothers, if any one die without issue, or enter a religious order, let the rest of the brethren divide his wealth, except the wife’s separate property. Let them allow a maintenance to his women for life, provided these preserve unsullied the bed of their lord. But, if they behave otherwise, the brethren may resume that allowance."§ So [this other passage] of the same author; ["on failure of heirs, the property goes to the king,"] except the wealth of a Brahmana. But a king, who is attentive to the obligations of duty, should give a

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She alone is competent to the performance of sacred rites.] According to the remark of Ačyuta and Čṛṣṭiṣaṇa, this alludes to the grammatical rule for the derivation of patni wife, from patni husband; as intending his female associate in the performance of religious ceremonies. Vide Pāṇi in 4.1.35, Mitakṣara on inheritance. 2.1.5.

48. Not being of the rank of wives.] Being of a tribe distant by one intermediate degree, or being of Čādrā class. Čādrāmaṇi and Čṛṣṭiṣaṇa.

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* Manus, 9. 86—87. † Vishnu, 20. 3. ‡ Vishnu, 20. 1.

[ed: See 1 Strange II. 1. 150.—Ed.
maintenance to the women of such persons. "The law of inheritance has been thus declared." The allotment of maintaining to the women of such persons, not being of the rank of wives, and the declared right of wives to succeed to the whole estate, constitute no discrepancy.

49. Accordingly, Yāhampati propounds the king’s right to an eschaton in default of the wife: “If men of the military, commercial and servile tribes die childless, leaving neither wife nor brother, let the king take the property; but he is indeed lord of all.” But Nārada, directing that “he should give a maintenance to the women of such persons.” (§ 48.) authorizes the king to take the whole estate, giving to them enough for their support. This contradiction must be reconciled by distinguishing between the wife and the espoused woman. Accordingly, in passages declaratory of the wife’s right of succession, the term “wife” (patnī) is employed; and, in those which call a maintenance, the term “woman” (sī or māri) or “spouse” (bhāryā) or other similar word.

50. In the text of Devala (§ 17.) which expresses, “Next let brothers of the whole blood divide the heritage of him, who leaves no male issue; or daughters equal [as appertaining to the same tribe;] or let the father, if he survive, or brothers belonging to the same tribe, or the mother, or the wife, inherit in their order; but, on failure of all these, the nearest of the kinsmen succeed;” where “daughters equal” are such as appertain to the same class [with the deceased]; and “brothers belonging to the same tribe” intend those of the half-blood; for whole brothers are specified under the appropriate term, and the distinction would be impertinent [as not excluding anyone;† or as superfluous, since whole brothers of course belong to the same tribe;] in this text, we say, the order in which heirs are enumerated from the whole brother to the wife, is not intended for the order of their succession; since it contradicts Vishnu and the rest [as Yāhampati and Yajñavalkya]; but the meaning of the text is, that the heirs shall take the succession in the order declared by Vishnu and others. To mark uncertainty in the specified order, the author has twice used the word “or;” once in the phrase “or daughters;” and again in the sentence “or let the father, &c.” and the word is also understood in other places. Thus Devala has himself shown vagueness in his own enumeration, intimating that “either brothers, or daughters, or parents, &c., [take the succession].”

51. As for what has been said by Bāloka, concerning the text of Caṇkha and the rest (§ 15.), that it either relates to a wife inferior in class to her husband, or supposes the

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51. It either relates to a wife inferior in class.] According to this opinion, the passage is read with the interposition of the privative a. "The wife not eldest," that is, inferior by tribe. (Vide § 15.) Aśyata and Gṛtkshana.

† Nārada, 13, 52. † Gṛtkshana. † Ragh. on Dāyahāṅga. † Malayavara.
widow to be young, or is relative to brethren unseparated or re-united; that author has manifested his own imbecility by thus proposing an indefinite interpretation of the law; for the doubt remains [which of the three is intended?] and neither rule could be followed in practice.

52. As for the assertion, that the text, which ordains a maintenance, is relative to an unmarried woman and concubine, that must be rejected as intending a favor to the matrons; for the scope of the precepts, which allot a maintenance to women, has been already shown.

53. Moreover, under the distinction respecting the wife as belonging to the same or to a different tribe, how is the contradiction [of the text to passages of Vishnu and Yajnavalkya] § 4 and 5] regarding the succession of parents and brothers, to be reconciled [without transposition, or without connecting in construction remote terms?] If it be by distinguishing the cases of re-union and continued separation, the same distinction may pervade the whole subject: and what occasion is there for assuming a difference relative to the wife, as belonging to the same or to another tribe? But the proposed distinction, founded on re-union and separation, [§ 19] has been already fully refuted by us [§ 30.]

54. The distinction regarding the whole and the half-blood is contradicted by Vishnavati, who says “Let the wife of a deceased man, who left no male issue, take his share, notwithstanding kinsmen, a father, a mother, or uterine brethren be present.”§ Uterine brethren are brothers

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Or supposes the widow to be young.] Conformably with the text of Harita, which directs, that property, sufficient only for the support of life, should be allotted to a young widow. Achyuta, Çrikishna and Mahevarya.

Or is relative to brethren unseparated or re-united.] The reasoning, on which this is grounded, has been before stated. (Vide § 19.) Çrikishna.

52. As for the assertion.] Of the same author, according to Çrikishna. But Mahevarya says, a certain author.

Intending a favor to the matrons.] This passage, which is obscure, has been explained by Çrikishna as ironical; the concubines being here cunningly turned matrons: and Mahevarya quotes Çahamani as authority for that interpretation. But the same commentators, in concurrence with Achyuta, state another explanation in which the wives are understood by matrons. It is only by favor of the wives, who themselves inherit the whole property, that a maintenance is allowed to the concubines.

53. The proposed distinction founded on re-union, &c. has been refuted.] Mahevarya understands this to be leveled against the doctrine of the Kañkhula school.

54. The distinction regarding the whole and half-blood.] The opinion that the whole brother inherits before the wife, but the half-brother after her. Çahamani and Achyuta.

* Çrikishna. † Mahevarya. ‡ Mahevarya, Vide § 48. § Vide supra, § 1.
the contradiction, being inconsistent with a passage of Vṛhaspati.

by the same mother [and of course of the whole blood.] The author declares the wife’s right of succession, although such persons exist. By the term “his share,” is understood the entire share appertaining to her husband; not a part of it only [sufficient for her support.]

husband; not a part of it only [sufficient for her support.]

55. Therefore the interpretation of the law is right as set forth by us.

56. But the wife must only enjoy her husband’s estate after his demise. She is not entitled to make a gift, mortgage or sale of it. Thus Kātyāyana says, “Let the childless widow, preserving unaltered the bed of her lord, and abiding with her venerable protector, enjoy with moderation the property until her death. After her let the heirs take it.”

57. Abiding with her venerable protector, that is, with her father-in-law or others of her husband’s family, let her enjoy her husband’s estate during her life; and not, as with her separate property, make a gift, mortgage or sale of it at her pleasure. But, when she dies, the daughters or others, who would regularly be heirs in default of the wife, take the estate; not the kinsmen [or sapindas;] since those, being inferior to the daughter and the rest, ought not to exclude those heirs; for the widow debar them of the succession; and, the obstacle being equally removed if her right cease or never take effect, it can be no bar to their claim.

58. Nor shall the heirs of the woman’s separate property [as her brothers, &c.†] take the succession [on failure of daughters and daughter’s sons, to the exclusion of her husband’s heirs.§] for the right of these [persons, whose succession is declared under that head,] is relative to the property of a woman [other than that which is inherited by her.‡] Kātyāyana has propounded by separate texts the heirs of a woman’s property; and [his text, declaratory of the succession to heritage,‴] would be tautology; consequently heritage is not ranked with woman’s peculiar property.[‴]

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56. Abiding with her venerable protector.] This is according to the usual reading of the text, and conformable with the interpretation of it in the Ratnākara. But, in the Dīṣṇu-tatva, it is read vātā śrīhitā in place of gurut śrīhitā; and the reading is expounded by the commentator Kāciraka, “diligent in such observances as may be beneficial to her husband in another world.” He rejects another interpretation, “observant of facts.”

Enjoy with moderation.] With abstemiousness, according to the commentators, Cṛkitśaṇa and Achyuta. But, in the Sūtrīchandrika, it is explained “patient of

* Mahāgyana.  † Mahāgyana.  ‡ Cṛkitśaṇa and Achyuta.
§ Cṛkitśaṇa and Achyuta.  || Mahāgyana.  †† Mahāgyana.
‴ Cṛkitśaṇa, &c.  †† Achyuta, &c.
59. Therefore those persons, who are exhibited in a passage above cited (§ 4.), as the next heirs on failure of prior claimants, shall, in like manner as they would have succeeded if the widow’s right had never taken effect, equally succeed to the residue of the estate remaining after her use of it, upon the demise of the widow in whom the succession had vested. At such time [when the widow dies, or when her right ceases,] the succession of daughters and the rest is proper, since they confer greater benefits on the deceased [by the oblations presented by them] than other claimants [such as the sapiṇḍas abovementioned.][§ 37.]

60. Thus in the Mahābhārata, in the chapter entitled Dānadharmā, it is said “For women, the heritage of their husbands is pronounced applicable to use. Let not women on any account make waste of their husband’s wealth.”

61. Even use should not be by wearing delicate apparel and similar luxuries: but, since a widow benefits her husband by the preservation of her person, the use of property sufficient for that purpose is authorized. In like manner [since the benefit of the husband is to be consulted,] even a gift or other alienation is permitted for the completion of her husband’s funeral rites. Accordingly the author says, “Let not women make waste.” Here “waste” intends expenditure not useful to the owner of the property.

62. Hence, if she be unable to subsist otherwise, she is authorized to mortgage the property; or, if still unable, she may sell or otherwise alienate it: for the same reason is equally applicable.

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There is considerable difference in the interpretation of the text, as to its general scope, according to various compilers, by whom it is cited.

60. Thus in the Mahābhārata, &c. The author here corroborates what had been said concerning the restriction on the widow’s power of gift, mortgage and sale. (§ 56.) Achyuta, Čṛṅkrṣṇa and Mahēvyava.

The passage, here cited, is read differently in the text of the Mahābhārata; padi-dāyaṇya, instead of padi-dāya. But both readings may be interpreted in the same sense. One of the commentators on the puram notices another variation, patiyatā, instead of pativitā; “their husband’s wealth.” Another commentator expands the passage in a different manner; “Let not sons resume any part of the wealth given to a woman by her husband.”

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* Čṛṅkrṣṇa.
† Mahēvyava.
| Mahābhārata, Dānadharmā, 46. 24.
* Čṛṅkrṣṇa.
† Chuddmagi.
§ Mahēvyava.

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63. Let her give to the paternal uncles and other relatives of her husband presents in proportion to the wealth, at her husband’s funeral rites. Vīnaśpati directs it, saying “With presents offered to his names, and by pious liberality, let her honour the paternal uncles of her husband, his spiritual parents and daughter’s sons, the children of his sisters, his maternal uncles, and also ancient and unprotected persons, guests, and females of the family.” The term “paternal uncle” intends any sapinda of her husband; “daughter’s sons,” the descendants of her husband’s daughter; “children of his sister,” the progeny of her husband’s sister’s son; “maternal uncles,” her husband’s mother’s family. To these and to the rest, let her give presents, and not to the family of her own father, while such persons are forthcoming: for the specific mention of paternal uncles and the rest would be superfluous.

64. Unless with their consent, however, she may bestow gifts on the kindred of her own father and mother. Thus Nārada says, “When the husband is deceased, his kin are the guardians of his childless widow. In the disposal of the property, and care of herself, as well as in her maintenance, they have full power. But, if the husband’s family be extinct or contain no male, or be helpless, the kin of her own father are the guardians of the widow, if there be no relations of her husband within the degree of a sapinda.”† In the disposal of property by gift or otherwise, she is subject to the control of her husband’s family, after his decease, and in default of sons.

In like manner, the succession, devolving on a daughter, passes, after her, to her father’s heirs.

66. An unmarried daughter should have a share allotted by the widow for the expenses of her marriage.

65. In like manner, if the succession have devolved on a daughter, those persons, who would have been heirs of her father’s property in her default, [as her son, her paternal grandfather, &c.] take the succession on her death; not the heirs of the daughters property [as her daughter’s son, &c.].

66. The widow should give to an unmarried daughter a fourth part out of her husband’s estate, to defray the expenses of the damsel’s marriage. Since sons are required to give that allotment, much more should the wife, or any other successor, give a like portion.

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65. In like manner, if the succession have devolved on a daughter, those persons, &c.] If the next heirs succeed to the residue of the property, in the instance of the widow, whose right is preferable to the daughter’s, much rather should the next heirs who would regularly succeed if there were no daughter, take the succession after her. Čṛkṛśna and Čuddāmanti.

† Vide supra, § 2. 
‡ Nārada, 13. 28—29.
§ Achyuta and Čṛkṛśna.
|| Vide supra. 
* Vide C. 3. § 34.
67. Conclusion. Thus has the widow's right of succession been explained.

SECTION II

On the right of the Daughter and Daughter's Son.

1. The daughter's right of succession on failure of the wife is declared.* On that subject Mama and Nárada say, "The son of a man is even as himself; and the daughter is equal to the son: how then can any other inherit his property, notwithstanding the survival of her, who is as it were himself?"† Nárada particularizes the daughter [as inheriting in right of her] continuing the line of succession;‡ "On failure of male issue, the daughter inherits, for she is equally a cause of perpetuating the race: since both the son and daughter are the means of prolonging the father's line."§ The author states the circumstance of her continuing the line as a reason of the daughter's succession: and the line of descendants here intends such descendants as present funeral oblations; for one, who is not an offerer of oblations, confers no benefits, and consequently differs in no respect from the offspring of a stranger or no offspring at all.

2. Her son only presents such oblations.

3. Therefore the doctrine should be respected, which Dikshita maintains; namely that a daughter, who is mother of male issue, or who is likely to become so, is competent to inherit; not one, who is a widow, or is barren, or fails in bringing male issue as bearing none but daughters, or from some other cause.(a)

4. Here again, the unmarried daughter is in the first place sole heiress of her father's property [to the exclusion of any daughter verbally betrothed.§] Accordingly Paráçara says, "Let a maiden daughter take the heritage of one who dies leaving no male issue; or, if there be no such daughter, a married one shall inherit." In the term "married" is here implied the restriction before mentioned [excluding one who fails in bringing male issue.]]

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Upon the same principle, the succession, devolving on the mother by the death of her son, passes after her decease to the heirs of her son; and not to her own heirs. See Sect. 3. § 31.

*[Chṛkšṭha. †Mama, 9. 130. Not found in Nárada's institutes. †Nárada, 13. 49. §Chṛḍāmani and Chṛkšṭha. ||Chṛḍāmani and Chṛkšṭha.

(a) See 1 Morl. Dig. 319, 335, 480.—Ed.]}
5. Thus Devala says, "To maidens should be given a nuptial portion out of the father's estate. But of him, who leaves no appointed daughter, nor son, the unmarried daughter, belonging to his own tribe, and legitimate, shall take the inheritance, like a son." The term "appointed daughter" implies also son. "His own," belonging to the same tribe with himself. "Legitimate," his own lawful issue.

6. This is proper: for, should the maiden arrive at puberty unmarried, through poverty, her father and the rest would fall to a region of punishment, as declared by holy writ. Thus Vasishtha says, "So many seasons of menstruation as overtake a maiden feeling the passion of love and sought in marriage by persons of suitable rank, even so many are the beings destroyed by both her father and her mother; this is a maxim of the law."* So Paithinasi: "A damsel should be given in marriage, before her breasts swell. But, if she have menstruated before marriage, both the giver and the taker fall to the abyss of hell; and her father, grandfather and great-grandfather are born [insects] in ordure. Therefore she should be given in marriage while she is yet a girl."

7. Since then the father and the rest are saved from hell by sufficient property becoming applicable to the charges of her marriage; and, being accordingly married, she confers benefits on her father by means of her son; the wealth devolving on her is for the benefit of the owner;† and it is reasonable, therefore, that the property should descend to the unmarried daughter, on failure of the wife.

8. But, if there be no maiden daughter, the succession devolves on her who has, and on her who is likely to have, male issue.(b). That is declared by Visvaspati: "Being of equal class and married to a man of like tribe, and being virtuous and devoted to obedience, she [namely the daughter,‡] whether appointed or not appointed to continue the male line, shall take the property of her father who leaves no son [nor wife.§]."

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5. Out of the father's estate.] This is according to the reading, which is followed by this author, as well as by Raghunandana. But in other compilations, as the Smriti-chandrika, Ratnakara and Viramitrodhana, the text is read pitṛ-dravyaṃ instead of pītṛ-dravyāḥ and the author of the last mentioned work explains the passage as signifying, that 'a portion of the paternal estate [equal to the fourth part of a share] and nuptial presents should be given to a maiden daughter.'

* Vasishtha, 17. 56.
† Vide Sect. 1. § 44.
‡ Vide § 13.
§ Orfikshna and Chuddamani.
(c) See 6 Moo, I. A. Ca. 444.—Ed.

(6) See 6 Moo, I. A. Ca. 444.—Ed.
9. Of equal class.] Belonging to the same tribe with her father.

9. Interpretation of the text. Married to a man of like tribe.] This is intended to exclude one married to a man of a superior or inferior tribe. For the offspring of a daughter married to a man of a higher or lower class is forbidden to perform the obsequies of his maternal grandfather and other ancestors who are of inferior or of superior rank. But one, married to a man belonging to the same class, confers benefits on her father by means of her son.

10. The son of a daughter appointed to continue the male line is like a son, highly beneficial to his ancestor; and, through him, the appointed daughter is equal to a son: wherefore the appointed daughter and legitimate son have an equal right of succession.* But a married daughter, who was not so appointed, confers less benefit on her father than the son and the rest [viz. the son's son and grandson's son,† and the widow;‡] and is of benefit by means only of her son: it is proper, therefore, that she should succeed only on failure of other heirs down to the unmarried daughter.

11. It must not be alleged, that, admitting this doctrine of benefits conferred being the cause of a right of succession.§ the daughter, who has male issue, should alone inherit in the first instance; but, on failure of such, then a daughter who may have issue. For her son, born subsequently, might in this manner be excluded from the succession. Nor is this proper; for both equally confer benefits on their grandfather, as daughter's sons.

12. By specifying "obedience" to her husband (§ 8), the author indicates, that she is not in the state of widowhood, and that consequently she may have issue.

13. In the text before cited (§ 8), the pronoun refers to the word "daughter" contained in a preceding passage [which will be forthwith quoted. || § 14.] Thus, by the conditions specified, that she be "of equal class"

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9. To exclude one married to a man of a superior or inferior tribe, &c.] This remark of Jinasvāhā is inadmissible: for the term 'married' excludes the notion of union with a man of inferior tribe; since there can be no marriage between a woman of higher tribe and a man of a lower one. Therefore the intention is to exclude one married to a man of superior class. Viramikrodha.

Who are of inferior or of superior rank.] A daughter's son of a superior tribe is forbidden to offer a funeral sapta to the names of his maternal grandfather who is of a lower tribe; and a daughter's son, being of inferior rank, is forbidden to offer it for his maternal grandfather who is of a higher class. Ragh. on Dāya-bhāga.

11. For her son might be excluded from the succession.] Accordingly the notion, that, in the case of two daughters having male issue, one a widow, the other having a husband living, the widow should inherit in the first instance, because she first offers funeral oblations through her son (whose father is already dead), is refuted. Achyuta and Črikṣha.

* Vide C. 10, † Črikṣha. § Achyuta and Črikṣha. || Chājakāna, Črikṣha, &c.

‡ Chājakāna.
A daughter does not inherit of course, in right of her relation as such.

and "married to a man of like tribe," &c. (§ 8), the author shows, that she does not inherit her father’s wealth merely in right of her relation as daughter. Else, since the daughter’s right of succession is declared by the following passage, the mention of it by the same author in the foregoing text would be a vain repetition. But a special rule, regarding what was suggested generally, is not tautology.

14. A passage of Vṛhaspati compares the daughter to the son.

14. "As a son, so does the daughter of a man proceed from his several limbs. How then should any other person take her father’s wealth?"

15. Since a daughter’s right of succession to the property of her father is founded on her offering funeral oblations by means of her son; therefore, even in the case of an appointed daughter, on whom the estate has devolved by the demise of her father, should she bear no male issue in consequence of her proving barren, or because incapable of procreation, the property does not go upon her death to her husband. Thus Čankha and Līkhitā say, "The husband is not entitled to the wealth of his wife being an appointed daughter, if she die leaving no issue." So Pāchhināsi: "On the death of an appointed daughter, her husband does not inherit her property: if she leave no issue, it shall be taken by her unmarried sister or by another." Hence her property is to be taken by her maiden sister, or by another sister likely to have issue. Therefore, when the succession has devolved on a female, [her husband’s] claim [as her heir] is precluded.

16. But the following passage of Manu must be understood to be applicable, on the demise of an appointed daughter, who has not been destitute of male issue, having borne a son who has died. "Should a daughter, appointed to continue the male line, die by any accident without a son, the husband of that daughter may without hesitation possess himself of her property."

14. Proceed from his several limbs.] This is an allusion to a passage of the Veda, which is quoted by Baudhāyana. It is addressed by a father to his son. "From my several limbs thou art distilled; from my heart thou art produced: thou art indeed self, but denominated son: mayst thou live a hundred years."

15. By her unmarried sister or by another.] The text is read and interpreted differently in the Rājacāra: ‘If she leave no son, it shall be taken by her daughter or by her sister.’ This is according to the reading of the text, as it is cited in the Kalpaṇa, ‘aputrāyān kumārayā svasāt tad grahyam,’ instead of aputrāyān kumārayā vā svasāt tad grahyam tad anyāyā.

16. Having borne a son who has died.] Jñāṇatvā-vāhana’s text exhibits the conjunctive particle cha; and, according to this reading, the sense should be ‘who is not destitute of male issue and who has borne a son who has died.’ But Achyuta and Čṛīkṛṣṇa censure it as an erroneous reading.

ANNOTATIONS.

* Vṛhaspati. † Chudāmani, Achyuta and Čṛīkṛṣṇa. ‡ Manu, 9, 132.
17. Vihaspati recites the gift of the funeral oblation as the sole cause [of right] in the instance of both [the daughter and the grandson]. "As the ownership of her father's wealth devolves on her, although kindred exist; so her son likewise is acknowledged to be heir to his maternal grandfather's estate." (a) As the daughter is heiress of her father's wealth in right of the funeral oblation which is to be presented by the daughter's son; so is the daughter's son owner of his maternal grandfather's estate in right of offering that oblation, notwithstanding the existence of kindred, such as the father and others.

18. Nor does this text (§ 17) relate to the son of an appointed daughter: for the pronoun "her," in both the phrases ("devolves on her," and "her son is acknowledged,") bears reference to the "daughter whether appointed or not appointed," who was mentioned in the preceding passage (§ 8.) Or, upon the principle of selecting the nearest term, the reference may properly be to the "daughter not appointed." But this term cannot be rejected to select the other.

19. Accordingly Manu propounds the daughter's origin from the person of the maternal grandfather as the reason of the daughter's son having a right to the succession; not her appointment to raise a son: else he would have specified this cause. "Let the daughter's son take the whole estate of his own father who leaves no [other] son; and let him offer two funeral oblations; one to his own father, the other to his maternal grandfather. Between a son's son and the son of a daughter, there is no difference in law; since their father and mother both sprung from the body of the same man."

20. Thus this very author expressly declares, that the daughter's son, born of one not appointed to continue the male line, has the right of succession. "By that male child, whom a daughter, whether formally appointed or not, shall produce from a husband of an equal class; the maternal grandfather becomes in law the father of a son: let that son give the funeral oblation and possess the inheritance."†

ANNOTATIONS.

19. There is no difference.] By thus likening the grand son in the female line to the grandson in the male line, it is intimated, that, as, on failure of the son, the son's son is heir, so, in default of the daughter, the daughter's son is the successor. Ragh. Daya-tavā.

Consider as another son.] In the Kalpaśāstra, the text is read asvām "her" instead of aśvam "another." That reading varies the construction rather than the purport of the text.

† Manu, 9. 139.

(a) Sec 1 Morl. Dig. 258.—Ed.
21. Besides the term 'daughter's son' is in law restricted to signify the male offspring of an appointed daughter. Baudhāyana intimates that, when he says, "[Considers] another [son] the daughter's son termed son of an appointed daughter, being born of the female issue after an express stipulation." Here 'consider' is understood.

22. Bhajadeva cites the text (§ 17.) as of general import.

23. But Govinda-rāja, in his commentary on Manu, states the claim of the daughter's son as preferable to that of the married daughter, of the grounds of the following passage of Vishnu. "If one die leaving neither son nor grandson, the daughter's son shall inherit the estate; for, by consent of all, the son's son and the daughter's son are alike in respect of the celebration of obsequies."†

24. This does not appear to us satisfactory: for it contradicts the text above cited (§ 8.)

25. A daughter's son inherits after the married daughter; the succession assuredly devolves on the daughter's son notwithstanding the existence of the father and other kinsmen(b). For it appears from the comparison of his condition to heirs, (§ 17.) and more expressly from the purport of the term "likewise" in the phrase "her son likewise is acknowledged to be heir," (§ 17.) that his pretensions are inferior to her's. Therefore, it is a right deduction, that the succession of the daughter's son is next after the daughter.

26. By the words "although kindred exist," (§ 17.) the succession of both parents, which reasonably should take effect on failure of the wife, but which is barred by the daughter and daughter's son, is hinted as taking place when no such impediment exists. Accordingly Vishnupati, immediately after [the passage above cited; § 17.]

ANNOTATIONS.

21. After an express stipulation.] After the accepting of her as an appointed daughter. (Vide § 15-17.) Chudamani and Çrikrisna.

25. A married daughter such as above described.] Who does not fall of bearing issue. Chudamani, Achyuta and Çrikrisna.

Who has or is likely to have male issue. Ragh. on Dāya-bhāga.

26. Bears reference to the parents.] Else, if the brothers inherit next after the daughter's son, that would contradict Yājñavalkya and the rest, as above cited. (Vide Sect. 1. § 4.) Chudamani and Çrikrisna.

* Çrikrisna.

† Not found in Vishnu's institutes. It is cited by Raghunandana in the Dāyātātva, as on the authority of Govinde-rāja's quotations. Çrikrisna.

(2) See I Marl. Dig. 320.—Ed.
says "On failure of those persons, the brothers and nephews of the whole are entitled to the estate, or kinsmen, or cognates, or pupils, or venerable priests." Here the word "those" bears reference to the daughter's son [named in the text,] and to the parents indicated [by the term kindred.]* Therefore, it is on failure of these persons, that the succession of brothers and the rest take place.

27. As for the assertion of Bāloka, that the daughter's son inherits after the whole series of heirs specified in the passage of [Yāñavalkya] above cited, "The wife, daughters, also," &c., (sect. 1. § 4.) that is mere childish prattle; daughter's son; for it contradicts the text of Viñāsati (§ 17.) Nor is there any thing inconsistent with that enumeration of heirs; for the maiden daughter, married daughter, and daughter's son, are all signified by the term "daughters" in the plural number (sect. 1. § 4.) As the word "son," in the phrase "who departed for heaven leaving no son," intends male issue down to the great-grandson, since he is equally a giver of funeral oblations; so does the term "daughter" comprehend the daughter's son, for he also is the giver of a funeral offering; or as the term "male issue," in the sentence "on failure of male issue, the daughter inherits" (§ 1.), intends the widow also. Else the plural number, in the word "daughters," would be unmeaning: and the author would have used the singular number, as in the words "the wife," "the son of a brother," &c. We shall hereafter [in the course of expounding passages concerning the re-union of parters†] explain the intention of the plural number in the word "brothers" (sect. 1. § 4.)

28. Moreover, since a series of heirs is specified from both parents to the king, it would follow, that the succession of the daughter's son takes effect on failure of the king. But there never is a vacancy of the throne; and consequently the succession could never take place.

29. Therefore the succession of the daughter's son on failure of daughters, as affirmed by Vigvarna, Jitendriya, Bhājadeva and Govinda-raja, should be respected.

30. But, if a maiden daughter, in whom the succession has vested, and who has been afterwards married, die [without bearing issue;] the estate, which was her's, becomes the property of those persons, a married daughter or others, who would regularly succeed if there were no such [unmarried daughter] in whom the inheritance

ANNOTATIONS.

27. As for the assertion, that the daughter's son inherits after the whole series of heirs, &c.] This doctrine is maintained by the Māthīnī school, as is remarked by Ākṣekha in the Krama-Saṅgraha.

* Nāgh. on Daśa-bhāga.
† Ākṣekha and Ākṣekha. Vide infra. Sect. 5. § 27. j Ākṣekha,
vested, and in like manner succeed on her demise after it has so vested in her[2]. It does not become the property of her husband or other heirs; for that [text, which is declaratory of the right of the husband and the rest,*] is relative to a woman's peculiar property. Since it has been shown by a text before cited (sect. 1. § 56), that, on the decease of the widow in whom the succession had vested, the legal heirs of the former owner, who would regularly inherit his property if there were no widow in whom the succession vested, namely the daughters and the rest, succeed to the wealth; therefore the same rule [concerning the succession of the former possessor's next heirs] is inferred a fortiori, in the case of the daughter and grandson whose pretensions are inferior to the wife's.

31. Or the word “wife” [in the text above quoted,† sect. 1. § 56.] is employed with a general import: and it implies, that the rule must be understood as applicable generally to the case of a woman's succession by inheritance.

32. Conclusion. 32. Thus has the succession of the daughter and daughter's son been explained.

SECTION III.

On the Father's right of succession.

1. If there be no daughter's son, the succession devolves on the father; and not on the mother [before the father]; nor at once on both parents. For that is contrary to Vishnu's text “If there be none, it belongs to the father; if he be dead, it appertains to the mother.”§

2. But the following passage of Manus, as well as that of Vivaspati, must be understood as relating to a case of failure of heirs down to the father inclusively. “Of a son dying childless [and leaving no widow||] the mother shall take the estate; and, the mother also being dead, the father's mother shall take the heritage.”∥ Of a deceased son, who leaves neither wife nor male issue, the mother must be considered as heiress: or, by her consent, the brother may inherit.**

3. This is a result too of reasoning. The father's right of succession should be after the daughter's son and before the mother: for the father, offering two oblations of food to other manes, in which the deceased participates, is inferior to the daughter's son who presents one oblation to the deceased and two to other manes in which

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* Śrīkṛṣṇa. † Śrīkṛṣṇa. ‡ Āchārya. § Vīdā Infra. Sect. 1. § 5.
|| Śrīkṛṣṇa and Āchārya. || Manus, 9, 217. ** Vivaspati.
(\[\text{(c) See 1. Murl. Dig. 319, \(-\)}\] \[\text{\&\}}\])
the deceased participates; he is preferable to the mother and the rest because he presents [personally*] to others two oblations in which the deceased participates; and his superiority is indicated in a passage of Mann: "In a comparison of the male with the female sex, the male is pronounced superior."†

4. In the term piturau "both parents" (Sect. I. § 4.), the priority of the father is indicated: for the father is first suggested by the radical term pír; and afterwards the mother is inferred from the dual number, by assuming that one term [of two which composed the phrase] is retained.

5. Hence [since the members of the series are presented to the understanding in the order here stated], the argument, that, 'the mental apprehension of a series being co-extensive with the oral recital of its component members, recital, being wanting, necessarily precludes apprehension; must be rejected as inconclusive; for it is not true, that an adequate indication is wanting [being deducible in the manner above stated; § 4.] and [the joint succession of father and mother] would contradict the text of Vishnu.

6. Conclusion. Thus the father's right of succession has been explained.

SECTION IV.

On the Mother's right of succession

1. If the father be not living, the succession devolves on the mother: for, immediately after propounding the father's right to the estate, Vishnu's text declares, "If he be dead, it appertains to the mother."§

2. This too is reasonable: for her claim properly precedes that of the brothers and the rest; since it is necessary to make a grateful return to her, for benefits which she has personally conferred by bearing the child in her womb and nurturing him during his infancy; and also because she confers benefits on him by the birth of other sons who may offer funeral oblations in which he will participate.

ANNOTATIONS.

4. By assuming that one term is retained.] This is an allusion to the etymology of piturau 'parents' from pír 'father,' representing the compound term máita-piturau 'mother and father.' Paññā. I. 9. 70.

* Chulāmaṇi. † Mann, 9. 33. ‡ Čikīram. § Vide supra. Sect. I. § 5.
3. The notion, therefore, that the mother's right should precede the father's, because she is pronounced to surpass him in the degree of veneration due to her, must be rejected. For, if a superior title to veneration were the reason of a right of inheritance, the succession would devolve on the spiritual preceptor before the father; since it is said "Of him who is the natural parent, and him who gives holy knowledge, the giver of the sacred sciences is the more venerable father."* And paternal uncles and the rest would inherit in preference to a younger brother or a nephew. Therefore the mother's right of succession is after the father [and before the brothers.†]

4. By thus declaring that the mother's succession takes place after the father of the deceased, and before the father's offspring, the author intimates, that the paternal grandmother's succession likewise takes place after the grandfather and before the grandfather's offspring. For otherwise [if a different order of succession be assumed‡ or if that order be not established§ or that indication be not acknowledged|| there is a contradiction between the specified order of succession, "both parents, brothers, likewise, &c.," [and this case which is perfectly analogous,++]. Accordingly [since the grandmother's right of succession is in this manner indicated by Vājivaivalīkyā,††† Manu says, "And the mother also being dead, the father's mother shall take the heritage."††⁺ The meaning is 'being dead, that is, deceased, together with her offspring.'

5. Here the particle "and," as well as "also," must be joined in construction with both parts of the sentence. Therefore the sense is 'and the mother being dead, the paternal grandmother also may take the heritage.' What then becomes of the brothers and the rest? These persons, including the paternal grandfather, are indicated by the particle "also."

ANNOTATIONS.

3. The notion that the mother's right should precede the father's is rejected.] This appears to be levelled against the doctrine maintained by the Maitřila school, or at least by Vičesvāpati Miśra and by the author of the Vivāda-chandra. Čṛṇaka, in the Krama-sangala, cites Miśra (meaning Vičesvāpati Miśra) as affirming that doctrine on the strength of an inverted and erroneous reading of Viśnu's text. (Sec. 1. § 5.) Because she is pronounced to surpass him.] By the following or similar passages: "A mother surpasses a thousand fathers."★★ Čṛṇaka.

5. Are indicated.] Copies of Čṛṇaka exhibit a different reading; samācālidās 'assembled' instead of suchitāh 'limited.' The variation does not make a material alteration in the sense.

* Mann, 2. 146. † Čṛṇaka. ‡ Čṛṇaka. § Chādāmarā. || Achyuta. ¶ Vide Supra. Sect. 1. § 4. ** Chādamāri and Čṛṇaka. †† Ragh. on Dāya-bhāga. ††† Vide supra. Sect. 3. § 2. ††⁺ Vide supra. Sect. 3. § 3. §§ Chādamāri. ||| Mann, 2. 145.
6. The meaning then of the text [of Yajñavalkya] is this: the succession of both parents takes effect, in the order which has been explained, after the descendants of the deceased, down to his daughter's son, and before [the father's*] own offspring. Hence the succession of the paternal grandfather and grandmother is thus shown to take place before their own offspring. Accordingly it is not separately propounded in the text of Yajñavalkya; since the right of the paternal grandfather and grandmother is virtually declared by showing the mother's right of succession.

7. Conclusion.

7. Thus the mother's right of inheritance has been explained.

SECTION V.

On the Brother's right of succession.

1. If the mother be dead, the property devolves on the brother: for Vishnu, having declared, that, "If the father be dead, it appertains to the mother," proceeds to say “On failure of her, it goes to the brothers:† and here the pronoun refers to the mother. It appears also from the passage [of Yajñavalkya] "both parents, brothers likewise,"‡ that the brother's succession takes place in the case of the death of both parents.

2. It must not be alleged, that, under the passage above cited, which expresses "brothers likewise and their sons," the brother's son, being declared heir in like manner as the brothers are, shall inherit also next to the mother. For the text of Vishnu, declaring that “it goes to the brothers,” adds “After them, it descends to the brother's sons:” and in this place the pronoun refers to the brothers.

3. That too is reasonable: for the brother confers benefits on the deceased owner by offering three funeral oblations to his father and other ancestors, in which the deceased partakes; and he occupies his place, as presenting three oblations to the maternal grandfather and the rest, which the deceased was bound to offer; and he is

ANNOTATIONS.

7. The mother's right of inheritance has been explained.] On the death of the mother, the residue of the estate devolves on the brother as next heir in the order of succession, and not, like a woman's peculiar property, on her son and daughter: for it is a case of an estate devolving on a woman. (Vide Section 2. § 33.) Chāḍāmānu.

* Ragh. on Dāya-bhāga. † Vide Supra. Sect. 1. § 5. ‡ Sect. 1. § 4.
therefore superior to the brother's son, who has not the same qualifications. But deriving his origin from the mother, the brother, though he do possess these qualifications, is inferior to the mother; and his succession, therefore, very properly takes effect after her.

4. Besides why may not the word "likewise" be connected with the term "brother," and thus the parents and brothers may have an equal right of succession; the text being interpreted as parents, so do brothers inherit.

5. The question, then, must be negatived, as at variance with the text of Vishnu: and the same is to be done in the other instance likewise [of the claims of brother and brother's son.\(^8\)] So Manu declares, that brothers take the inheritance, not the nephew. "Of him, who leaves no son, the father shall take the inheritance; or the brothers."\(^9\)

6. Moreover, why has not the nephew, whose father is living, a right of succession? There is no other reason but this: that one, whose father is living, does not confer benefits, since he is incompetent to offer oblations. If then it be thus settled, [that the order of succession is regulated by the decree in which benefits are conferred;\(^1\)] how should a nephew, whose father is deceased, inherit equally with the brother, since he does not confer equal benefits? Accordingly Devala, in a passage before cited [Sect. I. \(\S\) 17.] not specifying the brother's son in the series of heirs down to the half-brother, comprehending the widow, daughter equal by class, father, mother, brother of the whole blood, and brother of the half-blood, intimates that the succession of nephews and the rest takes place on failure of heirs down to the half-brother.

7. The passage, which pronounces a nephew to be as a son, [\("\) They are all fathers by means of that son;\(^8\)] is intended to authorize his presenting a funeral oblation and to establish his right of succession on failure of brothers. [They do not inherit together;\(^1\)] for that contradicts the text [of Vishnu\(^8\)] above cited. Else why should not [his right of succession\(^8\)] be before the brothers.

8. Therefore the brother alone is heir in the first instance.

9. Here again, a brother of the whole blood has the first title: under the following text [\(\S\) 10]: and, even under the general rule for the brother's succession ("Brothers also," Sect. I. \(\S\) 4). The meaning is, that the whole

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\(^8\) Achyuta and Čṛkitśa. \(^9\) Manu, 9. 155. \(^1\) Čṛkitśa. \(^1\) Manu, 9. 132. \(^1\) Achyuta. \(^1\) Chādāmaṇi and Čṛkitśa. \(^8\) Čṛkitśa.
brother shall inherit in the first place: but, if there be none, then the half-brother; for he also is signified by the word brother, being issue of the same father.

10. The passage alluded to (§ 9) is as follows: “A re-united [brother] shall keep the share of his re-united [co-heir], who is deceased; or shall deliver it to a son subsequently born. But an uterine brother [shall thus retain or deliver the allotment] of his uterine relation.”* This text of Yājñavalkya also shows, that the term brother is applicable both to the whole and to the half-blood. Else, if it intended only the uterine [and of course whole] brother, the author would not have specified, that “the uterine brother, should retain or deliver the allotment of his uterine relation,” for the whole blood would be signified by the single term “brother.”

11. Therefore the succession of brothers, whether of the whole or of the half-blood, is declared by the passage before cited (“Both parents, brothers likewise.” Sect. I. § 4.) But, by here specifying the uterine relation, the prior right of the uterine (or whole) brother is intimated.

12. The succession of the half-brother, between [the whole brother and the brother’s son,†] as affirmed by Črikara and Viśvarūpa, should be acknowledged; for he is inferior to the whole brother, who presents oblations to six ancestors which the deceased was bound to offer, and also presents three oblations to the father and others, in which the deceased participates; while the half-brother only presents three oblations in which the deceased participates: and he is superior to the nephew, because he surpasses him in the conferring of benefits, since he offers three oblations of which the deceased participates.

13. In answer to the inquiry whether the half-brother, though re-united in co-parcenery, be inferior or not to the whole brother, Yājñavalkya says, “A half-brother, being again associated, may take the succession; not a half-brother, though not re-united: but one united [by blood, though not by co-parcenery,] may obtain the property; and not [exclusively] the son of a different mother.”‡

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13. A half-brother, being again associated, &c.] This obscure text, darker even than the preceding one (§ 10), admits of different interpretations, independently of variations in the reading, which also are numerous. It is necessary therefore for the understanding of the commentary, to exhibit a second version of the text, conformably with the interpretation of Čūdāpaṇi: “A half-brother, being again associated, may not take the succession of his half-brother: [the whole blood] though not re-united, shall obtain the property; not, though united, the son of a different mother.” Raghunandana, in the Dāya-bhāsa, remarks, that the Mitakṣara and Ratnakara concur in the same interpretation with Jñātavahana, from which he also does not substantially differ.

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 130. † Čriksha. ‡ Yājñavalkya, 2. 140.
14. The meaning of the text is this: 'A brother by a different mother, but associated again in coparcenery, shall first take the inheritance; not generally any half-brother [whether associated or separated].' The latter part of the text is in answer to the question, whether, inheriting first, he excludes the whole brother or takes the succession jointly with him? 'The whole brother, though not re-united in coparcenery, shall take the heritage;' (here the word whole brother is understood from the preceding sentence:) 'not exclusively the son of a different mother, though re-united.' Or the term "associated" may signify whole brother [or united by blood.] Accordingly the text is so read in the citation of it by Jitendriya as a passage of Vaidha Yajunavalkya: and, in that case, the term "associated" is understood from the preceding sentence.

15. Therefore the half-brother, who is again associated in coparcenery, shall not take the succession exclusively; but the whole brother [shares it] though not associated. Such is the meaning: and consequently the whole brother, who is not re-united in coparcenery, and the half-brother, who is associated, should divide the succession. Accordingly the author has employed the particle "but" [with the connective sense].

16. An objection is stated by Črikara Miça. The maxim, that "the re-united brother shall keep the share of his re-united co-heir," (§ 11.) is independent [of other precepts,] as it applies to the case of re-united half-brothers exclusively; and, in like manner, the maxim that "uterine [meaning the whole] brother retains the allotment of his uterine relation," (§ 10.) bears no reference [to any other rule], when it is applicable to the case of unassociated whole brothers only: but, when there is a half-brother associated and a whole brother unasso-

ANNOTATIONS.

14. The text is so read.] The reading here exhibited is sdhara nāyaṇamātṛjīn instead of saṃskṛta nāyaṇamātṛjīn. The second verse of the stanza is read in the Kalyanpat of the Aṣṭādhyāyī; the word wealth of the half-brother, nāyaṇatyāya dhanam haret, is not understood by the commentator of the Ratajākara as unauthorized; and Raghunandana, in the Dīya-tatvā, quotes the censure and apparently concurs in it.

16. In the disquisition on the passage dwayō pramanant.] This is the ninth (or, according to one reckoning, the seventh) adhikaraṇa or topic in the third section of Jaimini's seventh chapter. It is a disquisition on the interpretation of a passage of the Veda, which directs that a northern altar be prepared for the Chaturmasya sacrifice, and forbids it at two of the four sacrifices comprehended under that designation; namely, at the Vāgaveda and Gumiṣṭhrīya: whence it is concluded, that, this being an exception to the more general rule, the altar is directed to be employed under that general rule in the remaining two sacrifices only; viz., at the Vācuna-prajāha and Śikṣamadha. The reasoning, introduced into this disquisition, is the groundwork of Črikṣa's objection. See Mitakṣāra, 9. 1. 34.

* Črikṣaṇa. † Črikṣaṇa. ‡ Črikṣaṇa. § Māhātā 7. 3. 9.
ciated, if the two maxims be applied to this case in consequence of finding both descriptions of brethren, then both maxims take effect with reference to each other. Now it is not right to make the same rule operative with and without reference to another maxim; for this argues variability in the precept. Thus it is shown [by Jaimini,] in the disquisition on the passage dvayoh pramayanti,* that the prohibition, relatively to two sacrifices, of the use of the uttara-vedi or northern altar directed generally for the four sacrifices [in which those two are comprehended], is not a prohibition [but an exception]; for, if the precept concerning the northern altar be taken with reference to the denial, implying consequently an option, in the instance of two sacrifices, and be taken absolutely and without reference to any other maxim in the instance of the two other sacrifices, there would be variability in the precept. So, in regard to the subject under consideration, the maxims, that “the re-united brother shall keep the shares of his re-united co-heir,” and that “the uterine [or whole] brother shall retain the allotment of his uterine relation,” (§ 10.) are applicable in those cases in which the rules are operative independently of any other: but, if there be a half brother associated and a whole brother unassociated, the two rules are not applicable in this instance; and it would follow, that no one could take the estate [since there is no special provision in the law for this case.]† Therefore [the true interpretation is, that, in the case stated,] where the associated half brother might be supposed to be heir of his associated parceller, under the rule, that “a re-united brother shall keep the share of his re-united co-heir,” the maxim that “the uterine [or whole] brother shall retain the allotment of his uterine relation,” serves as an exception to that rule. Thus the half brother, though associated, cannot be supposed to be heir, if there be a brother of the whole blood. Then how does the succession go? The whole brother, whether re-united or not re-united in co-parcellery, inherits the property.

Crikara's conclusion.

17. That is not congruent: for it is not true, that there is variability in a precept, merely because two [rules], which are severally applicable to two [cases], become applicable in a single instance at the same time.

18. Thus, in respect of the precepts enjoining the votary to bestow his whole wealth as a gratuity in one instance and no gratuity in the other, which are respectively applicable independently of each other, if either the priest doing the functions of Udgâtâ, or the one performing the office of Pratistotâ, singly stumble [in passing

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18. If either the priest doing the functions of Udgâtâ, Among the priests, who officiate at the sacrifice called Jyotishtoma, one is termed Udgâtâ and another Pratistotâ. In the course of the ceremony the priests proceed from one apartment named

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* Mimânsâ, 739. † Crikara. ‡ Achyula and Crikara. § Ibid.
the one apartment to the other, at the celebration of the sacrifice called Jyotistoma. [*] but, if both those priests should stumble at the same time, neither injunction would be applicable; for that would be a variableness in the precept.

19. In like manner, under the precepts, which direct the priest to touch an oblation with the prayer denominated example.

19. A further Chaturbhotra, at the full moon, and with the prayer named Praichathotra at the new moon; an oblation of curds consecrated to Indra is understood in the sacrifice named Upasana-yāga, and an offering of milk consecrated to Indra is similarly understood at the Agnishomiya sacrifice; and, both precepts being thus severally applicable in those instances, neither of them would take effect at the Agninya sacrifice, since there would be variableness in the precept if both were applied to this case.

20. Therefore, the definition of variableness in a precept is its being a positive injunction without reference to any opposition in one instance, and [an eventual one†] with reference to the opposition of a different precept in another instance. Thus, in the example stated (§ 16), the prohibition bears reference to the injunction concerning the altar, expressed in these words “At this sacrifice prepare the uttara-vedi.” Without opposition to that [injunction], it would be no precept. Therefore it is a command which bears reference to the injunction respecting the altar. Nor is it in constant opposition to it; for, were it so, the prohibition [as well as the injunction§] would be useless; since, without the prohibition [and injunction, †] the omission of the altar might be deduced [from the silence of the law]. Therefore, even the injunction concerning the altar is a command which bears relation to the contrary prohibition; but, in regard to two of the periods of sacrifice, it is independent of any other rule. Consequently there is variableness in the precept; and an alternative must be inferred. But, in the case of any thing supposed as a matter of spontaneous option, a prohibition is an absolute forbiddance: for the occasional omission of the act was inferrible without the aid of an express prohibition.

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Havirghāna to another denominated Havilparamāna. During their progress, if the Udgāts happen to stumble, the votary is enjoined to bestow his whole wealth in a gratuity. But, if the Pratistott fall, the ceremony is terminated without any gratuity, or with a triflc only; and the sacrifice is to be recommenced.

19. The prayer denominated Chaturbhotra. Beginning with the words Prithvi hotā. One, being four times called by Prajāpati under the designation of ātman or soul, replies in the words of this prayer. Hence he is named Chaturbhotra “four times called,” and, for the sake of mystery, Chaturbhotra; from which the name of the prayer is derived. Tālikrīya Brahmāna; and Madhava on Mānasik. 3. 7. 4.)

The prayer termed Praichathotra. It begins with the words Agniḥ hotā.

[* Grikshma &c. † Chudāmanī. ‡ Grikshma. § Achyuta. ¶ Achyuta.
21. Accordingly [since there is variability in the precept, with a general and a particular rule, or injunction and prohibition, are sometimes applicable in the same instance, but not when two particular rules are so; or since a prohibition, which is constant, is invariable without the aid of either injunction or prohibition; the passage, which directs that the Shodasins shall be taken, and that it shall not be taken, [at an Atiratra sacrifice] constitute an alternative.

22. But according to the doctrine of those, who affirm, that an alternative is inferred by this reasoning; namely that, since a prohibition implies a previous supposition [to the contrary], the [negative!] precept does not obviate the cause; an alternative would be invariable even in the instance of a prohibition concerning that which was suggested only as a matter of spontaneous choice; for example, the passage which expresses "The priest makes not two [portions of an oblation of liquid butter] when a victim is offered; [nor at the sacrifice with acid asclepias:]" and other similar passages.

23. Moreover, since an effect cannot preclude its own cause, how can there be in one case opposition [which is necessary to constitute an alternative?] for the precepts are not equipollent. But, admitting that such is the nature of prohibition, that it eradicates its own cause; it should eradicate it altogether, for [the precept, which suggested] the previous supposition, is of inferior cogency.

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In the sacrifice named Upasnam-yaga.] Sacrifices are directed to be performed at the full and change of the moon. The Upasnam-yaga is one of those to be celebrated at the full moon and the Agnashayya at new moon. Curds constitute the oblation at one, and milk at the other of these sacrifices. The Agnashya appertains to both periods; and both kinds of oblations are to be made on that occasion.

21. Passage, which direct that the Shodasins shall be taken拿来. One passage of the Veda expresses "At the Atiratra take the Shodasins," another, on the contrary, provides "At the Atiratra take not the Shodasins." It is inferred, that an alternative must be admitted; and that the Shodasins may optionally be used or not at the ceremony called Atiratra. (Janina's Minanasa 10. 8. 4.)

Shodasins is a name for a vessel of a particular description. Çrikshna.

It is a wooden bowl employed at sacrifices in which the juice of acid asclepias is drunk.

22. The passage which expresses "the priest makes not two portions, &c." This passage, with the sequel of it which is here inserted between hyphens, forms the subject of a disagreement in Janina's Minanasa. (10. 8. 3)

23. The precepts are not equipollent.] The author here alludes to a passage of Gautama: "If there be contradiction between equal authorities, an option is inferred."\(^7\) Achyuta, Çrikshna &c.

* Çrikshna.  
† Achyuta.  
‡ Achyuta.  
§ Gautama, I. 4.
24. But they affirm, that this prohibition concerns the supposition of something which spontaneous choice may suggest, and is not a forbiddance of any thing deduced from a precept. That is an assertion which argues extreme ignorance: for it would follow, that an alternative does not exist; since the practice of what is commanded by precept, and the prohibition of a practice not commanded by precept, cannot be in opposition at the same time. The prohibition too would not be essential to the act of religion, since the practice of something suggested by spontaneous choice is not supposable as an essential part of a religious act.

25. Therefore, [since the opposite opinion is erroneous,*] an alternative is inferred [not in the manner there proposed, but†] according to the reasoning set forth by us [viz., that, if the prohibition be constant, both injunction and prohibition would be unnecessary; and, if the injunction were invariably cogent, the prohibition would be vain.†] But let that be; for why expatiate?

26. As for the remark of the same author, who says (§ 16.) that if there be a half brother associated and a whole brother unassociated, in which case the half brother might be supposed to be the heir under the rule, that "a re-united brother shall keep the share of his re-united co-heir;" (§10.) then the maxim, that the uterine [or whole] brother shall retain the allotment of his uterine relation, (§ 10.) serves as an exception to that rule; That is unsuitable, for, in this very case, the rule concerning the re-united co-heir might on the contrary serve as an exception to the maxim, that “the uterine [or whole] brother shall retain the allotment of his uterine relation,” under which the whole brother might be supposed to be the heir: since there is not in this instance any ground of preference.

27. But this author’s interpretation of the text “A half brother being again associated, &c. (§13), as explanatory of the passage “a re-united brother shall keep the share of his re-united co-heir,” is quite wrong: for, the intended purport being conveyed in that text, the passage in question would become superfluous.

28. Moreover the exposition of the text [by Črikarṣa§], as signifying ‘Let not the half brother, who is an associated half brother, take the estate; but the whole brother, (this term is understood,) who is not re-united, shall positively take it; a son of a different mother, though

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24. Cannot be in opposition at the same time. ‘Or may subsist in the same instance.’ For Črikarṣa notices two readings of this passage: Upasaha-sambhavat and Upasaha-sambhavāt.

* Črikarṣa.
† Črikarṣa and Achyuta.
§ Črikarṣa and Achyuta.
united, shall not inherit;' is also erroneous, for the same term 'half-brother' in the first part of the text, is needlessly repeated; and the phrase 'son of a different mother,' in the latter part of it, becomes superfluous; and the particle any is taken in the sense of positively.

29. Besides, under the interpretation of the passage concerning the uterine [or whole] brother as an exception to the claim of the associated half-brother if a whole brother unassociated exist; and its consequent inapplicability to the case of a whole brother and half-brother both unassociated; these would have an equal right of succession [under the general maxim, that brothers shall inherit; section 1. § 4.] since no distinction is specified: it or else the property would belong to neither of them [if the general rule be explained by the particular one.]

30. But, if the passage concerning the uterine [or whole] brother be applicable to this case also, [taking the term "uterine" as intending such a brother generally, whether associated or unassociated,] then the objection of variableness in the precept may be retorted on you; for the passage, concerning the re-united brother, bears reference to opposition in one case, [in that of the associated half-brother and unassociated whole brother:] and bears no reference to opposition in another case, [in that of a whole brother and half-brother both unassociated:] in like manner as it is declared, that the general rule for preparing the vedi or altar at a sacrifice with the Soma plant, must be understood as applicable to sacrifices in which the use of the altar has not been otherwise directed; since there would be variableness in the precept, if it operate in the case of the Dikshitiya and other similar sacrifices, in bar of a command forbidding the altar suggested by the extension of a rule [concerning sacrifices celebrated at the full moon,] but in other instances operate without bar to any thing else.

31. But, according to our interpretation, there is no variableness in the precept, even as that is understood by Črīktsha: for the passages concerning the re-united brother and the uterine [or whole] brother (§ 10.) are relative severally to different cases; and that regarding "a half brother again associated" (§ 13.) declares the equal participation of a

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30. At a sacrifice with the Soma plant.] It is a general rule, that an altar is to be used at sacrifices in which the Soma or Asclepias adca is employed. An altar is also directed to be provided at sacrifices celebrated at the full of the moon. By extension of this rule to the Dikshitiya, which is one part of the sacrifice to be celebrated at that period, the use of the altar is deductible from this as well as from the general rule abovementioned. Now, since the injunction is unnecessary as regarding what is otherwise known, it is supposed, that, to give operation to the injunction in this case, it must be taken as a bar to the inference deductible from an extension of a different rule. Hence it is considered liable to the objection of variableness.

* Achyuta. † Črīktsha. ‡ Črīktsha and Achyuta.
§ Črīktsha. || Črīktsha. *Črīktsha.
32. So Manu likewise shows the same rule of succession. "His uterine brothers and sisters, and such brothers as were re-united after a separation, shall assemble together and divide his share equally."

33. Reciprocity being indicated by the plural number, in the term "uterine brothers," as respecting these exclusively; and in the words "brothers re-united," as relating to the half-brothers; the words "assemble together" are properly employed to mark association of both [descriptions of brethren;†] for they would otherwise be meaningless terms. Therefore it is from mere ignorance that it has been asserted, that both [do not inherit together;¶] because reciprocity is not expressed by the text. Moreover, since the text exhibits the conjunctive particle "and," in the phrase "and such brothers as were re-united, &c." and the rule [of grammar] expresses, that a conjunctive compound is used when the sense of the conjunctive particle is denoted;§ the assertion, that reciprocity is not expressed by the text, would imply, that even the conjunction does not bear that sense [viz., the sense of reciprocation.||]

34. Therefore, if whole brothers and half brothers only [not re-united brothers of either description†] be the claimants, the succession devolves exclusively on the whole brothers. Accordingly Vṛhat Manu says, "If a son of the same mother survive, the son of her rival shall not take the wealth. This rule shall hold good in regard to the immovable estate. But, on failure of him, [the half-brother] may take the heritage."

35. This rule shall hold good in regard to the immovable estate.]

This rule is relative to divided immoveables. For, immediately after treating of such [property,] Yāmana says, "The whole of the undivided immovable estate appertains to all the brethren; but divided immovable must on no account be taken by the half-brother."

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* Manu, 9. 213. 
† Čākṣashna. 
‡ Achyuta. 
§ Pāṇini, 3. 2. 29. 
|| Achyuta and Čākṣashna. 
¶ Ibid.
36. All the brethren.] Whether of the whole blood or of the half-blood. But, among whole brothers, if one be re-united after separation, the estate belongs to him. If an unassociated whole brother and re-united half-brother exist, it devolves on both of them. If there be only half-brothers, the property of the deceased must be assigned in the first instance to a re-united one; but, if there be none such, then to the half-brother who is not re-united.

37. Accordingly the plural number is employed* in the term "brothers," (sect. 1. § 4.) for the purpose of indicating the succession of all descriptions of them, in the order here stated. Else it would be unmeaning.

38. The text, "a re-united [brother] shall keep the share of his re-united co-heir." (§ 10) is intended to provide a special rule governed by the circumstance of re-union after separation, and applicable to the case where a number of claimants in an equal degree of affinity occurs.

39. Hence, if there be competition between claimants of equal degree, whether brothers of the whole blood, or brothers of the half-blood, or sons of such brothers, or uncles, or the like, the re-united percener shall take the heritate: for the text does not specify the particular relation; and all [these relations] were premised in the preceding text (sect. 1. § 4.†); and a question arises in regard to all of them. Therefore the text must be considered as not relating exclusively to brothers.

40. Conclusion.

SECTION VI.

On the Nephew's right of succession,—and that of other heirs.

1. On failure of brothers, the brother's son is heir: for the text of Vishnu, having declared "it goes to the brothers," proceeds "After them it descends to the brother's sons."‡

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36. All the brethren.] Effects other than immovable go to the brothers of the whole blood whether separated or unseparated. Ragh. Daya-tatva.

* Vide Sect. 2. § 37. † Çūkraša. ‡ Sect. 1. § 5.
2. Among these, the succession devolves first on the son of a uterine [or whole] brother; but, if there be none, it passes to the son of the half-brother(s). For the text expresses, “An uterine [brother] shall retain or deliver the allotment of his uterine relation” (sect. 5. § 10). Indeed the son of the half-brother, being a giver of oblations to the father of the late proprietor, together with his own grandmother, to the exclusion of the mother of the deceased owner, is inferior to a son of a whole brother [who is the giver of oblations to the grandfather in conjunction with the mother of the deceased*].

3. Nor can it be pretended that the stepmother, grandmother and great grandmother take their places at the funeral repast, in consequence of [ancestors being deified†] with their wives: for the terms “mother” [grandmother and great grandmother] &c. [in such texts as the following||] bear the original sense of “his own natural mother,” “father’s natural mother,” and “grandfather’s natural mother”; and it is by those terms that they are described as taking their places at the funeral repast. Thus it is said, “A mother tastes with her husband the funeral repast consisting of oblations to the manes; and the paternal grandmother with her husband; and the paternal great grandmother with her’s.” But the introduction of stepmothers and the rest to a place at the periodical obsequies, is expressly forbidden. Thus the sage declares, “Whosoever die, whether man or woman, without male issue, for such person shall be performed funeral rites peculiar to the individual, but no periodical obsequies.”

4. Besides, the command for the celebration of the funeral repast in honour of ancestors with their wives, is of invariable exigency; as it is universally acknowledged: but, since there are not stepmothers in every instance, the precept must relate to the natural mother; for the association of the variable and invariable exigency of the same command would be a contradiction.

5. Since the paternal uncle, like the nephew of the whole blood, offers two oblations, which the owner was bound to present, to two ancestors with their wives, should not the succession devolve equally on the uncle and nephew of the late proprietor? The answer is, the paternal uncle is indeed a giver of oblations to the grandfather and great

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2. For the text expresses “An uterine brother,” &c.] Although there be no text which declares the right of a nephew of the whole blood before a nephew of the half-blood; yet, under the passage cited, which shows, that in the case of brothers, the whole blood excludes the half blood, it is reasonable, that the son of an excluded person should be debarred by the son of the person who excludes him. Çrīkṛṣṇa and Aĉhyuta.

† Çrīkṛṣṇa and Aĉhyuta.

|| Çrīkṛṣṇa.

(o) See 1 Mor. Dig. 313, 324.—Ed.
grandfather of the proprietor; but the nephew is giver of two oblations to two ancestors including the owner’s father who is principally considered. He is therefore a preferable claimant, and inherits before the uncle(*)

6. Accordingly [since superior benefits are conferred by such a successor*], the brother’s grandson excludes the paternal uncle; for he is a giver of oblations to the deceased owner’s father(b) who is the person principally considered.

7. But the brother’s great grandson, though a lineal descendant of the owner’s father, is excluded by the paternal uncle; for he is not a giver of oblations, since he is distant in the fifth degree. Thus Manu says, “To three must libations of water be made, to three must oblations of food be presented; the fourth in descent is the giver of those offerings: but the fifth has no concern with them.”† By this passage the fifth in descent is debarred.

8. But, on failure of heirs of the father down to the great-grandson, it must be understood, that the succession devolves on the father’s daughter’s son [in preference to the uncle;‡] in like manner as it descends to the owner’s daughter’s son [on failure of the male issue, in preference to the brother.](§)

9. The succession of the grandfather’s and great-grandfather’s lineal descendants including the daughter’s son, must be understood in a similar manner, according to the proximity of the funeral offering; since the reason stated in the text “for even the son of a daughter delivers him in the next world, like the son of a son,”§ is equally applicable; and his father’s or grandfather’s daughter’s son, like his own daughter’s son, transports his manes over the abyss, by offering oblations of which he may partake.

10. Accordingly Manu has not separately pronounced their right of inheritance: for they are comprehended under the two passages, “To three must libations of water be made, &c.”|| and “To the nearest kinsman (supta) the inheritance next belongs.”&& Yājñavalkya likewise uses the term “gentiles” or kinsmen (gotrajya)** for the

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8. In the manner as it descends to the daughter’s son.] Although the succession ought previously to devolve on the sister, as it goes to the daughter before the daughter’s son, nevertheless she is excluded from the succession because she is no giver of oblations at periodical obsequies; being disqualified by sex. But the daughter’s right of inheritance before the daughter’s son takes effect under the special provisions of an express text (Sect. 2, § 14.) Çrikshma.

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(*) Çrikshma. † Manu, 9, 186. Vide supra. Sect. 1, § 40.
‡ Achyuta and Çrikshma. § Manu, 9, 133. || Manu, 9, 186.
(a) See 1 Mod. Dig. 328.—Ed. (b) See 1 Strange, II, L, 33.—Ed.
(c) See 1 Mod. Dig. 336, 338.—Ed.
purpose of indicating the right of inheritance of the father's and grandfather's daughter's son, as sprung from the same line, in the relative order of the funeral oblation; and for the further purpose of excluding females related as sapindas, since these also sprung from the same line.

11. Accordingly [since they are excluded.]* Baudhāyana, after promising "A woman is entitled," proceeds "not to the heritage; for females, and persons deficient in an organ of sense or member, are deemed incompetent to inherit." The construction of this passage is "a woman is not entitled to the heritage." But the succession of the widow and certain others [viz, the daughter, the mother and the paternal grandmother; †] takes effect under express texts, without any contradiction to this maxim.

12. On failure of any lineal descendant of the paternal great-grandfather, down to the daughter's son, who might present oblations in which the deceased would participate; to intimate, that, in such case, the maternal uncle shall inherit in consequence of the proximity of oblations, as presenting offerings to the maternal grandfather and the rest, which the deceased was bound to offer, Yajnavalkya employs the term, "cognates" (bandhu).§ But Mām has indicated it only by a passage declaratory of succession according to the nearness of the obligation.

13. Since the maternal uncle and the rest present three oblations to the maternal grandfather and other ancestors, which the deceased was bound to offer, therefore the property should devolve on the maternal uncle and the rest; for it is by means of wealth, that a person becomes a giver of oblations. Two motives are indeed declared for the acquisition of wealth: one temporal enjoyment, the other the spiritual benefit of alms and so forth. Now, since the acquirer is dead and cannot have temporal enjoyment, it is right that the wealth should be applied to his spiritual benefit. Accordingly Viśvaspati says, "Of property which descends by inheritance, half should carefully be set apart for the benefit of the deceased owner to defray the charges of his monthly, six-monthly and annual obsequies." So Apastamba ordains, "Let the pupil or the daughter apply the goods to religious purposes for the benefit of the deceased." By saying to defray the charges of his monthly, &c. obsequies his participation, and by directing "religious purposes" his spiritual benefit, are stated as reasons. Accordingly the sage says, "Wealth is useful for alms and for enjoyment." It is reasonable, there-

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11. Females are deemed incompetent to inherit.] Whether bearing the same or a different family name. Therefore the son's daughter has no right of inheritance. Bagh. on Dāya-bhāga.

* Čṛkṣeṣu. † Achyuta and Čṛkṣeṣu. § Vide Sect. 1 § 4.
fore, that, on failure of kindred who might present oblations in which he would participate, the succession should devolve on the maternal uncle and the rest, who present oblations which he was bound to offer.

14. Accordingly [since the succession devolves on heirs down to the maternal uncle and the rest, in the order of omissions in which the deceased may participate, or which he was bound to offer;*] Manu, considering that support as sufficiently indicated by the two passages above cited, "To three must libations be made, &c." "To the nearest kinsman the inheritance next belongs;" (vide § 7 and 17.) proceeds thus, "Then, on failure of such kindred, the distant kinsman shall be the heir, or the spiritual protector, or the pupil."†

15. The distant kinsman (sakulva) is the descendant of the paternal grandfather's grandfather or the remote ancestor. Such relatives are denominated Samánodakas. Their order of succession is in the series as exhibited. On failure of such heirs [down to the Samánodakas], the succession devolves on the spiritual preceptor, the pupil, &c.

16. Otherwise [if the text of Manu do not intend the maternal uncle and the rest,§] how is the admission of maternal uncles and others affirmed without contradiction to Manu? Therefore this meaning is intended by him in the passage above cited; and there is no contradiction.

17. Accordingly, having declared, while treating of inheritance, "To three must libations of water be made; to three must oblations of food be presented; the fourth in descent is the giver of those offsprings; but the fifth has no concern with them;"∥ he adds "To the nearest kinsman (sapindā) the inheritance next belongs;"¶ for the purpose of showing, that the fifth in descent, not being connected even by a single oblation, is not the heir, so long as a person connected by a single oblation, whether sprung from the father's or the mother's family, exists. Otherwise, since the relation of sapindā has been declared by a distinct text, ("Now the relation of sapindā or men connected by the funeral cake, ceases with the seventh person;"***) and the right of the fourth in descent to inherit is declared by the text "To the nearest kinsman the inheritance next belongs;"†† the passage, which begins "To three must libations be made, &c."††† would be superfluous. It cannot be said, that it is intended to direct the celebration of funeral repast in honour of three ancestors: for it is inserted in the midst of a disquisition concerning inheritance; and the funeral repast is ordained by a

* Gṛikṛsha.
† Manu, 9, 187. Vide infra. § 21.
§ Gṛikṛsha.
∥ Manu, 9, 186.
** Manu, 5, 60.
†† Manu, 9, 187.
††† Manu, 9, 186.
different text. Thus Manu says, “Let the householder honour the sages by duly studying the Vedas; the gods by oblations to fire as ordained by law; the manes, by pious obsequies; men, by supplying them with food; and spirits, by gifts to all animated creatures.”

18. Nor should it be pretended, that the text [of Manu, “To the nearest sapinda, &c.” § 17.] is intended to indicate kin is not by nearness of kin according to the order of birth, and birth, not according to the presentation of offerings; for the order of birth is not suggested by the text. But Manu, declaring, that oblations of food, as well as libations of water, are to be offered to three persons, and that the fourth in descent is a giver of oblations, but neither is the fifth in ascent a receiver of offerings nor the fifth in descent a giver of them, thus declares nearness of kin, and, shows that it depends on superiority of [benefits by] presentation of oblations.

19. Therefore a kinsman who is allied by a common oblation as presenting funeral offerings to three persons in the family of the father, or in that of the mother, of the deceased owner, such kinsman having sprung from his family though of different male descent, as his own daughter’s son or his father’s daughter’s son, or having sprung from a different family as his maternal uncle or the like, [is heir §] and the next (“To three must libations of water be made,” &c. § 7.) is intended to propound the succession of such kinsmen; and the subsequent passage (“To the nearest sapinda, &c. § 17.”) must be explained as meant to discriminate them according to their degrees of proximity.

20. The order of succession then must be understood in this manner: on failure of the father’s daughter’s son or other person who is a giver of three oblations (presented to the father, &c.) which the deceased shares or which he was bound to offer, the succession devolves in the next place on the maternal uncle and others [namely his son or grandson] who offer oblations to the maternal grandfather and the rest which the deceased was bound to present [a].

21. But on failure of kin in this degree, the distant kinsman (sakulya) is successor. For Manu says, “Then, on failure of such kindred, the distant kinsman shall be the heir, or the spiritual preceptor, or the pupil.”

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20. The succession devolves in the next place on the maternal uncle, &c.] On failure of persons who are givers of oblations in which the deceased may participate, the kinsman [that is, the maternal grandfather, or maternal uncle, and so forth] is heir. Here also, as in the instance of the father and paternal ancestors, if the maternal grandfather be living, he is heir; but, on failure of him, the maternal uncle and other maternal kindred in order; for they present oblations, which the deceased was bound to offer. [Rag. Daya-latya.

21. The distant kinsman is one who shares a divided oblation.] The sakulya is of two descriptions; descending and ascending. The first intends the son of the great

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[a] See 1 Morl. Dig. 239.—Ed.
The distant kinsman (sakulya) is one who shares a divided oblation (sect. 1. § 37.) as the grandson's grandson or other descendant within three degrees reckoned from him; or as the offspring of the grandfather's grandfather or other remoter ancestor.

22. Among these claimants [whether ascending or descending]* the grandson's grandson and the rest are nearest, since they confer benefits by means of the residue of oblations which they offer. [These descendants are therefore heirs.] On failure of such, the offspring of the paternal grandfather's grandfather inherits in right of oblations presented to the paternal grandfather's grandfather and other ancestors who are sharers of the residue of oblations which the deceased was bound to offer.

23. If there be no such distant kindred, the Samānodakas, or kinsmen allied by common libation of water, must be admitted to inherit, as being signified by the term sakulya [conformably with Baudhāyana's explanation of it; sect. 1 § 37.†]

24. On failure of these, the spiritual preceptor [or instructor in knowledge of the vedas] is the successor. In default of him, the pupil [or student of the vedas] is heir: by the text of Manu, "or the spiritual preceptor or the pupil." (§14.) On failure of him likewise, the fellow-student; by the text of Yājñavalkya "a pupil and a fellow-student." (sect. 1. § 4.)

25. In default of these claimants, persons bearing the same family name (gotra) are heirs. On failure of them, persons descended from the same patriarch are the successors. For the text of Gautama expresses "Persons allied by funeral oblations, family name and patriarchal descent, shall share the heritance [of a childless man; or his widow shall partake."||]

26. On failure of all heirs as here specified, let the priests take the estate. Thus Manu says, "On failure of all those, the lawful heirs are such Brāhmaṇas, as have read the three vedas, as are pure in body and mind, as have

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grandson and the rest to the third degree in the descending line; the other signifies the great-grandfather's father and other ancestors to the third degree in the ascending line. Čākṣuṣa, Karma-saṅgraha.

25. Or his widow shall partake.] The passage, as cited in the text, was incomplete; the compiler having omitted the close of it, which is declaratory of the widow's participation. The defect of the quotation has been supplied. As the original passage stands in Gautama's Institutes, it is not easily reconcilable with Māṇḍūkya-sūtra's doctrine of the widow's preferable title.

26. Virtue which would be extinguished, &c.] This differs from Kulākā-bhaṭṭa's interpretation, which makes the passage relate to funeral rites: "thus the rites of obsequies cannot fail."
subdued their passions. Thus virtue is not lost."* Virtue which would be extinguished by the ample enjoyment [of its reward.] but is renewed by the acquisition of fresh merit through the circumstance of his wealth devolving on Brāhmaṇas, is not lost. Here also the author indicates the appropriation of the property for the benefit of the deceased.

27. In default of them, the king shall take the wealth: excepting however the property of a Brāhmaṇa. A failure of descendants from the same patriarch and of persons bearing the same family name, as well as of Brāhmaṇas, must be understood as occurring when there are none inhabiting the same village: else an escheat to the king could never happen.

28. If the right of the father’s daughter’s son, and of the maternal uncle and the rest, be not considered as intended by the text, “To three must libations of water be made, &c., (§ 7.) they would have no right of succession, since they have not a place among distant kinsmen and others, whose order of succession is specified. Nor can this be deemed an admissible inference, since they are indicated by Yājñavalkya under the terms “Gentiles and cognates” (sect. 1. § 4). Consequently it must be affirmed, that they have been indicated by Manu in this text (§ 7). Therefore such order of succession must be followed, as will render the wealth of the deceased most serviceable to him.

29. Accordingly (since inheritance is in right of benefits conferred, and the order of succession is regulated by the degree of benefit;) the equal right of the son, the son’s son and the son’s grandson, is proper: for their equal pretensions are declared in the text, “By a son a man conquers worlds,” &c. (sect. 1. § 31.) and in other similar passages(a). They equally present oblations to the deceased. Hence also the grandson and great-grandson, whose fathers are living, do not inherit, for they do not confer benefits, since they are forbidden to celebrate the periodical obsequies by skipping the surviving father; the law providing, that oblations shall not be presented, overpassing a living person. Otherwise these [sons and grandsons, whose fathers are living;] would have the same right of inheritance with those whose fathers are deceased. Or the son alone would inherit as nearest of kin in the order of birth, to the exclusion of the son’s son and son’s grandson. Neither is there any express text declaratory of the equal rights of three descendants, son, grandson and great-grandson. Therefore it must be inferred, that the parity in their right of inheritance arises from the equal benefits conferred by them.

* Manu, 9. 188. † Çṣkritsha. ‡ Achyuta and Çṣkritsha.

(a) See 1 Strange, H. L. 127, 128.—Ed.
30. In every case the wealth is appropriated in the manner most serviceable to the deceased.

30. In like manner the appropriation of the wealth of the deceased to his benefit, in the mode which has been stated, should in every case be deduced according to the specified order.

31. This doctrine, [that inheritance is deducible from reasoning and founded on services rendered,]* must be admitted to have the assent of Manu and other sages: for there can be no other purpose of propounding, under the head of inheritance, the superior benefits derived from sons and the rest; and the exoneration of the father from debt is stated as a reason for the son’s inheriting: (“By the eldest son a man is exonerated from debt to his ancestors; therefore that son is entitled to take the heritage.” Sect. 1. § 32.) Redemption also is exhibited as a cause of succession to property: (“Even the son of a daughter delivers him in the next world like the son of a son.”†) and there is no other reason for the equal right of inheritance of three descendants, the son and the rest, besides their deliverance [of their ancestors;] and the passage, “To three must libations of water be made, &c.” (§ 7.) would be unnecessary [if such were not the purpose ‡] and the exclusion of persons impotent, degraded, blind from their birth and so forth, is an opposite rule as founded upon their rendering no services; [but not so as grounded on the mere letter of the law:] § and it is troublesome to establish an assumed precept for debarring those before whom an heir intervenes; [as must be done upon any other supposition ‡] and it is reasonable, that the wealth, which a man has acquired, should be made beneficial to him by appropriating it according to the degree in which services are rendered to him.

32. It is maintained by Udyota; the irreproachable Udyota,§ should be respected by the wise.

33. If the learned be yet unsatisfied [with relying on reason,*] for the ground of the law of inheritance, this doctrine may be derived from express passages of law. Still the same interpretation of both texts [of Manu, § 7. and 17.] must be assumed. But let this be. What need is there of expatiating?

34. Excepting the property of a Brāhmaṇa, let the king take the wealth [on failure of heirs]. So Manu directs “the property of a Brāhmaṇa shall never be taken by the king: this is a fixed law. But the wealth of the other classes on failure of all heirs, the king may take.”¶ By the term “all” is signified every heir including the Brāhmaṇa. (§ 36).

ANNOTATIONS.

31. Before whom an heir intervenes.] As the grandson or great-grandson, whose own father is living, and so forth. Çrikṛṣṇa.

35. The goods of a hermit, of an ascetic, and of a professed student, let the spiritual brother, the virtuous pupil and the holy preceptor take. On failure of these, the associate in holiness, or person belonging to the same order, shall inherit. Thus Yājñavalkya says, "The heirs of a hermit, of an ascetic and of a professed student, are, in their order, the preceptor, the virtuous pupil, and the spiritual brother and associate in holiness."  

36. Goods, such as they may happen to possess, should be delivered in the inverse order of this enumeration. The student must be understood to be a professed one: for, abandoning his father and relations, he makes a vow of service and of dwelling for life in his preceptor's family. But the property of a temporary student would be inherited by his father and other relations.

37. Thus has the distribution of the wealth of one, who leaves no male issue, been explained.

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35. The associate in holiness or person belonging to the same order.] This is according to the author's apprehension of the meaning of the text: but in fact, 'associate in holiness' is an epithet of spiritual brother. Čṛkṣirṣya.

36. Goods such as they may happen to possess.] Viz., the board of wild rice or other property of a hermit; the guard, clout, and other effects of an ascetic; and the books, clothes and other goods of a student.

Recapitulation by Čṛkṣirṣya Turvālankāra.

The order of succession to the property of a deceased man, is this. First the son inherits; on failure of him, the son's son; in his default, the son's grandson. However, a grandson whose father is dead, and a grand-grandson whose father and grandfather are deceased, inherit at once with the son. On failure of descendants down to the son's grandson, the wife inherits: and she, having received her husband's heritage, should take the protection of her husband's family or of her father's, and should use her husband's heritage for the support of life, and make donations and give alms in a moderate degree, for the benefit of her deceased husband; but not dispose of it at her pleasure, like her own peculiar property. If there be no widow, the daughter inherits; in the first place, a maiden daughter; or on failure of such, an affianced daughter: but, if there be none, a married daughter; and she may be one, who has, or is likely to have, male issue; for both these inherit together: but one who is barren, or who becomes a widow having no male issue, is incompetent to inherit. On failure of the married daughter, a daughter's son is heir. If there be none, the father succeeds; or, if he be dead, the mother. If she be deceased, a brother is the successor. In the first place, the uterin (or whole) brother; if there be none, a half brother. But, if the deceased lived in renewed co-parcenery with a brother, then, in case of all being of the whole blood, the associated whole brother is heir in the first instance; but, on failure of him, the unassociated whole brother. So, in case of all being of the half blood, the associated half brother inherits in the first place; and on failure of him the unassociated half brother. But, if there be an associated half brother and an unassociated whole brother, then both are equal heirs. In default of brothers, the brother's son is the successor. Here also a nephew of the whole blood inherits in the first instance; and on failure of such, the nephew of the half blood; but, in case of re-unions of co-heirs, and on the supposition of all being of the whole blood, the associated son of the whole brother.

* Yājñavalkya, S. 139.
is in the first place heir; and, on failure of him, the unassociated nephew of the whole blood: or, on the supposition of all being of the half-blood, the associated nephew of the half-blood, is the first heir; and, on failure of him, the unassociated nephew. But, if the son of the whole brother be absent, and the son of the half brother associated, both inherit together, like brothers in similar circumstances. If there be no brother's son, the brother's grandson is heir. Here likewise the distinction of the whole blood and half blood, and that of re-united parsimony and disjoined parsimony, must be understood. On failure of the brother's grandson, the father's daughter's son is the successor: whether he be the son of the sister of the whole blood, or the son of a sister of the half blood. If there be none, the father's own brother is heir; or, in default of such, the father's half brother. On failure of these, the succession devolves in order on the son of the father's whole brother, on the son of his half brother, on the grandson of his whole brother, and on the grandson of his half brother. In default of these, the paternal grandfather's daughter's son inherits; and, in this instance also, whether he be son of the father's own sister or son of the father's half sister: and, in like manner, [the whole blood and half blood inherit alike] in the subsequent instance of the succession devolving on the son of the great-grandfather's daughter. On failure of these heirs, the paternal grandfather is the successor. If he be dead, the paternal grandmother inherits. If she be deceased, the paternal grandfather's own brother, his half brother, their sons, and grandsons, and the great-grandfather's daughter's son are successively heirs. On failure of all such kindred, who present oblations in which the deceased owner may participate, the succession devolves on the maternal uncle, and the rest, who present oblations which the deceased was bound to offer. In default of these, the heritage goes to the son of the owner's maternal aunt. Or, failing him, it passes successively to the son and grandson of the maternal uncle. On failure of these, the right of inheritance accrues to the remote kindred in the descending line, who present the residue of oblations to ancestors with whom the deceased owner may participate; namely, to the grandson's grandson and other descendants for three generations in succession. In default of these, the inheritance returns to the ascending line of distant kindred, by whom oblations are offered, of which the deceased owner may partake; namely, to the offspring of the paternal grandfather's grandfather and other ancestors, in the order of proximity. On failure of these, the succession devolves on the Samandakas or kindred allied by a common oblation of water. In default of them, the spiritual preceptor is heir; or, if he be dead, the pupil; or, failing him, the fellow-student in theology. If there be none, the inheritance devolves successively on a person bearing the family name, and on one descendant from the same patriarch, in either case being an inhabitant of the same village. On failure of all relatives as here specified, [the property devolves on Brāhmaṇas learned in the three Vedas and endowed with other requisite qualities; and, in default of such,] the king shall take the eschaton, excepting however the property of a Brāhmaṇa. But the priests, who have read the three Vedas and possess other requisite qualities, shall take the wealth of a deceased Brāhmaṇa.

So the goods of an anchorite shall devolve on another hermit considered as his brother and serving the same holy place. In like manner the goods of an ascetic shall be inherited by his virtuous pupil; and the preceptor shall obtain the goods of a professed student. But the wealth of a temporary student is taken by his father or other heir. Such is the abridged statement of the law of inheritance. Çrīkṛṣṇa.

Remark by the Translator.

The son and grandson of the maternal uncle ought to precede the son of the maternal aunt, by the analogy of the rule of inheritance on the father's side. But three collated copies of Çrīkṛṣṇa's commentary agree in stating the order of succession as here exhibited. On the other hand the same author, in his original treatise on inheritance

* The son of the proprietor's own sister, and the son of his half sister, have an equal right of inheritance; according to Āchārya Çhūḍāmaṇi. Çrīkṛṣṇa, Kraṇa-saṅgraha.

† The maternal grandfather inherits before his son the maternal uncle, according to the Dāya-aswa of Raghunandana and Kraṇa-saṅgraha of Çrīkṛṣṇa.

‡ See the note subjoined to this summary.

§ Kraṇa-saṅgraha.
CHAPTER XII.

On a second partition of property after the re-union of co-parceners.

1. When partition is again made after re-union of parencers, the shares must be equal.

So Manu, &c.

1. Next the partition of the property of re-united co-parceners is explained. On that subject Manu and Vishnu say, "If brethren, once divided and living again together as parencers, make a second partition, the shares must in that case be equal: there is not in this instance any right of primogeniture."*

entitled Krama-sangraha, exhibits the succession on the mother's side in the following order: first the maternal grandfather; next the maternal uncle; then the maternal uncle's son; after him, the maternal uncle's son's son; and subsequently the maternal grandfather's daughter's son. On failure of these, the maternal great-grandfather, his son, his son's son, his grandson, and his daughter's son; again, on failure of these, the maternal grandfather's grandson, his son, his son's son, his grandson and his daughter's son.†

It must be remarked, however, that the text of Çrikrshna's treatise, according to some copies of it, interposes the mother's sister's son between the maternal uncle and his son. But that is an evident mistake; for the mother's sister's son is the same with the maternal grandfather's daughter's son, who is placed by the same author after the maternal uncle's grandson.

The author of the Dāya-nirmaya states the succession differently: viz. first the maternal uncle; then the maternal uncle's son; next the maternal grandfather; after him, the mother's sister's son; subsequently the maternal uncle's son's son; and lastly the maternal great-grandfather. He gives reasons founded on the number of oblations deemed beneficial to the deceased owner.

Jagannātha Tarkapanchānana intimates the opinion, that the son of a son's daughter, or of a grandson's daughter, or of a niece, or of a nephew's daughter, are entitled in the succession before the maternal grandfather. (Digest of Hindu law, Vol. IV. p. 250.)

I find nothing else upon the subject in other writers of the Bengali school; and, amidst this disagreement of authors, I should be inclined to give the preference to the authority of Çrikrshna's Krama-sangraha; because the order of succession on the mother's side, as there stated, follows the analogy of the rule of inheritance on the father's side. C.

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1. Property of re-united co-parceners.] According to the doctrine of those who contend for a general property of co-parceners in the aggregate estate, re-united property in wealth in which an aggregate property is raised by the annulment of previously vested several rights, through a stipulation or agreement with a father, brethren, &c. concluded subsequently to partition with one accord, to this effect "the wealth, which is mine, is mine; and that, which is mine, is thine." But, according to the author's doctrine, it is wealth in which undistinguished several rights are raised by the annulment of the previous several rights through a stipulation as abovementioned. Çrikrshna.

† That part of the text which is enclosed between parentheses is wanting in some copies of the Krama-sangraha.
2. The shares must be equal.] This supposes re-union of brothers belonging to the same tribe. But, in the case of association of brothers appertaining, the one to the sacerdotal, and the other to the military tribe, the rule of distribution must be understood to conform with the original allotment of shares: for the text is intended only to forbid an elder brother’s superior portion as before allotted to him. Accordingly [since unequal partition, regulated by difference of tribes, is not denied;*] Vīhaspati, saying “Among brethren, who, being once separated, again live together through mutual affection, there is no right of primogeniture when partition is again made;” prohibits only the assignment of a superior share to the eldest, but does not ordain equality of allotments.

3. Definition of “re-united co-parcener,” in a passage of Vīhaspati.

4. It is restricted to certain relations: father and son; brothers, uncle and nephew.

5. Other rules hold good in this as in any partition among brothers.

6. Conclusion.

CHAPTER XIII.

On the distribution of effects concealed.

1. The distribution of that, which was concealed at the time of partition and is afterwards discovered, shall be now taught. On that subject Manu says, “When all the debts and wealth have been justly distributed according to law, any thing, which may be afterwards discovered, shall be subject to an equal distribution.”†

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6. Other particular rules.] Wealth, acquired without use of the joint stock, belongs to the acquirer exclusively, and is not shared by the rest: but, in the instance of the gains of science, such of the brethren as are equally or more learned participate;

* Crikśva and Aschvita.
† Manu, 9, 216.
2. The division of it should be precisely similar to that which had been previously made; and a less share is not to be given, nor no share, to the person who concealed the property, as a punishment of his concealment. Such is the meaning of the sentence "shall be subject to an equal distribution." Nor is the text intended to enjoin the allotment of equal shares of the property to all the partners; for there is no reason for prohibiting the deduction in favour of the eldest, and so forth; and it would follow, that brothers belonging, one to the sacerdotal, another to the military, and the rest to other tribes, would have equal shares.

3. Thus Yājñavalkya says, "Effects, which have been withheld by one co-heir from another, and which are discovered after the separation, let them again divide in equal shares: this is a settled rule."

4. So Kātyāyana declares [by the close of the following text,†] that a division shall be again made of that which has been distributed in an undue manner. "What has been concealed by one of the co-heirs, and is afterwards discovered, let the sons, if the father be deceased, divide equally with their brethren. Effects, which are withheld by them from each other, and property which has been ill distributed, being subsequently discovered, let them divide in equal shares. So Brīgu has ordained."

5. But a fair distribution is conclusive.

6. And what has been already justly divided, is not distributed again.

5. But the maxim, "Once is the partition of inheritance made,"‡ relates to the case of a fair distribution.

6. "Being subsequently discovered."] The meaning is, that what has been already divided, is not to be again distributed.

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and, in the case of wealth acquired with the use of the joint stock, all partsake. These and other special rules, set forth under the head of partition among brethren, must be observed also in the case of partition after re-union. Čṛkṣṭhaṇa.

2. For there is no reason.] Since the text is significant as obviating a supposition, that the withholding of the effects shall have a smaller share, or none, it is illogical to make it a restriction of the concept for allowing a deduction of a twentieth part and so forth to the eldest, &c. Çṛkṣṭhaṇa.

Since the sentence, "shall be subject to an equal distribution," is pertinent as grounded on the reasons here stated; it is wrong to make it a restriction of a different text. Aĉyuta.

If a younger brother be the person who witholds the effects, the eldest, though faultless, should have less than his regular share, and the youngest more. This objection is also to be understood. Rāg. on Dāya-bhāga.

The Mitākṣarā, Sūlayāni, Kauṇikabhāṣṭa and others maintain the doctrine which is here opposed. Rāg. ibid.

† Yājñavalkya, 2, 125. ‡ Çṛkṣṭhaṇa. § Manu, 9, 17.
7. Kātyāyana provides, that violence shall not be used to compel restitut::ion of effects withheld; nor shall the co-heir make good what he has consumed.

7. So Kātyāyana says. "Effects, which have been taken by a kinsman, he shall not be compelled by violence to restore; and the consumption of unseparated kinsmen, they shall not be required to make good." By gentle means, and not by violence, a kinsman shall be made to restore the effects taken by him. But what has been consumed by a co-heir during co-parcenery, over and above his due proportion, he shall not be required to make good.

8. In answer to those authors, who contend, that, in this case, as there is the property of another in the common effects, he, who embezzles them, is a thief and of course a sinner, the following argument is propounded: since the received import of the term conveys, that a thief is he, who usurps a right in the property of another, without a title [by gift, sale or other act of the owner,\(\text{S}\)] being clearly conscious, that the thing belongs to another; but, in the present case, the person cannot distinguish "this is mine and that is another's," for the goods are undivided; therefore, as donation is complete then only, when the owner, conscious that the thing is his, relinquishes it with a view to its becoming the property of another person, and that other person is sensible of his property, apprehending "this is become mine," but that cannot occur in respect to common goods, and therefore common property is pronounced unfit to be given; so theft likewise is complete by the consciousness that "this is not mine, but another's:" therefore the crime of theft is not imputable to the act of embezzling what is common.

9. But the term embezzlement or withholding (apahāra) signifies concealment; and concealment is not exactly theft; for the word theft is in use for an un concealed taking. Thus Kātyāyana says, "The taking of another's goods, whether privately or openly, by night or by day, is termed theft." Accordingly [since the concealment of common property is not theft,\(\text{FP}\)] it has been before declared, that the holder of the goods shall not be compelled by violence to restore them. (§ 7.) But, if it were a theft [in him who withholds common property,\(\text{FP}\)] then, under the text which directs, that "Having compelled the thief to restore the stolen goods, the king should enjoin him by various modes of condign punishment:" admitting even that he should be made to restore the goods by gentle means, still the enjoining of him would be indispensable.

9. Embezzlement is not theft.

10. Accordingly the person embezzling has nevertheless his regular share.

10. This too [namely that such is the definition of theft,\(\text{FP}\)] appears from the sagesauthorizing the allotment of a share even to the holder of common property.

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\(\text{S}\) Āryaśāstra. \(\text{FP}\) Āryaśāstra. \(\text{FP}\) Āryaśāstra.

\(\text{FP}\) Yādukārya, 2. 268. \(\text{FP}\) Āryaśāstra and Āryaśāstra.
11. Accordingly it is observed by Vigavirya, "The crime of theft is not here imputable; for the recital of the text obviates that supposition." His meaning is, because the sense of the verb to steal is not applicable to the case.

12. Hence also it is remarked by Jitendriya, in the chapter on expiation and penance, that: if a man seize gold appertaining to another by mistake for iron or other matter [of little value:] or something which is not gold, mistaking it for this substance; or a thing resembling some chattel of his own but belonging to another person, by mistake for his own; in all these cases there is not a complete seizure [or wilful taking of the gold:] for, in these several instances, there is not a knowledge of its belonging to another person, being such as the thing in fact is. In like manner, in the present instance also. [viz. in that of common property.]* the same holds good: for, previous to partition, a discriminative property, referrible to particular persons relatively to particular things, is not perceived. Consequently there is not in this case a complete theft.

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12. Consequently there is not in this case a complete theft.] Raghunandana contests this reasoning, without however materially differing as to the result. He says, 'It is the doctrine of Jitendriya, and of the authors of the Dāya-bhāga and Prāya-ghita-Vivekā, that, if goods be taken knowing them to be another's, the crime of theft is committed; but that crime is not imputable to one who uses them by mistake as to the substance. Their assertion, that the appropriation of another's property by mistake for his own is not theft, appears unsatisfactory: for it is at variance with the story of Nṛga in the Bhāgavata. "A cow, belonging to a certain eminent priest, strayed into my herd of kine, and being confounded with them was given by me, ignorant of the circumstance, to a man of the sacerdotal tribe. The owner, seeing her led away, claimed her for his own; and the other replied, she is mine by gift; Nṛga gave her to me. The priest, confounding, addressed me, setting forth their claim: you are the giver, said the one; the lawless taker, said the other. Hearing this, I was confounded. For that sin was I transformed into a lizard; since which time I have seen myself, O prince, in this degraded form."'

But, if many rings belonging to diverse persons be mixed together, it is no theft if one sell another's ring by mistake for his own, in consequence of their similarity: for they were placed together under the conviction, that, in the case of many articles which have no discriminative mark, as cowries or the like, belonging to different persons, being intermixed, no offence is committed if they be reciprocally used by a sort of barter: else a person would not do so, [he would not place them together,] under the apprehension of offence. The following passage of the Matsya purāṇa relates to this case: "The man, who, through ignorance, makes a sale of another man's chattels, is faultless; but, wilfully doing so, he merits punishment as a robber." Therefore, the disposal of chattels belonging exclusively to another person, without such person's consent and with the reflection, "this is mine and shall be disposed of according to my pleasure," is theft. Sometimes it is mental, being a resolution only. In other instances it is corporeal, as an actual gift or sale. But such (a theft) cannot happen in the case of the goods of undivided brethren: for it cannot be distinctly ascertained "this is mine and that is another's." Accordingly [since there is no theft,] Kāśyapa says, "Effects which have been taken, &c." (§ 7.) Here taken [or more literally embezzled] is used metaphorically.

* Čūkstha. † Čūbhağavata, 10. 51. § Kāśīra, Ṣ Kāśīra, Ṣ Kāśīra, Ṣ Kāśīra.
13. Or, admitting that it is a theft, the guilt of robbery is not incurred: for the text allows a share even to the person who embezzles the property. Else, in the case of embezzling gold or other valuable effects, the offender, being degraded from his tribe, would have no allotment.

14. If it be alleged that, since there is no text expressly authorizing the allotment of a share to the thief who has embezzled gold to an amount sufficient to cause his degradation from his tribe, the rule for the allotment of a share is presumed to be applicable to the case of theft of other effects: but why may not the law which forbids the stealing of gold or the like, be the rather considered as relating only to goods appertaining to another, and not common? Still, however, there is no proof of authority on which to ground the selection [of one of these restrictions in preference to the other.] The answer to this alleged objection is as follows: in the legal definition, “the taking of another’s goods is theft,”* “another’s” signifies appertaining to a different person to the utter exclusion of any right of his own; for, of two sorts of property, common and several, the notion of several property is most readily presented. Therefore the proposition is similar to that which provides for the previous performance of a sacrifice, [preparatory to the sacrifice with the aid of ascetics,†] where an oblation, such as is presented at the full of the moon, intends particularly the offering of a cake of ground rice, as used at the Agnishoma [one of the ceremonies performed at that period.] and not the oblation of liquid butter, as practised at the Upanasuyaça, for this is common to the Agnishoma and to sacrifices bearing other denominations.

15. Accordingly [since it is not theft,‡] there is no censure anywhere expressed in Bátoka on such a subject [viz. in regard to the taking of common property.§]

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"Thus also there is no offence in taking a treasure which is found. For it is a thing of which the owner is lost.

"There is not a similar [innocency] in the case of associated traders: for no text indicates it. On the contrary, it is directed by a passage of Yajñavalkya (2. 264), that a fraudulent partner shall be dismissed without profit. Traders have not, as in the instance of inherited effects, a property vested in several persons relatively to the same chattel. But, by reason of intermixture, the property in the goods is uncertain."

14. An oblation such as is presented at the full of the moon, intends particularly the offering of a cake of ground rice.] Two sorts of oblations are commonly used at different sacrifices. One, which is the simplest, consists of clarified butter only; the other, termed paridasa, is a cake of ground rice kneaded with hot water into the form of a tortoise and roasted on a specific number of pails before one of the consecrated fires; it is then smeared with clarified butter, and presented as a burnt offering in the second consecrated fire.

15. Accordingly since it is not theft.] The author has, in this dissertation, relied on the doctrine of those who maintain a general property vested in the co-owners over the aggregate estate. But, according to his own doctrine of several rights to portions of the estate, it is difficult, even with all this laborious argument, to obviate the inference of theft. Crikshma.

* Kátyáyana. Vide supra. § 9. † Achiyuta. ‡ Crikshma.
§ Achiyuta and Crikshma. || Achiyuta.
16. It is a remark of Bāla, that, as in the instance of green and black kidney beans in relation to sacrifices, where it might be supposed, that black kidney beans would be a fit substitute when green kidney beans are not procurable, but the use of such beans is prohibited by an express passage of scripture which declares that black kidney beans are unfit to be employed at sacrifices; so, notwithstanding the taking of that which is, and that which is not, his own, [being common,] is permitted, still the taking of what exclusively is not his own is forbidden: this is puerile; for the definition of theft, as above explained, is not applicable [to the case of embezzlement of common property.]† It cannot be affirmed, that black kidney beans are unemployed in sacrifices; although ground particles of green beans, intermixed with black beans, be employed: for, in such case, mixed black beans appear to be used at the sacrifice.

17. Conclusion. Thus has partition of effects concealed by co-partners from each other, been discussed.

CHAPTER XIV.

On the ascertaining of a contested partition.

1. The determination of a doubt, regarding the fact of a partition having been made, is next explained. On that subject Nārada says, "If a question arise among co-heirs in regard to the fact of partition, it must be ascertained by the evidence of kinsmen, by the record of the distribution, or by the separate transaction of affairs."(a)†

ANNOTATIONS.

16. It is a remark of Bāla.] In the silence of the commentators, it appears uncertain whether this be the name of an author; and whether the person, noticed in the preceding paragraph under the name of Bāloka, be intended; or whether the meaning be, "it is the remark of a child (bāla);" it is puerile.

As in the instance of green and black kidney beans.] The author here adverts to the reasoning contained in the Mīndasā 6. 3. 6, Viḍo Mitākshārā C. 1. § 9. § 11.

1. By the record of the distribution.] Aṣṭāvyuṣa and Čekrśaṅga notice a variation in the reading of the text bhāgakhyena, in place of bhāgadekhyena. Their exposition of that reading is "by occupancy or by a writing." In the various quotations of this passage in numerous compilations, no other hint of such a reading has been found: except in Bālam-bhaṭṭa's commentary on the Mitākshārā.

Jmāta-vāhāna makes subsequent mention (§ 5.) of another unauthorized variation of the text.

* Muda, Phaseolus Mungo, green kidney beans. Máśka, Phaseolus max. v. radiatus; black kidney beans.
† Čekrśaṅga.
‡ Nārada, 12, 25. (a) See 1 Midd. Dig. 453.—Ed.
2. The mention of kinsmen is intended to show, that, if such be forthcomin, other persons should not be made witnesses. Accordingly [since a recourse to other witnesses is forbidden when kinsmen are forthcomin,]* Yajñavalkya says, “When partition is denied, the fact of it may be ascertained by the evidence of kinsmen, relatives and witnesses, and by written proof; or by separate possession of house or field.”†

3. In the first place “kinsmen” or persons allied by community of funeral oblations, are witnesses. On failure of them, relatives, as signified by the term bandha. In default of these, strangers may be witnesses. For, if they were equally admissible, the specific mention of “kinsmen” and “relatives” would be unmeaning; since they are comprehended under the term “witnesses.”

4. Hence also Çanki says, “Should a doubt arise on the subject of a partition of the wealth of kindred, the family may give evidence, if the matter be not known to the relations sprung from the same race.” Relations sprung from the same race are “kinsmen.” If the matter be not known to them, “the family” or relatives (as the maternal uncles and the rest.) will give evidence; but not a stranger [while a person of the family can bear testimony.]§ But, if these also be uninformed, any other person may be a witness.

5. Accordingly, kinsmen are stated by Nārāda (§ 1.) as the chief evidences: and a different reading, jñātibhīhi, “persons acquainted with the matter,” [instead of jñātibhīhi, ‘kinsmen,’] is unfounded.

6. Next the proof is by written evidence: but written proof is [in general] superior to oral testimony: being so declared [by an express passage of law: Testimony is better than presumption; and writing is better than oral evidence.”]!

7. In the next place, the proof is by the circumstance of separate transaction of affairs (§ 1.) as it is stated by Nārāda, “Gift and acceptance of gift, cattle, grain, house, land and attendants, must be considered as distinct among separated, brethren, as also diet, religious duties.

ANNOTATIONS.

7. With their co-heirs.] This is according to the reading of the text, as it is expounded in the Śrīti-chandrikā. But copies of Jñāta-vāhana exhibit svarūdhvahāḥ “with their own wealth,” instead of svarūdhvāḥ “with their co-heirs,” or athārthāhaṃ the correspondent reading which occurs in the Ramaśākara. As neither Jñāta-vāhana, nor his commentators, explain the passage, it has been thought expedient to follow the reading which preserves the best sense.

* Gṛkhītha. † Yajñavalkya, 2. 150. ‡ Viramitrodāya.
§ Gṛkhītha. §§ Achyuta and Gṛkhītha.
income and expenditure. Separated, not unseparated, brethren may reciprocally bear testimony, become sureties, bestow gifts and accept presents. Those, by whom such matters are publicly transacted with their co-heirs, may be known to be separate even without written evidence."*

8. So Vṛhaspati: "A violent crime, immovable property, a deposit, and a previous partition among co-heirs, may be ascertained by presumptive proof, if there be neither writing nor witnesses. The exertion of force, a blow, or the plunder, may be evidence of a violent crime; possession of the land may be proof of property; and separate wealth is an argument of partition. They, who have their income, expenditure and wealth distinct, and have mutual transactions of money-lending and traffic, are undoubtedly separate.

9. One brother gives and another accepts, or they have separate house and land, or their income and expenditure [of wealth], and abode are separate; or, when a loan or other affair is transacted by one, another is made witness to it, or becomes surety; or they have mutual transactions of money-lending or the like; or one, having bought certain goods from another person, sells it for traffic to his brother; in these and similar instances, since any such act can only take place among divided brethren, a presumption of partition is deduced from it by the intelligent.

10. It is not to be concluded from the use of the plural number in the phrase "by whom such matters are transacted" (§ 7.), that the concurrence of all those circumstances is required. For these texts are founded on reason; and the reason is equally applicable in every several instance.

11. Presumptive proof is admitted for want of direct evidence.

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ANNOTATIONS.

8. Exertion of force, a blow, &c.] The commentary of Črikāshna confirms and explains the reading, as exhibited in Śrīta-vāhana's quotation. But, in the Śrīta-chandrika, the text is read and interpreted cūlamābandha "a family feud," instead of balāntībandha "an exertion of force," and Vyāgkīta is expounded 'rivalship' instead of 'mark of a blow.'

11. By saying, "if there be neither writing nor witnesses," (§ 8.) it is intimated, that presumptive proof is to be admitted only in default of written and oral evidence.

* Nārada, 13 38. 40.
† Črikāshna.
CHAPTER XV.

_Preliminary._

1. Gratification cannot be afforded in this work, to those whose comprehension of the principles of the law of inheritance is impeded by submission to the authority of teachers: but the author's labour has been devoted to reconcile the doctrines of sages whose intellect was governed by evidence [of holy writ.]

2. This treatise, composed by Jīmita-vāhana, should be considered as adapted to clear the doubts which arise from the various interpretations of preceding authors.

3. Thus, in the Dharmaratna, or gem of the law, composed by the great doctor the fortunate Jīmita-vāhana, the Dāya-bhāga, or law of inheritance, is finished.

ANNOTATIONS.

1. The authority of teachers.] As Črīkara-miṣra and the rest. Črīkara-miṣra.

Sages whose intellect, &c.] Achyuta and Črīkara-miṣra notice another reading of this passage, māṣaṭṭha sambāde, instead of munukṣa sambāde. According to that reading, the sense is "devoted to reconcile the doctrines of those who attend to proof and demonstration."
THE LAW OF INHERITANCE.

FROM THE

MITĀKŚHARA,

A COMMENTARY BY VIGNANŚVARA ON THE INSTITUTES OF VAIṆAVĀLKA

CHAPTER 1

SECTION 1.

Definition of Inheritance; and of Partition.—Disposition on Property.

1. Evidence, human and divine, has been thus explained with [its various] distinctions; the partition of heritage is now propounded by the image of holiness.

2. Here the term heritage (dīya) signifies that wealth, which inherence becomes the property of another, solely by reason of relation to the owner.

ANNOTATIONS.

1. Evidence human and divine, intending to expound with great care the chapter on inheritance, the author shows by this verse the connexion of the first and second volumes of the book. Subodhînī.

The image of holiness, Yajñavalkya, bearing the title of contemplative saint (Yogīvara), and here termed the image of holiness (Yogamartī) Bālam-Bhaṭṭa.

2. Solely by reason of relation, “Solely” excludes any other cause, such as purchase or the like. “Relation,” or the relative condition of parent and offspring and so forth, must be understood of that other person, a son or kinsman, with reference to the owner of the wealth. Bālam-Bhaṭṭa.

The meaning is this. Wealth, which becomes the property of another, (as a son or other person bearing relation) in right of the relation of offspring and parent or the like, which he bears to his father or other relative who is owner of that wealth, is signified by the term heritage. Subodhînī.
3. It is of two sorts: unobstructed (Agratibandha) or liable to obstruction (Sapratibandha). The wealth of the father or of the paternal grandfather, becomes the property of his sons or of his grandsons, in right of their being his sons or grandsons; and that is an inheritance not liable to obstruction. But property devolves on parents (or uncles) brothers and the rest upon the demise of the owner, if there be no male issue; and thus the actual existence of a son and the survival of the owner are impediments to the succession; and on their ceasing, the property devolves [on the successor] in right of his being uncle or brother. This is an inheritance subject to obstruction. The same holds good in respect of their sons and other [descendants].

4. Partition (vibhaga) is the adjustment of divers rights regarding the whole, by distributing them on particular portions of the aggregate.

5. Entertaining the same opinion, Narada says, "Where a division of the paternal estate is instituted by sons, that becomes a topic of litigation called by the wise partition of heritage." "Paternal" here implies any relation, which is a cause of property. "By sons" indicates the default of all the male line in general.

ANNOTATIONS.

3. In right of their being his sons or grandsons.] A son and a grandson have property in the wealth of a father and of a paternal grandfather, without supposition of any other cause but themselves. Theirs consequently is inheritance not subject to obstruction. Subodhini.

Property devolves on parents, &c.] Viṣṇuvaṭa-Bahaṭa reads "parents, brothers and the rest" (pitā-bhrātā-dānāṃ) and expounds it "both parents, as well as brothers and so forth," Bālam-Bahaṭa writes and interprets "an uncle and a brother or the like," (pīṭhāya-bhrātā-dānāṃ) but notices the other reading. Both are sanctioned by different copies of the text.

The same holds good in respect of their sons, &c.] Here the sons or other descendants of the son and grandson are intended. The meaning is this: if relatives of the owner be forthcoming, the succession of one, whose relation to the owner was immediate, is inheritance not liable to obstruction; but the succession of one, whose relation to the owner was mediate or remote, is inheritance subject to obstruction, if immediate relatives exist. Subodhini.

In respect of their sons, &c.] Meaning sons and other descendants of sons and grandsons, as well as of uncles and the rest. If relatives of the owner be forthcoming, the succession of one, whose relation was immediate, comes under the first sort; or mediate, under the second. Bālam-Bahaṭa.

4. Partition is the adjustment of divers rights.] The adjustment, or special allotment generally, of two or more rights, vested in sons or others, relative to the whole undivided estate, by referring or applying those rights to parcels or particular portions of the aggregate, is what the word "partition" signifies. Subodhini and Bālam-Bahaṭa.

5. "When division of the paternal estate," &c.] Considerable variations occur in this text as cited by different authors. It is here read pitrasya; and Bālam-Bahaṭa states the etymology of pātra, signifying "of or belonging to a father." He censures the reading in the Kalpataru, pīṭhāya, as ungrammatical. It is read in the Madana-
6. The points to be explained under this [head of inheritance*], are, at what time, how, and by whom, a partition is to be made, of what. The time, the manner, and the persons, when, in which, and by whom, it may be made, will be explained in the course of interpreting stanzas on those subjects respectively. What that is, of which a partition takes place, is here considered.

7. Does property arise from partition? or does partition of pre-existent property take place? Under this [head of discussion,†] proprietary right is itself necessarily explained: [and the question is] Whether property be deduced from the sacred institutes alone, or from other [and temporal] proof?

8. [It is alleged, that] the inferring of property from the sacred code alone is right, on account of the text of Gautama; "An owner is by inheritance, purchase, partition, seízuro,‡ or finding.§ Acceptance is for a Brâhmaṇa

ANNOTATIONS.

vritāṇa, pitrāṇā [of a father, &c.]. Other variations occur upon other terms of the text: which is here read tānayaḥ for putraḥ; kalpyatā for prakalpyatā; and vyaṁhāra-padam for tad-vivāda-padam. The last in noticed by the commenator Bālam-Bṛha. A disagreement also occurs respecting the pronoun yātra, for which some substitute yāta, and others yāt tu. See Jñātī-vāhāna C. 1. § 2.

Paternal here implies, &c.] The meaning, here expressed, is that the word "paternal," as it stands in Nārāyaṇa’s text, intends what has been termed [by the author in his definition of heritage,] ‘relation to the owner, a reason of property.’ Subodhini.

It intends any relation to the owner, as before mentioned, which becomes a cause of property; and it consequently includes the paternal grandfather and other [predecessors,]. The author accordingly observes, ‘that “by sons” indicates propinquity in general; meaning any immediate relative. Bālam-Bṛha.

7. Does property arise from partition? Here the inquiry is twofold: for the substance, which is to be divided, is the subject of disquisition; and the doubt is, whether partition be of property, or of what is not property. For the sake of this, another question is considered: Is partition the cause of property, or not? If it be not the cause of property, but birth alone be so; then, since property is by birth, follows that partition is of property. This is one disquisition, which the author proposes by the question “does property arise from partition, &c.” Another inquiry relates to the subject of property. The author introduces it, saying “proprietary right is explained.” Here the right of property is the subject of discussion; and the doubt is, whether it results from the holy institutes only, or be demonstrable by other and temporal proof? That question the author proposes. Subodhini.

The substance, which is to be divided, is the subject of the first disquisition. Here the question is, whether partition of what is not property, be the cause of proprietary right; and thus right, arising from partition, would not be antecedent to it, since partition, which becomes the cause of that right, had not yet taken place. Or is partition not the reason of property, but birth alone? and thus, since proprietary right thence arose, partition would be of property. This is one disquisition, which the author proposes: “Does property arise, &c.” He introduces a second question, which serves towards the solution of the first. Bālam-Bṛha.

8. It is alleged that the inferring of property from the sacred code alone is right. The author here states the opponent’s argument. Subodhini.

* Bālam-Bṛha. † Bālam-Bṛha. ‡ Apprehensio, vel occupatio. § Invenitio.
an additional mode; conquest for a Kshatriya; gain for a Vaicya or Candra." For, if property were deducible from other proof, this text would not be pertinent. So the precept, "A Brâhmana, who seeks to obtain any thing, even by sacrificing or by instructing, from the hand of a man, who had taken what was not given to him, is considered precisely as a thief;" which directs the punishment of such as obtain valuables, by officiating at religious rites, or by other similar means, from a wrongdoer who has taken what was not given to him, would be irrelevant if property were temporal. Moreover, were property a worldly matter, one could not say "My property has been wrongfully taken by him;" for it would belong to the taker. Or, [if it be objected that] the property of another was seized by this man, and it therefore does not become the property of the usurper; [the answer is,] then no doubt could exist, whether it appertain to one or to the other, any more than in regard to the species, whether gold, silver, or the like. Therefore property is a result of holy institutes exclusively.

9. To this the answer is, property is temporal only, for it effects transactions relative to worldly purposes, just as rice or similar substances do: but the consecrated fire and the like, deducible from the sacred institutes, do not

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On account of the text of Gautama- [If property were deducible from other, that is from temporal, proof, this passage of Gautama’s Institutes would not be pertinent, since it would be useless if it were a mere repetition of what was otherwise known. Bâlam-Shâs.] For it would belong, &c. The thing would belong to the taker; since that relation would be alone the subject of perception. Bâlam- &c.

Therefore property is a result of holy institutes exclusively.] If property be worldly it would follow, that, when the goods of one man have been seized by another, should the person, who has been despoiled, affirm concerning them, “my property has been taken away by this man,” a doubt would not, upon hearing that, arise in the minds of the judge, whether it be the property of one, or of the other. As no doubt exists regarding the species, whether gold or something else, when gold, silver, or any other worldly object, is inspected; so none would exist in regard to property, for [according to the supposition] it is a worldly matter. But doubt does arise. Therefore it cannot be affirmed, that the usurper has no property. Or [the meaning may be this] the opponent, who contends that it is not the property of the captor, because that, which has been seized by him, is another’s property, must be asked. Is there or is there not, proof, that property is not vested in the captor? [The opponent] impeaches the first part of the alternative: “then no doubt could exist, &c.” The notion is this: As no doubt arises concerning the species, when there is demonstration that it is gold or silver; so likewise, in the proposed case, no doubt could arise. Nor is the second part of the alternative admissible: for, if no evidence arise, it could not be allowed, that the captor has not property. Omitting, however, this part of the reasoning, the author closes the adversary’s argument, concluding that property is deduced solely from the sacred code. Subodhin Or Bâlam- &c.

9. Property is temporal only.] The author proves his proposition, that property is secular, by logical deduction. Property is worldly for it effects transactions relative to worldly purposes. Whatever does effect temporal ends, is temporal: as rice and other similar substances. Such too is property. Therefore, it is temporal. But whatever is not worldly, promotes not secular purposes as a consecrated fire and other spiritual matters. Subodhin.

give effect to actions relative to secular purposes. [It is asked] does not a consecrated fire effect the boiling of food; and so, of the rest? [The answer is] No; for it is not as such, that the consecrated flame operates the boiling of food; but as a fire perceptible to the senses: and so, in other cases. But, here, it is not through its visible form, either gold or the like, that the purchase of a thing is effected, but through property only. That, which is not a person's property in a thing, does not give effect to his transfer of it by sale or the like. Besides, the use of property is seen also among inhabitants of barbarous countries, who are unacquainted with the practice directed in the sacred code: for purchase, sale, and similar transactions are remarked among them.

10. Moreover, such as are conversant with the science of reasoning, deem regulated means of acquisition a matter of popular recognition. In the third clause of the Lipiśūtra, the venerable author has stated the adverse opinion, after obviating] an objection to it, that, 'if restrictions, relative to the acquisition of goods, regard the religious ceremony, there could be no property, since proprietary right is not temporal.' [by showing, that] 'the efficacy of acceptance and other modes of acquisition in constituting proprietary right, is matter of popular recognition.' Does it not follow, 'if the mode of acquiring the goods concern the religious ceremony, there is no right of property, and consequently no celebration of a sacrifice?' [Answer] 'It is a blunder of any one who affirms, that acquisition does not produce a proprietary right; since this is a contradiction in terms.' Accordingly, the author, having again acknowledged property to be a popular notion, when he states the demonstrated doctrine, proceeds to explain the purpose of the disposition in this manner. Therefore a breach of the restriction affects the person, not the religious ceremony: and the meaning of this passage is thus

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For it is not as such that the consecrated flame, &c. A hallowed fire has two characters: the spiritual one of consecration; and the worldly one of combustion. It effects the boiling of food in its worldly capacity as fire; not in its spiritual one as consecrated. For, if it did so in its last mentioned capacity, a secular fire, wanting the spiritual character of consecration, would not effect the boiling of food. Therefore the objection does not hold. Then, in the proposed case, gold or other valuable would effect the secular purpose of sale and purchase, in its character of gold or the like, not in that of property. The author replies to that objection: 'It is not through its visible form &c.' Besides, the use of property is observable among barbarians, to whom the practice enjoined by the sacred institutes is unknown: and, since that cannot be otherwise accounted for, there is evidence of property being secular. Subodhini.

10. The Lipiśūtra.] The śūtra, or aphorism, here quoted, is on the desire of acquisition (aśā), and is the second topic (adhyāya) in the first section (pāda of the fourth book (adhyāya) of aphorisms by Jaimini, entitled Mīmāṃsā. Subodhini and Bālān-Bhārati.
expounded. If restrictions, respecting the acquisition of chattels, regard the religious ceremony, its celebration would be perfect, with such property only, as was acquired consistently with those rules; and not so, if performed with wealth obtained by infringing them; and consequently, according to the adverse opinion, the fault would not affect the man, if he deviated from the rule; but, according to the demonstrated conclusion, since the restriction, regarding acquisitions, affects the person, the performance of the religious ceremony is complete, even with property acquired by a breach of the rule; and it is an offence on the part of a man, because he has violated an obligatory rule. It is consequently acknowledged, that even what is gained by infringing restrictions, is property: because, otherwise, there would be no completion of a religious ceremony.

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In the third clause of the Śrīpāta-sūtra, the distinction between religious and personal purposes is examined. In the second, the inquiry is whether the willing of kins and similar preparatives be relative to the person or to the act of religion. In the third, the question examined is whether restrictions, noticed in primeval revelation, as to the means of acquisition, (such as these, 'let a Brāhmana acquire wealth by acceptance or the like, a Kshatriya by victory and so forth, and a Vaiśya by agriculture, &c.') must be taken as relative to the person or to the religious ceremony [performed by him.] Subodhīnī and Bālam-Bhāṣa.

The position of the adversary is, that injunctions regarding the means of acquisition concern the religious ceremony, through the medium of the goods used by the agent: for, unless that be admitted, the precept would be nugatory, because there would be no one whom it affected. Subodhīnī.

The meaning is this: As in the case of an acquisition of goods under a precept relative to sacrifice, such as this "purchase the moon-plant," the injunction regarding the acquisition of goods concerns the religious ceremony; so does the injunction respecting acceptance and other means of acquisition. Bālam-Bhāṣa.

The author states an objection to this position of the adversary. The objection is this: the question, considered in the third clause of the Śrīpāta-sūtra, is whether injunctions regarding acquisition of goods concern the religious ceremony or the person. The opponent's position is, that they concern the ceremony. That is not congruous. For, if the injunctions, regarding acquisition of goods, concern the religious ceremony, no property would arise; since property, being spiritual, would have no worldly cause to produce it; and no other means are shown in scripture; and the injunctions regarding acquisition, being relative to the ceremony, are not relative to anything else: thus, for want of property, the religious rites would not be complete with that which was not property; and consequently the position, that injunctions, regarding acquisition of goods, concern the act of religion, is incongruous. Subodhīnī.

He revives the position by answering that objection; and the notion is this: the injunctions, regarding acceptance and the like, accomplish property; and they will become relative to the religious ceremony through the medium of goods adopted to the performance of the ceremony: as the husking of grain, which effects the removal of the chaff, concerns the religious ceremony through the medium of clean rice which is adapted to the ceremony. But the wise consider property as a worldly matter (resulting from birth,) like the relation of a son to his father. Consequently there is no failure in the completion of religious rites [as supposed in the objection.]

* By the commentator on the Mīmāṁsā: Prabhākara summoned Guru.
† Soma, Aconitox acida, Roth.
11. It should not be alleged, that even what is obtained by robbery and other nefarious means, would be property. For proprietary right in such instances is not recognised by the world: and it disagrees with received practice.

12. Thus, since property, obtained by acceptance or any other means, is established to be temporal; the acceptance of alms, as well as other [prescribed] modes for a Brahmana, conquest and similar means for a Kshatriya, husbandry and the like for a Vaishya, and service and the rest for a Shudra, are propounded as [sufficient] means.

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Adverting, that, because injunctions regarding acquisition concern the religious ceremony, the acquisition likewise must relate to the ceremony; does it not follow, since it relates not to anything else, that there is no such thing as property? and would not a failure of the religious ceremony ensue? [Wherefore the adversary's position is erroneous.] The author states the objection and confutes it with decision. 'Some one has blundered, affirming that acquisition does not produce property, for it is a contradiction in terms. Such is the construction of the sentence; and the meaning is this: Acquisition, which is an accident of the acquirer, is a relation between two objects [the owner and his own] like that of mother and son. Consequently, there can be no acquisition without a thing to be acquired; and it is a contradiction in terms to say 'acquisition does not produce a proprietary right,' as it is to affirm "my mother is a barren woman." Subodhan and Balam-Bhaya.

The demonstrated conclusion is, that, since valuables, being intended for every purpose, must be relative to the person, restrictions, regarding the acquisition of them, must concern the person also. Balam-Bhaya.

The purpose of the discussion under this topic of inquiry is stated. It is interpreted by the venerable author (Prabakara-Guru.) The implied sense is this. According to the adversary's position, there is no offence affecting the person, in violating the injunction. But the religious ceremony is not only accomplished with goods acquired by a breach of the injunction. It is the religious ceremony, therefore, which is affected. But, according to the demonstrated doctrine, since the restrictions concern the person, the offence is his if he infringe the rule; and the religious ceremony is not affected. Subodhan.

The author, by way of closing the argument, states the result as applicable to the subject proposed. It is acknowledged by the maintainer of the right doctrine, that even what is gained by infringing the rule, much more what is acquired by other means, is property. Balam-Bhaya.

Otherwise, that is, if a right of property in wealth acquired, even by infringing the rule, be not admitted; then, since no property is temporal because the restrictions concern the religious ceremony [and that, which is thus acquired, does so likewise,] therefore the means of living would be unattainable, since no temporal property could exist; and consequently there could be no religious ceremony, for there would be nobody to perform it. Subodhan and Balam-Bhaya.

11. It should not be alleged, that even what is obtained by robbery. If property be acknowledged in that which is acquired by infringing the restriction, might it not be supposed, that even what is obtained by robbery and other nefarious means, becomes property? The author obviates that objection. It does not become so. He removes the inconsequence of the reason. For the employment of it as such in sale and other transactions is not familiarly seen in practice. Balam-Bhaya.

12. Thus since property obtained by acceptance, &c. Property being thus proved to be temporal, the author successively relates the several arguments before cited in support of the notion that it is not temporal. Balam-Bhaya.
Other means are common to all. Restrictions intended for spiritual purposes; and inheritance and other modes are stated as means common to all. "An owner is by inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure or finding."  

13. Unobstructed heritage is here denominated "inheritance." "Purchase" is well known. "Partition" intends heritage subject to obstruction. "Occupation" or seizure is the appropriation of water, grass, wood and the like not previously appertaining to any other [person as owner]. "Finding" is the discovery of a hidden treasure or the like. "If these reasons exist, the person is owner." If they take place, he becomes proprietor. "For a Brāhmaṇa, that, which is obtained by acceptance or the like, is additional; not common [to all the tribes]. Additional is understood in the subsequent sentence: 'For a Kṣatriya, what is obtained by victory, or by agreement or the like, is peculiar.' In the next sentence, "additional" is again understood: what is gained or earned by agriculture, keeping of cattle, [traffic] and so forth, is for a Vaiśya peculiar; and so is, for a Cādha, that which is earned in the form of wages, by obedience to the regenerate and by similar means. Thus likewise, among the various causes of property which are familiar to mankind, whatever has been stated as peculiar to certain mixed classes in the direct or inverse order of the tribes, (as the driving of horses, which is the profession of the Vaiśyas, and so forth,) is indicated by the word "earned" (nirvīśita): for all such acquisitions assume the form of wages or hire; and the noun (nirvīsita) is exhibited in the Trikāndī as signifying wages.

14. As for the precept respecting the succession of the widow and the daughter, &c., the declaration [of the order of succession] even in that text is intended to prevent mistake, (although the right of property be a matter fami-

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Common to all.] Including even the mixed classes. Bālam-Bhāra.

13. If these reasons exist, the person is owner.] If such reasons are known to exist, the owner is known. Subodhini and Bālam-Bhāra.

Both commentaries read jñātiṣaṁ jñātyaṁ svāṁ, "such reasons existing, an owner exists." But copies of the text exhibit jñātiṣaṁ jñātyaṁ svāṁ, "such reasons being known, the owner is known.

Additional.] The meaning of the term is "excellent." Bālam-Bhāra.

14. As for the precept respecting the succession.] The author obtrains an objection, that, it property be a worldly matter, the import of the text here cited is inconsistent, as it provided by precept, that the widow and certain other persons shall inherit on the owner's demise. Subodhini and Bālam-Bhāra.


3 According to a text of Upanishad, from which these words are taken.

4 The dictionary of Amaraṅgīna in three books. (Kāṇā.) The passage here cited occurs in the 3rd book of the Amaraṅgīna, Ch. 4. v. 217.

5 Vidē infra, Ch. 2, Sect. 1 § 4.
liar to the world,) where many persons might [but for that declaration] be supposed entitled to share the heritage by reason of their affinity to the late owner. The whole is therefore unexceptionable.

15. As for the remark, that, if property were temporal, it could not be said "my property has been taken away by him;"* that is not accurate, for a doubt respecting the proprietary right does arise through a doubt concerning the purchase, or other transaction, which is the cause of that right.

16. The purpose of the preceding disquisition is this. A text expresses "When Brāhmans have acquired wealth by a blamable act, they are cleared by the abandonment of it, with prayer and rigid austerity."† Now, if property be deducible only from sacred ordinances, that, which has been obtained by accepting presents from an improper person, or by other means which are repudiated, would not be property, and consequently would not be partible among sons. But if it be a worldly matter, then even what is obtained by such means, is property, and may be divided among heirs; and the atonement abovementioned regards the acquirer only: but sons have the right by inheritance, and therefore no blame attaches to them, since Manu declares "There are seven virtuous means of acquiring property: viz. inheritance, &c." ‡

17. The first question (§ 7.) from partition, or the division be of an existent right.

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The declaration of the order of succession.] Bālam-bhaṭṭa notices as a variation in the reading, the words have supplied; kraun-samaramsa "declaration of the order of succession," instead of samaramsa "declaration."

15. As for the remark, that if property were temporal.] The sense is this: in such a case, the proposition "another's property has been taken by him" is simply apprehended from the affirmation of the complainant. But that is apprehension, not proof. Accordingly, if it be contradicted, a doubt arises respecting the cause of right. Thus, if the complainant declare, "my goods have been taken by him," and the defendant affirm the contrary, a doubt arises in the minds of witnesses, whether the thing were unjustly seized by that man, or were fairly obtained by purchase or other title: and so, from a doubt respecting a purchase or other cause of property, arises a doubt concerning property which is the effect. Subodhini.

16. The purpose of the preceding disquisition is this.] Admitting property to be a worldly matter; still [its nature] seems to be an unit [subject of inquiry] under the head of inheritance, since it matters not whether property be temporal or spiritual. Apprehending this objection, the author proceeds to explain the purpose of the disquisition. Subodhini.

* Vide § 8.

† The text is apparently referred to Manu by the commentator Bālam-bhaṭṭa; but it is not found in Manu's institutes. A passage of similar import does, however, occur, Ch. 10, 1, 111.

‡ Manu, 10, 115.
18. Of these [positions], that of property arising from partition is right; since a man, to whom a son is born, is enjoined to maintain a holy fire: for, if property were vested by birth alone, the estate would be common to the son as soon as born; and the father would not be competent to maintain a sacrificial fire and perform other religious duties which are accomplished by the use of wealth.

19. Likewise the prohibition of a division of that, which is obtained from the liberality of the father previous to separation, would not be pertinent: since no partition of it can be supposed, for it has been given by consent of all parties. But Nārada does propound such a prohibition: "Excepting what is gained by value, the wealth of a wife, and what is acquired by science, which are three sorts of property exempt from partition; and any favour conferred by a father."

20. So the text concerning an affectionate gift, ("What has been given by an affectionate husband to his wife, she may consume as she pleases, when he is dead, or may give it away, excepting immovable property;"†(a) would be pertinent, if property were vested by birth alone.

Nor is it right to connect the words "excepting immovable property" with the terms "what has been given." [In the text last cited;] for that would be a forced construction by connexion of disjoined terms.

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18. Is enjoined to maintain a holy fire.] For it is ordained by a passage of the Veda, "that he, who has a son born and who has black [not grey] hair, should consecrate a holy fire," and the meaning of that passage is this: one who has issue (for the term son implies issue in general) and whose hair is [yet] black, or who is in the prime of life; that is, who is capable; one, in short, who is qualified; must perform the consecration and maintenance of a holy fire. Does not this relate to the consecration of sacrificial fires, not to the rise of property from partition? Anticipating this objection, he adds "if property were by birth &c." The meaning is this: if property arose from birth alone, a son would, even at the instant of his birth, have ownership; and since the goods are thenceforward in common, the father would not be competent to the consecration of sacrificial fires and other religious acts (as funeral purgations, rites on the birth of children, and other indispensable ceremonies,) which must be performed by the husband and wife, and which can only be accomplished by expenditure of wealth. Subodhini and Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

20. The text...would not be pertinent, if property were vested by birth.] For, if property were vested at the instant of birth, no such gift could be made: since he would be incompetent even with the consent of the child, and one cannot give away what is common to others. Subodhini and Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

*Nārada, 13. 6.
† Vishnu according to a subsequent quotation (§ 25.) But Nārada cited by Jīmānta-rāhima (C. 4. Sect. 1. § 23.)
(a) See 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 91; 2 Strange H. L. 430; 1 Morl. Dig 250 (2), 596.—Z.
21. As for the text "The father is master of the gems, pearls, and corals, and of all other moveable property; but neither the father nor the grandfather is so of the whole immovable estate;" and this other passage "By favour of the father, clothes and ornaments are used, but immovable property may not be consumed, even with the father's indulgence;' which passages forbid a gift of immovable property through favour, they both relate to immovable wealth which have descended from the paternal grandfather. When the grandfather dies, his effects become the common property of the father and sons; but it appears from this text alone, that the gems, pearls and other moveables belong exclusively to the father, while the immovable estate remains common.

22. Therefore property is not by birth, but by demise of the owner, or by partition. Accordingly [since the demise of the owner is a case of property, there is no room for supposing, that a stranger could not be prevented from taking the effects because the property was vacant after the death of the father before partition. So likewise, in the case of an only son, the estate becomes the property of the son by the father's demise; and does not require partition.

23. To this the answer is: It has been shown, that property is a matter of popular recognition; and the right of sons and the rest, by birth, is most familiar to the world, as cannot be denied: but the term partition is generally understood to relate to effects belonging to several owners, and does not relate to that which appertains to another, nor to goods vacant or unowned. For the text of Gautama expresses "Let ownership of wealth be taken by birth; as the venerable teachers direct."§

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Nor is it right to connect, &c. Is not the text, so far from being in contradiction to the right by birth, actually founded on it? for the construction is this: what has been given, excepting immovable property, by an affectionate husband to his wife, she may consume as she pleases, when he is dead: thus, a right of property by birth being true in regard to immovables, since the gift of them is forbidden; and, by analogy, the same being true of other goods, a gift of wealth other than immovables is permitted by the provisions of the law: why then should not this text be professed? Approaching the objection, he says "Nor is it right to connect, &c." The construction stated would be requisite, but it is not a proper one; for the style would be involved, if the construction connect disjoined terms. Subodhini.

21. As for the text "The father is master of the gems, &c." Approaching the objection, that, since a gift of immovables through partial affection is forbidden by the plain construction of two other passages of law, birth and not partition is the cause of property, he obviates it. Subodhini.

22. "Let ownership of wealth, &c." By birth alone the heir may take the thing which is denominated ownership of wealth; as the venerable teachers hold. Subodhini.

§ Dādhāvalīka cited by Jñātaka-vīhāra (E. 2, § 32.)
† The name of the author is not given with any quotation of this text.
‡ Subodhini and Bālaim-bhātta. § Not found in Gautama's institutes.
(2) See 7 Mātr. Dig. 307, n. b.
24. Moreover the text above cited: "The father is master of the gems, pearls, &c." (§ 21) is pertinent on the supposition of a proprietary right vested by birth. Nor is it right to affirm, that it relates to immovable which have descended from the paternal grandfather: since the text expresses "neither the father, nor the grandfather." This maxim, that the grandfather's own acquisition should not be given away while a son or grandson is living, indicates a proprietary interest by birth. As, according to the other opinion, the precious stones, pearls, clothes, ornaments and other effects, though inherited from the grandfather, belong to the father under the special provisions of the law; so, according to our opinion, the father has power; under the same text, to give away such effects, though acquired by his father. There is no difference.

25. But the text of Vishnu (§ 20), which mentions a gift of immovable bestowed through affection, must be interpreted as relating to property acquired by the father himself and given with the consent of his son and the rest: for, by the passages [above cited, as well as others not quoted,] viz. "The father is the master of the gems, pearls, &c." (§ 21), the fitness of any other but immovable for an affectionate gift was certain.

26. As for the alleged disqualification for religious duties which are prescribed by the Veda, and which require for their accomplishment the use of wealth, (§ 18) sufficient power for such purposes is inferred from the cogency of the precept [which enjoins their performance].

27. Therefore it is a settled point, that property in the paternal or ancestral estate is by birth, [although†] the father have independent power in the disposal of effects other than immovable(a), for indispensable acts of duty and for purposes prescribed by text of law, as gifts through affection, support of the family, relief from distress, and so forth: but he is subject to the control of his sons and the rest, in regard to the immovable estate, whether acquired by himself or inherited from his father or other predecessor; since it is ordained, "Though immovables or bipeds have been acquired by a man himself, a gift or sale of

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Bālam-bhāṭa notices a variation in the reading: artha-svāmitva, in the ablative case, instead of artha-svāmitvan, in the nominative. That reading is found in the Dvāyataśtra; and the text is, there explained in an entirely different sense. See Jñātavāhana, C. 7, § 18.

27. "No gift or sale should be made."[†] The close of the passage is read otherwise by Raghunandana: "The dissipating of the means of support is censured;" vikṣipto vīgarāṭhā, instead of na dānam na cha vikṣiptayāt.

† Bālam-bhāṭa.

(a) See I Mod., Definition of. 49: "Strangely, II. 1, 6, 9.—Ibid.
them should not be made without convening all the sons. They, who are born, and they who are yet unbegotten, and they who are still in the womb, require the means of support; no gift of sale should, therefore, be made."

28. An exception to it follows: "Even a single individual may conclude a donation, mortgage, or sale, of immovable property, during a season of distress, for the sake of the family, and especially for means purposes(a)."

29. The meaning of that text is this: while the sons and grandsons are minors, and incapable of giving their consent to a gift and the like; or while brothers are so and continue unseparated; even one person, who is capable, may conclude a gift, hypothecation, or sale, of immovable property, if a calamity affecting the whole family require it, or the support of the family render it necessary, or indispensable duties, such as the obsequies of the father or the like, make it unavoidable(b).

30. The following passage "Separated kinsmen, as those who are unseparated, are equal in respect of immovables: for one has not power over the whole, to make a gift, sale or mortgage:"(c) must be thus interpreted: "among unseparated kinsmen, the consent of all is indispensably requisite, because no one is fully empowered to make an alienation, since the estate is in common:' but, among separated kindred, the consent of all tends to the facility of the transaction, by obviating any future doubt, whether they be separate or united: it is not required, on account of any want of sufficient power, in the single owner; and the transaction is consequently valid even without the consent of separated kinsmen.

31. In the text, which expresses, that "Land passes by six formalities; by consent of townsmen, of kinsmen, of neighbours, and of heirs, and by gift of gold and of water;"(d) consent of townsmen is required for the publicity of the transaction, since it is provided, that "Acceptance of a gift, especially of land, should be public:"(e) but the contract is not invalid without their consent. The approbation of neighbours serves to obviate any dispute concerning the boundary. The use of the consent of kinsmen and of heirs has been explained.

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* Vyasa as cited in other compilations. † Vrhaspati cited in the Ratnakara, &c.
‡ Vrhaspati as cited in the Ratnakara. § The author of this passage is not named.
|| This passage also is anonymous.

(a) See 6 Mac. I. A. Ca. 303. 407 for authorities as to the power of a manager or guardian in possession to alienate ancestral estate.—Ed.
(b) See 7 Strange H. L. 39; 3 Ibid. 348, 340: 1 Modl. Dig. 430, 445n.—Ed.
(c) See 2 Strange H. L. 7. 437.—Ed.
32. By gift of gold and of water. Since the sale of immovables is forbidden ("In regard to the immovable estate, sale is not allowed; it may be mortgaged by consent of the parties interested;"") and since donation is praised ("Both he who accepts land, and he who gives it, are performers of a holy deed, and shall go to a region of bliss;"") if a sale must be made, it should be conducted, for the transfer of immovable property, in the form of a gift, delivering with it gold and water [to ratify the donation.]

33. A distinction regarding the right by birth will be noticed. (Sect. 5. § 3.)

33. In respect of the right by birth, to the estate paternal or ancestral, we shall mention a distinction under a subsequent text. (Section 5. § 3.)

SECTION II.

Partition equable or unequal.—Four periods of partition.—Provision for wives.—Exclusion of a son who has no competence.

1. At what time, by whom, and how, partition may be made, will be next considered. Explaining these points, the author says, “When the father makes a partition, let him separate his sons [from himself] at his pleasure, and either [dismiss] the eldest with the best share, or [if he choose] all may be equal sharers.”

2. When a father wishes to make a partition, he may at his pleasure separate his children from himself, whether one, two or more sons.

3. No rule being suggested (for the will is unrestrained,) the author adds, by way of restriction, “he may separate (for this term is again understood) the eldest with the best share,” the middlemost with a middle share, and the youngest with the worst share.

4. This distribution of best and other portions is propounded by Manu. “The portion deducted for the eldest is the twentieth part of the heritage, with the best of all the chattels; for the middlemost, half of that; for the youngest, a quarter of it.”

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2. Separate his children.] Make them distinct and several by giving to them shares of the inheritance. Bahlam-bhujin.

* The origin of this quotation likewise has not been found.
† Brāhma-vaivānā-purāna.
‡ Yājñavalkya, 2, 115.
§ Manu, 9, 112. Vide infra. Sect. 3. § 3.
5. The term “either” (§ 1) is relative to the subsequent alternative “or all may be equal sharers.” That is, all, namely the eldest and the rest, should be made partakers of equal portions.

6. This unequal distribution supposes property by himself acquired. But, if the wealth descended to him from his father, an unequal partition at his pleasure is not proper: for equal ownership will be declared.

7. One period of partition is when the father desires separation, as expressed in the text. “When the father makes a partition.” (§ 1) Another period is while the father lives, but is indifferent to wealth and disinclined to pleasure, and the mother is incapable of bearing more sons; at which time a partition is admissible, at the option of sons, against the father’s wish: as is shown by Nárada; who premises partition subsequent to the demise of both parents (“Let sons regularly divide the wealth when the father is dead,”) and adds “Or when the mother is past child-bearing and the sisters are married, or when the father’s sensual passions are extinguished.” Here the words “let sons regularly divide the wealth” are understood. Gautama likewise, having said “After the demise of the father, let sons share his estates;” states a second period, “Or when the mother is past child-bearing.” § and a third, “While the father lives, if he desire separation.” So, while the mother

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7. One period of partition is when the father desires separation. There are four periods of partition. One is, while the father lives, if he desire partition. Another is, when the mother ceases to be capable of bearing issue, and the father is not desirous of sexual intercourse and is indifferent to wealth; if his sons then require partition, though he do not wish it. Again another period is, while the mother is yet capable of bearing issue, and the father, though not consenting to partition, is old, or addicted to vicious courses, or afflicted with an incurable disease; if the sons then desire partition. The last period is, after the decease of the father. Vīpyavara in the Madhava-Parījāta.

There are four periods of partition in the case of wealth acquired by the father. Vīpyavara in the Subodhini.

Four periods of partition among sons have been stated by the author (Vijñāneśvara,) which are compendiously exhibited in a twofold division by the contemplative saint (Yānadvāla.) Here, three cases may occur under that of distribution during the life of the father: viz., with, or without, his desire for separation: the case of his not desiring it being also twofold; viz., 1st, when the mother has ceased to be capable of bearing children and the father is disinclined to pleasure, &c., 2d, when the mother is not capable of bearing issue, but the father is disqualified by vicious habits or the like. Subodhini.

The doctrine of the eastern writers (Jînuvādha, &c.) who maintain, that two periods only are admissible, the volition of the father and his demise, and not any third period, and that the text, relative to the mother’s incapacity for bearing more issue, regards the estate of the paternal grandfather or other ancestor; is refuted. Bāmbhastā.

* Nárada, 13. 2. † Nárada, 13. 3. ‡ Gautama, 28. 1.
§ Gautama, 28. 2. ¶ Gautama, 28. 2. || See Jînuvādha, C. 1. § 44.
(e) This section refers to the law governing the division of property generally. Nāgalīja Madali v. Subhāmaniga Madali, 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 70.—Ed.
is capable of bearing more issue, a partition is admissible by the choice of the sons, though the father be unwilling, if he be addicted to vice or afflicted with a lasting disease. That Ānukha declares: "Partition of inheritance takes place without the father's wish, if he be old, disturbed in intellect, or diseased."  

8. Two sorts of partition at the pleasure of the father have been stated; namely, equal and unequal. The author adds a particular rule in the case of equal partition; "If he make the allotments equal, his wives, to whom no separate property has been given by the husband or the father-in-law, must be rendered partakers of life-portions."  

9. When the father, by his own choice, makes all his sons partakers of equal portions, his wives, to whom peculiar property had not been given by their husband, or by their father-in-law, must be made participant of shares equal to those of sons. But, if separate property have been given to a woman, the author subsequently directs half a share to be allotted to her: "Or if any had been given, let him assign the half."  

10. But, if he give the superior allotment to the eldest son, and distribute similar unequal shares to the rest, his wives do not take such portions, but receive equal shares of

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We hold, that while the father survives and is worthy of retaining uncontrolled power, his will alone is the cause of partition. If he be unworthy of such power, in consequence of degradation, or of retirement from the world, or the like, the son's will is likewise a cause of partition. But, in the case of his demise, the successor's own choice is of course the reason. By this mode, the periods are three. Else there must be great confusion, in the uncertainty of subject and accident, if many reasons, as extinction of worldly propensities and so forth, must be established collectively and alternatively. Thus the mention of certain reasons in some texts, and the omission of them in others, are suitable: for the extinction of the temporal affections, and the other assigned reasons, indicate the single circumstance of the father's want of uncontrolled power; since it is easy to establish that single foundation of the text. Vyāmitrodaya.

When the father's passions are extinguished.] Jīmūta-vahana's reading of the passage is different: and there are other variations of this text. See note on Jīmūta-vahana. Ch. 1. § 33.

Partition of inheritance takes place without the father's wish.] A text of a contrary import is cited from the same author, by Jīmūta-vahana. See note on Jīmūta-vahana. C. 1. § 33.

9. The author subsequently directs half a share.] This and the passage cited may be supposed to bear reference to a passage which occurs near the close of the head of inheritance. (C. 2. Sect. 11. § 54): but the quotation is not exact, and the text relates to a different subject.

10. The furniture in the house, &c.] The chairs, and the earthen and stone utensils, and the ornaments worn by her, are the wife's dedicated allotment. Haradatta says the furniture, as well as the car, is the father's; and the ornaments are the wife's. Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

a Cited as a passage of Hārīta in the Vyāvahāra miṣṭukha.
† Jājñavalkya, 2. 116.
‡ Vide infra. C. Sect. 11. § 33.
¶ The scholiast of Gautama.
the first born, &c. But she takes her ornaments and the household furniture.

the aggregate from which the son’s deductions have been subtracted, besides their own appropriate deductions specified by Apastamba: “The furniture in the house and her ornaments are the wife’s [property].”

11. A trifle may be given to a son who needs not a full share.

Text of Yajnavalkya.

11. To the alternative before stated (§ 1) the author propounds an exception: “The separation of one, who is able to support himself, and is not desirous of participation, may be completed by giving him some trifle(e).”†

12. To one who is himself able to earn wealth, and who is not desirous of sharing his father’s goods, any thing whatsoever, though not valuable, may be given, and the separation or division may be thus completed by the father; so that the children, or other heirs, of that son, may have no future claim of inheritance.

13. The distribution of greater and less shares has been shown (§ 1.) To forbid, in such case, an unequal partition made in any other mode than that which renders the distribution uneven by means of deduction, such as are directed by the law, the author adds “A legal distribution, made by the father among sons separated with greater or less shares, is pronounced valid.”‡

14. When the distribution of more or less among sons separated by an unequal partition is legal, or such as ordained by the law; then that division, made by the father, is completely made, and cannot afterwards be set aside: as is declared by Manu and the rest. Else it fails, though made by the father. Such is the meaning; and in like manner, Nārada declares “A father, who is afflicted with disease, or influenced by wrath, or whose mind is engrossed by a beloved object, or who acts otherwise than the law permits, has no power in the distribution of the estate.”§

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13. In any other mode, ‡ The commentator Kālikākṣaṭa prefers another reading nyāthaḥ ‘not according to law’ instead of nyātha ‘in any other mode.’

† Vādi infra, Sect. 3, § 6.
‡ Vādāvālalkya, 2, 117.
§ Yajnavalkya, 2, 117.
§ Nārada, 12, 16.

(a) See 1 Morl. Dig. 21.—217.
SECTION III.

Partition after the Father’s decease.

1. Distribution among brothers should be equal; by the text of Yājñavalkya.

1. The author next propounds another period of partition, other persons as making it, and a rule respecting the mode. “Let sons divide equally both the effects and the debts, after [the demise of] their two parents.”

2. After their two parents. After the demise of the father and mother: here the period of the distribution is shown. The sons. The persons, who make the distribution, are thus indicated. Equally. A rule respecting the mode is by this declared: in equal shares only should they divide the effects and debts.

3. But Manu, having premised “partition after the death of the father and the mother,” and having declared, “The eldest brother may take the patrimony entire, and the rest may live under him as under their father;” has exhibited a distribution with deductions, among brethren separating after the death of their father and mother: “The portion deducted for the eldest is the twentieth part of the heritage with the best of all the chattels; for the middlemost, half of that; for the youngest, a quarter of it.” The twentieth part of the whole amount of the property [to be divided] and the best of all the chattels, must be given [by way of deduction] to the eldest; half of that, or a fortieth part, and a middling chattel, should be allotted to the middlemost; and a quarter of it, or the eightyieth part, with the worst chattel, to the youngest. He has also directed an unequal partition, but without deductions, among brethren separating after their parents’ decease; allotting two shares to the eldest, one and a half to the next born, and one apiece to the younger brothers: “If a deduction be thus made, let equal shares of the residue be allotted: but, if there be no deduction, the shares must be distributed in this manner; let the eldest have double share, and the next born a share and a half, and the younger sons each a share: thus is the law settled.” The author himself has sanctioned an unequal distribution when a division is made during the father’s life-time (“Let him either dismiss the eldest with the best share, &c.”). Hence an unequal partition is admissible in every period. How then is a restriction introduced, requiring that sons should divide only equal shares?

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 118.
† Manu, 9. 104.
‡ Manu, 9. 105.
§ Manu, 9. 112.
∥ Bālam-bhaṭṭa.
¶ Ibid.
** Manu, 9. 116–117.
†† Yājñavalkya.
‡‡ Vide Sect. 2. § 1.
(v) See 1 Morl. Dig. 315.—Lit.
(b) See 1 Strange, II. 1. 331.—Lit.
The question is thus answered: True, this unequal partition is found in the sacred ordinances; but it must not be practised, (a) because it is abhorred by the world; since that is forbidden by the maxim "Practise not that which is legal, but is abhorred by the world, [for*] it secures not celestial bliss:"† as the practice [of offering bulls] is shunned, on account of popular prejudice, notwithstanding the injunction "Offer to a venerable priest a bull or a large goat;"‡ and as the slaying of a cow is for the same reason disused, notwithstanding the precept "Slay a barren cow as a victim consecrated to Mitra and Varuna."§

5. It is expressly declared, "As the duty of an appointment [to raise up seed to another,] and as the slaying of a cow for a victim, are disused, so is partition with deductions [in favour of elder brothers]."||

6. Apastamba also, having delivered his own opinion, "A father, making a partition in his life-time, should distribute the heritage equally among his sons;" and having stated, as the doctrine of some, the eldest's succession to the whole estate. ("Some hold, that the eldest is heir:"§§) and having exhibited, as the notion of others, a distribution with deductions. ("In some countries, the gold, the black kine, and the black produce of the earth,

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4. As the slaying of a cow is for the same reason disused.] This is a very remarkable admission of the former prevalence of a practice, which is now held in the greatest abhorrence.

5. The duty of an appointment.] So the term (niyoga-dharma) is here interpreted by the author of the Viramitrodaya. But it is explained in the Subodhini, as intending the injunction of an observance, such as the offering of a bull, &c.

6. In some countries the gold, &c.] The sense of the text is this: In certain countries, the gold, the black kine, the black produce of earth, as Māśa, and other dark-coloured grain, or as black iron, (so some interpret the word) appertain to the eldest son; the car, and the furniture in the house, or utensils such as stools and the like, belong to the father:‡‡ the jewels worn by her are the wife's, as well as property which she has received from the father and other kinsmen. Such respectively are the portions of the eldest son, of the father, and of his wife. Subodhini; and Haradatta cited by Balāṇ-bhaṭṭa.

* Subodhini and Bālāṇ-bhaṭṭa.
† A passage of Yājñavalkya, according to the quotation of Mitra Miṣṭry in the Viramitrodaya; but ascribed to Manu in Bālāṇ-bhaṭṭa's commentary. It has not, however, been found either in Manu's or in Yājñavalkya's institutes.
‡ This also is a passage of Yājñavalkya, according to Mitra Miṣṭry's quotation; but has not been found in the institutes of that author.
§ A passage of the Veda, as the proceeding one is of the Smṛti, according to the remark of the Subodhini and Bālāṇ-bhaṭṭa.
|| Smṛti-saṁgraha as cited in the Viramitrodaya. †† Phaseolus radiatus.
** See a different interpretation. Sect. 2. § 10.
(a) See 2 Strange, H. L. 383—3: 1 Morl. Dig. 397.—Ea.
belong to the eldest son; the car appertains to the father; and the furniture in the house and her ornaments are the wife's;* as also the property [received by her] from kinsmen; so some maintain;") has expressly forbid it as contrary to the law; and has himself explained its inconsistency with the sacred codes: "It is recorded in scripture, without distinction, that Manu distributed his heritage among his sons."†

7. Therefore unequal partition, though noticed in codes of law, should not be practised, since it is disapproved by the world and is contrary to scripture. For this reason, a restriction is ordained, that brethren should divide only in equal shares.

8. It has been declared, that sons may part the effects after the death of their father and mother. The author states an exception in regard to the mother's separate property; "The daughters share the residue of their mother's property, after payment of her debts."‡

9. Let the daughters divide their mother's effects remaining over and above the debts; that is, the residue after the discharge of the debts contracted by the mother.(a)

Hence, the purport of the preceding part of the text is, that sons may divide their mother's effects, which are equal to her debts or less than their amount.

10. The meaning is this: A debt, incurred by the mother, must be discharged by her sons, not by her daughters; but her daughters shall take her property remaining above her debts; and this is fit; for by the maxim "A male child is procreated if the seed predominate, but a female if the woman contribute most to the fetus;" the women's property goes to her daughters, because portions of her abound in her female children; and the father's estate goes to his sons, because portions of him abound in his male children.

ANNOTATIONS.

Among his sons.] Bālam-bhaṭa reads patya "son" in the singular; but all copies of the Mītakṣara and Subodhitu, which have been collated, exhibit the term in the plural (patreḥśyaḥ "sons") and so does the Vīramitrodāya, quoting this passage from the Mītakṣara.

8. Sons may divide their mother's effects, which are equal to her debts or less.] They may take the goods and must pay the debts. Bālam-bhaṭa.

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* Vide supra. Sect. 2. § 10.
† A passage of the Tatttvirīya Veda, cited by Apastamba; as here remarked by Bālam-bhaṭa.
‡ Yājñavalkya, 2, 118. (c) Sec 3 Strange, H. L. 388.—Ed.
11. On the subject [of daughters*] a special rule is propounded by Gautama: "A woman’s property goes to her daughters, unmarried, or unprovided."† His meaning is this: if there be competition of married and unmarried daughters, the woman’s separate property belongs to such of them as are unmarried; or, among the married, if there be competition of endowed and unendowed daughters, it belongs exclusively to such as are unendowed: and this term signifies ‘destitute of wealth.’

12. In answer to the question, who takes the residue of the mother’s goods, after payment of her debts, if there be no daughter? the author adds “And the issue succeeds in their default.”‡

13. On failure of daughters, that is, if there be none, the son, or other male offspring, shall take the goods. This, which was right under the first part of the text (“Let sons divide equally both the effects and the debts;”)§ is here expressly declared for the sake of greater perspicuity.

SECTION IV.

Effects not liable to Partition.

1. The author explains what may not be divided “Whatever else is acquired by the co-parcener himself, without detriment to the father’s estate, as a present from a friend, or a gift at nuptials, does not appertain to the co-heirs. Nor shall he, who recovers hereditary property, which had been taken away, give it up to the parceners: nor what has been gained by science.”¶

2. That, which had been acquired by the co-parcener himself without any detriment to the goods of his father or mother; or which has been received by him from a friend, (a) or obtained by marriage, shall not appertain to the co-heirs of brethren. Any property, which had descend-

ANNOTATIONS.

11. Unmarried or unprovided.] The text is explained otherwise by Jimūta-vidhâna. (C. 4. Sect. 2. § 13, and 23.)

Married and unmarried.] Married signifies espoused; unmarried, maiden, sedent.


* Bâlâm-bhâtta † Gautama, 28, 22. ‡ Yâjñavalkya, 2, 118.
§ Vide § 1. ¶ Yâjñavalkya, 2, 179—180.
(a) See Remya Pavinda, Nt. Bishhû Leelhy, J Moore, J. A. Cst. 162 per Wigram (1870).
ed in succession from ancestors, and had been seized by others, and remained unrecovered by the father and the rest through inability or for any other cause, he, among the sons, who recovers it with the acquiescence of the rest, shall not give up to the brethren or other co-heirs: the person recovering it shall take such property.

3. If it be land, he takes the fourth part, and the remainder is equally shared among all the brethren. So Gauḍa, in his celebrated treatise on law, says that if land be recovered by one co-heir, he shall have a quarter of it.

4. A word supplied in the text.

5. The close of the passage of Yājñavalkya (4.1.) explained.

6. Here the phrase "any thing acquired by himself, without detriment to the father's estate," must be understood.

6. The acquisition must have been made without charge to the patrimony.

4. In regular succession.] Here the word "inherited" must be understood.

5. He need not give up to the co-heirs, what has been gained by him, through science, by reading the scriptures or by expounding their meaning: the acquirer shall retain such gains.

6. The acquisition must have been made without charge to the patrimony.

ANNOTATIONS.

4. Inherited must be understood.] The author supplies the deficiency in the text cited by him. The words "in succession" are in the text; "inherited" must be understood to complete the sense. Subodhini.

6. Any thing acquired by himself.] Here, according to Bālam-bhūṣaṇa's remark, either a different reading is proposed (kinehit for anyat) or an interpretation of the words of the text, "whatever else (anyat)" being explained by (kinehit) "any thing."

It is connected with every other member of the sentence.] More is implied; for the same phrase is understood in every instance, stated in other cases, of acquisitions exempt from partition. Subodhini.

In the form termed śūra.] For, at such a marriage, wealth is received from the bridegroom by the father or kinmen of the bride. See Māna, 3. 31.

(6) See 2 Str. II. L. 379.—E7.
7. Thus, since the phrase "without detriment to the father's estate" is in every place understood; what is obtained by simple acceptance, without waste of the patrimony, is liable to partition. But, if that were not understood with every member of the text, presents from a friend, a dowry received at a marriage, and other particular acquisitions, need not have been specified.

8. But, it is alleged, the enumeration of amicable gifts and similar acquisitions is pertinent, as showing, that such gains are exempt from partition, though obtained at the expense of the patrimony. Were it so, this would be inconsistent with the received practice of unerring persons, and would contradict a passage of Nárada: "He, who maintains the family of a brother studying science, shall take, be he ever so ignorant, a share of the wealth gained by science." Moreover the definition of wealth, not participable, which is gained by learning, is so propounded by Kátyáyana: "Wealth, gained through science which was acquired from a stranger while receiving a foreign maintenance, is termed acquisition through learning."(a)

9. Thus, if the phrase "without detriment to the father's estate," be taken as a separate sentence, any thing obtained by mere acceptance would be exempt from partition, contrary to established practice.

ANNOTATIONS.

7. Thus since the phrase &c.? A different reading is noticed by Bálam-bhaṭṭa "Not thus;" na tathā instead of "Thus" tathā. It is taken as a distinct sentence; and is explained as intimating, that, on the other hand, amicable gifts and the like, acquired without detriment to the patrimony, are not liable to partition. According to this reading and interpretation, that short sentence belongs to the preceding paragraph.

In the following sentence there seems to be another difference of reading, in the phrase "without waste (or with waste) of the patrimony." But the reading, which is countenanced by the exposition given in the Subodhiṇī, has been preferred.

Since the phrase "without detriment to the father's estate."[ Since that portion of the text is applicable to amicable gifts and other acquisitions which are specified as exempt from partition, therefore, as those acquisitions made at the charge of the patrimony are liable to be shared, so any thing obtained by mere acceptance, not being included among such acquisitions, must be subject to partition, though procured without use of the paternal goods. Subodhiṇī.

8. As showing that such gains are exempt from partition.] A difference in the reading of this passage, bhūjyataṃ (in the ablative case) instead of bhūjyatyāya (in the dative), is mentioned by Bálam-bhāṭṭa; but he makes no difference in the interpretation. Would contradict a passage of Nárada.] Since the support of the family is here stated as a reason for partaking of the property, the right of participation in the gains of science is founded on a special cause; and is not a natural consequence of relation as a brother: and the gains of science are not naturally liable to partition, and are therefore mentioned as excepted from distribution.

* Nárada, 13. 10.

(a) See Laxman Row Sadacee v. Mullar Row Bajee, 2 Knapp P. C. Rep. 60 65.—Ed.
10. This condition, that the acquisition be without detriment to the patrimony, is made evident by Manu: "What a brother has acquired by his labour, without using the patrimony, he need not give up to the co-heirs; nor what has been gained by science." (a)†

11. Exposition of the text.

12. Is it not unnecessary to declare, that effects obtained as presents from friends, and other similar acquisitions made without using the patrimony, are exempt from partition: since there was no ground for supposing a partition of them? That what is acquired, belongs to the acquirer, and to no other person, is well known: but a denial implies the possible supposition of the contrary.

13. Here a certain writer thus states grounds for supposing a partition. By interpreting the text, "After the death of the father, if the eldest brother acquire any wealth, a share of that belongs to the younger brothers; provided they have duly cultivated science;" in this manner, "if the eldest, youngest or middlemost, acquire property before or after the death of the father, a share shall accrue to the rest, whether younger or elder," grounds do exist for supposing friendly presents and the like to be liable to partition, whether or not the father be living: that is accordingly denied.

14. The argument is erroneous: since there is not here a denial of what might be supposed; but the text is a recital of it and solution of that which was demonstratively true: for most texts, cited under this head, are mere recitals of that which is notorious to the world.

15. Or you may be satisfied with considering it as an exception to what is suggested by another passage, "All the brethren shall be equal sharers of that which is acquired by them in concert:" and it is therefore a mere error to deduce the suggestion from an indefinite import of the word "eldest" in the text before cited (§ 13). That passage must be interpreted as an exception to the general doctrine, deduced from texts concerning friendly gifts and the rest, that they are exempt from partition, both before the father's death and after his demise.

16. Other things exempt from partition, have been enumerated by Manu; "Clothes, vehicles, ornaments, prepared food, women, sacrifices and pious acts, as well as the common way, are declared not liable to distribution."||

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* Subodhina.
† Manu, 9, 208. The close of this passage is read differently by Kallūka-bhaṭṭa, Jñātā-vāhana, &c. See Jñātā-vāhana Ch. 6, Sect. 1, § 3.
‡ Manu, 9, 204.
§ Vithaspati cited in the Rainākara.
|| Manu, 9, 219.
(a) See 2 Strange H. L. 357.—Ed.
17. Exposition of the text.

The apparel of the brother is retained by them. The father's apparel is given away at his obsequies. A passage of Vīñāsputī confirms this. Now clothes may be distributed.

17. Clothes, which have been worn, must not be divided. What is used by each person, belongs exclusively to him; and what had been worn by the father, must be given by brother parting after the father's decease, to the person who partakes of food at his obsequies; as directed by Vīñāsputī; "The clothes and ornaments, the bed and similar furniture, appertaining to the father, as well as his vehicle and the like, should be given, after perfuming them with fragrant drugs and wreaths of flowers, to the person who partakes of the funeral repast." But new clothes are subject to distribution.

18. Vehicles. The carriages, as horses, litters or the like. Here also, that, on which each person rides, belongs exclusively to him. But the father's must be disposed of as directed in regard to his clothes. If the horses or the like be numerous, they must be distributed among co-heirs who live by the sale of them. If they cannot be divided, the number being unequal, they belong to the eldest brother: as ordained by Manu; "Let them never divide a single goat or sheep, or a single beast with unclenched hoofs: a single goat or sheep belongs to the first born."*

19. The ornaments worn by each person are exclusively his. But what has not been used, is common and liable to partition. "Such ornaments, as are worn by women during the life of her husband, the heirs of the husband shall not divide among themselves: they, who do so, are degraded from their tribe."† It appears from the condition here specified ("such ornaments as are worn,") that those, which are not worn may be divided (c).

20. Prepared food, as boiled rice, sweet cakes and the like, must be similarly exempted from partition. Such food is to be consumed according to circumstances.

ANNOTATIONS.

18. The number being unequal. Inequality here signifies insufficiency for shares; not inquiry for number. And this is right. Suppose three horses and three sons: since the number is adequate to the allotment of shares, the horses may be divided. Suppose four horses and either three or five sons: since the horses do not answer to the number of co-heirs, and cannot be distributed into shares in their kind, and since a distribution by means of the value is forbidden, and the cattle is directed to be given to the eldest brother, the horses may be divided so far as they are adequate to the shares, and the surplus shall be given to the eldest. Throughout this title, inequality must be so understood. Sube ścian.

* Manu, 9. 119.
† Manu, 9. 260.
(c) See J. Strange, H. L. 50: 2 Ibd. 370.—Ed.
21. Water, or a reservoir of it, as a well or the like, being unequal to the allotment of shares, must not be distributed by means of the value; but is to be used by turns.

22. The women or female slaves, being unequal in number to the shares, must not be divided by the value, but should be employed in labour for the co-heirs alternately. But women (adulteresses or others) kept in concubinage by the father, must not be shared by the sons, though equal in number; for the text of Gautama forbids it. "No partition is allowed in the case of women connected with the father or with one of the co-heirs."*

23. The term yogakshema is a conjunctive compound resolvable into yoga and kshema. By the word yoga is signified a cause of obtaining something not already obtained: that is, a sacrificial act to be performed with fire consecrated according to the Veda and the law. By the term kshema is denoted an auspicious act which becomes the means of conservation of what has been obtained: such is the making of a pool or a garden, or the giving of alms elsewhere than at the altar. Both these, though appertaining to the father, or though accomplished at the charge of the patrimony, are indivisible; as Sautaksya declares. "The learned have named a conservatory act kshema, and a sacrificial one yoga; both are pronounced indivisible: and so are the bed and the chair.

24. Some hold, that by the compound term yoga-kshema, those who effect sacrificial and conservatory acts (yoga and kshema), are intended, as the king's counsellors, the stipendiary priests, and the rest. Others say, weapons, cowtails, parasols, shoes and similar things are meant.

25. The common way, or road of ingress and egress to and from the house, garden, or the like, is also indivisible.

ANNOTATIONS.

21. Being unequal.] It is thus hinted, that, if the number be adequate, partition takes place. Balam-bhatia.

22. "Women connected."] Enjoyed, or kept in concubinage. Subodhiniat.

Female slaves, being taken for enjoyment by any one of the brethren or co-heirs, belongs exclusively to him. Haradatta on Gautama.

24. Some hold.] The interpretation, given by Medhātithi and the Kalpataru, is stated. Balam-bhatia.

* Gautama, 28. 45.
26. The exclusion of land from partition, as stated by Uçanas. (“Sacrificial gains, land, written documents, prepared food, water, and women, are indivisible among kinsmen even to the thousandth degree;”) bears reference to sons of a Brâhmana by women of the military and other inferior tribes: for it is ordained [by Vîhaspati:] “Land, obtained by acceptance of donation, must not be given to the son of a Kshatriya or other wife of inferior tribe: even though his father give it to him, the son of the Brâhmana may resume it, when his father is dead.”*

27. A term in the text explained. Sacrificial gains acquired by officiating at religious ceremonies.

28. In general what is obtained through the father’s favour, will be subsequently declared exempt from partition.† The supposition that any thing, acquired by transgressing restrictions regarding the mode of acquisition, is indivisible, has been already refuted.‡

29. It is settled, that whatever is acquired at the charge of the patrimony, is subject to partition. But the acquirer shall, in such a case, have a double share, by the text of Vasishtha. “He, among them, who has made an acquisition, may take a double portion of it.”§

30. Not however, where the common stock is improved. The author propounds an exception to that maxim. “But, if the common stock be improved, an equal division is ordained.(a)”¶

31. Among unseparated brethren, if the common stock be improved or augmented by any one of them, through the text of Yajñavalkya.

ANNOTATIONS.

29. He, among them.] Among the brethren. Subodhini.

* This is a passage of Vîhaspati, according to the remark of Bâlam-bhaṭṭa; and it is cited as such by Jimuta-vâhana, C. 9. § 19.
† Sect. 6. § 13. 16. ‡ Sect. 1. § 16. § Vasishtha, 17. 42. || Yajñavalkya, 2. 121.
(a) See 2 Str. H. L. 383.—Ed.

(§) But there is no rule of law which precludes one member of an undivided family, though living together, from entering into an agreement with his co-partners in respect of the expenditure upon the family property and repayment of self-acquired funds; and such an agreement is rendered more reasonable and probable where portions of the family property are occupied and enjoyed by each of the members living separately. See Mithilâsâki Gaurâyana v. Sobbiramâsî Gaurâyana 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 311 and see 1 Strange, H. L. 198: 2 W. Macn. P. II. L. 192: 6 Mo. I A. Ca. 347.—Ed.
SECTION V.

Equal rights of Father and Son in property ancestral.

1. The distribution of the paternal estate among sons has been shown; the author next propounds a special rule concerning the division of the grandfather’s effects by grandsons. “Among grandsons by different fathers, the allotment of shares is according to the fathers.”

2. Although grandsons have by birth a right in the grandfather’s estate, equally with sons; still the distribution of the grandfather’s property must be adjusted through their fathers, and not with reference to themselves. The meaning here expressed is this: if unseparated brothers die, leaving male issue; and the number of sons be unequal, one having two sons, another three, and a third four; the two receive a single share in right of their father, the other three take one share appertaining to their father, and the remaining four similarly obtain one share due to their father. So, if some of the sons be living and some have died, leaving male issue; the same method should be observed: the surviving sons take their own allotments, and the sons of their deceased brothers receive the shares of their own fathers respectively. Such is the adjustment prescribed by the text.

3. If the father be alive, and separate from the grandfather, or if he have no brothers, a partition of the grandfather’s estate with the grandson would not take place; since it has been directed, that shares shall be allotted, in right of the father, if he be deceased: or, admitting partition to take place, it would be made according to the pleasure of the father, like a distribution of his own acquisitions: to obviate this doubt the author says; “For the ownership of father and son is the same in land, which was acquired by the grandfather, or in a corroy, or in chattels [which belonged to him.”

ANNOTATIONS.

1. Grandsons by different fathers. [Children of distinct fathers; meaning sons of brothers. Another reading also occurs: pramita-pitkānām “whose fathers are deceased” instead of aneka-pitkānām “whose fathers are different.” Subodhiu.

Bālam-bhāja notices another variation of the reading, but with disapprobation; aneka-pitkānām. It intends the same meaning, though inaccurately expressed.

3. If he be deceased. A variation in the reading and punctuation of the passage is noticed by Bālam-bhāja: vibhāgo nāsīt dhriya-māna; apiśarī pīto bhāga kalpa-syaktavat, (instead of vibhāgo nāsīt; adhiya-māna pīti pītna, &c.) “partition would not take place, if he be living, since it is directed that shares shall be allotted in right of the father, if he be deceased.”

* Yājūvalkya, 2. 121.
† Yājūvalkya, 2. 122.
4. Land] a rice-field or other ground. A corroy] So many leaves receivable from a plantation of betel pepper, or so many nuts from an orchard of areca. Chattels] gold, silver, or other moveables.

5. In such property, which was acquired by the paternal grandfather, through acceptance of gifts, or by conquest or other means [as commerce, agriculture, or service,*] the ownership of father and son is notorious; and therefore partition does take place. For, or because, the right is equal, or alike, therefore partition is not restricted to be made by the father's choice; nor has he a double share.

6. For the same reason, the distribution is as before stated (§ 1.)

6. Hence also it is ordained by the preceding text, that "the allotment of shares shall be according to the fathers," (§ 1.) although the right be equal.

7. The first text "When the father makes a partition, &c." (Sect. 2. § 1.) relates to property acquired by the father himself. So does that which ordains a double share: "Let the father, making a partition, reserve two shares for himself."† The dependence of sons, as affirmed in the following passage, "While both parents live, the control remains, even though they have arrived at old age;"‡ must relate to effects acquired by the father or mother. This other passage, "They have not power over it (the paternal estate) while their parents live;"§ must also be referred to the same subject.

ANNOTATIONS.

To obviate this doubt the author says:] If the father be alive, and separated from his own father, or if, being an only son with no brothers to participate with him, he be alive and not separated from his own father; then, since in the first mentioned case he is separate, no participation of the grandson's own father, in the grandfather's estate, can be supposed, and therefore, as well as because he is surviving, the grandson cannot be supposed entitled to share the grandfather's property, since the intermediate person obstructs his title; and, in the second case, although the grandson's own father have pretensions to the property, since he is not separated, still the participation of the grandson in his grandfather's estate cannot be supposed, for his own father is living; hence no partition of the grandfather's effects, with the grandson whose father is living, can take place in any circumstances. Or, admitting that such partition may be made, because he has a right by birth; still, as the father's superiority is apparent, (since a distribution by allotment to him is directed, when he is deceased; and that is more assuredly requisite, if he be living;) it follows, that partition takes place by the father's choice and that a double share belongs to him. Subodhini.

For the ownership of father and son.] The Kalpataru and Aparākṣa read "The ownership of both father and son" instead of "For the ownership of father and son;" chakriṇa instead of ohāva vi.


* Bālam-bhāṇa. † Nārada, 13. 19.
‡ The remainder of this passage has not been found; nor is the text cited in other compilations. Bālam-bhāṇa accredits it to Maru; but it is not found in his Institutes.
§ Maru, 9. 201.
8. Thus, while the mother is capable of bearing
more sons, and the father retains his worldly affec-
tions and does not desire partition, a distribution of
the grandfather’s estate does nevertheless take place by
the will of the son(s).

9. So likewise, the grandson has a right of
prohibition, if his unseparated father is making a do-
nation, or a sale, of effects inherited from the grand-
father; but he has no right of interference, if the
effects were acquired by the father. On the contrary,
he must acquiesce, because he is dependant.

10. Consequently the difference is this: although he have a
right by birth in his father’s and in his grandfather’s
property; still, since he is dependant on his father in
regard to the paternal estate, and since the father has
a predominant interest as it was acquired by himself, the son must
acquiesce in the father’s disposal of his own acquired property; but,
since both have indiscriminately a right in the grandfather’s estate, the
son has a power of interdiction [if the father be dissipating the
property.]

11. Manu likewise shows, that the father, however reluctant,
must divide with his sons, at their pleasure, the effects
acquired by the paternal grandfather; declaring, as he
does (“If the father recover paternal wealth not re-
covered by his co-heirs, he shall not, unless willing, share it with his
sons; for in fact it was acquired by him.”)† that, if the father recover
property, which had been acquired by an ancestor, and taken away by
a stranger, but not redeemed by the grandfather, he need not himself
share it, against his inclination, with his sons; any more than he need
give up his own acquisitions.

SECTION VI.

Rights of a posthumous son and of one born after the partition.

1. A son, born
after partition, is
entitled to share:
conformably with
the text of Vyāja-
valkya.

1. How shall a share be allotted to a son born
subsequently to a partition of the estate? The author
replies “When the sons have been separated, one
who is [afterwards] born of a woman equal in class,
shares the distribution.”

* Subodhini. † Manu, 9, 209. ‡ Vyājavalkya, 2, 122.

(c) This section, like sec. 10, applies to divisions of ancestral property, Nāgalaṅga
362.—Ed.
2. The sons being separated from their father, one, who shall be afterwards born of a wife equal in class, shall share the distribution. What is distributed, is distribution, meaning the allotments of the father and mother: he shares that; in other words, he obtains after [the demise of] his parents, both their portions: his mother's portion, however, only if there be no daughter; for it is declared that "Daughters share the residue of their mother's property, after payment of her debts."†

3. Born of a woman of a different tribe, he receives merely his own proper share, from his father's estate, with the whole of his mother's property [if there be no daughter.]‡

4. The same rule is propounded by Manu: "A son, born after a division, shall alone take the parental wealth."§ The term parental (pitraya) must be here interpreted "appertaining to both father and mother;" for it is ordained, that "A son, born before partition, has no claim on the wealth of his parents; nor one, begotten after it, on that of his brother."||

5. The meaning of the text is this: one, born previously to the distribution of the estate, has no property in the share allotted to his father and mother who are separated [from their elder children]; nor is one, born of parents separated [from their children], a proprietor of his brother's allotment.

6. Thus, whatever has been acquired by the father in the period subsequent to partition, belongs entirely to the son born after separation. For it is so ordained: "All the wealth, which is acquired by the father himself, who has made a partition with his sons, goes to the son begotten by him after the partition; those, born before it, are declared to have no right."**

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ANNOTATIONS.

2. If there be no daughter.] But, if there be a daughter, the son does not take his mother's portion. Subodhini.

3. His own proper share.] See Section 8.

From his father's estate.] Bālam-bhaṭṭa here notes a different reading; pitrya, in the accusative, for pitṛya in the ablative; and afterwards, mātrākaun “maternal” for mātrā “his mother’s.” The sense is not materially affected by these variations.

4. On the wealth of his parents.] This passage, being read differently by Jīmūṭa-vāhanā (Ch. 7, § 5.), who writes pitṛya “parental or paternal” instead of pitrya “of both parents,” is not less ambiguous according to that reading, than the text cited from Manu.

5. In the share.] Bālam-bhaṭṭa censures another reading, vībhāga “in the division,” for bhāga “in the share.”

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*Bālam-bhaṭṭa. † Yājñavalkya, 2. 118. Vṛtta supra. Sect. 3. § 8. ‡ Subodhini.
§ Manu, 9. 216. †† Vṛhaspati. ¶ Bālam-bhaṭṭa.
** Vṛhaspati. See Jīmūṭa-vāhanā, Ch. 7, § 6.
7. But the son, born subsequently to the separation, must, after the death of his father, share the goods with those who reunited themselves with the father after the partition: as directed by Manu; "Or he shall participate with such of the brethren, as are reunited with the father."*

8. When brethren have made a partition subsequently to their father's demise, how shall a share be allotted to a son born afterwards? The author replies "His allotment must absolutely be made, out of the visible estate corrected for income and expenditure."†

9. A share allotted for one who is born after a separation of the brethren, which took place subsequently to the death of the father, at a time when the mother's pregnancy was not manifest, is "his allotment." But whence shall it be taken? The author replies, "from the visible estate" received by the brethren, "corrected for income and expenditure." Income is the daily, monthly or annual produce. Liquidation of debts contracted by the father, is expenditure. Out of the amount of property corrected by allowing for both income and expenditure, a share should be taken and allotted to the [posthumous son.]

10. The meaning here expressed is this: Including in the several shares the income thence arisen, and subtracting the father's debts, a small part should be taken from the remainder of the shares respectively, and an allotment, equal to their own portions, should be thus formed for the [posthumous] son born after partition.

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3. Absolutely.] The particle वि is here employed affirmatively. The meaning is, that an allotment for them should be made only from the visible estate corrected for income and expenditure. Subodhini.

9. His allotment.] The pronoun "his" refers to the son born after partition. Subodhini.

Corrected for income and expenditure.] If agriculture or the like have been practised by the brethren with their several shares after separation, the gain is "income." The payment of the father's debts, the support of their own families, and similar disbursements constitute "expenditure." Counting the income in the shares, and deducting the expenditure from the allotments, as much as may be in each instance proper, should be taken from each portion, and an allotment thus adjusted for a son born of a pregnancy which existed at the moment of the father's decease, as well as at the time of the partition, though not then manifest. Subodhini.

10. Including in the several shares, &c.] It is the astringency though divided, as much as when undivided. Since then the offspring, though yet in the mother's womb, is entitled to a share of the father's goods, as being his issue, therefore that offspring is entitled to participate in the gain arising out of the patrimony. Here again, if it be a male child, he has a right to an equal share [with others of the same class]. But, if a female child, she participates for a quarter of the share due to a brother of the same rank with herself. This, which will be subsequently explained, should be here understood. Subodhini.

* Manu, 9.216.  † Yājñavalkya, 2. 128.
11. This must be understood to be likewise applicable in the case of a nephew, who is born after the separation of the brethren; the pregnancy of the brother’s widow, who was yet childless, not having been manifest at the time of the partition.

12. But, if she were evidently pregnant, the distribution should be made, after awaiting her delivery; as Vasiṣṭha directs, “Partition of heritage [takes place] among brothers [having waited] until the delivery of such of the women, as are childless [but pregnant].” This text should be interpreted, “having waited until the delivery of the women who are pregnant.”

13. It has been stated, that the son, born after partition, takes the whole of his father’s goods and of his mother’s.† But if the father, or the mother, affectionately bestow ornaments or other presents on a separated son, that gift must not be resisted by the son born after partition; or, if actually given, must not be resumed. So the author declares: “But effects, which have been given by the father, or by the mother, belong to him on whom they were bestowed.”‡

ANNOTATIONS.

11. Who was yet childless.] This is according to the reading and interpretation followed by Bhāratacāla. He notices, however, another reading, (aprāgasya instead of aprajāti), which connects the epithet of “childless” with the brother.

12. Such of the women as are childless but pregnant.] Vāchśapati-mīra connects the word “women” (or “wives”) with the term “brothers.” The Kalpastru, and other compilations, also understand the wives of brothers to be meant; but, in the Smṛti-chandrikā, the passage is interpreted as relating to the widows of the father. All concur in explaining it as meant of pregnant widows.

This text should be interpreted.] The most natural construction of the original text is: Partition of heritage is among brothers and women who are childless; until the birth of issue. The authors of the Kalpastru and Chināmānipi follow that interpretation, and consider that a share should be set apart for the widow who is likely to have issue (being supposed pregnant); and when she is delivered, the share is assigned to her son, if he be alive; if not, to the son of the brother and the woman shall have a maintenance. The author of the Smṛti-chandrikā acknowledges that to be the natural construction of the words; but rejects the consequent interpretation, because it contains a contradiction, and because widows are not entitled to participate as heirs. He expounds the text, nearly as it is explained in the Mitākṣarā, viz.: Among brothers, who have continued to live together, until the delivery of the childless but pregnant widow, partition of heritage takes place after the birth of the issue, when its sex is known; and does not take place immediately after the obeisances. Vigraha-bhaṣa, in the Madana-Pārījata, exhibits a similar interpretation: “Partition takes place after awaiting the delivery of widows who are evidently pregnant.”

* The first part of this passage corresponds with a text of Vasiṣṭha’s institutes (17, 36.), but the sequel of it is not to be found in that work.
† Vide supra. § 1, — § 7.
‡ Yājñavalkya, 2. 124.
(a) See 7 Moc. I. A. Ca. 192.—Ed.
14. What is given (whether ornaments or other effects,) by the father and by the mother, being separated from their children, to a son already separated, belongs exclusively to him; and does not become the property of the son born after the partition.

15. By parity of reason, what was given to any one, before the separation, appertains solely to him.

16. So, among brethren, dividing the allotment of their parents who were separated from them, after the demise of those parents, (as may be done by the brothers; if there be no son born subsequently to the original partition,) what had been given by the father and mother to each of them, belongs severally to each, and is shared by no other. This must be understood.

SECTION VII.

Shares allotted to provide for widows and for the维护ial of unmarried daughters.—The initiation of uninitiated brothers defrayed out of the joint funds.

1. When a distribution is made during the life of the father, the participation of his wives, equally with his sons, has been directed. (“If he make the allotments equal, his wives must be rendered partakers of like portions.”*) The author now proceeds to declare their equal participation, when the separation takes place after the demise of the father: “Of heirs dividing after the death of the father, let the mother also take an equal share.”†

2. Of heirs separating after the decease of the father, the mother shall take a share equal to that of a son; provided no separate property had been given to her. But, if any had been received by her, she is entitled to half a share, as will be explained (a).†

ANNOTATIONS.

2. Provided no separate property had been given.] Peculiar property of a woman (stridhana.) Vide C. 2. Sect. 11. § 1.

* Section 2. § 8. † Yājñavalkya, 2. 124. ‡ Vide C. 2. Sect. 11. § 34.
(a) See 2 Str. H. L. 307, 383, 404.—Ed.
3. If any of the brethren be uninitiated, when the father dies, who is competent to complete their initiation? The author replies: “Uninitiated brothers should be initiated by those, for whom the ceremonies have been already completed.”

4. By the brethren, who make a partition after the decease of their father, the uninitiated brothers should be initiated at the charge of the whole estate.

5. In regard to unmarried sisters, the author states a different rule: “But sisters should be disposed of in marriage, giving them as an allotment, the fourth part of a brother’s own share.”

6. The purport of the passage is this: Sisters also, who are not already married, must be disposed of, in marriage, by the brethren, contributing a fourth part out of their own allotments. Hence it appears, that daughters also participate after the death of their father. Here, in saying “of a brother’s own share,” the meaning is not, that a fourth part shall be deducted out of the portions allotted to each brother, and shall be so contributed; but that the girl shall be allowed to participate for a quarter of such a share as would be assignable to a brother of the same rank with herself. The sense expressed is this: if the maiden be daughter of a Brāhmaṇī, she has a quarter of so much as is the amount of an allotment for a son by a Brāhmaṇī wife.

ANNOTATIONS.

3. Initiation.] Sanskrita; a succession of religious rites commencing on the pregnancy of the mother and terminating with the investiture of the sacerdotal thread, or with the return of the student to his family and finally his marriage.

4. By the brethren, who make a partition, &c.] By such, for whom all the initiatory ceremonies, including marriage, have been completed. Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

After the decease of their father.] In like manner, while the father is living but disqualified by degradation from his tribe or other incapacity, if the brethren be themselves the persons who make the partition, the same rules must be understood in regard to the initiation of brothers at the charge of the common stock. Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

6. The purport of the passage is this.] As commentators disagree in their interpretation of the text, and a subtle difficulty does arise, the author proceeds to show, that his own exposition, and no other, conveys the real sense of the passage. Taking the phrase “the uninitiated should be initiated” as here understood from the preceding sentence (§ 3), he expounds the text: “Sisters also, who are not already married, &c.”

Some thus interpret the words “own share.” After assigning as many shares as there are brothers, a quarter part should be given to a sister, out of their several allotments; so that, if there be two or more sisters, a quarter of every share must be given to each of them.

But others thus expound those terms: “Deducting a quarter from each of their shares, the brothers should give that to a sister. If there be two or more sisters, they and their brothers shall respectively take the same subtracted share [and residue] and no separate deduction shall be made [for each].”

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 125.
† Yājñavalkya, 2. 125.
(a) See 2 Str. H. L. 313.—Ed.
(b) See 1 Strange, H. L. 404.—Ed.
7. For example, if a certain person had only a Brahmani wife, and leaves one son and one daughter; the whole paternal estate should be divided into two parts, and one such part be subdivided into four; and, the quarter being given to the girl, the remainder shall be taken by the son. Or, if there be two sons and one daughter, the whole of the father's estate should be divided into three parts; and one such part be subdivided into four; and, the quarter having been given to the girl, the remainder shall be shared by the sons. But, if there be one son and two daughters, the father's property should be divided into thirds, and two shares be severally subdivided into quarters: then, having given two [quarter] shares to the girls, the son shall take the whole of the residue. It must be similarly understood in any case of an equal or unequal number of brothers and sisters alike in rank.

8. But, if there be one son of a Brahmani wife and one daughter by a Kshatriya woman, the paternal estate should be divided into seven parts; and the three parts, which would be assignable to the son of a Kshatriya woman, must be subdivided by four; then, giving such fourth part to the daughter of the Kshatriya wife, the son of the Brahmani shall take the residue. Or, if there be two sons of the Brahmani and one daughter by the Kshatriya wife, the father's estate shall be divided into eleven parts; and three parts, which would be assignable to a son by a Kshatriya wife, must be subdivided by four: having given such quar-

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Both interpretations are unsuitable: *for, according to the first, if there be one brother and seven or eight sisters,* nothing will remain for the brother, if a quarter must be given to each sister; or, if there be no sister and many brothers, the sister has a greater allotment than a brother, if a quarter must be given to her by each of her brothers; and this is inconsistent with a text, which indicates, that a daughter should have less than a son.

Under the second exposition, if there be one sister and numerous brothers, the same objection arises, which was before stated; or, in the case of one brother and seven or eight sisters, suppose the amount of the brother's share to be a nistha, the quarter of that is very inconsiderable, and the allotment of shares out of it is still more trifling: the terms of the text "giving them, as an allotment, the fourth part," (§ 5) would be impertinently; or, admitting that the precept is observed, still there would be an inconsistency.

But, according to our method, since each sister has exactly a quarter of a share, there is nothing contradictory to the terms of the text, "a fourth part" (§ 6). Subodhini.

7. Divided into two parts, and one such part . . . . into four.] If the text were not so explicit, it might have rather concluded, that the estate should be divided into five parts; one for the sister, and four for the brother: which would be exactly an allotment of a quarter of the amount of a brother's share to a sister. But, according to the distribution exemplified in the text, the sister receives one quarter of that which she would have received, had she been male instead of female. It is, however, in the instance first stated, a seventh only of what her brother actually reserves for himself.*

* If there be four sisters, nothing will remain for the brother; if there be a greater number, the allotment of a quarter to each is impossible. C.
ter share to the daughter of the Kashatriya, the two sons of the Brāhmaṇa shall share and take the whole of the remainder. Thus the mode of distribution may be inferred in any instance of an equal or unequal number of brothers and sisters dissimilar in rank.

9. Nor is it right to interpret the terms of the text ("giving the fourth part" § 5) as signifying 'giving money sufficient for her marriage,' by considering the word "fourth" as indefinite. For that contradicts the text of Manu ‘To the maiden sisters, let their brothers give portions out of their own allotments respectively: to each the fourth part of the share; and they, who refuse to give it, shall be degraded.’

10. The sense of this passage is as follows. Brothers, of the sacerdotal and other tribes, should give to their sisters belonging to the same tribes, portions out of their own allotments; that is, out of the shares ordained for persons of their own rank, as subsequently explained.† They should give to each sister a quarter of their own respective allotments. It is not meant, that a quarter should be deducted from the share of each and be given to the sister. But, to each maiden, should be severally allotted the quarter of a share ordained for a son of the same class. The mode of adjusting the division, when the rank is dissimilar and the number unequal, has been stated: and the allotment of such a share appears to be indispensably requisite, since the refusal of it is pronounced to be a sin; “They, who refuse to give it, shall be degraded.” (§ 9.)

11. If it be alleged, that, here also, the mention of a quarter is indeterminate, and the allotment of property sufficient to defray the expenses of the nuptials is all which is meant to be expressed: the answer is, no; for there is not any proof, that the allotment of a quarter of a share is indeterminate in both codes; and the withholding of it is pronounced to be a sin.

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This is consonant.] Medhatithi’s interpretation of a parallel passage of Manu;‡ where he observes, that ‘if the maiden sisters be numerous, the portions are to be adjusted at the fourth part of an allotment for a brother of the same class: thus the meaning is, let the son take three parts, and let the damsel take the fourth.’

9. For her marriage.] Sanskrita (§ 3) signifies, in this instance, marriage: since the previous ceremonies are not performed for females, but only for male children. Subodhinī, &c.

“Out of their own allotments respectively.”] A difference in the reading of this passage is remarked in the notes on Jñātā-vāhana (C. 3. Sect. 2. § 36). A further variation occurs in the commentary by Medhatithi, who reads Svābhyaḥ Svābhyaḥ “to their own sisters;” that is, “sisters of their own classes respectively.”

“To each the fourth part of the appropriate share.”] This part of the text is understood differently by Jñātā-vāhana (C. 3. Sect. 2. § 36).

11. In both codes.] In the text of Yājñavalkya and in that of Manu. Subodhinī.

12. As for what is objected by some, that a sister, who has many brothers, would be greatly enriched, if the allotment of a [fourth]* part were positively meant; and that a brother, who has many sisters, would be entirely deprived of wealth; the consequence is obviated in the manner before explained: it is not here directed, that a quarter shall be deducted out of the brother’s own share and given to his sister; whence any such consequence should arise.

13. Hence the interpretation of Medhatithi who has no compeer, as well as of other writers, who concur with him, is square and accurate; not that of Bhāruci.

14. Therefore, after the decease of the father, an unmarried daughter(a) participates in the inheritance. But, before his demise, she obtains that only, whatever it be, which her father gives; since there is no special precept respecting this case. Thus all is unexceptionable.

SECTION VIII.

Shares of Sons belonging to different tribes.

1. The adjustment of a distribution among brothers alike in rank, whether made with each other, or with their father, has been propounded in preceding passages (“When the father makes a partition, &c.”). The author now describes partition among brethren dissimilar in class: “The sons of a Brāhmaṇa, in the several tribes, have four shares, or three, or two, or one; the children of a Kshatriya have three portions, or two, or one; and those of a Vaiśya take two parts, or one.”§

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Pronounced to be a sin.] In Manus’s text. (§ 9.) Bālam-bhaṭṭa.


This commentator treats Asahāya as an epithet of the author next named (Medhatithi.) The word occurs, however, as a proper name in the Vivāda-rāvaikara, in commenting on a passage of Manus (9, 166.) The meaning may be that the opinion of Asahāya, Medhatithi, and the rest is accurate; not that of Bhāruci.

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* Bālam-bhaṭṭa.
† § 6.
‡ Section 2, § 1.
§ Yājñavalkya, 2. 126.
(c) Sec 2 Str. II, L, 311, Ed.
2. Under the sanction of the law,* instances do occur of a Brāhmaṇa having four wives; a Kshatriya, three; and a Vaiṣya, two; but a Čādrā, one. In such cases, the sons of a Brāhmaṇa, born to him by women of the several tribes, shall have four shares, three, two, or one, in the order of these tribes.

3. The several tribes (varṇaśātras.) Women of the different classes the ascendent and the rest, are here signified by the word tribe (varṇa.) The termination ās, subjoined to a noun in the singular number and locative or other case, bears a distributive sense, conformably with the grammatical rule.†

4. The meaning here expressed is this: The sons of a Brāhmaṇa, by a Brāhmaṇa woman, take four shares apiece; his sons by a Kshatriya wife, receive three shares each; by a Vaiṣya woman, two; by a Čādrā, one.

5. Among the sons of a Kshatriya, born to him by women of the several tribes, (for that is here understood,) have three shares, or two, or one, in the order of the tribes: that is, the sons of a Kshatriya man, by a Kshatriya woman, take three shares each; by a Vaiṣya woman, two; by a Čādrā wife, one.

6. Among the sons of a Vaiṣya, by women of the several tribes, (for here, again, the same term is understood,) have two shares, or one, in the order of the classes: that is, the sons of a Vaiṣya man, by a Vaiṣya woman, take two shares apiece; by a Čādrā woman, one.

7. Since a man of the servile tribe cannot have a son of different class from his own, because one wife only is allowed to him, (for "a Čādrā woman only must be the wife of a Čādrā man,"†) partition among his children takes place in the manner before-mentioned.

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Madhāvatī is a celebrated commentator on Manu; and his exposition of Manu’s text (§ 9.) agrees with the author’s explanation of Yājñavalkya’s (§ 5.)

Bhāruchī, an ancient author, probably maintained the opinion and interpretation which are refuted in the present Section.

9. Under the sanction of the law.] The initial words of a passage of Yājñavalkya (1. 57.) are cited in the text, for the sanction of the practice here noticed.

3. Conformably with the grammatical rule.] The author quotes a rule of grammar. (Pāṇini, 5. 4. 43.)

7. In the manner before-mentioned.] As directed by the texts above cited. (Yājñavalkya, 3. 115. and 116. Vide Sect. 2. and 3.) Subodhrin.

* Yājñavalkya, 1. 57.
† Pāṇini, 5. 4. 43.
‡ Manu, 3. 13.
8. Although no restriction be specified in the text (§ 1.), it must be understood to relate to property other than land obtained by the acceptance of a gift. For it is declared [by Vṛhaspati] "Land obtained by acceptance of donation, must not be given to the son of a Kshatriya or other wife of inferior tribe: even though his father give it to him, the son of the Brāhmaṇa may resume it, when his father is dead."

9. Since acceptance of donation is here expressly stated, land obtained by purchase or similar means appertains also to the son of a Kshatriya or other inferior woman. For the son by a Čudrā woman is specially excepted ("The son, begotten on a Čudrā woman by any man of a twice-born class, is not entitled to a share of land."

†) Now, if land acquired by purchase and similar means did not belong to the sons of a Kshatriya or Vaigya wife, the special exception of a son by a Čudrā woman would be impertinent.

10. But the following text. "The son of a Brāhmaṇa, a Kshatriya, or a Vaigya, by a woman of the servile class, shall not share the inheritance; whatever his father may give him, let that only be his property;"† relates to the case where something, however inconsiderable, has been given by the father, in his lifetime, to his son by a Čudrā woman. But, if no affectionate gift have been bestowed on him by his father, he participates for a single share [of the moveables]. Thus there is nothing contradictory.

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9. Begotten on a Čudrā woman.] Čudrā does not here bear its regular signification of 'wife of a Čudrā man,' but intends a wife of the regenerate man, being a Čudrā woman. Subodhīna and Bālan-bhāṭa.

The special exception of a son by a Čudrā woman would be impertinent.] Since the son of the Čudrā is specially excepted, it follows, that the sons of the Kshatriya wife and those of the Vaigya do participate. Subodhīna.

10. Where something ... has been given.] Where an affectionate gift has been bestowed. In some copies, the reading is son [prasāda-dātan in place of pradātan. Bālan-bhāṭa.

* Bālan-bhāṭa supplies the author's name.

† This also is a passage of Vṛhaspati. See Jīmūtā-vāhnum, Ch. 9. § 22.

‡ Maha, 9. 195.
SECTION IX.

Distribution of effects discovered after partition.

1. Something is here added respecting the residue after a general distribution of the estate. "Effects, which have been withheld by one co-heir from another, and which are discovered after the separation, let them again divide in equal shares: this is a settled rule."*

2. What had been withheld by co-partners from each other, and was not known at the time of dividing the aggregate estate, they shall divide in equal proportions, when it is discovered after the partition of the patrimony. Such is the settled rule or maxim of the law.

3. Here, by saying "in equal shares" the author forbids partition with deductions. By saying "let them divide," he shows, that the goods shall not be taken exclusively by the person who discovers them.

4. The embezlement was an offence.

5. Since the text is thus significant, it does not imply, that no offence is committed by embezzling the common property.

5. Is it not shown by Manu to be an offence on the part of the eldest brother, if he appropriate to himself the common property; and not so, on the part of younger brothers? "An eldest brother, who from avarice shall defraud his younger brothers, shall forfeit the honours of his primogeniture, be deprived of his [additional] share, and be chastised by the king."†

6. That inference is not correct; for, by pronouncing such conduct criminal in an elder brother, who is independent and represents the father, it is more assuredly shown (by the argument exemplified in the loaf and staff) to be criminal in younger brothers, who are subject

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6. By the argument exemplified in the loaf and staff.] If a staff, to which a loaf is attached, be taken away by thieves, it is inferred, that assuredly the loaf also has been stolen by them.‡ So, in the case under consideration, if the eldest, who is independent and represents the father, be criminal for withholding the goods, the same may surely be affirmed concerning the rest, if they do so. Subodhini.

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 127.
† Manu, 9. 213.
‡ See Jīmātā-vāhana, 2. 25 & 3. 1. 16.
A passage of the Veda declares the guilt in general terms, to the control of the eldest and hold the place of sons. Accordingly it is declared [in the Veda*] to be an offence without exception or distinction: “Him indeed, who deprives an heir of his right share, he does certainly destroy; or, if he destroy not him, he destroys his son, or else his grandson.”†

7. Whoever debarrs, or excludes, from participation, an heir, or person entitled to a share, and does not yield to him his due allotment; he, being thus debarred of his share, destroys or annihilates that person who so debarrs him of his right: or, if he do not immediately destroy him, he destroys his son or his grandson.

8. Embezzlement of common property is criminal in any person.

9. The use of it, under the supposition of a right to do so, is argued to be innocent.

9. It is argued, that blame is not incurred by one who takes the goods, thinking them his own, under the notion, that the common property appertains also to him.

10. But still the offence is committed.

10. That is wrong. He does incur blame: for, though he took it thinking it his own; still he has taken the property of another person, contrary to the injunction which forbids his so doing.

11. As in answer to a proposed solution of a difficulty “If an oblation of green kidney beans; be not procurable, and black kidney beans§ be used in their stead, by reason of the resemblance, the maxim, which prohibits the employment of these in sacrifices, is not applicable, because they were used by mistake for ground particles of green kidney beans;” it is on the contrary maintained, as the right opinion, that, although the ground particles of green kidney beans be taken as being unforbidden, still the ground particles of black kidney beans are also actually employed: and the prohibitory command is consequently applicable in this case.’

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11. As in answer to a proposed solution.] The author here adduces an example of reasoning from the Mīmāṃsā, in the 6th book (Adhyāya) 3d section (pāda) and 6th topic (Adhikarana.) Subodhini.

The black kidney bean, with certain other kinds of grain, is declared by a passage of the Veda unfit to be used at sacrifices. An oblation of green kidney beans, by another passage of the same, is directed to be made on certain occasions. If then the green sort be not procurable, may the black kind be used in its stead? The solution

* Bālam-bhaṣṭa.† A passage of the Veda, as observed by Bālam-bhaṣṭa.
‡ Mudga : Phaseolus Mungo : green kidney beans.
§ Māśa : Phaseolus Max. v. radiatus : black kidney beans.
12. Therefore it is established, both from the letter of the law and from reasoning, that an offence is committed by taking common property.

SECTION X.

Rights of the Dvayamushyayana or son of two fathers.

1. Intending to propound a special allotment for the Dvayamushyayana (or son of two fathers,) the author previously describes that relation. "A son, begotten by one, who has no male issue, on the wife of another man, under a legal appointment, is lawfully heir, and giver of funeral oblations, to both fathers.*

2. A son, procreated by the husband's brother or other person (having no male issue), on the wife of another man, with authority from venerable persons, in the manner before ordained, is heir of both the natural father and the wife's husband: he is successor to their estates, and giver of oblations to them, according to law.

3. The meaning of this is as follows. If the husband's brother, or other person, duly authorized, and being himself destitute of male issue, proceed to an intercourse with the wife of a childless man, for the sake of raising issue both for himself and for the other; the son, whom he so begets, is the child of two fathers and denominated Dvayamushyayana. He is heir to both, and offers funeral oblations to their manes.

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first proposed is, that the black sort may be substituted for the green kind, in like manner as wild rice is used in place of the cultivated sort: and, in answer to the argument drawn from the special prohibition, it is pretended, that the prohibition holds against the use of the black kidney bean as such, and not against its use when ground particles of this and other sorts are taken with particles of green kidney beans as being unforbidden. But the correct and demonstrated opinion is, that the black kind is altogether unfit to be used at sacrifices, being expressly prohibited: its particles, therefore, although intermixed with other sorts, are to be avoided; and for this reason they must not be used as a substitute for the other kind. Subodhini and Bājām-bhāja.

1. Dvayamushyayana, or son of two fathers.] As here described, the Dvayamushyayana is restricted to one description of adoptive son, the Kshetraja or son of the wife: but the term is applicable to any adopted son retaining his filial relation to his natural father with his acquired relation to his adoptive parent. See Sect. II. § 32.

2. In the manner before ordained.] The initial words of another passage of Yājñavalkya are here cited. It is as follows: "Let the husband's brother, or a kinsman near of remote, having been authorized by venerable persons, and being anointed with butter, approach the childless wife at proper seasons, until she become pregnant. He, who approaches her in any other mode, is degraded from his tribe. A child, begotten in that mode, is the husband's son, denominated (kshetraja) son of the wife."*  

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 128.
† Yājñavalkya, 1. 69—70.
4. But, if one, who has made issue, being so authorized, have intercourse with the wife for the sake of raising up issue to her husband only; the child, so begotten by him, is son of the husband, not of the natural father; and, by this restriction, he is not heir of his natural father, nor qualified to present funeral oblations to his names. It is so declared by Manu: "The owners of the seed and of the soil may be considered as joint owners of the crop, which they agree, by special compact, in consideration of the seed, to divide between them."*

5. By special compact.] When the field is delivered by the owner of the soil to the owner of the seed, on an agreement in this form, "let the crop, which will be here produced, belong to us both;" then the owners both of the soil and of the seed are considered by mighty sages as sharers or proprietors of the crop produced in that ground.

6. So [the same author.] "Unless there be a special agreement between the owners of the land and of the seed, the fruit belongs clearly to the land-owner; for the soil is more important than the seed."†

7. But produce, raised in another's ground, without stipulating for the crop, or without a special agreement that it shall belong to both, appertains to the owner of the ground: for the receptacle is more important than the seed; as is observed in the case of cows, mares and the rest.

8. Here, however, the commission for raising up issue is relative to a woman who was only betrothed, since any other such appointment is forbidden by Manu. For, after thus premising a commission, "On failure of issue, the desired offspring may be procreated, either by his brother or some other kinsman, on the wife who has been duly authorized: anointed with liquid butter, silent, in the night, let the kinsman, thus appointed, beget one son, but a second by no means, on the widow [or childless wife:];"† Manu has himself prohibited the practice: "By regenerate men, no widow must be authorized to conceive by any other: for they, who authorize her to conceive by any other, violate the primeval law. Such a commission is nowhere mentioned in the nuptial prayers; nor is the

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8. The commission ...... is relative to a woman who was only betrothed.] The commentator, Balkum-bha, dissent from his doctrine: and cites passages of law to show, that, after truth verbally plighted, should the intended husband die before the actual celebration of marriage, the damsel is at the disposal of her father to be given in marriage to another husband. It is unnecessary to go into his explanation of the passages cited in the text, in support of another opinion.

* Manu, 9, 53. † Manu, 9, 52. ‡ Manu, 9, 55.—60.
marriage of widows noticed in laws concerning wedlock. This practice, fit only for cattle, and reprehended by learned priests, was introduced among men, while Venus had sovereign sway. He, possessing the whole earth, and therefore eminent among royal saints, gave rise to a confusion of tribes, when his intellect was overcome by passion. Since his time, the virtuous censure that man, who, through delusion of mind, authorizes a widow to have intercourse for the sake of progeny, "*

9. Nor is an option to be assumed from the [contrast of] precept and prohibition. Since they, who authorize the practice, are expressly censured: and disloyalty is strongly reproved in speaking of the duties of women; and continence is no less praised. This, Manu has shown:

"Let the faithful wife exalt her body by living voluntarily on pure flowers, roots, and fruits; but let her not, when her lord is deceased, even pronounce the name of another man. Let her continue till death forgiving all injuries, performing harsh duties, avoiding every sensual pleasure, and cheerfully practising the incomparable rules of virtue, which have been followed by such women, as were devoted to one only husband. Many thousands of Brahmans, having avoided senility from their early youth, and having left no issue in their families, have ascended nevertheless to heaven; and, like those abstemious men, a virtuous wife ascends to heaven, though she have no child, if, after the decease of her lord, she devote herself to pious austerity: but a widow, who, from a wish to bear children, slight her deceased husband, brings disgrace on herself here below, and shall be excluded from the abode of her lord." †

Thus the legislature has forbidden the recourse of a widow or wife to another man, even for the sake of progeny. Therefore it is not right to deduce an option from the injunction contrasted with the prohibition.

10. The authorizing of a woman sanctified by marriage, [to raise up issue to her husband by another man,] being thus prohibited, what then is a lawful commission [to raise up issue?] The same author explains it: "The damsel, whose husband shall die after troth verbally plighted, his brother shall take in marriage according to this rule: having espoused her in due form, she being clad in a white robe, and pure in her conduct, let him privately approach her once in each proper season, until issue be had." ‡

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9. It is not right to deduce an option. For an option is inferred in the case of equal things: but here a censure is passed on those persons, who authorize such a practice, and none upon those who forbid it. The injunction and the prohibition are consequently not equal; and therefore an option is not inferred. Subodbhuti.

‡ Manu, 9, 64–68. † Manu, 5, 157–161. ‡ Manu, 9, 69–70.
11. It appears from this passage, that he, to whom a damsel was verbally given, is her husband without a formal acceptance on his part. If he die, his own brother of the whole blood, whether elder or younger, shall espouse or take in marriage the widow. "In due form," or, as directed by law, "having espoused" or wedded her, and "according to this rule," namely with an immolation of clarified butter and with restraint of voice, &c., let him "privately" or in secret, "approach her, clad in a white robe, and pure in her conduct," that is, restraining her mind, speech and gesture, "once" at a time, until pregnancy ensues.

12. The intercourse of the widow with her husband's kinsman is a nominal marriage.

12. These espousals are nominal, and a mere part of the form in which an authorized widow shall be approached; like the immolation of clarified butter and so forth. They do not indicate her becoming the wedded wife of her brother-in-law.

13. Therefore the offspring, produced by that intercourse, appertains to the original husband, not to the brother-in-law. But, by special agreement, the issue may belong to both.

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12. These espousals are nominal. The notion is this: as an immolation of clarified butter, and other observances, are proscribed as mere forms in approaching an authorized widow; so these espousals are a mere part of that intercourse, and not a principal and substantive act, where the parties might be supposed to become a married couple. Subodhini and Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

For the woman cannot become a lawful wedded wife, being twice-married. Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

13. Therefore the offspring, &c. The child is not a legitimate son (aurṣa) of both parents; but is (kṣetra) son of the soil or wife, and appertains to the husband or owner of the soil, provided no agreement were made to this effect: "the offspring, here produced, shall belong to us both." But, if such a stipulation exist, he is son of both. Subodhini and Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

He is not legitimate son (aurṣa) of the natural father, but similar to a legitimate son; as will be made evident in the sequel. Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

* Vide Sect. 11, § 4. (a) See 1 Strange, H. L. 88.—Ed.
SECTION XI.

Sons by birth and by adoption.

1. A distribution of shares, among sons equal or unequal in class, has been explained. Next, intending to show the rule of succession among sons principal and secondary, the author previously describes them. "The legitimate son is one procreated on the lawful wedded wife. Equal to him is the son of an appointed daughter. The son of the wife is one begotten on a wife by a kinsman of her husband, or by some other relative. One, secretly produced in the house, is a son of hidden origin. A damsel's child is one born of an unmarried woman; he is considered as son of his maternal grand-sire. A child, begotten on a woman whose marriage had not been consummated, or on one who had been desflowered (before marriage), is called the son of a twice-married woman. He, whom his father or his mother give for adoption, shall be considered as a son given. A son bought is one who was sold by his father and mother. A son made is one adopted by man himself. One, who gives himself, is self-given. A child accepted, while yet in the womb, is one received with a bride. He, who is taken for adoption, having been forsaken by his parents, is a deserted son."

2. The issue of the breast (urus) is a legitimate son (aumasa).

2. Exposition of the text.

Legitimate son.

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1. Son of his maternal grand-sire.] In the numerous quotations of this passage, some read sajaki "son," others smrti "called," and others again matri "considered." The terms is not materially affected by these differences; as either term, being not expressed, must be understood.

2. A son, begotten on a woman of equal tribe.] In fact it is not to be so understood. For it contradicts the author's own doctrine, since he includes the Mardhava-sikha and others, born in the direct order of the tribes, among legitimate issue (§ 41.) They are not sons begotten on a woman of equal tribe: and, if issue by women of different tribes be not deemed legitimate, being considered as born of wives whom it was

* Yajnavalkya, 2, 129–133.
† Balam-bhata directs this to be supplied in conformity with passages of Vishnu (3, 2.) and Manu (9, 165.)

(r) See 1 Strange, H. L. 40.—Ed.
3. The son of an appointed daughter (putrīkā-putra) is equal to him; that is equal to the legitimate son. The term signifies son of a daughter. Accordingly he is equal to the legitimate son; as described by Vasishtha: “This damsel, who has no brother, I will give unto thee, decked with ornaments: the son, who may be born of her, shall be my son.” Or that term may signify a daughter becoming by special appointment a son. Still she is only similar to a legitimate son; for she derives more from the mother than from the father. Accordingly she is mentioned by Vasishtha as a son, but as third in rank: “The appointed daughter is considered to be the third description of sons.”

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not lawful to marry, then it might follow, that other persons would take the heritage, although such sons existed. Hence the mention of a wife equal by tribe intends only the preferableness of her or her offspring; and the restriction, that she be a lawful wife, excludes the Kṣetriya or issue of the soil, and the rest. Vīnumitraṇya.

The son by a woman of equal tribe, espoused in any of the irregular forms of marriage (Aśura, &c.) is a legitimate son; and the sons of a Brāhmaṇa, by wives espoused in the direct order of the classes (Kṣetriya, &c.), denominated the Muniśvakāna, the Ambashtiga, and the Pārśvya or Nikāla; and the sons of a Kshatriya by wives of the Vaiṣṇa or Cādā tribe, named the Mahishya and the Ugra; and the son of a Vaiṣṇa by a Cādā woman, called the Karna; are all legitimate sons. Vīṇguvāraḥṣa in the Madana-Parijāta.

By the term “lawful” is excluded a woman espoused by one to whom such marriage was not permitted: therefore the sons by women of superior tribe are not legitimate. [See 1 Mor. Dig. 510.—Ed.] and, for this purpose, the word “lawful” has been introduced into the text (§ 1.). A lawful wife for a man of a regenerate tribe is a woman of a regenerate tribe; and, for a Cādā man, a Cādā woman. [See R. & A. No. 45 of 1860, 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 478—Ed.] For want of a wife of preferable description, one analogous is allowed. Consequently it is not indispensable, that the wife be of the preferable description. Even a Cādā woman may be the wife of a regenerate man; and her issue is legitimate, as will be shown. Kilem-bhāya. [See 7 Mor. 1. A. Ca. 34.—Ed.]

3. Equal to the legitimate son. The daughter appointed to be a son, and the son of an appointed daughter, are either of them equal to the legitimate son. Vīṁguvāra in the Madana Parijāta.

Since the son of an appointed daughter is son of legitimate female issue, therefore he is equal to a legitimate son; but he is not literally a legitimate son, being one remoto distant. Vīṁguvāra in the Subodhini.

Or that term may signify, &c. If it may signify a daughter who becomes by appointment a son; that is, who is put in place of a son. Although she be legitimate, yet being female, she is merely equal to a son. Vīnumitraṇya.

“Equal to him,” equal to the legitimate son, is the putrīkā-putra or daughter appointed to be a son: for, since all the terms of the definition of a legitimate son, excepting sex, are applicable to her, she is similar to him. Aparāśya.

The Pūtrīkā-putra is of four descriptions. The first is the daughter appointed to be a son. She is so by a stipulation to that effect. The next is her son. He obtains of course the name of son of an appointed daughter, without any special compact. This distinction, however, occurs: he is not in place of a son, but in place of a son’s son, and is a daughter’s son. Accordingly he is described as a daughter’s son in the text of Čaṇkha and Jñākita: “An appointed daughter is like unto a son; as Paścimeśa has declared: her offspring is termed son of an appointed daughter; he offers funeral oblations to the maternal grandfathers and to the paternal grandfathers. There is no du.

Vasishtha, 17, 10. Vasishtha, 17, 14.
4. The son of two fathers (dv天mushāyāna) is inferior to the natural father's legitimate son, because he is produced in another's soil.

5. A child, begotten by another person, namely by a kinsman, or by a brother of the husband, is a wife's son (kshetraja).

6. The son of hidden origin (grāddhāja) is one secretly brought forth in the husband's house. By excluding the case of a child begotten by a man of inferior or superior tribe, this must be restricted to an instance where it

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ference between a son's son and a daughter's son in respect of benefits conferred. The third description of son of an appointed daughter is the child born of a daughter who was given in marriage with an express stipulation in this form: "The child, who shall be born of her, shall be mine for the purpose of performing my obsequies." He appertains to his maternal grandfather as an adopted son. The fourth is a child born of a daughter who was given in marriage with a stipulation in this form: "The child, who shall be born of her, shall perform the obsequies of both." He belongs, as a son, both to his natural grandfather and to his maternal grandfather. But, in the case where she was in thought selected for an appointed daughter, she is so without a compact, and merely by an act of the mind. Hemādri.

The son of the appointed daughter belongs in general only to the maternal grandfather: but by special compact, to the natural father also. Thus Yama says: "Let the son of an appointed daughter perform the obsequies of his maternal ancestors exclusively: but, if he succeed to the property of both, let him perform the obsequies of both." Accordingly this child also is denominated dv天mushāyāna or son of two fathers. Bālam-bhāṣṭra.

"The appointed daughter is the third description of sons."

For she, who has no brother, reverts to her male ancestors and obtains a renewed filiation." Vasisthāna.

The adopted daughter is counted by Vasisthāna as the third: not by Yājñavalkya. Subodhini.

Mitra-nigra reads second instead of third; against the authority of the institutes and of every compiler who has cited this passage.

5. Is inferior to the legitimate son. He is similar to the son of the body. Bālam-bhāṣṭra.

Is not the son of two fathers the offspring of his natural father? Is he then a legitimate son or one or other of the various descriptions of adoptive and secondary sons? Anticipating this question, the author says: "He is not different from him;" he is equal to a son of the body. Subodhini.

The commentary last cited reads avāśisthā: 'not different' instead of upaktīṣṭha: inferior.' Both readings are noticed by Bālam-bhāṣṭra.

5. A child, begotten by another person, is a wife's son.] There are two descriptions of kshetraja or wife's son; the first of them is son of both fathers (dvipatiṅka) the other is adopted son of the wife's husband. Virmabrodaya.

A son begotten, under a formal authority, by a kinsman being of equal class, or by another relative, is a wife's son. Yājñavalkya in the Madama-Pārijāta.

6. He must belong to the same tribe.] A child secretly conceived by a woman, in her husband's house, from a man of the same tribe, but concerning whom it is not certainly known who the individual was, is named a son of concealed origin. The ignorance as to the particular person must be the husband's, not the wife's: and the knowledge of his equality in tribe may be obtained through her; for surely she must

4 Vide Sect. 10.
5 Manu, 9. 127.
6 Manu, 9. 126.
8 Vasisthāna, 17. 15.
is not ascertained who is the father, but it is certain that he must belong to the same tribe.

7. A damsel's child (kātīma) is the offspring of an unmarried woman by a man of equal class (as restricted in the preceding instance): and he is son of his maternal grandfather, provided she be unmarried and abide in her father's house. But, if she be married, the child becomes son of her husband. So Manu intimates: "A son, whom a damsel conceives secretly in the house of her father, is considered as the son of her husband, and denominated a damsel's son, as being born of an unmarried woman." *

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know who he is. But, if she really do not know his tribe, having been secretly violated by a stranger [in a dark night,] then the child bears the name of a son of inidum origin, but is not so in his son as the one before described. Vīyatā in the Mahābhārata.

In such circumstances, the child must be abandoned, say others. Bildam-bhātīya.

Since the natural father is not known, the child belongs to the same tribe with his mother. But, if there be any suspicion, that he was begotten by a man of inferior tribe, he is condemned. Vasiṣṭhyā in the Śrīdharma-dhīmānīya.

A son, who is born of the wife, and concerning whom it is not certainly known who is the natural father, is adoptive son of the mother's husband, and called son of concealed origin. Being son of the adoptive father's own wife and begotten on her by another man, he is similar to the son of the wife, and therefore described after him. Aparājita.

7. By a man of equal class.] As the son before described must be one begotten by a man of like tribe, so must this son also be the offspring of a man of equal class. "Damsel" does not here signify unmarried only; for, even with that import, the term is frequently used in the sense of "unconnected with man." But it signifies a woman with whom a regular marriage has not been consummated. Bildambhātīya.

The meaning of the passage of the Māyikṣara is this: "Unmarried" signifies one, whose nuptials have not been consummated; "married," whose nuptials are begun. The suffix here implies an act begun and not past. For a child begotten by a particular slice in class, on a woman whose marriage is complete, is a son of concealed origin. Vīyatā in the Māyikṣara.

The child, born of an unmarried woman, is denominated son of a damsel; and is considered by Manu and the rest as son of his maternal grandfather. Being produced in a soil which in some measure appertains to him, namely his daughter, the child is similar to the son of concealed origin, and is therefore mentioned by Yājñavalkya next after him. Aparājita.

If the maternal grandfather have no male issue, then the damsel's son is deemed his son; if he have issue, then the child is son of the husband. If both be childless, he is adoptive son of both. Pārijitī in the Rāmāna and Yadvīd-vivaka.

If either of them be desistate of male issue, the child is his son; but, if both be so, the child is son of both. Bildam-bhātīya.

So Manu intimates.] The meaning of the passage cited from Manu is as follows: a young woman, berefted, but whose nuptials have not been completed; and who is consequently a maiden, since she is not yet become the wife of her intended husband: a son (we say) borne by such a damsel is denominated a damsel's child, and is considered as son of the bridegroom; that is, of the person by whom she is espoused. Accordingly the condition "in the house of her father" is pertinent as an explanatory phrase: for, after marriage, she inherits the house of her husband. Vīyatā in the Māyikṣara.

* Manu, 9. 172.  † Bildam-bhātīya.
8. The son of a woman twice-married is one begotten by a man of equal class, on a twice-married woman, whether the first marriage had or had not been consummated.

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8. Whether, &c.] Whether the marriage had or had not been consummated by the first husband, and whether she have been forsaken by her husband in his lifetime or be a widow. Such is the meaning. Accordingly Vishnu so declares: "He, whose a woman, either forsaken by her husband, or a widow, and again becoming a wife by her own choice, conceived [by a second husband,] is called the son of a woman twice-married." The child is son of the natural father: for the first husband's right to the woman is annulled by his death or relinquishment; and she has not been authorized to raise up issue to him; and she takes a second husband solely by her own choice. Bhām-bhāṣya.

There are two descriptions of twice-married women: the first is a woman whose marriage has not been consummated, but only contracted, and who is espoused by another man. The other is a woman who has been blemished by intercourse with a man, before marriage. The offspring of such a woman is (parmar-bhāva) son of a twice-married woman. Accordingly it is so expressed in the text. Viṣṇudhvaja.

"A woman, whose marriage had not been consummated, and who is again espoused, is a twice-married woman. So is she, who has had previous intercourse with another man, though she be not actually married a second time." Vishnu.

A child begotten "on a woman, whose [first] marriage had not been consummated;" on the wife of an impotent man or the like, whether she have become a widow or not; or on his own wife "who had been deflowered," who had been enjoyed by strangers, and who is taken back; and again espoused; the child (we say) begotten on such a woman, is called "son by a woman twice-married." The twice-married woman has been described in the first book [of Viṣṇuvalkya's Institutes.] Aparāraka.

"Whether a virgin or deflowered, who is again espoused with solemn rites, is a twice-married woman: but she, who deserts her husband and through lust co-habits with another man of the same tribe, is a self-guided woman." Viṣṇuvalkya.

There are two descriptions of women termed anyapārvā or previously connected with another: namely the parmarbhāva or women twice-married, and the svāmī or self-guided and unchaste woman. The twice-married woman also is of two descriptions; according as she has or has not been deflowered. She, who is not a virgin, is blemished by her intercourse with man before the nuptial ceremony: she, who is yet a virgin, is blemished by the repetition of the ceremony of marriage. But one, who deserts the husband of her youth, and through lust co-habits with another man of the same tribe, is a self-guided woman (svāmī.) Mitākṣarā.

A woman, who, having been married, whether she be yet a virgin or not, is again espoused in due form by her original husband or by another, is a twice-married woman. She is so described by Manus: "If she be still a virgin, or if she left her original husband and return to him, she may again perform the marriage ceremony with her second [or, in the latter case, her original] husband." and by Vasiṣṭha: "She, who, having deserted the husband to whom she was married in youth, and having co-habited with others, returns to his family, is a twice-married woman. Or she, who deserts a husband impotent, degraded, or insane, and marries another husband, or does so after the death of the first, is a twice-married woman." The repetition of the nuptial ceremony constitutes her a twice-married woman. But she, who leaves her husband and through desire co-habits, without marriage, with a man of the same tribe, is a self-guided woman. Aparāraka.

* Manus, 9. 175. Incorrectly cited as a passage of Vishnu. † Vishnu, 15. 8.—9.
‡ Viṣṇuvalkya, 1. 68. †† See Manus, 7. 162.
§ On Viṣṇuvalkya, 1. 68. † Mann, 9. 176. ⁶⁶ Vasiṣṭha, 17. 15.—19.
(a) See 1. Mani, Dig. 310.—Ed.
9. He, who is given by his mother with her husband's consent.

9. Son given, while her husband is absent, or incapable though described by present, or without his assent, after her husband's death, or who is given by his father, or by both, being of the same class with the person to whom he is given, becomes his given son (dattaka). So Manu declares: "He is called a son given (dattrama) whom his father or mother affectionately gives as a son.

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9. He, who is given by his mother with her husband's consent | Vasishtha says, "Let not a woman either give or accept a son, unless with the assent of her husband." He had before said: "Men, produced from virile seed and maternal blood, proceed from his father and his mother, as an effect from its cause. Therefore both his father and his mother have power to give, to sell, or to abandon their son." [\(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\)]

Concerning the mother's authority to give away her son, when she is a widow, see a subsequent note. In regard to a widow's power of adopting a son, there is much diversity of opinions. Vachaspati misres, who is followed by the Mathila school, maintains that neither a woman, nor a C Buddhadharma, can adopt a dattaka or a given son; because the prescribed ceremony (\(^{15}\)) includes a sacrifice, which they are incapable of performing. This difficulty may be obviated by admitting a substitute for the performance of that ceremony, and accordingly adoption by a widow, under an authority from her husband, is allowed by writers of the other schools of law. Nanda-pandita, however, in his treatise on adoption, restricts this to the case of a woman whose husband is living, since a widow cannot, he observes, have her husband's sanction to the acceptance of a son. On the other hand, Bali-an-bhatta contends, that a woman's right of adopting, as well as of selling, a son, is common to the widow and to the wife. This likewise is the opinion of the author of the Vyasa-bhrama-nayaka: but, while he admits, that a widow may adopt a son without her husband's previous authority, he requires, that she should have the express sanction of his kindred. Writers of the Sastra school, on the contrary, insist on a formal permission from the husband declared in his lifetime.

Being of the same class with the person to whom he is given, | Or being given to a person of the same class. The two readings, (savarnya in the dative, or savarnya in the nominative), both noticed by the commentator Bali-an-bhatta, give the same sense.

The adopted son must be of the same tribe with the giver or natural parent as well as with the adoptive parent, according to the remark of Aparshika cited with approbation by Nanda-pandita in his treatise on adoption.

Becomes his given son.] The son given (dattaka or dattrama) is of two sorts; 1st simple, 2d son of two fathers (dvaramushyaka). The first is one bestowed without any special compact; the last is one given under an agreement to this effect: "he shall belong to us both." Vyasa-bhrama mayaka.

"Whom his father or mother gives." Mathiladi reads and interprets "whom his father and mother give." (inserting the conjunctive particle cha instead of the disjunctive va.) Bali-an-bhatta condemns that reading; and infers from the disjunctive particle and dual number in the text, that three cases are intended; viz. 1st. The mother may give her son for adoption with her husband's consent, if he be absent or incapable; and without it, if he be dead or the distress be urgent. 2d. The father may give away his son without his wife's consent, if he be dead, or insane, or otherwise incapable; but, with her consent, if she reside in her own father's house. 3d. The father and mother may conjointly give away their son, if they be living together.

"Whom his father or mother affectionately gives."] Adverbially: not from aversion or intimidation. In the Vrata-khanda, the word is expressly stated to be used adverbially: but Bali-an-bhatta considers it as an epithet of the son to be adopted, and as implying, that the adoption is not to be made against his will or without his free consent.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\] Bali-an-bhatta.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\] Bali-an-bhatta.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\] Vasishtha, 15. 4.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\] Vasishtha, 10. 1 - 2. (a) See 7 Maa. I. A. Ca. 201. 4 Strange, H. L. 80. - \(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\).
being alike [by class,] and in a time of distress; confirming the gift with water."

10. Distress is requisite to justify a parent in giving away his offspring.

11. The person must not be an only son: so Vasishtha.

10. By specifying distress, it is intimated, that the son should not be given unless there be distress. This prohibition regards the giver [not the taker.][]

11. So an only son must not be given [nor accepted.] For Vasishtha ordains "Let no man give or accept an only son."§

12. Nor, though a numerous progeny exist, should an eldest son be given: for he chiefly fulfils the office of a son; as is shown by the following text: "By the eldest son, as soon as born, a man becomes the father of male issue."(a)]

12. Nor the eldest son: according to Māṇu.

13. The mode of accepting a son for adoption is propounded by Vasishtha: "A person, being about to adopt a son, should take an unremote kinsman or the near relation of a kinsman, having convened his kindred and an-

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"Being alike,"[8] This is interpreted by Medhatithi as signifying ‘alike, not by tribe, but by qualities suitable to the family: accordingly a Kshatriya, or a person of any other inferior class, may be the given son (dātaka) of a Bālam-bhāṭa. Bālam-bhāṭa and the author of the Mayāka enunciate this doctrine: since every other authority concurs in restricting adoption to the instance of a person of the same tribe.

10. By specifying distress. "Distress" is explained in Prakūya cited by Chandegvara, 'inability [of the natural father] to maintain his offspring;'(b) Nanda pandita, in his treatise on adoption, expands it as including the necessity for adoption arising from the want of issue. But Bālam-bhāṭa rejects this, and supports the other interpretation; explicating the term as signifying ‘famine or other calamity.’ This prohibition regards the giver.] If he give away his son, when in no distress, the blame attaches to him, not to the taker. Bālam-bhāṭa.

11. So an only son should not be given.] Nor should such a son be accepted. The blame attaches both to the giver and to the taker, if they do so. Bālam-bhāṭa.

"Let no man give or accept an only son."

"For he is [destined to continue the line of his ancestors." Such is the sequel of Vasishtha’s text. Bālam-bhāṭa.(c)

13. The mode of accepting a son ...... is propounded by Vasishtha.] Raghunandana, in the Udrāna-tātra, has quoted a passage from the Kahika-purāṇa, which with

(a) See 1 Strange, II. L. 61.—Ed.

(b) In Special Appeal No. 412 of 1868 (1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 54) the Madras High Court held that the adoption of an only son was, when made, valid according to Hindu law; and agreed with Sir T. Strange that "with regard to both these prohibitions respecting an eldest and an only son, where they most strictly apply, they are directory only; and an adoption of either, however blameless in the giver, would nevertheless to every legal purpose, be good; according to the maxims of the civil law prevailing, perhaps, on no code more than in that of the Hindus, fuitus etsi non cogat sed non detinet." See, too, cases noted in 1 Morl. Dig. 17.—Ed.

(c) As to the validity of the adoption of an eldest son, see Reg. Appeal No. 29 of 1853. Mad. Sādā Decr. of 1854 p. 31.—Ed.

described by Va- 
ounced his intention to the king(?) and having offered
nished offering with recitation of the holy words, in
the middle of his dwelling.

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the text of Vasishtha constitutes the grandeur of the line of succession, as received by his followers. They construe the passage as an unqualified prohibition of the adoption of a youth or child whose age exceeds five years and especially one whose initiation is advanced beyond the ceremony of tonsure. This is not included as a rule by writers in other schools of law; and the authenticity of the passage itself is contested by some, and particularly by the author of the Vyakhya handed down, who observes truly, that it is wanting in many copies of the Kālika-purāṇa. Gilchrist, allowing the text to be genuine, explain it in a sense more consonant to the general practice, which permits the adoption of a relative, if not of a stranger, more advanced both in age and in progress of initiation. The following version of the passage conforms with the interpretation of it given by Nanda Pratipit in the Daśottara-nilakṣṇa. "Some give him the rest, though sprung from the seed of another, yet being duly initiated by the adopter under his own family name, become sons of the adoptive parent." A son, having been regularly initiated under the family name of his [natural] father, like the ceremony of tonsure, does not become the son of another man. When both the ceremony of tonsure and other rites of initiation are performed by the adopter, under his own family name, then alone can sons be given and the rest be considered as brothers; they are termed slaves. After their fifth year, 1 the king, sons are not to be blessed. But, having taken a boy five years old, the adopter should first perform the sacrifice for male issue.

The puṣṭrisi or sacrifice for male issue, mentioned at the close of this passage, is a ceremony performed according to the instructions contained in the following text of the Veda: "He who is desirous of sons should offer to the prayer of male desiring, an oblation of roasted rice seated upon the northwest, and an oblation of three oblations of rice seated upon eleven pieces of sugar; Indra grants him progeny; Indra renders it old.

"An untended kṣemana or the near relation of a kṣemana." This very obscure passage, which is variously read and interpreted, is here translated, according to the elaborate gloss of Nanda Pāṇḍita in his treatise entitled Daśottara-nilakṣṇa. Yet the same writer in his commentary on Viṣṇu (16.11), citing this passage, gives the preference to another reading (aḍha-bhandavam sanakṣiśaḥ eka), which he expounds "one whose whole kin dwell in a near country, and one not connected by affinity." Which of these readings he has adopted in his commentary on the Mitaksara, is not ascertained. From a remark in the text (11.10), the author himself, Vījñāna-prabhā, appears to have read and understood it differently: "Should take, in the presence of his king, one whose kṣemana are not remote," for copies of the Mitaksara exhibit the reading aḍha-bhandavam bonding-samkṣiśaḥ eva. But the commentator Viśnu-bhaṭṭa seems to have read, as the Daśottara-nilakṣṇa, bonding-samkṣiśaḥ in the ascensive instead of the locative; though he explains the terms a little differently and transpose them: "should take a kṣemana nearly related (bonding-samkṣiśaḥ) as a brother's son or the like; but, on failure of such, one whose kṣemana are not remote (aḍha-bhandavam) that is, any other person, whose father and the rest of his relations abide in a near country and whose family and kin are commonly known." The authors of the Kālika-purāṇa and the Daśottara-nilakṣṇa read, like the scholars of Viṣṇu, aḍha-bhandavam samakṣiśaḥ eva, and thus interpret the passage. "Should take one whose kṣemana, namely his maternal uncle and the rest, are near, and whose name and tribe, with other particulars, can therefore be ascertained; or, for want of such kindred, even one whose good or bad qualities are not known, the one whose kṣemana are not at hand; for his name and family may be ascertained by other sufficient proofs.

"Announced his intention to the king." Rāja or king, strictly signifying the sovereign, is here restricted, according to the remark of Nanda Pratipit, to the chief of the town or village.
14. Explanation of the text. 14. An unremote kinsman.] Thus the adoption of one very distant by country and language, is forbidden.

15. The same cases applicable to adoption by purchase, &c.

15. The same [ceremonial of adoption"f] should be extended to the case of sons bought, self-given, and made [as well as that of a son deserted"f]: for parity of reasoning requires it.

16. The son bought (ktva) is one who was sold by his father and mother, or by either of them; excepting as before an described by only son or an eldest one, and supposing distress and equality of tribe. As for the text of Manu, ("He is called a son bought, whom a man, for the sake of having issue, purchases from his father and mother: whether the child be equal or unequal to him,"?) it must be interpreted "whether like or unlike in qualities;" not in class: for the author concludes by saying "This law is propounded by me, in regard to sons equal by class."§

17. The son made (kitrina) is one adopted by the person himself, who is desirous of male issue; being enticed by the show of money and land, and being an orphan without father or mother: for, if they be living, he is subject to their control.

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"In the middle of his dwelling,"]. The sequel of Vasiśṭha's text is as follows. "But, if doubt arise, let him set apart [without initiation and with a bare maintenance] like a śūdra, one whose kindred are remote. For it is declared [in the Veda] Many are saved by one.'&

15. The same ceremony.] Excepting the sacrifice or burnt offering. However, even that is to be performed in the adoption of a son self-given. Bālam-bhaṣa.

16. As for the text of Manu, &c.] Cālapīna, on the other hand, explains Yājñavalkya by Manu, and admits the inequality of tribe. "A child, sold by his father and mother, and received for adoption, is a son bought. He may be of dissimilar tribe: for the text of Manu expresses "equal or unequal."*" Cālapīna quotes the following discordant interpretations: "Equal," belonging to the same tribe; or, if that be not practicable, one unequal, or not appertaining to the same tribe. So the Pārijāta."** But the author of the Pārijāta observes, Though the text express "unequal," yct a child of a superior tribe must not be taken as a son, by a man of inferior tribe; nor one of inferior class, by a son of a higher tribe. And the words "equal or unequal," as interpreted by Madhārka, are relative to similarity in respect of qualities."††

17. The son made.] One berth of father and mother and belonging to the same tribe with the adopter, and by him adopted, being enticed to acquiesce by the show of wealth, is a son made by adoption. Viṣṇeśvara in the Madana-Pārijāta.

The form, to be observed, is this. At an auspicious time, the adopter of a son, having bathed, addressing the person to be adopted, who has also bathed, and to whom he has given some agreeable words, says "Be my son." He replies "I am become thy son." The giving of some chattel to him arises merely from custom. It is not necessary to the adoption. The consent of both parties is the only requisite; and a set form a speech is not essential. Bṛhadāraṇya in the Čuddādviveka(β).

* Sabhagītā. † Bālam-bhaṣa. ‡ Manu, 9, 174. § Yājñavalkya, 2, 134. Vide § 37.

|| Vasiśṭha, 15, 6-7. ** Dipaśākā on Yājñavalkya.

†† Virāda Renukāra.

(β) See 2. Man. Dig. 22.—eβ (e.) See 1 Man. Dig. 22.—eβ.
19. The son received with a bride, is a child, who, being in the womb, is conceived when a pregnant bride is espoused. He becomes son of the bridegroom.

20. A son deserted (apavirāja) is one, who, having been discarded by his father and mother, is taken for adoption. He is son of the taker. Here, as in every other instance, he must be of the same tribe with the adoptive father.

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18. The son self-given. He, who, unsolicited, gives himself saying "let me become thy son," is called a son self-given (svayamātman). Apavirāja.

Here also it is requisite, that he belongs to the same tribe with his adoptive father. Vīryavāna in the Mahāna-Pārījata.

"He who has lost his parents, or been abandoned by them without cause, and offers himself to a man as his son, is called a son self-given." Māma.

Being abandoned by his father and mother without any sufficient cause, such as degradation from class or the like: but merely inability to maintain him during a dearth, or for a similar reason. Yvamitrodāyā.

19. The son received with a bride.] If a woman be married while pregnant, the child born of that pregnancy is a son received with a bride (sahāraja) provided the child were begotten by a man of equal class. Vīryavāna in the Mahāna-Pārījata.

He is distinguished from the son of an unmarried damsel, because the conception preceded the betrothing of the mother; and from the son of concealed origin, because the natural father is known. Then what difference is there: for the son of the unmarried damsel was conceived before birth or birth ? True: yet there is a great difference, since one is born before marriage, and the other after marriage. This son received with a bride is a son of him who takes the hand of the pregnant woman in marriage; for the maternal grandfather's right is divested by his giving away the child with the mother. Nāmant Pañjita in the Vaiṣṇavaṇī on Vishnu.

Since the bridegroom is specified as the adoptive father, the child does not belong to his natural father. Although the religious ceremony of marriage do not take place in the case of a pregnant woman, since a text of law restricts the prayers of the marriage ceremony to the murtis of virgins, and forbids their use in the instance of women who are not virgins, as a practice which has become obsolete among mankind; and it would be inconsistent with a passage of the Veda [heard at the initial ceremony as a prayer] expressing "the virgin worships the garments in the form of fire," nevertheless the term "marry" [in the text of Māma] means a religious ceremony different from that but consisting of burnt offerings, and worship according to the remark of the Ratnakarṇa and the rest. Vachaspādīnāya in the Īśānaṇa Īcchāhṛtāni.

20. Discarded. Abandoned: not for any fault, but through inability to rear him, or because he was born under the influence of the moon in the snake's tail, or for any similar reason. Bīla-mahāya.
21. Order in which these different sons succeed to an inheritance as declared by Yājarāvalkya.

22. Of these twelve sons above-mentioned, on failure of the first, respectively, the next in order, as enumerated, must be considered to be the giver of the funeral oblation or performer of obsequies, and taker of a share or successor to the effects.

23. If there be a legitimate son and an appointed daughter, Mānu propounds an exception to the seeming right of the legitimate son to take the whole estate: “A daughter having been appointed, if a son be afterwards born, the division of the heritage must in that case be equal: since there is no right of primogeniture for the woman.”

24. So also the allotment of a quarter share to other inferior sons, when a superior one exists, has been ordained by Vāsiṣṭha: “When a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards born, the given son shares a fourth part.”

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Since that, of which there is no owner, is appropriated by seizure or occupation the child becomes son of him, by whom he is taken.” Nanda Pundita in the Vaiṣṇava on Vīṣṇu. 15. 25.

22. Of these twelve sons.] The various modes of adoption, added to the legitimate son by birth, raise the number of descriptions of sons to twelve, according to most authorities. That number is expressly affirmed by Mānu, 6 Nāradī, 6 Vāsiṣṭha, 6 Vīṣṇu, 85. 6. A passage is however quoted from Dvaraka, assigning the number of fifteen (“The descriptions of sons are ten and five,”) and Vīśvanātha is cited as alleging the authority of Mānu for thirteen: “Of the thirteen sons, who have been enumerated by Mānu in their order, the legitimate son and appointed daughter (the aticle is dropped) are the cause of lineage. As it is declared to be a substitute for liquid butter, so are eleven sons by adoption substituted for the legitimate son and appointed daughter.” Nanda Pundita, in his commentary on Vīṣṇu, observes, that “the number of thirteen specified by Vīśvanātha, and that of fifteen by Dvaraka, intend sub-divisions of the species, not distinct kinds; consequently there is no contradiction, for those sub-divisions are also included in the enumeration of twelve.” It appears, however, from a comparison of texts specifying the various descriptions of sons, that the exact number (as indeed is acknowledged by numerous commentators and compilers) is thirteen; including the son by a Gudr woman. Vide 8 3b.

23. If there be a son and an appointed daughter.] So this passage is interpreted by the commentators Vaiṣṇava and Bālāk-bhaṭṭa. The original is, however, ambiguous and might be explained “if there be a legitimate son and a son of an appointed daughter.” Bālāk-bhaṭṭa remarks, that this can only happen where a legitimate son is born after the appointment of a daughter.

24. So the allotment of a quarter share.] As the appointed daughter participates where there is a legitimate son: so do other sons likewise partake. Subobliant.

* Yājarāvalkya, 2. 423. † Mānu, 9. 154. ‡ Vāsiṣṭha, 15. 8. § Mānu, 9. 158.
|| Nāradī, 13. 44. ¶ Vāsiṣṭha, 17. 11. 
\[ \text{Vīṣṇu, } 15. 1. \]

(1) See J. Strange, 8. L. 74.—Ed.
intended for an indication of others also, as the son bought, son made by adoption, and [son self-given* and] the rest; for they are equally adopted as sons.

25. Kātyāyana allots to them the same portion; provided they be of equal class; else, food and raiment only.

26. The son of the wife, and sons given, bought, made, self-given and discarded, are of equal class; the damsel's son, the son of concealed origin, son of a pregnant bride, and son of a twice-married woman, are of inferior rank.

27. "Those who belong to the same tribe," as the son of the wife, the son given and the rest [namely the sons bought, made, self-given and discarded, †] share a fourth part, if there be a true legitimate son; but those who belong to a different class, as the damsel's son, the son of concealed origin, the son of a pregnant bride, and the son by a twice-married woman, do not take a fourth part, if there be a legitimate son; but they are entitled to food and raiment only.(a)

28. "Exceptionable sons, as the son of an unmarried damsel, a son of concealed origin, one received with a bride, and a son by a twice-married woman, share neither the funeral oblation, nor the estate." This passage of Vīśnusūtra merely denies the right of those sons to a quarter share, if there be legitimate issue: but, if there be no legitimate son or other preferable claimant, even the child of an unmarried woman and the rest of the adoptive sons may succeed to the whole paternal estate, under the text before cited (§ 21.)

29. Manu allots to adopted sons, a mere maintenance.

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The mention of a son given. This is according to the reading of the text as here cited and in the Vīrmitrodāya and Kāṇḍākara's Vīvada-Tāndava. But, in the Kāṇḍānara, Rāmākara, Chintāmani, &c., that restrictive term is wanting: Sa chatuntha-bhāga-bhāga syat, instead of Chatuntha-bhāga-bhāga syad cattakah.


28. Applicable to a case where adopted son (namely the son given, &c.) are disobedient. It also relates to the damsel's son and the rest; for they are declared entitled to food and raiment only, if there be legitimate issue; and that must be supposed to be founded on the same authority with this text; but Manu has himself pronounced a fifth or a sixth part for the son of the wife, if there be legitimate issue.|| Vīrmitrodāya.

* Bhāma-bhāga.
† Subodhīndra and Pārijāta.
‡ It is not found in the Institutes of Vīśnusūtra; but is cited from that author in the Madana-Pārijāta and Vīrmitrodāya, as in this place.
§ Manu, 9. 163.
|| Vide § 29.
a. See J. Strange, II. 1. 94.—ED.
Manu must be considered as applicable to a case, where the adopted sons (namely the son given and the rest) are disobedient to the legitimate son and devoid of good qualities.

29. Here a special rule [different from Kātyāyana’s*] is pronounced by the same author (Manu) respecting the son of the wife: ‘Let the legitimate son, when dividing the paternal heritage give a sixth part, or a fifth, of the patrimony to the son of the wife.’† The cases must be thus discriminated: if disobedience and want of good qualities be united, then a sixth part should be allotted. But, if one only of those defects exist, a fifth part.

30. Manu, having premised two sets of six sons declares the first six to be heirs and kinsmen; and the last to be not heirs but kinsmen: ‘The true legitimate issue, the son of a wife, a son given, and one made by adoption, (c) a son of concealed origin, and one rejected [by his parents], are the six heirs and kinsmen. The son of an unmarried woman, the son of a pregnant bride, a son bought, a son by a twice-married woman, a son self-given, and a son by a Çùdrā woman, are six not heirs but kinsmen.’‡

31. That must be expounded as signifying, that the first six may take the heritage of their father’s collateral kinsmen (sāpipiḍas and samānodiṣkās) if there be no nearer heir; but not so the last six. However, consanguinity and the performance of the duty of offering libations of water and so forth, on account of relationship near or remote, belong to both alike.

32. It must be so expounded; for the mention of a given son in the following passage is intended for any adopted or succeedaneous son. “A given son must never claim the family and estate of his natural father(b).’ The funeral

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31. The first six may take the heritage of collateral kinsmen: ..... not so the last six.] The sense of the two passages is, that, if there be no nearer collateral kinsman, the first six inherit the property; but not the six last. Subodhini.

However, consanguinity, &c.] Medhatithi interprets the text of Manu as signifying that the last six are neither heirs nor kinsmen. But that interpretation is assured by Kulluka-bhaṭa; and is supposed by the commentator on the Mitākṣara to be here purposely confused.

32. The mention of a given son is intended for any adopted son.] The meaning, as here expressed, is this: the mention of a son given is in this place intended to denote any succeedaneous son. Consequently, since it appears from the text, that adopted sons have a right of inheritance; but, according to the opponent’s opinion, it appears from another passage, that they have not a right of succession; it might be concluded from such a contradiction, that the precepts have no authority: therefore, lest the text become futile, the interpretation, proposed by us, is to be preferred. Subodhini.

* Bālam-bhaṭa. † Manu, 9, 164. ‡ Manu, 9, 169—169.

(a) See 1 Strange, H. L. 98 : 1 Morl. Dig. 308—Ed.

(b) So held in Srīniśa Ayyangār v. Kṛpa Ayyangār, 1 Mad. H. C. 160, and see 2 Strange, H. L. 124, 126 : 1 Morl. Dig. 28, 24, 307 308.—Ed.
oblation follows the family and estate: but of him, who has given away his son, the obsequies fail."

33. All, without exception, have a right of inheriting their father's estate, for want of a preferable son: since a subsequent passage ("Not brothers, nor parents, but sons, are heirs to the estate of the father,"† purposely affirms the succession of all subsidiary sons other than the true legitimate issue; and the right of the legitimate son is propounded by a separate text ("The legitimate son is the sole heir of his father's estate,"‡) and the word "heir" (dāyada) is frequently used to signify any successor other than a son.

34. Differences in the order of enumeration reconciled: as found in Vāsiṣṭha, &c.

34. The variation which occurs in the institutes of Vāsiṣṭha and the rest, respecting some one in both sets, must be understood as founded on the difference of good and bad qualities.

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Of him, who has given away his son, the obsequies fail.] This must be understood of the case where the giver has other male issue. "Subodhinī.

But, if he have not, then even that son is competent to inherit his estate and to perform his obsequies; like the son of two fathers (See, 10 § 1): for a passage of Čāntapa directs "Let the given son present oblations to his adoptive parent and to his natural father, on the anniversary of decease, and at Gayā, and on other occasions; not, however, if there be other male issue." This indeed can only occur where the natural father is bereft of issue after giving away his son: since, at the time of the gift, it is forbidden to part with an only son (§ 11.) In this manner is to be understood the circumstance of a given son, as son of two fathers, conferring benefits on both. Bālāmbhunā.

If either the natural parent or the adoptive father have no other male issue, the dvyāmūdayāṇa or son of two fathers shall present the funeral oblation to him and shall take his estate: but not so, if there be male issue. If both have legitimate sons, he offers an oblation to neither, but takes the quarter of a share allotted to a legitimate son of his adoptive father. Vyavahāra-māvyākha.

33. The word "heir" is frequently used.] An instance is cited in the text. It is part of a passage, of which the sequel has not been found. The words are "let him compel the heirs to pay."

34. The variation, which occurs in Vāsiṣṭha, &c.] Mann, declaring the appointed daughter equal to the legitimate son, includes her under legitimate issue,§ and proceeds to define the remaining ten súdheébanus sons. | But Vāsiṣṭha states the appointed daughter as third in rank:¶ which is a disagreement in the order of enumeration. The same must be understood of other institutes of law,∥∥∥ which are here omitted for fear of prolixity. How then is the succession of the next in order on failure of the preceding reconcilable? The author proposes this difficulty with its solution. His notion of the mode of reconciling it is this: Mann, declaring that the first set of six sons by birth or adoption is competent to inherit from collateral kinmen on failure of nearer heirs, but not so the second set, afterwards proceeds to deliver incidentally definitions of those various sons. It appears therefore to be a loose enumeration, and not one arranged with precision. Accordingly Mann, in saying "Let the inferior in order take

* Mann, 9. 143.
† Mann, 9. 185.
‡ Vide § 28.
§ Mann, 9. 155.
¶ Mann, 9. 163—178.
∥∥∥ Vāsiṣṭha, 17. 14.
35. But the assignment of the tenth place to the son of an appointed daughter, in Gautama's text, is relative to one differing in tribe.

36. The following passage of Manu, "If, among several brothers of the whole blood, one have a son born, Manu pronounces them all fathers of male issue by means of that son;" is intended to forbid the adoption of others if a brother's son can possibly be adopted. It is inconsistent with the subsequent text: "brothers likewise and their sons, gentiles, cognates, &c." 

37. The foregoing rules of limitation are restricted to persons of the same tribe.

38. Not being applicable when the rank differs.

39. Some adoptive sons are however included.

39. Here the damsel's son, the son of hidden origin, the son received with a bride, and a son by a twice-married woman, are deemed of like class, through their

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the heritage, does not limit this very order, but intends one different in some respects; and the difference is relative to good and bad qualities. The same method must be used with the variations in other codes. Moreover, what is ordained by Yajnavalkya is consistent with propriety. For the true legitimate son and the son of an appointed daughter are both legitimate issue and consequently equal. The son of the wife, a son of hidden origin, the son of an unmarried damsel, and a son by a twice-married woman, being produced from the seed of the adoptive father or from a self-appertaining to him, have the preference before the son given and the rest. The son received with a bride, being produced from self which the adoptive father accepts for his own, is placed in the second set by the authority of the text [or because the mother did not appertain to the adoptive father at the time when the child was begotten]. The whole is therefore unexceptionable. Subodhikrt.

36. That is inconsistent with the subsequent text. It is incompatible with a passage of Yajnavalkya declaratory of the nephew's right of succession after brothers. For, if he be deemed a son, because all the brethren are pronounced fathers of male issue by means of the son of a brother, he ought to inherit before all other heirs, such as the father and the rest [who are in that passage preferred to him]. Subodhikrt.

The principle of giving a preference to the nephew, as the nearest kinsman, in the selection of a person to be adopted, is carried much further by Nanda pañjika in the Dattaka-mahâsukta: and, according to the doctrine there laid down, the choice should fall on the next nearest relation, if there be no brother's son; and on a distant relation, in default of near kindred: but on a stranger, only upon failure of all kin. See § 14.

30. They are not within the definition of tribe. For Yajnavalkya, having described the origin and distinctions of the tribes and classes, [viz. the Mardhâvasikta

2 Manu, 9. 182.  

† Yajnavalkya, 2. 184.  
§ Manu, 9. 184.  
‖ Bhârani-bhatta.

(a) See 1 Strange, H. L. 84. 1 Morl. Dig. 18.—Ed.
though not within the definition of tribe.

natural father, but not in their own characters: for they are not within the definition of tribe and class.

40. Since

40. Legitimate issue, of a mixed class, inherits before adoptive sons.

issue, procreated in the direct order of the tribes, as the Mārdhāvāsikta and the rest, are comprehended under legitimate issue, it must be understood, that, on failure of these also, the right of inheritance devolves on the son of the wife and the rest.

41. But

the son by a Čudrā wife, though legitimate, does not take the whole estate, even on failure of other issue. Thus Manu says, "But, whether the man have sons, or have no sons, [by his wives of other classes,] no more than a tenth part must be given to the son of the Čudrā."

42. "Whether he have sons," whether he have male issue of a regenerate tribe; "or have no sons," or have no issue of such a tribe; in either case, upon his demise, the son of the wife or other [adoptive son,] or any other kinman [and heir,] shall give to the Čudrā's son, no more than a tenth part of the father's estate.

43. The son of the Kshatriya or Vaïṣya wife inherits in default of issue by a Brahmana.

43. Hence it appears, that the son of a Kshatriya or Vaïṣya wife takes the whole of the property on failure of issue by women of equal class.

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Ambushtha, Nishadha, Mābhishya, Ugra and Karana:] adds "This rule concerns the children of women lawfully married.† Vyāmśitadiśya(b).

Since these, (viz. the damsel's son and the rest) are bastards; born either in fornication or adultery, their exclusion from class, tribe, &c. has been ordained in the first book on religious observances. Subodhūśa.

41. No more than a tenth part.] Is not this wrong? for it has been declared, that the Čudrā's son shall take a share in a distribution among sons of various tribes (Sect. 8. § 1); but it is here directed, that he shall have a tenth part. No: for the four shares of the Bhārata's son, with three for the Kshatriya's child, make seven; and, with two for the Vaïṣya's offspring, make nine: adding that to one for the Čudrā's son, the sum is ten. Thus there is no contradiction; for, in that instance also, his participation for a tenth part is ordained: and the whole is unexceptionable. Subodhūśa.

42. Hence it appears.] It so appears from the text of Manu above cited (§ 41) Bālam-bhāṣa.

(b) The son of a Brahmana by a Kshatriya is a mārdhāvāsikta or mārdhādāśaparigraphikta by a Vaïṣya is an ambushtha or vaïṣya, and by a Čudrā, is a Nishadha or pāragvā. The son of a Kshatriya by a Vaïṣya is a Mābhishya, by a Čudrā is an ugra. A karana is the son of a Vaïṣya by a Čudrā. See Manu, x. 8, 9: Jājñavalkya, i, 31, 32.—Ed.

* Manu, 9. 154.
† Jājñavalkya, i. 33.
SECTION XII.

Rights of a son by a female slave, in the case of a Cādru’s estate.

1. The author next delivers a special rule concerning the partition of a Cādru’s goods. “Even a son begotten by a Cādru on a female slave, may take a share by the father’s choice. But, if the father be dead, the brethren should make him partaker of the moiety of a share; and one, who has no brothers, may inherit the whole property, in default of daughter’s sons.”

2. The son, begotten by a Cādru on a female slave, obtains a share by the father’s choice, or at his pleasure. But, after the demise of the father, if there be sons of a wedded wife, let these brothers allow the son of the female slave to participate for half a share: that is, let them give him half [as much as is the amount of one brother’s allotment. However, should there be no sons of a wedded wife, the son of the female slave takes the whole estate, provided there be no daughters of a wife, nor sons of daughters. But, if there be such, the son of the female slave participates for half a share only.

3. From the mention of a Cādru in this place, [it follows, that] the son begotten by a man of a regenerable tribe on a female slave, does not obtain a share even by the father’s choice, nor the whole estate after his demise. But, if he be docile, he receives a simple maintenance.

ANNOTATIONS.

1. "In default of daughter’s sons." Some interpret this on failure of daughters, and in default of their sons. Bālam-bhāṭṭa.

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 134—135. † Bālam-bhāṭṭa. ‡ Subodhini and Bālam-bhāṭṭa.
(a) See 1 Morl. Dig. 310: 7 Mon. I. A. Ca. 35, 37, 49.—Ed.
(b) See 1 Strange, H. L. 70: 9 Ibid. 65, 70, 71; 1 Morl. Dig. 438.—Ed.
Chapter II.

Section I.

Right of the widow to inherit the estate of one who leaves no male issue.

1. The subject of collateral succession is next considered.

1. That sons, principal and secondary, take the heritage, has been shown. The order of succession among all [tribes and classes*] on failure of them, is next declared.

2. "The wife, and the daughters also, both parents, brothers likewise, and their sons, gentiles, cognates, a pupil, and a fellow student: on failure of the first among these, the next in order is indeed heir to the estate of one, who departed for heaven leaving no male issue. This rule extends to all [persons and†] classes."(a);

3. Interpretation of it.

The heir of a person, who leaves no male issue, is the first in succession, according to the enumeration in the text.

3. He, who has no son of any among the twelve descriptions above-stated (C. I. Sect. 11.) is one having 'no male issue.' Of a man, thus leaving no male progeny, and going to heaven, or departing for another world, the heir, or successor, is that person, among such as have been here enumerated, (viz. the wife and the rest,) who is next in order, on failure of the first mentioned respectively. Such is the construction of the sentence.

4. This rule, or order of succession, in the taking of an inheritance, must be understood as extending to all tribes, whether the Mûrdhâvasikta and others in the direct series of the classes, or Sûta and the rest in the inverse order; and as comprehending the several classes, the sacerdotal and the rest.

Annotations.

2. "Brothers likewise."] This is understood by Bâlam-bhatta as signifying both brothers and sisters.

"And their sons."] Bâlam-bhatta understands the daughters of brothers, as well as their sons.

3. Such is the construction of the sentence.] The commentator Bâlam-bhatta disapproves the reading which is here followed. The difference is, however, immaterial.

* Subodhini. † Subodhini, &c. ‡ Yâjñavalkya, 2. 136—137.
(a) See 1 Med. Dig. 319; 1 Mon. I. A. Ca. 132.—Ed.
5. In the first place, the wife shares the estate. "Wife" (patnī) signifies a woman espoused in lawful wedlock; conformably with the etymology of the term as implying a connexion with religious rites (a).

6. Vṛddha-Manu also declares the widow's right to the whole estate. "The widow of a childless man, keeping unsullied her husband's bed, and persevering in religious observances, shall present his funeral oblation and obtain [his] entire share."* Vṛhad-Vishnū likewise ordains it: "The wealth of him, who leaves no male issue, goes to his wife; on failure of her, it devolves on daughters; if there be none, it belongs to the father; if he be dead, it appertains to the mother."† So does Kātyāyana: "Let the widow succeed to her husband's wealth, provided she be chaste; and, in default of her, the daughter inherits if unmarried."‡ And again, in another place: "The widow, being a woman of honest family, or the daughters, or on failure of them the father, or the mother, or the brother, or his sons, are pronounced to be the heirs of one who leaves no male issue."§ Also, Vṛhaspatī: "Let the wife of a deceased man, who left no male issue, take his share, notwithstanding kinsmen, a father, a mother, or uterine brethren, be present."

ANNOTATIONS.

5. Conformably with the etymology.] A rule of grammar is cited in the text: viz. Pāṇini, 4. 1. 35.

The author of the Subodhāni remarks, that the meaning of the grammatical rule cited from Pāṇini is this: Patnī 'wife' analogously derived from Patī 'husband,' is employed when connexion with religious rites is indicated: for they are accomplished by her means, and the consequence accrues to him. The purport is, that a woman, lawfully wedded, and no other, accomplishes religious ceremonies: and therefore one espoused in lawful marriage is exclusively called a wife (patnī). Although younger wives are not competent to assist at sacrifices or other religious rites, if an eldest wife exist, who is not disqualified; still, since the rest become competent in their turns, on failure of her, or even during her life, if she be afflicted with a lasting malady or be degraded for misconduct, they possess a capacity for the performance of religious ceremonies: and here such capacity only is intended. Or else marriage may be exclusively meant by religious rites: for offerings are made to deities at that ceremony; and such also is a sacrifice or solemn rite. Thus likewise, a woman lawfully espoused, and no other, is a wife (patnī.)

* See a note on this passage in Jīmūta-vāhana, Ch. 11, Sect. 1. § 7.
† Vishnū, 17. 4—7.
‡ Vide infra, Sect. 2. § 2.
§ In the Vīmāntrātās, this is cited as the text of a different author; but the commentator on the Māthārakā treats it as a further passage from the author before cited.
(a) See 1 Morl. Dig. 312: 1 Strā. 57.—Ed.
(b) When A had two wives, B and C, and B predeceased A, leaving three daughters, and C survived A and was childless, it was held by the Madras High Court that C succeeded to A's property in preference to the three daughters, Padminī v. Venkata-rāmāyu, 1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 223.—Ed.
7. Passages adverse to the widow’s claim, likewise occur. Thus Nārada has stated the succession of brothers, though a wife be living; and has directed the assignment of a maintenance only to widows. “Among brothers, if any one die without issue, or enter a religious order, let the rest of the brethren divide his wealth, except the wife’s separate property. Let them allow a maintenance to his women for life, provided these preserve unsullied the bed of their lord.” But, if they behave otherwise, the brethren may resume that allowance.”* Mann propounds the succession of the father, or of the brother, to the estate of one who has no male offspring: “Of him, who leaves no son, the father shall take the inheritance, or the brothers.”† He likewise states the mother’s right to the succession, as well as the paternal grandmother’s: “Of a son dying childless, the mother shall take the estate: and, the mother also being dead, the father’s mother shall take the heritage.”‡ Caukhya also declares the successive rights of brothers, and of both parents, and lastly of the eldest wife: “The wealth of a man, who departs for heaven, leaving no male issue, goes to his brothers. If there be none, his father and mother take it: or his eldest wife.” Katyāyana too says, “If a man die separate from his co-heirs, let his father take the property on failure of male issue; or successively the brother, or the mother, or the father’s mother.”

8. The application of these and other contradictory passages is thus explained by Dhāreṇavara: “The rule, deduced from the texts [of Yājñavalkya, &c.], that the wife shall take the estate, regards the widow of a separated brother: and that, provided she be solicitous of authority for raising up issue to her husband." Whence is

ANNOTATIONS.

8. And other contradictory passages.] Alluding to the texts of Gaṅgānātha and Devaṅa subsequently quoted. Bhāṣā-bhūya.

The rule deduced from the texts.] From those of Yājñavalkya (§ 2.), Vṛddha-Maṇḍū, Vishṇu, Katyāyana and Vṛṣṇapati (§ 6.) Subodhītī, &c.

“If she seek......offspring.” The particle (vā) is understood by the author, by whom the passage is here cited, in the conditional sense, as appears from the interpretation of the text in the next paragraph (§ 9.); according to the remark of the commentators on the Mitākṣarā. But the scholiast of Gaṅgānātha takes it in its usual disjunctive sense: and the text is differently interpreted by the author of the Mitākṣarā himself (§ 14.)

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† Mana, 9. 185. Vide Sect. 4. § 1.
‡ Maṇḍū, 9. 317. Vide Sect. 4. § 2. and Sect. 5. § 2.
§ Subodhītī.
(a) See I Mar. Dig. 316. 2 Ib. 116.—Ed.
(b) See infra. §§ 20, 28. 2 Str. H. L. 297, 310.—Ed.
(c) See infra. §§ 20, 28. 2 Str. H. L. 297, 310.—Ed.

(a) In Purāṇopavanak Udyogān v. Ardhanāri Udyogān the Madras High Court held that on the death of an unindicted Hindu without leaving male issue his property, unless previously disposed of, devolved on his surviving co-parceners, and that his widow was only entitled to maintenance (1 Mad. H. C. Rep. 412). But see the judgment of the P. C. in Katākā Nāvēlkar v. The Rajah of Shivapungya 30th Nov. 1863.—Ed.
The rule for the widow's succession concerns the widow of a separated brother seeking to raise up offspring to him. This is confirmed by Gautama.

It inferred, that a widow succeeds to the estate, provided she seek permission for raising up issue, but not independently of this consideration. From the text above cited, "Of him, who leaves no son, the father shall take the inheritance," and other similar passages [as Nárada's, &c.†] For here a rule of adjustment and a reason for it must be sought; but there is none other. Besides it is confirmed by a passage of Gautama: "Let kinsmen allied by the funeral oblation, by family name, and by descent from the same patriarch, share the heritage; or the widow of a childless man, if she seek to raise up offspring to him."‡

9. The meaning of the text is this: person, connected by a common oblation, by race, or by descent from a patriarch, share the effects of one who leaves no issue; or his widow takes the estate, provided she seek progeny.

10. Manu likewise shows by the following passage, that, when a brother dies possessed of separate property, the wife's claim to the effects is in right of progeny, and not in any other manner. "He, who keeps the estate of his brother and maintains the widow, must, if he raise up issue to his brother, deliver the estate to the son."§

So, in the case of undivided property likewise, the same author says, "Should a younger brother have begotten a son on the wife of his elder brother, the division must then be made equally: thus is the law settled."||

11. Vasishṭha also hints, that the widow's succession is in contemplation of her issue.

12. Else she has a maintenance only; according to Nárada.

But, if authority for that purpose have not been received, the widow is entitled to a maintenance only; by the text of Nárada: "Let them allow a maintenance to his women for life."***

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10. "Must ...... deliver the estate to the son."§§ It is thus shown, that a separated brother is meant; else, if there had been no partition, he could not have separate property. In the text subsequently cited, it appears from the direction for making the division equally, that the case of an unseparated co-heir is intended. Since there could be no partition, if he were already separated. Subodhini.

11. The widow's succession is in right of such an appointment. A widow, who has ascended authority for raising up issue to her husband, has the right of succession to his estate; but no other widow has so. Vraamcitrodaya.

† Bálam-ūkṣa.
§ Manu, 9. 140. || Manu, 9. 130.
¶ Vasishṭha, 17. 48.
** Nárada, 13. 28. Vide supra. § 7.
13. The same (it is pretended) will be subsequently declared by the contemplative saint: "And their childless wives, conducting themselves aright, must be supported; but such, as are unchaste, should be expelled; and so, indeed, should those, who are perverse." *

14. Moreover, since the wealth of a regenerate man, is designed for religious uses, the succession of women to such property is unfit; because they are not competent to the performance of religious rites. (a) Accordingly, it has been declared by some author, "Wealth was produced for the sake of solemn sacrifices: and they, who are incompetent to the celebration of those rites, do not participate in the property, but are all entitled to food and raiment." "Riches were ordained for sacrifices. Therefore they should be allotted to persons who are concerned with religious duties; and not be assigned to women, to fools, and to people neglectful of holy obligations." 

15. That is wrong: for authority to raise up issue to the husband is neither specified in the text, ("The wife and the daughters also, &c." 4) nor is it suggested by the premises. Besides, it may be here asked; is the appointment to raise up issue a reason for the widow’s succession to the property? or is the issue, borne by her, the cause of her succession? If the appointment alone be the reason, it follows, that she has a right to the estate, without having borne a son; and the right of the son subsequently produced [by means of the appointment] does not ensue. But, if the offspring be the sole cause [of her claim, §] the wife should not be recited as a successor: since, in that case, the son alone has a right to the goods.

16. But, it is said, women have a title to property, either through the husband, or through the son, and not otherwise. That is wrong: for it is inconsistent with the following text and other similar passages. "What was

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13. The same (it is pretended) will be declared.] Here the particle kila indicates disapprobation; as in the example ‘Ah! wilt thou [ presume to] fight.’ For this passage of Yajnavalkya will be expounded in a different sense. So the expression ‘by some author’ (§ 14.) is intended as an indication of disrespect. Hence the insertion of the passage so cited, in this argument, does not imply an acknowledgment of it as original and genuine. Subodhini.

14. It has been declared by some author.] The passage here cited is not considered as authentic; and no authority is shown for that and the following text. Balam-bhatṭa.

15. And the right of the son subsequently produced does not ensue.] Which is inconsistent with the enumeration of his right of succession, as one of the twelve descriptions of sons, preferably to the widow and other heirs. Subodhini and Balam-bhatṭa.

16. That is wrong: for it is inconsistent with the following text.] Admitting the restriction, that women obtained property through their husbands or sons only, still

* Yajnavalkya, 2. 143. † § 2. ‡ Balam-bhatṭa. § Balam-bhatṭa.

(a) See 1 Strange, H. L. 135.—£[2].
given before the nuptial fire, what was presented in the bridal procession, what has been given in token of affection, what has been received by the woman from her brother, her mother, or her father, are denominated the sixfold property of a woman."*

17. Besides, the widow and the daughters are announced as successors (§ 2), on failure of sons of all descriptions. Now by here affirming the right of a widow, who has been appointed to raise up issue, the right of her son to succeed to the estate is virtually affirmed. But that had been already declared: and therefore the wife ought not to be mentioned under the head [of succession to the estate] of one who leaves no male issue.

18. But, it is alleged, the right of a widow, who is authorized to raise up issue to her husband, is deduced from the text of Gautama: "Let kinsmen allied by the funeral oblation, by family name, and by descent from the same patriarch, share the heritage; or the widow of a childless man: and she may either [remain chaste, or may] seek offspring."† This too is erroneous: for the sense, which is there expressed, is not 'if she seeks to obtain offspring, she may take the goods of one who left no issue;' but 'persons allied by the funeral oblation, by family name, and by descent from the same patriarch, share the effects of one who leaves no issue; or his widow takes his estate: and she may either seek to obtain progeny, or may remain chaste.' This is an instruction to her, in regard to her duty. For the particle (vā) 'or,' denoting an alternative, does not convey the sense of 'if.' Besides it is fit, that a chaste woman should succeed to the estate, rather than one appointed to raise up issue, reprobed as this practice is in the law as well as in popular opinion. The succession of a chaste widow is expressly declared: "The widow of a childless man, keeping unsullied her husband's bed, and persevering in religious observances, shall pre-

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that restriction does not hold good universally, since women's right of property is declared in other instances. Subodhini.

17. The wife ought not to be mentioned.] She ought not to be here mentioned lest it should be thought a vain repetition. Subodhini.

18. She may either seek to obtain progeny.] The author proposes two modes of conduct for a woman whose husband is deceased. One is, that she should seek offspring, or endeavour to obtain male issue under an authority for that purpose. The term vā (either, or,) in this place does not signify 'if;' but indicates an alternative and that implies an opposite case; and the opposite case is the second mode of conduct, which, though not expressly stated in the text, must, by force of the particle vā, in its usual disjunctive acceptation, be opposed to the desire of obtaining progeny by means of an appointment to raise up issue: and this is consequently determined to be the duty of

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* Menu, 9, 194.
† Bālam-bhaṭṭa.
‡ Vide § 8. The text is here translated according to the commentator's interpretation.
sent his funeral oblation and obtain his entire share."* And an authority to raise up issue is as expressly condemned by Manu: "By regenerate men no widow must be authorized to conceive by any other; for they, who authorize her to conceive by another, violate the primeval law."†

19. But the text of Vasishtha "An appointment shall not be through covetousness;"‡ must be thus interpreted: if the husband die either unseparated from his coreligionists or reunited with them, she has not a right to the succession; and therefore an appointment to raise up issue must not be accepted for the sake of securing the succession to her offspring.'

20. As for the text of Nārada, "Let them allow a maintenance to his women for life;"§ Since re-union of coreligionists had been premised (in a former text, viz. "The shares of re-united brethren are considered to be exclusively theirs;")|| it must be meant to assign only a maintenance to their childless widows. Nor is tautology to be objected to that passage, the intermediate text being relative to reunited coreligionists ("Among brothers, if any one die without issue, &c."") For women's separate property is exempted from partition by this explanation of what had been before said; and a mere maintenance for the widow is at the same time ordained.

21. The passage, which has been cited, "Their childless wives, conducting themselves aright, must be supported;"** will be subsequently shown to intend the wife of an impotent man and so forth.††

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chastity. The meaning therefore is this: two modes of conduct are here prescribed; either she must seek male issue by means of an appointment for that purpose, or she must remain chaste. Subodhini.

19. Therefore an appointment......must not be accepted.) Considering, that she has not herself a right to the estate, she ought not to seek an authority for raising up issue, from covetousness, with the view that the wealth may go to her progeny, as it cannot belong to herself. Subodhini.

20. Nor is tautology to be objected.] On the ground, that both passages convey the same import. For, in explaining what had been before said, the two several passages convey two distinct meanings: namely, that the woman's separate property is not to be divided; and that a maintenance only is to be granted to them. What had been before said, is not all which is afterwards declared; that it should be charged with tautology. The text "Among brothers, if any one die without issue," is an explanation of the preceding one ("The shares of reunited brethren are considered to be exclusively theirs.") The close of it, "except the wife's separate property," is a declaration of her property being indivisible; and the subsequent passage ("Let them allow a maintenance to his women for life") contains a separate injunction. Balām-bhaṭṭa.

** Vide supra. § 13. †† Vide Sect. 10, § 15.

22. As for the argument, that the wealth of a regenerate man is designed for religious uses; and that a woman’s succession to such property is unfit, because she is not competent to the performance of religious rites; that is wrong: for, if everything, which is wealth, be intended for sacrificial purposes, then charitable donations, burnt offerings, and similar matters, must remain unaccomplished. Or, if it be alleged, that the applicability of wealth to those uses is uncontradicted, since sacrifice here signifies religious duty in general; and charitable donations, burnt offerings and the rest are acts of religious duty; still other purposes of opulence and gratification, which are to be effected by means of wealth, must remain unaccomplished; and, if that be the case, there is an inconsistency in the following passages of Yājñavalkya, Gautama and Manu. “Neglect not religious duty, wealth or pleasure, in their proper season.”* “To the utmost of his power, a man should not let morning, noon or evening be fruitless, in respect of virtue, wealth and pleasure.”† “The organs cannot so effectually be restrained by avoiding their gratification, as by constant knowledge of the ill incident to sensual pleasure.”‡

23. Besides, if wealth be designed for sacrificial uses, the argument would be reversed, by which it is shown, that the careful preservation of gold [insulated by a passage of the Vedas] “Let gold be preserved,” is intended not for religious ends, but for human purposes.

24. Moreover, if the word sacrifice import religious duty in general, the succession of women to estates is most proper, since they are competent to the performance of auspicious and conservatory acts [as the making of a pool or a garden, &c.]]

**Annotations.**

22. Sacrifice here signifies religious duty in general.] The relinquishment of a thing, with the view to its appertaining to a duty, is a sacrifice (yāga) or consecration of the thing. The same design, terminated by casting the thing into the flames, is a burnt offering (homme) or holocaust. The conferring of property on another by annulling a previous right, is a gift (dāna) or donation. Such is the difference between sacrifice, burnt-offering and donation. Subhadra.

“[In their proper season.]” This part of the text was wanting in the quotation of it, as here exhibited: but the passage, as it is read in its proper place, by the Mitākṣara, Aparāśa and the Dīpakkālaka, contains the words awake kīle “in their proper season.”

23. The argument would be reversed.] The reasoning here alluded to occurs in the Manusmṛti; and is the 12th topic of the 4th section of the 3d chapter. The passage of the Vedas, which is there examined, and the initial words of which are quoted in the text, enjoins the careful preservation of gold, lest it lose its brightness and be tarnished. The question, raised on it, is whether the observance of the precept be essential to the efficacy of sacrifice or serve only a human purpose; and the result of the reasoning is, that the precept affects the person, and not the sacrifice. This reasoning is considered by the author to be incompatible with the notion, that wealth is intended solely for sacrificial uses.

* Yājñavalkya, 1. 115. † Not found in Gautama’s institutes. ‡ Manu, 2. 96. partially quoted in this place. § Bālam-balaṭa. || Bālam-balaṭa.
25. Though held in thralldom, they are capable of property.

25. The text of Nārada, which declares the dependence of women, ("A woman has no right to independence,"*) is not incompatible with their acceptance of property; even admitting their thralldom(a).

26. How then are the passages before cited ("Wealth was produced for the sake of solemn sacrifices, &c."†) to be understood? The answer is, wealth, which was obtained [in charity‡] for the express purpose of defraying sacrifices, must be appropriated exclusively to that use even by sons and other successors. The text intends that: for the following passage declares it to be an offence [to act otherwise] without any distinction in respect of sons and successors. "He, who, having received articles for a sacrifice, disposes not of them for that purpose, shall become a kite or a crow.§

27. It is said by Kātyāyana "Heirless property goes to the king,(b) deducting however a subsistence for the females as well as the funeral charges: but the goods belonging to a venerable priest, let him bestow on venerable priests." "Heirless property," or wealth which is without an heir to succeed to it, "goes to the king," becomes the property of the sovereign; "deducting however a subsistence for the females as well as the funeral charges:" that is, excluding or setting apart a sufficiency for the food and raiment of the women, and as much as may be requisite for the funeral repasts and other obsequies in honour of the late owner, the residue goes to the king. Such is the construction of the text. An exception is added: "but the goods belonging to a venerable priest," deducting however a subsistence for the females as well as the charges of obsequies, 'let him now bestow on a venerable priest.'

28. This relates to women kept in concubinage: for the term employed is "females" (yoshid.) The text of Nārada likewise relates to concubines; since the word there used is "woman" (stri.) Except the wealth of a Brāhmaṇa(c) [property goes to the king on failure of heir.]

ANNOTATIONS.

27. "Let him bestow on venerable priests." Or: "let him bestow on a venerable priest." The commentator, Bālam-bhaṣṭa, considers as a variation in the reading of the text, the subsequent interpretation of it, "let him bestow on a venerable priest" quotrīṣṭapāṇayat in place of quotrīṣṭapāṇayat tad arpayet. He remarks, however, that the singular number is used generically.

28. The text ...... relates to concubines.] Or to twice-married women and others not considered as wives capoused in lawful wedlock. Bālam-bhaṣṭa.

* Nārada, 13. 31. † Vide § 14. § Bālam-bhaṣṭa.

§ This is a passage of Manu according to Bālam-bhaṣṭa; and a text of the same import, but expressed in other words, occurs in his institutes, II. 25.

(c) See 1 Strange, H. L. 185.—Ed. (c) See 1 Mor, Dig. 311.—Ed.

(c) And even in the case of a Brāhmaṇa his estate, when he dies without heirs escheats to the Crown as the Soverign power in British India. The Collector of Munsiyari v. Jarrathamā, 5 Moz. 1, A. Oa. 608.—Ed.
But a king, who is attentive to the obligations of duty, should give a maintenance to the women of such persons. The law of inheritance has been thus declared."

29. But here (§ 2) the wife’s right of succession is declared.

30. Therefore the right interpretation is this: when a man, who was separated from his co-heirs and not reunited with them, dies leaving no male issue, his widow [if chaste] takes the estate in the first instance(a). For partition had been promised; and reunion will be subsequently considered.

31. It must be understood, that the explanation, proposed by Črīkara and others, restricting the widow’s succession to the case of a small(b) property, is refuted by this following argument. If there be legitimate sons, it is provided, whether partition be made in the owner’s lifetime or after his decease, that the wife shall take a share equal to the son’s. Hence the allotments equal, his wife must be rendered partakers of like portions."§ And again: "Of heirs, dividing after the death of the father, let the mother also take an equal share."

32. But it is argued, that, under the terms of the texts above cited, she does not take merely enough for her subsistence.

33. That is wrong: for the words “share” or “portion,” and “equal” or “like,” might consequently be deemed meaningless.

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31. It is a mere error to say, that the wife takes nothing but a subsistence. If the wife share a portion equal to that of a son, not an allotment sufficient only for her support, both when the husband is living, and after his decease, though sons exist; more especially should it be affirmed, that she obtains the whole wealth of her husband, who leaves no male issue; and thus, since the widow’s succession to the whole estate is established by reasoning a fortiori, the assertion, that she obtains no more than food and raiment, is erroneous. Besides, since the wife’s participation with a son, who is entitled to take a share of the estate, or, if there be no other son, the whole of it, has been expressly ordained, it is fit that she should, on failure of male issue, take the wealth of her childless husband being separate from his co-heirs. Subodhin.

32. For the words “share” and “equal” might consequently be deemed meaningless. These terms are commonly employed to signify “portion” and “parity.” By abandoning their own signification without sufficient cause, they would appear meaningless. Subodhin.

* Nārada, 19, 51—52. † Bālam-bhāṣa. ‡ Ibid.
(a) See 1 Strange, H. L. 270, 272.—Ed. (b) See 1 Strange, H. L. 135.—Ed.
33. Or suppose, that, if the wealth be great, she takes precisely enough for her subsistence; but, if small, she receives a share equal to that of a son. This again is wrong: for variableness in the precept must be the consequence. Thus, if the estate be considerable, the texts above cited, ("his wives must be rendered partakers of like portions;" and "let the mother also take an equal share;") assisted by another passage ["Let them allow a maintenance to his women for life;" § 12.] suggest an allotment adapted for bare support. But, if the estate be considerable, the same passages indicate the assignment of a share equal to a son’s.

34. Thus, in the instance of the Chāturmāśya sacrifices, in the disquisition of the [Mimāṃsā] on the passage dvayok pranayanti;† where it is maintained by the opponent, that the rules for the preparation of the sacrificial fire at the Soma-yāga extend to these sacrifices; in consequence of which the injunction not to construct a northern altar (uttaravedi) at the Vaishyeda and Čuṇāśirya sacrifices, must be understood as a prohibition of such altar; [which should also be constructed at those sacrifices, as at a Soma-yāga:] but it is answered by an advocate for the right opinion, that it is not a prohibition of that altar as suggested by extending to these sacrifices the rules for preparing the sacrificial fire at the Soma-yāga, but an exception to the express rule “prepare an uttara-vedi at this sacrifice [viz. at the Chāturmāśya:]” it is urged in reply by the opponent, that variableness in the precept must follow, since the same precept thus authorizes the occasional construction of the altar, with the reference to a prohibition of it, at the first and last of the [four] periods of sacrifice, and commands the

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33. Variableness in the precept must be the consequence.] If the passage above cited (§ 81.), assisted by another passage (§ 12.), ordain the widow’s receipt of a sufficiency for her support, at the time of making a partition with the sons, whether her husband, who was wealthy, be then alive or dead; but ordain her taking of a share equal to that of a son, if her husband possess little property; then a single sentence, once uttered, is in one case dependent [on a different passage, for its interpretation.] and not so in another instance. Consequently, since it does not retain an uniform import, there is variableness in the precept. Subodhini.

34. In the instance of the Chāturmāśya sacrifices.] These are four sacrifices performed on successive days, according to some authorities; but in the months of Ashādhā, Kārtika and Phalguna, according to others. They are severally denominated Vaiṣṇavāyana, Vāraṇa-prajāśā, Čaṭānāvā and Čuṇāśirya. The oblations consist of roasted cakes (paroṣāsa) and, at the second of them, two figures of sheep made of ground rice. The cakes are prepared in the usual manner, consisting of ground rice, kneaded with hot water, and formed into lumps of the shape of a tortoise: these are roasted on a specified number of pots (kapāla) placed in a circular hole, which contains one of the three consecrated fires perpetually maintained by devout Brāhmaṇas.

In the disquisition on the passage dvayok pranayanti.] Part of a passage of the Veda, which is the subject of a disquisition in the Mimāṃsā, and which gives name to it. This is the ninth [or, according to one mode of counting, the seventh] topic in the third section of Jaimini’s seventh chapter. See Jaimata-vāhana. Ch. 11. Sect. 5.

* Subodhini and Bālam-ḥatiṣa. † Mimāṃsā, 7. 3. 9.
construction of it at the two middle periods, independently of any other maxim: but it is finally shown as the right doctrine, for the very purpose of obviating the objection of variableness in the precept, that the prohibition of the altar at the first and last of the periods of sacrifice is a recital of a constant rule; and that the injunction, “prepare the uttarkarṇa at this sacrifice,” commands its construction at the two middle periods (namely the Varuṇa-pragbhāṣa, and Čākamedha) with a due regard to that explanatory recital.

35. As for the doctrine, that, from the text of Manu (“Of him, who leaves no son, the father shall take the inheritance, or the brothers,”*) as well as from that of Čāksha (“The wealth of a man, who departs for heaven, leaving no male issue, goes to his brothers. If there be none, his father and mother take it: or his eldest wife.”†) the succession of brothers, to the estate of one who leaves no male issue, is deduced; and that a wife obtains a sufficiency for her support, under the text “Let them allow a maintenance to his women for life;”‡ this being determined, if a rich man die, leaving no male issue, the wife takes as much as is adequate to her subsistence, and the brethren take the residuary; but, if the estate be barely enough for the support of the widow, or less than enough, this text (“The wife and the daughters also;’’)§ is propounded, on the controverted question whether the widow or the brothers inherit, to show, that the first claim prevails. This opinion the reverend teacher does not tolerate: for he interprets the text, “Of him who leaves no son, the father shall take the inheritance, or the brothers;”‖ as not relating to the order of succession, since it declares an alternative; but as intended merely to show the competency for inheriting, and as applicable when the preferable claimants, the widow and the rest, fail. The text of Čāksha too relates to a re-united brother.

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Since the same precept authorizes the occasional construction of the altar.][ Since one precept commands it at a Chāṭarvanīṣya sacrifice, and another forbids it at two of the periods of that sacrifice; the injunction, contrasted with the prohibition, seems to imply an option in this case: but, not being contrasted with any other rule, it becomes a cogent precept in the instance of two other periods: and thus the rule, being cogent in one case and not in the other, is variable in its import and effect.

35. On the controverted question whether the widow or the brothers inherit.] Whether the widow inherits, as provided by Nārada; or the brothers succeed conformably with the texts of Manu and Čāksha. Bālam-bhājana. This opinion the reverend teacher does not tolerate.] Meaning Vyāvanā. Subodhini and Bālam-bhājana.

The text of Čāksha relates to a re-united brother.] It relates to the case of a brother, who, after separation, becomes associated with his co-heirs, from affection or any other motive. Subodhini.

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* Vide § 7.
† Ibid.
‡ Nārada. Vide § 7.
§ Yaḍavavāya. Vide § 2.

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36. Besides it does not appear either from this passage [of Yājñavalkya*] or from the context, that it is relative to an inconsiderable estate. If the concluding sentence "On the failure of the first among these, the next in order is heir;† be restricted to the case of a small property, reference to another passage, in two instances (of the widow and of the daughters), but relates to wealth generally in the other instances (of the father and the rest,) the consequent defect of variability in the precept (§ 33.) affects this interpretation.

37. "If a woman, becoming a widow in her youth, be headstrong; a maintenance must in that case be given to her for the support of life."‡ This passage of Hárîta is intended for a denial of the right of a widow suspected of incontinency, to take the whole estate. From this very passage [of Hárîta§], it appears that a widow, not suspected of misconduct, has a right to take the whole property.

38. With the same view, Cānkha has said "Or his eldest wife." (§ 7.) Being eldest by good qualities, and not supposed likely to be guilty of incontinency, she takes the whole wealth; and, like a mother, maintains any other headstrong wife [of her husband.] Thus all is unexceptionable.

39. Therefore it is a settled rule, that a wedded wife, being chaste, takes the whole estate of a man, who being separated from his co-heirs and not subsequently reunited with them, dies leaving no male issue(a).

* Subodhini.
† Vido § 3.
‡ In the Vivāda-chintāmani this passage is read without the conditional particle; viz. "A woman.....is headstrong; but a maintenance must ever be given to her......"
§ Bālam-bhaṭṭa.
(a) See 1 Strange, H. L. 134; 1 Morl. Dig. 279, 316, 318; 8 Moo. L. A. Ca. 543 Sikho Singh v. Pīthār Singh 10 N. W. P. 420.—Ed.
SECTION II.

Right of the daughters and daughter’s sons.

1. After a wife, a daughter inherits: whatever be her tribe.

   1. On failure of her, the daughters inherit (a). They are named in the plural number (Section 1. § 2.) to suggest the equal or unequal participation of daughters alike or dissimilar by class.

   2. Thus Kātyāyana says, “Let the widow succeed to her husband’s wealth, provided she be chaste; and, in default of her, let the daughter inherit, if unmarried.”* Also Vṛhaspati: “The wife is pronounced successor to the wealth of her husband; and, in her default, the daughter. As a son, so does the daughter of a man proceed from his several limbs. How then should any other person take her father’s wealth?”

   3. If there be competition between a married and an unmarried daughter, the unmarried one takes the succession (b) under the specific provisions of the text above cited (“in default of her, let the daughter inherit, if unmarried.”)

   4. If the competition be between an unprovided and an enriched daughter, the unprovided one inherits: but, on failure of such, the enriched one succeeds: for the text of Gautama is equally applicable to the paternal, as to the maternal, estate. “A woman’s separate property goes to her daughters, unmarried or unprovided.”†

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1. They are named in the plural number. [Here female issue is signified by the original word “daughter” (dāghter;) and that is applicable, indifferently, to such as belong to the same or to different tribes. Plurality is denoted by the termination of the plural number, (as in gotahiras;) which includes, without inconsistency, those who are dissimilar from the parent. Therefore daughters, alike or different by class, are indicated by the original word and its termination. They share equal or unequal portions in the order before mentioned: namely four shares, three, two or one. (C. 1. Sect. 8 § 1.) Subodhini.

4. The text of Gautama is equally applicable to the paternal... estate.] The meaning is this: since the daughter’s right is declared with reference to a woman’s peculiar property, but it is not intended by using the word “woman’s” to restrict it positively to that single object, the parity of reasoning holds good. Subodhini.

(b) See 1. Strange, E. L. 135-9.—Ed.
5. It must not be supposed, that this relates to the appointed daughter: for, in treating of male issue, she and her son have been pronounced equal to the legitimate son ("Equal to him is the son of an appointed daughter,"*) or the daughter appointed to be a son.†

6. By the import of the particle "also" (Sect. 1. § 2.) the daughter's son succeeds to the estate on failure of daughters. Thus Vishnu says, "If a man leave neither son, nor son's son, nor [wife, nor female:] issue, the daughter's son shall take his wealth. For, in regard to the obsequies of ancestors, daughter's sons are considered as son's sons."§ Manu likewise declares, "By that male child, whom a daughter, whether formally appointed or not, shall produce from a husband of an equal class, the maternal grandfather becomes the grandsire of a son's son: let that son give the funeral oblation and possess the inheritance."(a)

SECTION III.

Right of the Parents.

1. Next both parents inherit, meaning the mother and the father, are successors to the property.

2. Although the order, in which parents succeed to the estate, do not clearly appear [from the tenor of the text; Sect. 1. § 2.] since a conjunctive compound is declared to present the meaning of its several terms at once; ‡ and the omission of one term and retention of the other constitute an

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5. For, in treating of male issue, she and her son have been pronounced, &c.] Since she has been noticed while treating of male issue, the introduction of her in this place would be improper. Subodhini.

6. The daughter's son succeeds to the estate on failure of daughters.] According to the commentary of Bālam-bhūpta, the daughter's daughter(6) inherits in default of daughter's sons. He grounds this opinion, for which however there is no authority in Vijnānevara's text, upon the analogy, which this author has admitted in another case, between the succession to a woman's separate property and the inheritance of the paternal estate. (Vide § 4.)

2. Although the order ...... do not clearly appear.] It is declared, that the two parents are successors to the property, if there be no daughter nor daughter's son. Since the term (pitaras) "parents" is formed by omitting one and retaining the other

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* C. 1. Sect. 11. § 1.  † C. 1. Sect. 11. § 3.  ‡ Bālam-bhūpta.
§ Not found in Vishnu's institutes: but cited under his name in the Sutti-chandrika.
|| Manu, 9. 186.
‡† Vārtika, 1. on Pāṇini, 2. 2. 20.
†† See 1 Morl. Dig. 258, 319, 335.—Ed.
(6) See 1 Morl. Dig. 326; i. Strange, H. L. 139.—Ed.
exception* to that [complex expression:] yet, as the word ‘mother’ stands first in the phrase into which that is resolvable, and is first in the regular compound (mātāpitarau) ‘mother and father,’† when not reduced [to the simpler form pitarau ‘parents’] by the omission of one term and retention of the other; it follows from the order of the terms and that of the sense which is thence deduced, and according to the series thus presented in answer to an inquiry concerning the order of succession, that the mother takes the estate in the first instance(§); and, on failure of her, the father.

3. Besides the father is a common parent to other sons, but the mother is not so: and, since her propinquity is consequently greatest, it is fit, that she should take the estate in the first instance, conformably with

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member of a complex expression (mother and father,) shall they conjointly take the estate or severally? and is the order of succession optional, or fixed and regulated? The author replies to these questions. Subodhiu.

A conjunctive compound is declared, &c.] A compound term is formed, as directed by Paññi and his commentators,‡ when two or more nouns occur with the import of the conjunction ‘and,’ in two of its senses (viz. reciprocation and comutation.) This is limited by the amendantary rule of Kātyāyana to the case where the sense conveyed by each word is presented at once: while the same terms, connected in a phrase by the conjunction copulative, would present the sense of each successively.

The omission of one term and retention of the other constitute an exception.] When the word pīr ‘father’ occurs with mātā ‘mother,’ it may be retained and the other be rejected. This is an exception to the general rule of composition. It is optional; and the regular form may be retained in its stead. Ex. Pitarau ‘two parents;’ or Mātāpitarau ‘mother and father.’ Paññi, I. 2. 70. and 2. 2. 29.—34.

The word mother stands first in the phrase into which that is resolvable.] The compound term, whether reduced to the simpler expression or retaining its complex form, is resolvable into the phrase mātā cha pīrā cha ‘ both the mother and the father.’ Thus, however, is only the customary order of terms, not specially enjoined by any rule of syntax.

Is first in the regular compound.] Conformably with one of Kātyāyana’s amendatory rules on Paññi’s grammar for the collocation of terms in composition. (2. 2. 34.) That rule requires the most revered object to have precedence: and the example of the rule, as given in Paññi’s Mahābhāṣya and Vāmana’s Kāśikā-vṛtti, is this very compound term mātāpitarau ‘ mother and father.’ The commentators, Kāliyata and Haranātha, assign reasons why a mother is considered to be more venerable than a father.

It follows, from the order of the terms.] The compound term mātāpitarau ‘ mother and father,’ as well as the abridged and simpler expression pitarau ‘parents,’ is resolvable into the same phrase mātā cha pīrā cha ‘ both the mother and the father.’ Thus, in every form of expression, ‘mother’ stands first. Hence the author infers, that the mother’s priority in regard to succession to wealth is intended by the text (Sect. 1. § 2)

3. The father is a common parent to other sons.] The mother is, in respect of sons, not a common parent to several sets of them: and her propinquity is therefore more immediate, compared with the father’s. But his paternity is common; since he may have sons by women of equal rank with himself, as well as children by wives of the

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* Paññi, I. 2. 70.
† Vārṣika, 3. on Paññi, 2. 2. 34.
‡ Vide infra, Sect. 11. § 20.
(§) See 1 Morl. Dig. 231.—K7.
a passage of Manu.

4. Nor is the claim in virtue of propinquity restricted to (sapiṇḍas) kinsmen allied by funeral oblations; but, on the contrary, it appears from this very text, (§ 3) that the rule of propinquity is effectual, without any exception, in the case of (samaṅgadikas) kindred connected by libations of water, as well as other relatives, when they appear to have a claim to the succession.

5. Therefore, since the mother is the nearest of the two parents, it is most fit, that she should take the estate. But, on failure of her, the father is successor to the property.

SECTION IV.

Right of the Brothers.

1. Next to the parents, the brothers inherit.

1. On failure of the father, brethren share the estate (a). Accordingly Manu says, "Of him, who leaves no son, the father shall take the inheritance of the brothers."†

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Kshatriya and other inferior tribes; and his nearness is therefore mediate, in comparison of the mother's. The mother consequently is nearest to her child, and she succeeds to the estate in the first instance, since it is ordained by a passage of Manu, that the person, who is nearest of kin, shall have the property. Subodhini.

5. On failure of her, the father is successor to the property.] The commentator, Bālam-bhaṭṭa, is of opinion, that the father should inherit first and afterwards the mother; upon the analogy of more distant kindred, where the paternal line has invariably the precedence before the maternal kindred; and upon the authority of several express passages of law. Nanda Paṇḍita, author of commentaries on the Mitakṣara and on the Institutes of Vīṣṇu, had before maintained the same opinion. But the elder commentator of the Mitakṣara, Vīgweyāra-bhaṭṭa, has in this instance followed the text of his author in his own treatise entitled Madana-Pārījata, and has supported Vīgweyāra's argument both there and in his commentary named Subodhini. Much diversity of opinion does indeed prevail on this question. Čikara maintains, that the father and mother inherit together; and the great majority of writers of eminence (as Aparākara and Kanalakara, and the authors of the Satī-chandrika, Madana-ratna, Vyavahāra-mayuḥka, &c.) gives the father the preference before the mother. Jinuta-vahana and Raghuśāndana have adopted this doctrine. But Vācheśpati-migya, on the contrary, concurs with the Mitakṣara in placing the mother before the father; being guided by an erroneous reading of the text of Vīṣṇu (Sec. 1. § 6.), as is remarked in the Vīran-trodāya. The author of the latter work proposes to reconcile these contradictions by a personal distinction. If the mother be individually more venerable than the father, she inherits; if she be less so, the father takes the inheritance.

1. Brethren.] The commentators, Nanda Paṇḍita and Bālam-bhaṭṭa, consider this as intending "brothers and sisters," in the same manner in which "parents" have been explained "mother and father," (Sec. 3. § 3.) and conformably with an express
2. It has been argued by Dhārēqvara, that, 'under the following text of Manu, “Of a son dying childless, the mother shall take the estate; and, the mother also being dead, the father's mother shall take the heritage;” even while the father is living, if the mother be dead, the father's mother, or in other words the paternal grandmother, and not the father himself, shall take the succession: because wealth, devolving upon him, may go to sons dissimilar by class; but what is inherited by the paternal grandmother, goes to such only as appertain to the same tribe: and therefore the paternal grandmother takes the estate.'

3. The holy teacher [Vijjvarūpa†] does not assent to that doctrine: because the heritable right of sons even dissimilar by class has been expressly ordained by a passage above cited: “The sons of a Brāhmaṇa, in the several tribes, have four shares, or three, or two, or one.”‡

4. A text of Manu, excluding the king, intends the sovereign not the Kshatriya.

4. But the passage of Manu, expressing that “The property of a Brāhmaṇa shall never be taken by the king,”§ intends the sovereign, not a son [of the late owner by a woman of the royal or military tribe].

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rule of grammar (Pāṇini, 1.2.68.) (a) They observe, that the brother inherits first: and, in his default, the sister. This opinion is controverted by Kamalākara and by the author of the Vyavahāra-māyūkha.

2. It has been argued by Dhārēqvara.] It had been shown (Sect. 3), that the father inherits on failure of the mother. But that is stated otherwise by different authors. To refute the opinion maintained by one of them, the author reverts to the subject by a retrospect analogous to the backward look of the lion. Subodhini and Bālam-bhaṭṭā.

Because wealth, devolving on him, may go to sons dissimilar.] The meaning is this: if the succession be taken by the father, the property becomes a paternal estate, and may devolve on his sons whether belonging to the Mārdhavāsīkta [or another mixt] tribe or to his own class. But, if it be taken by the grandmother, it becomes a maternal estate and devolves on persons of the same tribe, namely her daughters; or successively, on failure of them, her daughter’s sons, her own sons, and so forth. Subodhini and Bālam-bhaṭṭā.

4. Intends the sovereign, not a son.] It does not prohibit the succession of a Brāhmaṇa’s son by a Kshatriya wife, denominated king as being of his mother’s tribe, which is the royal or military one. But it relates to an escheat to the sovereign. Therefore it is not an exception to the passage cited in the preceding paragraph; and Vijjvarūpa’s reasoning holds good, that Dhārēqvara’s objection would be valid, if there were any harm in the ultimate succession of sons dissimilar by class. But that is not the case. On the contrary, they are expressly pronounced by the text here cited, to be partakers of inheritance.” Subodhini.

* Manu, 9.217. Vide Sect. 1. § 7. † The name is supplied by the Subodhini.
|| Bālam-bhaṭṭā.
(a) Sec 1 Moti. Dig. 325, 326. — Ed.
5. Among brothers, such, as are of the whole blood, take the inheritance in the first instance, under the text before cited: "To the nearest sapinda, the inheritance next belongs."* Since those of the half blood are remote through the difference of the mothers.

6. Next the half blood. 6. If there be no uterine (or whole) brothers, those by different mothers inherit the estate.

7. After brothers, nephews inherit in like manner. 7. On failure of brothers also, their sons share the heritage in the order of the respective fathers.

8. In case of competition between brothers and nephews, the nephews have no title to the succession; for their right of inheritance is declared to be on failure of brothers [*both parents, brothers likewise, and their sons, Ssect. 1. § 2. †]

9. However, when a brother has died leaving no male issue [nor other nearer heir, ‡] and the estate has consequently devolved on his brothers indifferently, if any one of them die before a partition of their brother's estate takes place, his sons do in that case acquire a title through their father; and it is fit, therefore, that a share should be allotted to them, in their father's right, at a subsequent distribution of the property between them and the surviving brothers.

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6. If there be no uterine (or whole) brothers, those by different mothers inherit.) The author of the Vyavahara-mayika censures the preference here given to the brothers of the half blood before the nephews, being sons of brothers of the whole blood.

7. Their sons share the heritage.) Including, say Nanda Panthita and Bālam-bhaṭṭa, the daughters as well as the sons of brothers, and the sons and daughters of sisters. This consequently will comprehend all nephews and nieces.

In the order of the respective fathers.) In their order as brothers of the whole blood, and of the half blood, Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

By analogy to the case of grandsons by different fathers (Chap. 1. Sect. 8.), the distribution of shares shall be made, through allotments to their respective fathers, and not in their own right, whether there be one, two, or many sons of each brother. Subodhini.

That is wrong: for the brethren had not a vested interest in their brother's wealth before their decease; and property was only vested in the nephews by the owner's demise. Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

* Manu, 9. 137. Vide Sect. 3. § 3. † Subodhini and Bālam-bhaṭṭa. ‡ Bālam-bhaṭṭa.
SECTION V.

Succession of kindred of the same family name: termed Gotraja, or gentiles.

1. If there be not even brother's sons, gentiles share the estate. Gentiles are the paternal grandmother and relations connected by funeral oblations of food and libations of water.

2. In the first place the paternal grandmother takes the inheritance. The paternal grandmother's succession immediately after the mother, was seemingly suggested by the text before cited, "And, the mother also being dead, the father's mother shall take the heritage:"

no place, however, is found for her in the compact series of heirs from the father to the nephew: and that text ("the father's mother shall take the heritage") is intended only to indicate her general competency for inheritance. She must, therefore, of course succeed immediately after the nephew; and thus there is no contradiction.

3. On failure of the paternal grandmother, the (gotraja) kinsmen sprung from the same family with the deceased and (sapiinda) connected by funeral oblations, namely the paternal grandfather and the rest, inherit the estate. For kinsmen sprung from a different family, but connected by funeral oblations, are indicated by the term cognate (bandhu Sect. 6.)

4. After him, the uncles and their sons.

4. Here, on failure of the father's descendants, the heirs are successively the paternal grandmother, the paternal grandfather, the uncles and their sons(a).

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1. Gentiles.] Gotraja or persons belonging to the same general family (gotra) distinguished by a common name: these answer nearly to the Gentiles of the Roman law.

2. She must, therefore, of course succeed.] Some copies of the Mitakshara read this passage differently. The variation is noticed in the commentary of Balam-bhaja, viz. "She succeeds, after the preceding claimants, if they be dead," uparitana-mishnamantram instead of utkarshate tat sudhamantram. The commentary remarks, that the "preceding (paritana) claimants" are the father and the rest down to the brother's son.

3. On failure of the paternal grandmother... the paternal grandfather.] Balam-bhaja insists, that the grandfather inherits before the grandmother, as the father before the mother. See Section 3.

(a) Sect. 1. § 7.

(£) See 1 Morl. Dig. 326.—LV,
5. Then the great-grandmother, great-grandfather, great-granduncles and so forth, to the seventh degree.

5. On failure of the paternal grandfather's line, the paternal great-grandmother, the great-grandfather, his sons and their issue, inherit. In this manner must be understood the succession of kindred belonging to the same general family and connected by funeral oblations.

ANNOTATIONS.

5. In this manner must be understood the succession of kindred.] The Subodhini, commenting on the first words of the following section, carries the enumeration a little further: viz. 'the paternal great-grandfather's mother, great-grandfather's father, great-grandfather's brothers and their sons. The paternal great-grandfather's grandmother, great-grandfather's grandfather, great-grandfather's uncles and their sons. The same analogy holds in the succession of kindred connected by a common libation of water.'

The scholiast of Vīshnu, who is also one of the commentators of the Mitakshara, states otherwise the succession of the near and distant kindred, in expounding the passage of Vīshnu. "If no brother's son exist, it passes to kinsmen (bandhu;) in their default it devolves on relations (sakulye)."* where Bālam-bhaṭṭa, on the authority of a reading found in the Mādāvatāmāsa, proposes to transpose the terms bandhu and sakulya; for the purpose of reconciling Vīshnu with Yājñavalkya, by interpreting sakulya in the sense of gotraja or kinsmen sprung from the same family. Nanda Pāṇḍita, preserving the common reading, says 'kinsmen (bandhu) are sapijjas; and these may belong to the same general family or not. First those of the same general family (sagotra) are heirs. They are three, the father, paternal grandfather, and great-grandfather; as also three descendants of each. The order is this: In the father's line, on failure of the brother's son, the brother's son's son is heir. In default of him, the paternal grandfather, his son and grandson. Failing these, the paternal great-grandfather, his son and grandson. In this manner the succession passes to the fourth degree inclusive; and not to the fifth: for the text expresses 'The fifth has no concern with the funeral oblations.'† The daughters of the father and other ancestors must be admitted, like the daughter of the man himself, and for the same reason. On failure of the father's kindred connected by funeral oblations, the mother's kindred are heirs: namely the maternal grandfather, the maternal uncle and his son; and so forth. In default of these, the successors are the mother's sister, her son and the rest.'

The commentator takes occasion to censure an interpretation which corresponds with that of the Mitakshara as delivered in the following section (8. 6. 4. 1.); and according to which the cognate kindred of the man himself, of his father and of his mother are the sons of his father's sister and so forth: because it would follow, that the father's sister's son and the rest would inherit, although the man's own sister and sister's sons were living. Bālam-bhaṭṭa, however, repels this objection by the remark, that the sister and sister's sons have been already noticed as next in succession to the brother and brother's sons; which is indeed Nanda Pāṇḍita's own doctrine.

He adds, 'after the heirs abovenoted, the sakulya or distant kinsman is entitled to the succession: meaning a relation in the fifth or other remoter degree.'

This whole order of succession, it may be observed, differs materially from that which is taught in the text of the Mitakshara. On the other hand, the author of the Vīraṇitrodaya has exactly followed the Mitakshara: and so has Kāmapāla: and it is also confirmed by Mādhava dhārya, in the Vyasahara-Mādhava, as well as by the Śrīnīt-chandrīkā.

But the author of the Vyasahara-mayākha contends for a different series of heirs after the brother's son: 1st the paternal grandmother; 2d the sister; 3d the paternal grandfather and the brother of the half blood, as equally near of kin; 4th the paternal great-grandfather, the paternal uncle and the son of a brother of the half blood, sharing together as in the same degree of affinity. He has not pursued the enumeration further; and the principle stated by him, nearness of kin, does not clearly indicate the rule of continuation of this series.

* Vīshnu, 17. 10. 11.
† Manu, 9. 186.
6. If there be none such, the succession devolves on kindred connected by libations of water (a); and they must be understood to reach to seven degrees beyond the kindred connected by funeral oblations of food: or else, as far as the limits of knowledge as to birth and name extend. Accordingly Viññat-Manu says "The relation of the sapiṇas, or kindred connected by the funeral oblation, ceases with the seventh person: and that of samānādakas, or those connected by a common libation of water, extends to the fourteenth degree; or as some affirm, it reaches as far as the memory of birth and name extends. This is signified by gotra or the relation of family name."*

SECTION VI.

On the succession of cognate kindred, bandhu.

1. On failure of gentiles, the cognates are heirs. Cognates are of three kinds; related to the person himself, to his father, or to his mother: as is declared by the following text. "The sons of his own father's sister, the sons of his own mother's sister, and the sons of his own aunt, and the sons of his mother's maternal uncle, must be considered as his own cognate kindred. The sons of his father's paternal aunt, the sons of his father's maternal aunt, and the sons of his father's maternal uncle, must be deemed his father's cognate kindred. The sons of his mother's paternal aunt, the sons of his mother's maternal uncles, must be reckoned his mother's cognate kindred."†

ANNOTATIONS.

1. The cognates are heirs.† Bandhu, cognate or distant kin, corresponding nearly to the Cognati of the Roman law.

Cognates are of three kinds.] Bālam-bhaṭṭa notices a variation in the reading, bandhavāḥ for bandhavaḥ. It produces no essential difference in the interpretation.

Related to the person himself, to his father or to his mother.] Aparārka, as remarked by Kamalakara, disallows the two last classes of cognate kindred, as having no concern with inheritance; and restricts the term bandhu, in the text, to the kindred of the owner himself. The author of the Vyavahāra-māyūkha confines that restriction.

* The first part of this passage occurs in Manu's institutes, 5. 60. The remainder of the text differs.

† The text is seemingly ascribed by the commentator Bālam-bhaṭṭa to Vṛddha Sātārṣa. But it is quoted in the Vyavahāra-Mādhyāna as a text of Baudhāyaṇa.

(e) See 1 Marīl. Dig. 338.—Ed.
2. Here, by reason of near affinity, the cognate kindred of the deceased himself, are his successors in the first instance: on failure of them, his father's cognate kindred; or, if there be none, his mother's cognate kindred. This must be understood to be the order of succession here intended.

SECTION VII.

On the succession of strangers upon failure of the kindred.

1. If there be no relations of the deceased, the preceptor, or, on failure of him, the pupil, inherits, by the text of Apastamba. So Apastamba said: “If there be no male issue, the nearest kinsman inherits; or, in default of kindred, the preceptor; or, failing him, the disciple.”

2. If there be no pupil, the fellow-student is the successor. He, who received his investiture, or instruction in reading or in the knowledge of the sense of scripture, from the same preceptor, is a fellow-student.

3. If there be no fellow-students, some learned and venerable priest should take the property of a Brāhmaṇa, under the text of Gautama: “Venerable priests should share the wealth of a Brāhmaṇa, who leaves no issue.”

4. For want of such successors, any Brāhmaṇa may be the heir. So Manu declares: “On failure of all those, the lawful heirs are such Brāhmaṇas, as have read the three Vedas, as are pure in body and mind, as have subdued their passions. Thus virtue is not lost.”

5. Never shall a king take the wealth of a priest; for the text of Manu forbids it: “The property of a Brāhmaṇa shall never be taken by the king; this is a fixed law.” It is also declared by Nárada: “If there be no heir of a Brāhmaṇa’s wealth, on his demise, it must be given to a Brāhmaṇa. Otherwise the king is tainted with sin.”

ANNOTATIONS.

2. This must be understood to be the order of succession. See a note at the close of the last section.

* Gautama, 28. 39.
† Manu, 9. 183.
‡ Manu, 9. 189.
§ Not found in the institutes of Nárada.
(a) But now see Collector of Mantrimadan v. Curdy Vizhata Narainappah, 8 Mon. I. A. Ca, 500, 513, where the Lord Justice Knight Bruce referred to this and the two preceding clauses and observed “from these it would appear that the beneficial enjoyment of a Brāhmaṇa’s property ought not on his death without heirs to pass to the king; that it ought, in some way or another, to pass to other Brāhmaṇas. But the texts also show that it is not to pass to Brāhmaṇas generally, or even to any definite or well
6. But the king, and not a priest, may take the estate of a Kshatriya or other person of an inferior tribe, on failure of heirs down to the fellow-student. So Manu ordains: "But the wealth of the other classes, on failure of all [heirs] the king may take."

SECTION VIII.

On succession to the property of a hermit or of an ascetic.

1. It has been declared, that sons and grandsons [or great-grandsons] take the heritance; or, on failure of them, the widow or other successors. The author now propounds an exception to both those laws: "The heirs of a hermit, of an ascetic, and of a professed student, are, in their order, the preceptor, the virtuous pupil, and the spiritual brother and associate in holiness."  

ANNOTATIONS.

1. "A virtuous pupil." The condition, that he be virtuous is intended generally. Hence the preceptor and the fellow hermit are successors in their respective cases, provided their conduct be unexceptionable. With a view to this, Yajñavalkya has placed the words "virtuous pupil" in the middle of the text, to indicate the connection of the epithet with the preceding and following terms. Subodhini, &c.

ascertained class of them. The persons to take the beneficial interest are to be Brahmans having certain spiritual qualification; they are to be pure in body and mind, and are to have read the three Vedas. If this be the law, it seems to imply a power of selection; and a kind of possession, at least intermediate, of the property in somebody. It cannot be supposed that the first Brahman who could lay hands upon the property of a member of his caste dying without heirs was to hold it, subject, perhaps, to the condition of showing that he possessed the personal qualifications which the law requires.

It appears to their Lordships, that the passage quoted by the Mimāṃsakas from Narada, in the very section which cites the prohibition of Manu, shows what the law in its utmost strictness was. That passage is—"If there be no heir of a Brahman's wealth, on his demise it must be given to a Brahman. Otherwise the king is tainted with sin." In other words, the king is to take the property, but to take it subject to the duty, which he cannot neglect without sin, of disposing of it at his discretion amongst Brahmanas of the kind contemplated by the preceding texts.

If this be so, it appears to their Lordships that, according to Hindu law, the title of the king by esche in the property of a Brahman dying without heirs ought, as in any other case, to prevail against any claimant who cannot show a better title; and that the only question that arises upon the authorities is, whether Brahmanical property so taken in, in the hands of the king, subject to a trust in favour of Brahmanas. In this suit, where the issue is between the Government claiming the property (whether subject to a trust or not), by escheat, and a party claiming by an adverse title, it is unnecessary to decide whether the duty imposed upon the King is one of imperfect obligation, or a positive trust affecting the property in his hands, or whether, if a trust, it is or is not one incapable of enforcement by reason of the uncertainty of its objects. It is also unnecessary to decide on the arguments addressed to us concerning a distinction, or supposed distinction, between the Brahmanas who have been called "Sacerdotal Brahmans" and the ordinary members of the caste." See too 2 Str. H. L. 47: 1 Morl. Dig. 311.—Ed.

* Manu, 9, 199.  † Bānam-bhaṣa.  ‡ Yajñavalkya, 2, 138.
2. The heirs to the property of a hermit, of an ascetic, and of a student in theology, are, in order (that is, in the inverse order) the preceptor, a virtuous pupil, and a spiritual brother belonging to the same hermitage.

3. The student (brahmachāri) must be a professioned or perpetual one: for the mother and the rest of the natural heirs take the property of a temporary student; and the preceptor is declared to be heir to a professed student as an exception [to the claim of the mother and the rest.*]

4. A virtuous pupil takes the property of a yati or ascetic. The virtuous pupil, again, is one who is assiduous in the study of theology, in retaining the holy science, and in practising its ordinances. For a person, whose conduct is bad, is unworthy of the inheritance, were he even the preceptor or [standing in] any other [venerable relation.]

5. A spiritual brother and associate in holiness takes the goods of a hermit (vānaprastha.) A spiritual brother is one who is engaged as a brotherly companion [having consented to become so.†]. An associate in holiness is one appertaining to the same hermitage. Being a spiritual companion, and belonging to the same hermitage, he is a spiritual brother associate in holiness.

6. In default of those heirs respectively, an associate in holiness is the successor.

7. Objection. They can have no property by inheritance, being pronounced disqualified by Vasishtha; nor any property acquired by themselves; being incapable of acquisitions, as shown by Gautama, &c.

But, on failure of these, (namely the preceptor and the rest,) any one associated in holiness takes the goods; even though sons and other natural heirs exist.

ANNOTATIONS.

4. A yati or ascetic.] The term 'ascetic' is in this translation used for the yati or saṃyāsi; and 'hermit' or 'anchorite' for the vānaprastha. In former translations, as in the version of Manu by Sir William Jones, the two last terms were applied severally to the two orders of devotion.

* Subodhini. † Subodhini. ‡ Vasishtha, 17. 43. Vide infra. Sect. 10. § 3.
§ Bālān-bhaṣṭa. || Gautama, 3. 9.
3. The answer is, a hermit may have property: for the text [of Yājñavalkya] expresses “The hermit may make a beard of things sufficient for a day, a month, six months, or a year; and, in the month of Agni, he should abandon [the residue of] what has been collected.” The ascetic too has clothes, books and other requisite articles; for a passage [of the Vedas] directs, that “he should wear clothes to cover his privy parts;” and a text [of law] prescribes, that “he should take the requisites for his austerities and his sandals.” The professed student likewise has clothes to cover his body; and he possesses also other effects.

9. It was therefore proper to explain the partition or inheritance of such property.

SECTION IX.

On the reunion of kinsmen after partition.

1. Yājñavalkya declares the preferable right of the re-united parcener, before the widow, &c.

2. Explanation of re-united parcener.

3. That cannot take place with any person indifferently; but only with a father, a brother, or a paternal uncle: as Yvimahapati declares. “He, who, being once separated, dwells again through affection with his father, brother, or paternal uncle, is termed re-united.”

4. The deceased’s share must be given to his posthumous son; or, if there be none, may be retained by the re-united parcener.

ANNOTATIONS.

4. Or, on failure of male issue, he, and not the widow, &c. shall take the inheritance.) The singular number is here indeterminate. Therefore, if there be two or more re-united parcers, they shall divide the estate. A maintenance must be allowed to the widows. Bālam-bhāṣa.

* Yājñavalkya, 3. 47. See Manu, 6. 15. † Bālam-bhāṣa.
‡ Bālam-bhāṣa. § Yājñavalkya, 3. 129.
5. A limitation of the preceding rule is contained in the sequel of the text.

5. The author states an exception to the rule, that a re-united brother shall keep the share of his re-united co-heir: "But an uterine [or whole] brother shall thus retain or deliver the allotment of his uterine relation."*

6. The words "re-united brother" and "re-united co-heir" are understood. Hence the construction, as in the preceding part of the text, is this: The allotment of a re-united brother of the whole blood, who is deceased, shall be delivered, by the surviving re-united brother of the whole blood, to a son born subsequently. But, on failure of such issue, he shall retain it. Thus, if there be brothers of the whole blood and half blood, an uterine [or whole] brother, being a re-united parencer, not a half brother who is so, takes the estate of the re-united uterine brother. This is an exception to what had been before said (§ 1.)

7. Next, in answer to the inquiry, who shall take the succession when a re-united parencer dies leaving no male issue, and there exists a whole brother not re-united, as well as a half brother who was associated with the deceased; the author delivers a reason why both shall take and divide the estate. "A half brother, being again associated, may take the succession, not a half brother though not re-united: but one, united [by blood, though not by co-parceny,] may obtain the property; and not [exclusively] the son of a different mother."†

8. A half brother, (meaning one born of a rival wife,) being a re-united parencer, takes the estate; but a half brother, who was not re-united, does not obtain the goods. Thus, by the direct provisions of the text, and by the exception, re-union is shown to be a reason for a half brother's succession.

9. The term "not re-united" is connected also with what follows: and hence, even one who was not again associated, may take the effects of a deceased re-united parencer. Who is he? The author replies: "one united;" that is, one united by the identity of the womb [in which

ANNOTATIONS.

6. A son born subsequently.] The widow's pregnancy not having been apparent at the time of the partition.

7. "A half brother, being again associated, &c."] The text admits of different interpretations besides variations in the reading. See Jīmūta-vādāna, C. 11, Sect. 5. § 13.—14.

9. The term "not re-united" is connected also with what follows.] It is connected with both phrases, like a crow looking two ways at once. Hence it constitutes, with what follows, another sentence. Subodhini.

* Yājñāvalkya, 2, 129.
† Yājñāvalkya, 2, 130.
he was conceived; in other words, an uterine or whole brother. It
is thus declared, that relation by the whole blood is a reason for the
succession of the brother, though not re-united in co-parcenery.

10. The term "united" likewise is connected with what follows:
and here it signifies re-united [as a co-parcener.] The
words "not the son of a different mother" must be
interpreted by supplying the affirmative particle (eva)
understood. Though he be a re-united parcener, yet,
being issue of a different mother, he shall not exclusively take the
estate of his associated co-heir.

11. Thus, by the occurrence of the word "though" (aṇī) in one
sentence ("though not re-united," &c. § 7.) and by the
denial implied in the restrictive affirmation (eva "exclu-
sively,") understood in the other, ("one united may
take the property, and not exclusively the son of a dif-
f erent mother;") it is shown, that a whole brother not
re-united, and a half brother being re-united, shall take and share the
estate: for the reasons of both rights may subsist at the same instant.

12. This is made clear by Manu, who, after promising partition
among re-united parceners ("If brethren, once divided
and living again together as parceners, make a second
partition;"*) declares "should the eldest or youngest
of several brothers be deprived of his allotment at the distribution, or
should any one of them die, his share shall not be lost: but his uterine
brothers and sisters, and such brothers as were re-united after a sepa-
ration, shall assemble together and divide his share equally."†

13. Among re-united brothers, if the eldest, the youngest or the
middlemost, at the delivery of shares, (for the indeclin-
able termination of the word denotes any case;) that
is, at the time of making a partition, lose or forfeit
his share by his entrance into another order [that of a hermit or
ascetic,] or by the guilt of sacrilege, or by any other disqualification;
or if he be dead; his allotment does not lapse, but shall be set apart.
The meaning is, that the re-united parceners shall not exclusively take
it. The author states the appropriation of the share so reserved: "His

ANNOTATIONS.

One united by the identity of the womb.] In like manner, a father, though not
re-united with the family, shall take a share of the property of his son; and a son,
though not re-united, shall receive a share of the estate of his father, from a re-united
parcener. This, according to the author of the Subodhini, is implied: the Veda de-
scribing the wife as becoming a mother to her husband, who is identified with his off-
spring. But Bālam-bhaṭṭa does not allow the inference.

11. The reasons of both rights may subsist at the same instant.] The re-union
of the half brother in family partnership, and the whole brother's relation by blood.
Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

13. They inherit the estate and divide it in equal shares.] This supposes the
brothers of the half blood to belong to the same tribe. But, if they are of different

* Manu, 9, 210. † Manu, 9, 211-212. ‡ Bālam-bhaṭṭa.
uterine brothers and sisters, &c.” (§ 12.) Brothers of the whole blood, or by the same mother, though not re-united, share that allotment so set apart. Even though they had gone to a different country, still, returning thence and assembling together, they share it: and that “equally;” not by a distribution of greater and less shares. Brothers of the half blood, who were re-united after separation, and sisters by the same mother, likewise participate. They inherit the estate and divide it in equal shares.

SECTION X.

On exclusion from inheritance(a).

1. The author states an exception to what has been said by him respecting the succession of the son, the widow and other heirs, as well as the re-united partcen. “An impotent person, an outcaste, and his issue, one lame, a madman, an idiot(b), a blind man, and a person afflicted with an incurable disease, as well as others [similarly disqualified,] must be maintained; excluding them, however, from participation.”

2. “An impotent person,” one of the third gender (or neuter sex.) “An outcaste;” one guilty of sacrilege or other heinous crime. “His issue;” the offspring of an outcaste. “Lame;” deprived of the use of his feet. “A madman;” affected by any of the various sorts of insanity proceeding from air, bile, or phlegm, from delirium, or from planetary influence. “An idiot;” a person deprived of the internal faculty: meaning one incapable of discriminating right from wrong. “Blind;” destitute of the visual organ. “Afflicted with an incurable disease;” affected by an irremediable distemper, such as marasmus or the like.

ANNOTATIONS.

tribes, the shares are four, three, two or one, in the order of the classes; since there is no reason for restricting that rule of distribution. Bālam-bhaṣṭa.

1. “An impotent person, an outcaste and his issue.”] The initial words are transposed by Jñāta-vāhāna. C. 5. § 10.

“An impotent person;] Whether naturally so, or by castration. Bālam-bhaṣṭa.

The offspring of an outcaste;] Of one who has not performed the requisite penance and expiation. Bālam-bhaṣṭa.

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 141.

(a) See 2 Strange, H. L. 126: 1 Morl. Dig. 339, 438.—Ed.

(b) As to the incapacity of an idiot to inherit. See 2. A. 28 of 1862, 1 Mad. II. C. Rep. 314.—Ed
3. Under the term "others" are comprehended one who has entered into an order of devotion, an enemy to his father, a sinner in an inferior degree, and a person deaf, dumb, or wanting any organ. Thus Vaisishtha says, "They, who have entered into another order, are debarred from shares."* Nārada also declares, "An enemy to his father, an outcaste, an impotent person, and one who is addicted to vice, take no shares of the inheritance even though they be legitimate; much less, if they be sons of the wife by an appointed kinsman."† Manu likewise ordains, "Impotent persons and outcastes are excluded from a share of the heritage; and so are persons born blind and deaf, as well as madmen, idiots, the dumb, and those who have lost a sense [or a limb]."‡

4. Those who have lost a sense or a limb.] Any person, who is deprived of an organ [of sense or action] by disease or other cause, is said not to have lost that sense or limb.

5. These persons (the impotent man and the rest) are excluded from participation. They do not share the estate. They must be supported by an allowance of food and raiment only; and the penalty of degradation is incurred, if they be not maintained. For Manu says, "But if it be fit, that a wise man should give all of them food and raiment without stint to the best of his power; for he, who gives it not, shall be deemed an outcaste."§ "Without stint" signifies for life.

6. They are debarred of their shares, if their disqualification arose before the division of the property. But one already separated from his co-heirs, is not deprived of his allotment.

ANNOTATIONS.

3. "They, who have entered into another order." Into one of devotion. The orders of devotion are, 1st, that of the professed or perpetual student; 2d, that of the hermit; 3d, the last order of that of the ascetic. Bālam-bhūta.

5. "A wise man should give all of them food and raiment." Other authorities (as Devul and Bauddhāyana) except the outcaste and his offspring. That exception not being here made, it is to be inferred, that one whose offence may be expiated and who is disposed to perform the enjoined penance, should be maintained; not one whose crime is inexcusable. Bālam-bhūta.

6. If their disqualification arose before the division of the property.] The disqualification of the outcaste and the rest who are not excluded for natural defects, Bālam-bhūta.

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* Vaisishtha, 17. 43.
† Nārada, 13. 21.
‡ Manu, 9. 301.
§ Manu, 9. 20.
7. If the defect be removed by medicaments or other means [as penance and atonement*] at a period subsequent to partition, the right of participation takes effect, by analogy [to the case of a son born after separation.] "When the sons have been separated, one, who is afterwards born of a woman equal in class, shares the distribution."†

8. The masculine gender is not here used restrictively in speaking of an outcaste and the rest. It must be therefore understood, that the wife, the daughter, the mother, or any other female, being disqualified for any of the defects which have been specified, is likewise excluded from participation.

9. Sons shall share, if free from similar disqualifications. So Yājñavalkya.

10. The sons of these persons, whether they be legitimate offspring or issue of the wife, are entitled to allotments, or are rightful partakers of shares; provided they be faultless or free from defects which should bar their participation, such as impotency and the like.

11. Of these [two descriptions of offspring§] the impotent man may have that termed issue of the wife; the rest may have legitimate progeny likewise. The specific mention of "legitimate" issue and "offspring of the wife" is intended to forbid the adoption of other sons.

12. Their daughters must be supported, until married; as Yājñavalkya declares.

13. Their daughters, or the female children of such persons, must be supported, until they be disposed of in marriage. Under the suggestion of the word "likewise," the expenses of their nuptials must be also defrayed.

14. The author adds a distinct maxim respecting the wives of disqualified persons: "Their childless wives, conducting themselves aright, must be supported; but such, as are unchaste, should be expelled; and so indeed should those, who are perverse."†

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* Bālam-bhūta.
‡ Yājñavalkya, 2. 143.
§ Bālam-bhūta.
|| Yājñavalkya, 2. 143. ‡ Yājñavalkya, 2. 143.
15. The wives of those persons, being destitute of male issue
and being correct in their conduct, or behaving virtu-
ously, must be supported or maintained. But, if un-
chaste, they must be expelled; and so may those, who
are perverse. These last may indeed be expelled: but they must be
supported, provided they be not unchaste. For a maintenance must
not be refused solely on account of perverseness.

SECTION XI.

On the separate property of a woman.

1. After briefly propounding the division of wealth left by the
husband and wife, ("Let sons divide equally both the
effects and the debts, after the demise of their two pa-
rents."{*}) the partition of a man's goods has been de-
cscribed at large. The author, now intending to explain fully the
distribution of a woman's property, begins by setting forth the nature of it:
"What was given to a woman by the father, the mother, the
husband or a brother, or received by her at the nuptial fire, or presented
to her on her husband's marriage to another wife, as also any other
[separate acquisition] is denominated a woman's property."†

2. That, which was given by the father, by the mother, by the
husband, or by a brother; and that, which was pre-
sented [to the bride] by the maternal uncles and the
rest [as paternal uncles, maternal aunts, &c.] at the
time of the wedding; before the nuptial fire; and a gift on a second
marriage, or gratuity on account of supersession, as will be subse-
quently explained. ("To a woman whose husband marries a second wife, let
him give an equal sum as a compensation for the supersession."(c) § 34.)
and also property(6) which she may have acquired by inheritance, pur-

ANNOTATIONS.

1. As also any other separate acquisition. In Jñātā-vāhana's quotation of the
text, (C. 4. Sect. 1. § 13.) the conjunctive and pleonastic particles chaiva (cha-eva) are
here substituted for the supplementary term ādyā. That reading is censured by Bālam-
bhāṣṭa.

2. Before the nuptial fire.] Near it. Subodhini.

On account of supersession.] Supersession is the contracting of a second mar-
riage through the influence of passion, while a first wife lives, who was married to fulfill
religious obligations. Subodhini.

Property which she may have acquired by inheritance.] The commentator, Bālam-
bhāṣṭa, defends his author against the writers of the eastern school (Jñātā-vāhana, &c.)
on this point. Wealth, devolving on a woman by inheritance, is not classed by the
authorities of that school with 'woman's property.' See Jñātā-vāhana, C. 4. and C.

† Jñātāvākyu, 2. 144.
‡ Bālam-Bhāṣṭa.
(c) See 1 Strange, H. L. 53, 53.—Ed.
(6) Quære movetque property: 3 Marcl. Dig. 180: Dāya-bhāga xi. 1.—Ed.
chase, partition, seizure or finding, are denominated by Manu and the rest 'woman's property.'(a)

3. Woman's property is not a technical expression.

3. The term 'woman's property' conforms, in its import, with its etymology, and is not technical: for, if the literal sense be admissible, a technical acceptance is improper.

4. The enumeration of six sorts of woman's property by Manu ("What was given before the nuptial fire, what was presented in the bridal procession, what has been bestowed in token of affection or respect, and what has been received by her from her brother, her mother, or her father, are denominated the sixfold property of a woman,") is intended, not as a restriction of a greater number, but as a denial of a less.

4. Manu's enumeration of six sorts denies a less number, and a greater.

5. Definitions of presents given before the nuptial fire and so forth have been delivered by Kätýayana: "What is given to women at the time of their marriage, near the nuptial fire, is celebrated by the wise as women's property bestowed before the nuptial fire. That, again, which a woman receives while she is conducted from her father's house to her husband's dwelling, is instanced as the property of a woman, under the name of gift presented in the bridal procession. Whatever has been given to her through affection by her mother-in-law or by her father-in-law, or has been offered to her as a token of respect, is denominated an affectionate present. That, which is received by a married woman or by a maiden, in the house of her husband or of her father, from her brother or from her parents, is termed a kind gift.'

ANNOTATIONS.

3. The term 'woman's property' is not technical.] This is contrary to the doctrine of Jñātā-vāhana, C. 4.

4. "Bestowed in token of affection or respect."] This passage is read differently in the Ratnākara and by Jñātā-vāhana (C. 4. Sect. 1. § 4.) It is here translated conformably with Bālām-bhaṣṭā's interpretation grounded on the subsequent text of Kätýayana (§ 5.), where two reasons of an affectionate gift are stated: one, simple affection; the other, respect shown by an obeisance at the woman's feet.


"Offered to her as a token of respect."] Given to her at the time of making an obeisance at her feet. Smṛti-chandrika.

"Denominated an affectionate present."] This reading is followed in the Smṛti-chandrika, Vṛamottodaya, &c. But the Ratnākara, Chintāmāni, and Vivāda-chandra read 'denominated an acquisition through loveliness;' Švānavyājitam instead of priti-dattam.

"From her brother or from her parents."] The Kulpātara reads "from her husband." See Jñātā-vāhana, C. 4. Sect. 2. § 21.

"Termed a kind gift."] So the commentary of Bālām-bhaṣṭā explains saudāvika, as bearing the same sense with its etymous saudāvya. He censures the interpretation which Jñātā-vāhana has given (C. 4. Sect. 1. § 22.)

*(a) See H. Morici, Dig. 331, 332. 2 Ibid. 450.—Ed.
Besides [the author says,] "That which has been given to her kindred; as well as her fee or gratuity, or any thing bestowed after marriage." What is given to a damsel by her kindred; by the relations of her mother, or those of her father. The gratuity, for the receipt of which a girl is given in marriage. What is bestowed or given after marriage, or subsequently to the nuptials.

7. It is said by Kātyāyana, "What has been received by a woman from the family of her husband at a time posterior to her marriage, is called a gift subsequent; and so is that, which is similarly received from the family of her father." It is celebrated as woman's property; for this passage is connected with that which had gone before. (§ 5.)

8. A woman's property has been thus described. The author next propounds the distribution of it: "Her kinsmen take it, if she die without issue."†

9. If a woman die "without issue," that is, leaving no progeny; in other words, having no daughter, nor daughter's daughter, nor daughter's son, nor son, nor son's son; the woman's property, as above described, shall be taken by her kinsmen; namely her husband and the rest, as will be [forthwith] explained.

10. The kinsmen have been declared generally to be competent to succeed to a woman's property. The author now distinguishes different heirs according to the diversity of the marriage ceremonies. "The property of a childless woman, married in the form denominated Brāhma, or in any of the four [unblamed modes of marriage] goes to her husband; but, if she leave progeny, it will go to her [daughter's] daughters; and, in other forms of marriage [as the Aṣura, &c.] it goes to her father [and mother, on failure of her own issue."§

11. Of a woman dying without issue as before stated, and who had become a wife by any of the four modes of marriage denominated Brāhma, Daiva, Arsha and Prājñapatya, the [whole] property, as before described, be-

ANNOTATIONS.

6. The gratuity, for the receipt of which a girl is given in marriage.] This relates to a marriage in the form termed Aṣura or the like. Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

7. Similarly received from the family of her father.] The Ratnākara reads 'from her own family'; Jīmūṭa-vāhaka, 'from the family of her kindred.' See Jīmūṭa-vāhaka, C. 4. Sect. 1. § 2.

11. Dying without issue as before stated.] Without any of the five descendants above mentioned (§ 9.) Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

† Yājñavalkya, 2. 145.
‡ Yājñavalkya, 2. 145.
§ Yājñavalkya, 2. 146.
|| Bālam-bhaṭṭa.
forms of marriage, the husband is first entitled to the succession; after him, his nearest of kin.

In the four other forms of marriage, the parents inherit; and first the mother; after her, the father; failing them, their next of kin.

12. In all forms of marriage, if the woman leave progeny; that is, if she have issue; her property devolves on her daughters. In this place, the term “daughters,” grand-daughters are signified; for the immediate female descendants are expressly mentioned in a preceding passage: “the daughters share the residue of their mother’s property, after payment of her debts.”†

13. Hence, if the mother be dead, daughters take her property in the first instance: and here, in the case of competition between married and maiden daughters, the unmarried take the succession; but, on failure of them, the married daughters: and here again, in the case of competition between such as are provided and those who are unenowed, the unenowed take the succession first; but, on failure of them, those who are endowed. Thus Gautama says “A woman’s property goes to her daughters unmarried, or unprovided;”‡ “or provided,” as is implied by the conjunctive particle in the text. “Unprovided” are such as are destitute of wealth or without issue.

14. But this [rule, for the daughter’s succession to the mother’s goods,§] is exclusive of the fee or gratuity. For that goes to brothers of the whole blood, conformably with the text of Gautama: “The sister’s fee belongs to the uterine brothers: after [the death of] the mother.”¶

ANNOTATIONS.

12. In all forms of marriage.] Several variations in the reading of this passage are noticed by Bālam-bhaṭṭa: as sarvēśvarī api, or sarvēśvarī eva, or sarvēśvin. There is only a shade of difference in the interpretation.

14. “After the death of the mother.”] This version is according to the interpretation given in the Satapadhī; which agrees with that of the scholiast of Gautama, the Kalpadaru and other authorities. But the text is read and explained differently by Jīmānā-vādāna. (C. 4. Sect. 3. § 27.)

Bālam-bhaṭṭa understands by the term ‘mother,’ in this place, the woman herself, or in short the sister, after whose death her fee or nuptial gratuity goes to her brothers.

‡ Gautama, 28, 22. Vide supra. C. 1. Sect. 3. § 11. § Bālam-bhaṭṭa, || Gautama, 23, 23 (c) See 2 Strange, H. 1. 412.—Ed.
15. After daughters, grand-daughters in the female line inherit.

16. If there be a multitude of these [grand-daughters;†] children of different mothers, and unequal in number, shares should be allotted to them through their mothers, as directed by Gantama: “Or the partition may be according to the mothers; and a particular distribution may be made in the respective sets.”‡

17. But if there be daughters as well as daughter’s daughters, a trifle only is to be given to the grand-daughters. So Manu declares: “Even to the daughters of those daughters, something should be given, as may be fit, from the assets of their maternal grandmother, on the score of natural affection.”§

18. In default of those grand-daughters; the sons of daughters inherit; as hinted by Nárada.

19. After them, the male issue succeeds.

This is confirmed by Manu.

18. On failure also of daughter’s daughters, the daughter’s sons are entitled to the succession. Thus Nárada says, “Let daughters divide their mother’s wealth; or, on failure of daughters, their male issue.”|| For the pronoun refers to the contiguous term “daughters.”

19. If there be no grandsons in the female line, sons take the property: for it has been already declared, “the [male] issue succeeds in their default.”¶ Manu likewise shows the right of sons, as well as of daughters, to their mother’s effects: “When the mother is dead, let all the uterine brothers and the uterine sisters equally divide the maternal estate.”**

ANNOTATIONS.

16. Children of different mothers, and unequal in number.] Where the daughters were numerous, but are not living; and their female children are unequal in number, one having left a single daughter; another, two; and a third, three; how shall the maternal grandmother’s property be distributed among her grand-daughters? Having put this question, the author reminds the readers of the mode of distribution of a paternal grandfather’s estate among his grandsons. (C. 1. Sect. 5.) Subodhini.

18. “Their male issue.”] Several variations in the reading of the last term are noticed in the commentary of Bālam-bhaṭṭa: making the term either singular or plural, and putting it in the first or in the seventh case. He deduces, however, the same meaning from these different readings.

The pronoun refers to the contiguous term.] Jīmūtī-vāhana, citing this passage for the succession of sons rather than of grandsons, seems to have understood the pronoun as referring to the remote word ‘mother.’ See Jīmūtī-vāhana. C. 4. Sect. 2 § 13.

19. “Let all the uterine brothers equally divide.”] In the Kalpataru the text is read “let all the sons by the same mother divide;” sarve putrāḥ saucādaraḥ instead of sumam sarve saucādarāḥ.

20. All the uterine brothers should divide the maternal estate equally; and so should sisters by the same mothers. Such is the construction; and the meaning is, not that brothers and sisters share together; for reciprocation is not indicated, since the abridged form of the conjunctive compound has not been employed: but the conjunctive particle (ehi) is here very properly used with reference to the person making the partition; as in the example, Devadatta practises agriculture, and so does Yajnavalkya.

21. "Equally" is specified (§ 19) to forbid the allotment of deductions [to the eldest and so forth.] The whole blood is mentioned to exclude the half blood.

22. But, though springing from a different mother, the daughter of a rival wife, being superior by class, shall take the property of a childless woman who belongs to an inferior tribe. Or, on failure of the step-daughter, her issue shall succeed. So Manu declares: "The wealth of a woman, which has been in any manner given to her by her father, let the Brāhmaṇa damsel take; or let it belong to her offspring."

ANNOTATIONS.

20. Since the abridged form of the conjunctive compound has not been employed.] Nouns coalesce and form a single word denominated dvandva or conjunctive compound, when the sense of the conjunctive particle (ehi 'and') is denoted. Pāṇini, 2. 2. 39. Vide supra Sect. 3. § 2.

The import of the particle, here intended, is either reciprocation (itaretara) explained to be the union, in regard to a single matter, of things specifically different, but mutually related, and mixed or associated, though contrasted; or it is cumulation (sahāra) explained as the union of such things, by an association, in which contrast is not marked. The other senses of the conjunctive particle are: assembly (samuchchaya) or the gathering together of two or more things independent of each other, but assembled in idea with reference to some common action or circumstance; and superaddition (anvāchāra) or the connexion of a secondary and unessential with a primary and principal one, through a separate action or circumstance consequent to it. In the two last senses of the conjunctive particle, there is not such a connexion of the terms as authorizes their coalescence to form a compound term. Kaiyata, Padamanjari, &c.

If reciprocation, as above explained, were meant to be indicated in the text of Manu (§ 19.), the word bhṛatā "brother" would have been used, inflected, however, in the dual number to denote "brother and sister" (Pāṇini, 1. 2. 68.); or else "children," or some generic term, would have been employed in the plural (Pāṇini, 1. 2. 64). But the text is not so expressed. Consequently reciprocation is not indicated. Subodhini and Bālam-bhaṣṭa.

The conjunctive particle is here very properly used.] 'It is employed in one of the acceptations, which do not admit of nouns coalescing in a compound term: namely in that of superaddition, as in the example which follows. D. practises agriculture; and so does Y. 'Brothers share equally; so do sisters.'

With reference to the person making the partition.] "Another reading of this passage is noticed in the commentary of Bālam-bhaṣṭa: 'with the import of superaddition relatively to the person who makes the partition;' vibhāga-kartāvya' anvāchārya api, instead of vibhāga-kartāvya anvāchārya api.

* Manu, 9. 108.
23. The mention of a Brāhmaṇī includes any superior class. Hence the daughter of a Kṣatriyā wife takes the goods of a childless Vaiṣya; [and the daughter of a Brāhmaṇī, Kṣatriyā or Vaiṣya inherits the property of a Čūḍrā,]*

24. On failure of sons, grandsons inherit their paternal grandmother’s wealth. For Gautama says, “They who share the inheritance, must pay the debts.”† and the grandsons are bound to discharge the debts of their paternal grandmother; for the text expresses “Debts must be paid by sons and son’s sons.”‡

25. Next the husband and other heirs, as above-mentioned.

26. On failure of grandsons also, the husband and other relatives abovementioned∥ are successors to the wealth.

27. One, who has verbally given a damsels [in marriage] but retracts the gift, must be fined by the king, in proportion to the amount of the property or the magnitude of the offence; and according to the rank of the parties, their qualities,§ and other circumstances. This is applicable, if there be no sufficient motive for retracting the engagement. But, if there be good cause, he shall not be fined, since retraction is authorized in such a case. “The damsels, though betrothed, may be withheld, if a preferable suitor present himself.”**

28. Whatever has been expended, on account of the espousals, by the [intended] bridegroom, [or by his father, or guardian,++] for the gratification of his own or of the damsel’s relations, must be repaid in full, with interest, by the affiancer to the bridegroom.

ANNOTATIONS.

23. Hence the daughter of a Kṣatriyā wife takes the goods of a childless Vaiṣya.] This inference is contested by Čirākṣaṇa in his commentary on the Dīya-bhāga of Jīmuța-vāhāna.

24. The grandsons are bound to discharge the debts.] Since one text declares them liable for the debts; and the other provides, that the debts shall be paid by those who share the inheritance; it follows, that they share the heritage. Subodhinī, &c.

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* Subodhinī and Bālam-bhaṭṭā. † Gautama, 12. 32 ‡ Yājñavalkya, 2. 50. ∥ § 9—11. § Yājñavalkya, 2. 147. ¶ Bālam-bhaṭṭā. ** Yājñavalkya, 1. 65. †† Bālam-bhaṭṭā.
29. If the betrothed damsel die, the bridegroom's presents are returned to him; as directed by Yājñavalkya.

29. Should a damsel, any how allianced, die before the completion of the marriage, what is to be done in that case? The author replies, "If she die [after truth plighted] let the bridegroom take back the gifts which he had presented; paying however the charges on both sides."* 

30. If a betrothed damsel die, the bridegroom shall take the rings and other presents, or the nuptial gratuity, which had been previously given by him to the bride, "paying however the charges on both sides:" that is, clearing or discharging the expense which has been incurred both by the person who gave the damsel and by himself; he may take the residue. But her uterine brothers shall have the ornaments for the head, and other gifts, which may have been presented to the maiden by her maternal grandfather, [or her paternal uncle,†] or other relations; as well as the property, which may have been regularly inherited by her. For Baudhayana says: "The wealth of a deceased damsel, let the uterine brethren themselves take. On failure of them, it shall belong to the mother; or, if she be dead, to the father."‡

31. It has been declared, that the property of a woman leaving no issue, goes to her husband. The author now shows, that, in certain circumstances, a husband is allowed to take his wife's goods in her lifetime, and although she have issue: "A husband is not liable to make good the property of his wife taken by him in a famine, or for the performance of a duty, or during illness, or while under restraint." 

32. In a famine, for the preservation of the family, or at a time when a religious duty must indispensably be performed, or in illness, or "during restraint" or confinement in prison or under corporal penalties, the husband, being destitute of other funds and therefore taking his wife's property, is not liable to restore it.(b) But, if he seize it in any other manner [or under other circumstances,] he must make it good.

ANNOTATIONS:

29. Any how allianced.] By a religious rite, or by taking of hands, or in any other manner. Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

30. Clearing or discharging.] The common reading of the passage is vigamya "accounting;" but Bālam-bhaṭṭa rejects that reading, and substitutes vigamya "removing" or "discharging;"

He may take the residue.] The meaning is this: after deducting from the damsel's property, the amount which has been expended by the giver or acceptor of the maid, or by their fathers or other relations on both sides, in contemplation of the marriage, let the residue be delivered to the bridegroom. Subodhīnī.

32. Is not liable to restore it.] He is not positively required to make it good. Bālam-bhaṭṭa.

* Yājñavalkya, 2. 147. † Bālam-bhaṭṭa. ‡ Yājñavalkya, 2. 148.

(o) See 1 Strange, H, 1. 38.—Ed. (b) See 2 Strange, H, 1. 23, 23.—Ed.
33. No other person, but her husband, may take her property. Nārada and Manu denounced punishment against the offender.

34. A present made on her husband's marriage to another wife has been mentioned as a woman's property (§ 1.) The author describes such a present: "To a woman, whose husband marries a second wife, let him give an equal sum, [as a compensation] for the supersession, provided no separate property has been bestowed on her; but, if any have been assigned, let him allot half(a)."

35. She is said to be superseded, over whom a marriage is contracted. To a wife so superseded, as much should be given on account of the supersession, as is expended [in jewels and ornaments, or the like,§] for the second marriage: provided separate property had not been previously given to her by her husband; or by her father-in-law. But, if such property had been already bestowed on her, half the sum expended on the second marriage should be given(b). Here the word 'half' (ardha) does not intend an exact moiety. So much therefore should be paid, as will make the wealth, already conferred on her, equal to the prescribed amount of compensation. Such is the meaning.

SECTION XII.

On the Evidence of a Partition(c).

1. Having thus explained partition of heritage, the author next specifies the evidence by which it may be proved in a case of doubt. "When partition is denied, the fact

ANNOTATIONS.

35. Here the word half does not intend an exact moiety.] The term, as it stands in the original text, is not neuter, that it should signify an equal part or exact moiety: but it is masculine and signifies portion in general. (Amara: 1. 1. 2. 17) Subodhin.

Bālam-bhaṭṭa, citing a passage of the Mahābhārata to prove that ardha in the masculine signifies half; interprets the quotation from the Amara-Kosha (1. 1. 2. 17.) as exhibiting ardha, masculine and neuter, in the sense of moiety. He therefore rejects the foregoing explanation, and considers the word 'half' as employed in the text for an indefinite sense.

* Nārada, as cited by Bālam-bhaṭṭa; but not found in his institutes.
§ Bālam-bhaṭṭa. (a) See 1 Morl. Dig. 259.—Ed.
(b) See 1 Strange, H. L. 53.—Ed. (c) See 2 Strange, H. L. 394, 396.—Ed.
pause of partition, if doubted, may be ascertained by the evidence of kinsmen, relatives and witnesses, and by written proof, or by separate possession of house or field."

2. If partition be denied or disputed, the fact may be known and of the text.

3. Other proofs of separation are stated by Nārada. The religious duties performed separately from them, are pronounced by Nārada to be tokens of a partition. "If a question arise among co-heirs in regard to the fact of partition, it must be ascertained by the evidence of kinsmen, by the record of the distribution, or by separate transaction of affairs. The religious duty of unseparated brethren is single. When partition indeed has been made, religious duties become separate for each of them."§

4. Other signs of previous separation are specified by the same author:"Separated not unseparated brethren may in a subsequent passage reciprocally bear testimony, become sureties, bestow gifts, and accept presents."

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**ANNOTATIONS.**

2. "By the testimony of kinsmen."] Or rather strangers belonging to the same tribe with the parties. Bālam-bhāta.

3. "By the record of the distribution."] Another reading is noticed by Bālam-bhāta: "by occupancy or by a writing;" bhoga-kechhyena instead of bhāga-kechhyena. See Nārada, 13. 36. 37.

§ Nārada, 12 - 36. 37.

\* Yājñavalkya, 2. 130.

\† In the preceding book on Evidence.

\‡ Manu, 3. 60.

\§ Nārada, 12. 39
THE

DÁYA-KRAMA-SANGRAHA.

AN

ORIGINAL TREATISE

ON THE

HINDU LAW OF INHERITANCE.

TRANSLATED BY

P. M. WYNCH, ESQ.

Calcutta.

PRINTED BY PHILIP PERCIVAL, AT THE HINDÚSTÁNI PRESS.

1818.
PREFACE.

The translation of the following Treatise on the Hindu Law of Inheritance was commenced, during a study of the Sanskrit language and Hindu Law; and although sometimes ago, completed, the publication has been unavoidably retarded, by circumstances connected with the performance of official duty.

Of the Treatise itself, Mr. H. Colebrooke in the preface to his translation of the Dāya-Bhāga and Mitāksharā, has observed: "An original Treatise by Čri Krishna Tarkānākāri, entitled Dāya-Krama-Sangraha, contains a good compendium of the law of inheritance, according to Jimīta-Vāhana's text, as expounded in his commentary of the Dāya-Bhāga."

The publication of the original, will be sufficiently justified by this high authority, and under the sanction of it, the Translation was undertaken.

Of the necessity of a careful and diligent study of the law of inheritance, the learned gentleman above mentioned, has justly remarked: "In proportion as the law of succession is arbitrary and irreducible to fixed and general principles, it is complex, and intricate in its provisions, and requires on the part of those entrusted with the administration of justice, a previous preparation by study; for its maxims cannot be rightly understood, when only hastily consulted as occasions arise."

Under an impression, therefore, that advantage may be derived from the publication of a Compendium on this subject, unembarrassed by argumentative discussion, and unencumbered by lengthened disquisition, this Work is offered, for the purpose of affording assistance to those entrusted with the due administration of justice in the Province of Bengal, who by want of leisure, or other causes, are debarred from an attentive perusal of the admirable translation of the elaborate work of Jimīta-Vāhana, or from a recourse to the original.

Should it however, serve but as a guide to the study of either—should the English judicial officer through its aid, be better enabled to determine the accuracy, and in consequence, more readily to detect the fallacy of an opinion delivered by the Pandit of his Court, the time devoted to this publication, will not have been spent in vain.

The mere labour of translation has been comparatively insignificant, the Treatise being short, and the style of the original, simple and easy.

A Tabular Sketch, exhibiting the successors to the property of one deceased, and the order in which they are respectively entitled to inherit, has been added to the first Chapter. The numbers affixed in the Table, correspond with those of the marginal notes, in that Chapter—an arrangement, by which it was intended to facilitate reference.

The versions of the texts of the divine Legislator, and of the Sages of Antiquity, cited in this Treatise, have been adopted from the works of Sir William Jones and Mr. Henry Colebrooke.
DÁYA-KRAMA-SANGRAHA.

AN ORIGINAL TREATISE

ON THE HINDU LAW OF INHERITANCE.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE ORDER OF SUCCESSION TO THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED MAN.

SECTION I.

Right of Succession by the Son, Grandson, and Great-grandson.

Order of succession.

1. The order of succession to be observed by heirs in regard to the property of a deceased man, is as follows:

2. First, his legitimate son succeeds in conformity with this text. "After the death of the father and mother, the brethren being assembled, must divide equally the paternal estate: for they have not power over it, while their parents live,"* and other texts of a like import which declare the right of the son to succeed on the decease of the father.

* Manu, 9, 704.
3. In default of the son, the grandson takes the inheritance; and failing him the great grandson. But a grandson(D) whose father(B) is dead, and a great-grandson(F) whose father(E) and grandfather(C) are dead, participate equally in the inheritance with the son(A)* for they without distinction confer equal benefits on the deceased owner of the property, by the presentation to him of funeral offerings at solemn obsequies.

4. But during the life-time of their parents, neither the grandson, nor the great-grandson, are entitled to the inheritance, since they do not confer any benefits on the deceased by the presentation of the funeral offering at solemn obsequies.

SECTION 2.

Widow's right of Succession.

1. In default of the grandson and great-grandson, the widow succeeds to the estate, in conformity with the text of Yajnavalkya. "The wife and the daughters, also both parents, brothers likewise and their sons, gentiles, cognates, a pupil and a fellow-student: On failure of the first among these, the next in order is indeed heir to the estate of one who departed for heaven, leaving no male issue. This rule extends to all classes."

Rule to be observed by the widow in regard to the estate of her deceased husband.

2. Here however, a particular rule is to be observed.

3. The wife is only to enjoy the estate of her deceased husband—she must not make a gift, mortgage, or sale of it. So, Katyayana declares, "Let the childless widow preserving unsullied the bed of her lord, and abiding with her venerable protector, enjoy with moderation the property until her death. "After her, let the heirs take it."

* Owner died, leaving

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4. "Abiding with her venerable protector, that is, having settled with her father-in-law, in her husband's family, let her so long as she lives, enjoy her husband's estate, and not (as she is entitled to do with her peculiar property;) make at will a gift, mortgage, or sale of it.

5. On her decease, those daughters who would be entitled to the succession in default of the wife, take the estate; and not the kinsmen, who by reason of their inferiority to the daughters, and the rest of the heirs, cannot obstruct their claim. Thus it is written in the "Dána Dhárma:" "For women, the heritage of their husbands is pronounced applicable to use.—Let not women on any account make waste of their husband's wealth."—This use even should not be made by wearing delicate attire, or indulging in other luxuries: but since a widow benefits her husband by the preservation of her body, the use of property for the attainment of this object is permitted.—In like manner, she may make a gift or other disposal for the sake of completing the funeral rites of her husband. Accordingly the expression "waste," is particularly made use of in the text above cited, and in other texts likewise. "Let not women make waste." By "waste," is meant expense unproductive of benefit to the owner of the property.

6. But, if the widow be unable to subsist otherwise, she may mortgage the property; and, if even then unable, she may sell it.

7. She should give to the paternal uncles, and to the other relations of her husband, presents in proportion to the wealth, for the sake of his funeral rites; Viśhpaṭi has ordered it by the following text. With presents offered to his manes, and by pious liberality, let her honour the paternal uncles of her husband; his spiritual pastor, and daughter's sons, the children of his sisters, and his maternal uncles; also ancient and unprotected persons, and females of the family." By the term "paternal uncle," is meant any relation of her husband included within the degree of relationship termed "Saṃśa." The term "daughter's sons," relates to the progeny of her husband's daughter. By "sister's sons," the descendants of her husband's sister's son are indicated. "Maternal uncles," that is the maternal uncles of her husband. On these and on the others should she bestow presents, and not on the members of the family of her own father, while these persons are living; for then the specification of "paternal uncles," and the rest would be superfluous.—With their consent, however, she may make gifts to the kindred of her own father and mother, as declared by Náraṇa. "When the husband is deceased, his kin are the guardians of his childless widow.—In the disposal of the property and care of herself, as well as in her maintenance, they have full power. But if her husband's family be extinct, or contain no male, or be helpless, the kin of her own father are the guardians of the widow, if there be no relations of her husband within the degree of a Saṃśa."—"In the disposal of property," that is by gift, &c., the wife is liable to the control of the family of her husband, after the death of her husband and on failure of sons;—So it is declared in the Dáya-Bhága. In the present time a widow is exclusively of the same class with her late husband, since marriage with a woman of unequal class is prohibited during the Kali, or iron age.
SECTION 3.

On the right of the Daughter.

1. In default of the wife, the daughter next succeeds in conformity with the following text of Devala, (and other texts likewise.) "His own maiden daughter, born in holy wedlock, shall like a son take the inheritance of him who dies without male issue." "His own," that is of the same tribe; "Born in holy wedlock," legitimate.

2. The unmarried daughter is first entitled to the succession. Parásará declares, "Let a maiden daughter take the heritage of one who dies leaving no male issue; or, if there be no such daughter, a married one shall inherit.

3. The following special rule must be here observed, namely, that, if a maiden daughter in whom the succession had once vested, and who was subsequently married, should die without having borne issue, the married sister who has, and the sister who is likely to have male issue, inherit together the estate which had so vested in her. It does not become the property of her husband or others, for their right is exclusively to a woman's separate property (Stri-dhana.)

4. But, if there be no maiden daughter, then the daughter who has, and the daughter who is likely to have male issue, are together entitled to the succession, and on failure of either one of them, the other takes the heritage in conformity with the text of Parásará above cited;—also the text which says "Being of equal class, and married to a man of a like tribe, and being virtuous and devoted to obedience, she [namely, the daughter] whether appointed or not appointed to continue the male line, shall take the property of her father who leaves no son, [nor wife;]" and because both descriptions of daughters [appointed, or not appointed] confer without distinction benefits on the deceased owner, by presenting to him through their sons' funeral oblations at solemn obsequies.

5. The doctrine maintained by Dikshita, and respected by the author of the Dáya-bháma, namely, That in default of daughters having, and daughters likely to have male issue, daughters who are barren, or widows, destitute of male issue, are incompetent to take the inheritance, because they cannot benefit the deceased owner by offering [through the medium of sons] the funeral oblation at solemn obsequies, should be understood.
SECTION 4.

On the right of the Daughter's Son.

1. In default of all daughters [who are entitled to succeed,] the daughter's son takes the inheritance according to the text, "Let the daughter's son take the whole estate of his own father who leaves no [other] son; and let him offer two funeral oblations; one to his own father, the other to his maternal grandfather;"* and other texts of a like import. "Of his own father," here means his mother's father.† Leaving "no [other] sons," is here used indefinitely to signify a failure of heirs, including the daughter, otherwise it would contradict the text of Yájñavalkya, "The wife and daughters, &c." [Sec. ii. § i.]

2. The opinion maintained by Govinda Rája, namely, That on failure of a son, [grandson and great-grandson] the daughter's son is entitled to the inheritance notwithstanding the existence of the daughter, is consequently refuted by the text above quoted.

3. The followers of the Maithila school assert, that the daughter's son is entitled to the heritage after the whole of the heirs enumerated in the text of Yájñavalkya just alluded to, and in other various texts. This is wrong; for since a series of heirs is recounted, ending with the king, whose demise never occurs, it must necessarily result that the daughter's son could not obtain the inheritance at all, and the texts declaratory of his right would then be irrelevant.

SECTION 5.

On the Father's right of Succession.

1. If there be no daughter's son, the father is next entitled to the succession in conformity with the text of Kátyáyana, who says: "In the case of disjoined parners, on failure of a son, the father obtains the wealth," and also, because he (the father) confers benefits on the deceased owner by the presentation of two funeral oblations (namely, to his own father and grandfather)

* Manu, 9. 132.
† Deceased owner.

Daughter's husband.

Son,
in which the deceased owner participates. Vāchaspati Miśra, (and others) by adopting a different reading in this text of Vishnu, "The wealth of him who leaves no male issue, goes to his wife: on failure of her, it devolves on daughters: if there be none, it belongs to the father: if he be dead, it appertains to the mother," namely, "If there be none, it belongs to the mother, and if she be dead, it appertains to the father," have declared the mother's right of succession to precede that of the father.

2. This is not correct; for the reading established by the original text of Vishnu, is the reverse [of that which they have adopted] namely, "If there be none, it belongs to the father, if he be dead, it appertains to the mother." It has also been thus transcribed by all authors;—Besides the other reading is at variance with the text of Kātyāyana above cited; and further, since the superiority of the male is deduced from the following part of a text of Manu, "In a comparison between the male and female sex, the male is pronounced the superior," it is most conformable to the intention of the law that the father's right of succession should precede that of the mother.

SECTION 6.

On the Mother's right of Succession.

1. In default of the father, the succession devolves on the mother, in conformity with the text of Vishnu above quoted.

2. Vāchaspati also says, "Of a deceased son, who leaves neither wife nor male issue, the mother must be considered as heirless, or by her consent the brother may inherit." For the mother confers benefits on the deceased owner by the birth of his brother, who offers three funeral oblations to the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather of the deceased owner in which he participates.

SECTION 7.

On the Brother's right of Succession.

1. On failure of the mother, the succession goes to the uterine or whole brother, who offers three funeral oblations to the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather of the deceased owner, in which he participates.

2. If there be no uterine or whole brother, the half brothers of the deceased are entitled to the succession, since they also offer three funeral oblations to the father.

* Manu, 9, 55.
ther and the other ancestors abovenamed of the deceased owner in which he participates, and because the text of Yājñavalkya specifies, "Both parents, brothers likewise," [Sec. ii. § i.] the succession devolves on sons born of a different mother, for they are begetten by the same father.

3. Hence if there are two brothers, the one uterine, and the other a half brother, and both were unassociated with the deceased owner, the uterine brother exclusively takes the wealth of his uterine brother in conformity with the text. "An uterine brother shall thus retain or deliver the share of his uterine relation."

4. Where an associated half brother, and an unassociated whole brother are the competitors for the succession, it devolves equally on both of them in conformity with the text. "A half brother being again associated may, take the succession."

5. Where uterine and half brothers compete, and both were associated with the deceased, the associated whole brother exclusively takes the inheritance, for in this case he possesses a double title [namely, his being uterine, and also associated] in conformity with the text. "A re-united [brother] shall keep the share of his re-united [co-heir] who is deceased."

6. The same order of succession must likewise be observed in the case of nephews of the whole and nephews of the half blood.

SECTION 8.

On the Nephew's right of Succession.

1. In default of brothers, the brother's son of the whole blood is the successor, and not a nephew of the half blood son.


Brother's son confers less benefits compared with the brother's son of the whole blood, since the mother and grandmother of the deceased owner do not participate in the oblations presented by the nephew of the half blood to the father and grandfather [of such deceased owner].

\[ \text{F} \quad \text{E} \]
\[ \text{B} \quad \text{E} \quad \text{A} \quad \text{B} \]
\[ \text{F} \quad \text{E} \quad \text{A} \quad \text{B} \quad \text{C} \quad \text{D} \quad \text{E} \]

* Grandfather, (Grandmother)

Father (Mother) (Contemporary wife)

Deceased owner + whole brother + half brother

\[
\frac{1}{3} \quad \frac{1}{2} \quad D
\]

Son. Son.

Here the mother, (A) and grandmother (B) of the deceased owner (C) do not participate in the oblation, which the nephew (D) of the half blood is bound to offer to his grandfather (E) and great-grandfather (F), since his (the nephew's) (D's) descent in the female line is derived from a different family.
2. The participation of a mother, a grandmother, and great-grandmother, in the funeral oblations presented by the oblator to the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather respectively, is recounted in the following passage of scripture. "The mother participates in the funeral oblation made to the manes of her husband: So also do the grandmother, and great-grandmother" [participate in oblations made to the grandfather and great-grandfather.]

3. Among brother’s sons associated and unassociated, all of the whole blood, the succession devolves exclusively on the associated brother’s son.

4. In like manner, in the case of associated and unassociated brother’s sons, all of the half blood, the succession devolves on the associated brother’s son of the half blood.

5. But if the son of the whole brother were unassociated, and the son of the half brother associated, then they both inherit together.

6. Where however two nephews were either associated, or unassociated with the deceased, one of the whole, the other of the half blood, then in both instances the succession devolves on the nephew of the whole blood.

SECTION 9.

On the right of the Brother’s Grandson.

11. Brother’s grandson is heir, both, because he presents one funeral oblation, [namely, to the deceased owner’s father; i. e., his own great-grandfather] in which the deceased owner participates, and because he is within the degree of relationship, termed “Sapinda.”

2. But brother’s great-grandsons do not inherit, since they confer no benefits, because they stand in the fifth degree of relationship to the father of the deceased owner.

3. Here likewise the distinction of the whole blood, and of the half blood, as in the instance of brother’s sons must be observed.

* Father.
| Deceased Owner | + Brother.
| *’s
| Son.
| Grandson.
SECTION 10.

On the right of the Father's Daughter's Son, and of other Heirs.

1. On failure of the brother's grandson, the succession goes to the father's daughter's son, for he presents three funeral oblations, namely, to the father, paternal grandfather, and paternal great-grandfather of the deceased owner, i.e., to his own maternal grandfather, maternal great-grandfather, and maternal great-great-grandfather. (According to Achārya Chudāmani, the son of the proprietor's own sister, and the son of his half-sister, have an equal right of inheritance).

2. In default of the father's daughter's son, the brother's daughter's son succeeds, for he presents two funeral cakes in which the deceased owner participates, namely, to his (the owner's) father and paternal grandfather.

3. Failing him, the paternal grandfather is the successor, for as the father is entitled to succeed on a failure of the heirs of the deceased owner ending with the daughter's son, so by the rule of analogy the succession devolves on the grandfather in default of heirs down to the father's daughter's son; and because he presents one oblation (namely, to the owner's paternal great-grandfather, i.e., his own father) in which the deceased owner participates.

4. In default of the paternal grandfather, the paternal grandmother is heir, according to the text of Mann,* "Of a son dying childless, [and leaving no widow,] the [father, and] mother shall take the estate, and the mother being also dead, the paternal [grandfather, and] grandmother shall take the heritage, [on failure of brothers and nephews]." As the mother succeeds on the death of the father, so by the rule of analogy the succession devolves on the paternal grandmother in default of the paternal grandfather.

5. Failing the paternal grandmother, the uncle succeeds, for he presents two oblations to the paternal grandfather, and great-grandfather of the deceased owner, (i.e., his own father and grandfather,) in which the said owner participates.

6. In his default, the succession devolves on the uncle's son, for he [also like his father] presents two oblations in which the deceased owner participates, namely, to the owner's paternal grandfather, and paternal great-grandfather, [i.e., his own paternal grandfather, and great-grandfather.]

* Mann, Chap. 9. v. 217.
7. Failing him, the uncle's grandson succeeds, for he presents one oblation, namely, to the paternal grandfather of the deceased owner, [i.e., his own paternal great-grandfather] in which the said owner participates.

8. Failing the uncle's grandson, the succession devolves on the grandfather's daughter's son, because he presents two oblations in which the deceased owner participates, namely, to the owner's paternal grandfather, and paternal great-grandfather, [i.e., his own maternal grandfather, and maternal great-grandfather.] Notwithstanding the grandfather's daughter's son, (19) who presents two oblations in which the deceased owner participates, confers greater benefits than the uncle's grandson, (18) who presents but one oblation in which the deceased owner participates, yet nevertheless the right of succession devolves in the first instance on the uncle's grandson by virtue of his relationship to the deceased owner in the degree termed Sapinda.

9. In default of the paternal grandfather's daughter's son, the uncle's daughter's son succeeds, because he presents two oblations, in which the deceased owner participates, namely, to the owner's paternal grandfather, and great-grandfather, [i.e., his own maternal great-grandfather, and great-great-grandfather.]

10. Then succeed in order the paternal great-grandfather, and the paternal great-grandmother, because of the deceased owner participating in the oblations offered to the paternal great-grandfather, and also by reason of the rule of analogy abovementioned.

11. Next succeed in order the paternal grandfather's brother, his son, and grandson, for they present one oblation, in which the deceased owner participates, namely, to the owner's paternal great-grandfather.

12. Afterwards the paternal great-grandfather's daughter's son takes the succession, since he presents an oblation, in which the deceased owner participates, namely, to the owner's paternal great-grandfather, [i.e., his own maternal grandfather.]

13. Next the succession devolves on the paternal grandfather's brother's daughter's son, who presents an oblation, in which the deceased owner participates, namely, to the owner's paternal great-grandfather, [i.e., his maternal great-grandfather.]

14. In his default, the maternal grandfather of the deceased owner succeeds.

15. Failing him, the maternal uncle, his son and grandson, for these texts of Mann, "To three [ancestors] must water be given at their obsequies; for three is the funeral
30. His son, & cake ordained,* and “To the nearest Suṇinda, the inheritance next belongs;†” which declare the right of succession to the wealth to take place according to the order of proximity of benefits conferred on the deceased owner, propound the right of the abovenamed to succeed; and the sole object of the introduction of the two texts above cited in a treatise on inheritance is to show that the right of succession to the estate occurs according to the order of benefits conferred on the deceased proprietor; otherwise the insertion of these texts in a treatise on inheritance would have been useless.

32. Maternal grandfather’s daughter’s son.

16. In default of the maternal uncle’s grandson, the maternal grandfather’s daughter’s son succeeds.

33. Maternal great-grandfather.

17. Failing him, the maternal great-grandfather, his son, grandson, and great-grandson.

34. Son.

35. Grandson.

36. Great-grandson.

37. Maternal great-grandfather’s daughter’s son.

18. In their default, the maternal great-grandfather’s daughter’s son succeeds.


19. Failing him, the maternal great-great-grandfather, his son, grandson, great-grandson.

39. Son.

40. Grandson.

41. Great-grandson.

42. Maternal great-great-grandfather’s daughter’s son.

20. In default of these, the maternal great-great-grandfather’s daughter’s son succeeds.

21. On failure of the heirs who present oblations in which the deceased owner participates, the “Sakulya,” (or remote kinsman) takes the inheritance according to the text of Manu, “Then the distant kinsman shall be the heir, or the spiritual preceptor or the pupil, [or the fellow-student of the deceased.”‡

Failing all these the succession devolves on the Sakulyas of distant kinmen.

Who are of two descriptions, descending and ascending.

22. The Sakulya, or remote kindred, is of two descriptions, 1st descending, and 2d ascending.

* Manu, 9, 163. † Manu, 9, 187.
‡ Manu, 8, 187.
23. The first includes the great-grandson's son, and the rest down to the 3d degree in the descending line. The second intends the great-grandfather's father, and other ancestors up to the 3d degree in the ascending line.

24. Here the distant kinsmen in the descending line, first obtain the inheritance, according to their respective order, since the deceased owner partakes of the remainder of the oblations which they present.

25. In their default, the distant kindred, as far as the third degree in the ascending line, inherit in due order: since the deceased proprietor participates in the remainder of funeral oblations made to his great-great-grandfather, and the other ancestors, three in all: and their offspring present oblations to those three who are partakers of the remainder of oblations which it belonged to the deceased owner to make. The text of Vīhaspati declares, "That where there are many relatives, (Jñātayād) or remote kindred, (Sakulyād) or cognate kindred, (Bāndhuvād) whoever is nearest of kin, shall take the wealth of him who dies without male issue." Propinquity of kin must be considered with reference to the greater or less benefits conferred on the deceased proprietor, as is confirmed by (both) the texts already cited above (§ 15.)

26. If there be no distant kindred of this description, the Samānadhakas, or kinsmen allied by common libations of water inherit, since they must be considered as comprehended in the term "Sakulya."

27. On failure of these, the spiritual preceptor is the successor.

28. In default of him, the pupil is heir, for the text of Mann, "or the spiritual preceptor, or the pupil," propounds the order in which these persons shall respectively succeed. The spiritual preceptor here intended is he who affords religious instruction to his pupil after investing him with the Brāhmanical thread, whence he is so denominated.

29. On failure of him, the fellow-student of the Vedas, as named in the text of Yājñavalkya, "a pupil and a fellow-student."

30. In his default, persons bearing the same family name, being inhabitants of the same village, succeed.

31. On failure of them, persons inhabitants of the same village, and descended from the same patriarch, are the successors, according to the text of Gautama. "Persons allied by funeral oblations, family name, and by patriarchal descent, shall take the heritage."
32. On failure of all heirs as here specified, Brāhmaṇas, inhabitants of the same village, endowed with learning in the three Vedas, and other qualities, are the successors. Thus Mānu says, "On failure of all those, the lawful heirs are such Brāhmaṇas as have read the three Vedas, as are pure in body and mind as have subdued their passions. Thus virtue is not lost."

33. In default of them, the wealth goes to the king, excepting, however, the property of a Brāhmaṇa. Thus Mānu: "The wealth of a Brāhmaṇa shall never be taken as an escheat by the king, this is a fixed law: but the wealth of the other classes, on failure of all heirs, the king may take."

Special rule to be observed with regard to the wealth of a Brāhmaṇa, and

34. Failing the duly qualified Brāhmaṇa in respect to the wealth of a Brāhmaṇa, a Brāhmaṇa residing in another village, is the successor, but not the king. This must be understood.

35. The goods of an anchorite, an ascetic, and of a professed student, are taken by the spiritual brother, the virtuous pupil, and the holy preceptor.

36. In failure of these, the associate in holiness, or person belonging to the same order, inherits. Thus Yājñavalkya, "The heirs of an hermit, of an ascetic, and of a professed student are in their order the preceptor, the virtuous pupil, and the spiritual brother, and associate in holiness." "Order," that is the inverse order; therefore the preceptor takes the goods of the professed student: the virtuous pupil those of the ascetic, and the spiritual brother and associate in holiness, that is, he who is engaged in the same pilgrimage, or sojourns in the same hermitage, those of the anchorite.

37. The professed student is of two descriptions, perpetual and temporary. The preceptor inherits the goods possessed by a perpetual student, for he abandons his father, and the rest making a vow of residing for life in his preceptor’s family. That the property of a temporary student would be inherited by his father, and other relations, since he does not enter on any such vow, and merely attends his preceptor for the purpose of instruction.

* Mānu, Chap. 9. v. 182.
Father's Side.

23. External grandfather's brother.

24. Son.

25. Grandson.

16. Uncle

17. Son.

20. Son.

18. Grandson.

27. Son.


29. Son.

30. Son.

* 45. "Samanodakas."

46. The spiritual preceptor.

47. The pupil.

48. The fellow-student.

49. Those bearing the same family name.

50. Those descended from the same patriarch.

51. Brāmaṇas learned in the Vedas.

52. "The king," [excepting the wealth of a Brāmaṇa.]
CHAPTER II

ON THE ORDER OF SUCCESSION TO THE PECULIAR PROPERTY OF A WOMAN.

SECTION 1.

Succession to the peculiar property of a Maiden.

1. In regard to the property of a maiden, first the uterine brother is the successor; in his default, the mother, and failing her, the father. Nārada says, "The wealth of a deceased damsel let the uterine brethren themselves take; on failure of them, it shall belong to the mother, or if she be dead, to the father."

2. This relates to wealth other than that which has been given to the damsel by a bridegroom, for a bridegroom has a right to wealth given by himself. The text of Paitinasi recites, "The bridegroom shall take the gratuity given by himself, and Nārada says, "Let the first bridegroom on his return take back the presents he gave to the damsel, who has since been married; and in case of her death likewise, let him receive back what he gave, after defraying the expenses which they have mutually incurred."

SECTION 2.

Definition of the peculiar property of a Married Woman.

1. The peculiar property of a woman is in the first place defined for the purpose of afterwards describing the order of succession to such property when belonging to a married woman. On this subject Nārada says, "What was given before the nuptial fire, what was presented in the bridal procession, her husband's donation, and what has been given by her brother, or by either of her parents, is termed the sixfold property of a woman."

2. Here the number six must not be considered as restrictively used; since it will be hereafter declared that woman's peculiar property is of many descriptions. Kātyāyana describes a gift before the
nuptial fire. "What is given to women at the time of their marriage, near the nuptial fire, is celebrated by the wise as the woman's peculiar property bestowed before the nuptial fire."

3. "The time of their marriage," that is the time occupied by the ceremony, commencing with the performance of funeral obsequies for departed ancestors, and concluding with the (Abhivad, or) prostration of the husband at the feet of his wife.

4. Property received by the woman during this time is denominated, "Yautaka," or property given at a marriage, conformably to the meaning of the root, "Yu," which signifies to mix, and the mixture here alluded to, is that which results from the union by marriage of the man and woman, who become as it were one and the same body. The following passage of scripture declares, "Her bones become identified with his bones, flesh with flesh, skin with skin."

5. Vyāsa also says, "Whatever is presented at the time of the nuptials to the bridegroom, intending [the benefit of the bride,] belongs entirely to the bride; and shall not be shared by the kinsmen."

6. "Intending," That which is given to the bridegroom, delivered into his hand, accompanied by an expression of the intention, such as "Let this belong to the bride," and not anything given without this intention; Such is the meaning.

7. Therefore the expression of "Before the nuptial fire," occurring in the text before cited, and that of "The time of their marriage," in the text since quoted, are both illustrative. Since whatever is delivered into the hand of the bridegroom, intending the benefit of the bride, becomes her's, such intention must therefore be considered as the foundation of her property therein. The mention therefore of the "bridegroom" must be taken figuratively, for wealth delivered into the hand of any other with that intention, would equally become the exclusive property of the bride.

8. Kātyāyana describes a gift presented in the bridal procession. "That again which a woman receives while she is conducted from the parental [abode, to her husband's dwelling] is instanced as the separate property of a woman under the name of gift presented to the bridal procession."

9. The term "parental," being derived from a compound expression, of which only one part is retained, the presents which she receives from the family of either her father, or mother, while proceeding to the house of her husband, are gifts presented in the bridal procession.

10. "Her husband's donation," is wealth given to her by her husband, as indeed appears from the use of the expression in another text of Kātyāyana. "Let the woman place her husband's donation as she pleases, when he is deceased; but while he lives, she should carefully preserve it, or else commit it to the family."

11. It must not be argued that the word dāya (donation) here used, relates to the wealth of her husband; for the latter part of the
text above cited, “but while he lives, she should carefully preserve it,” would then be irrelevant, and it is moreover impossible that during the life-time of the husband his wealth should go to his wife.

12. Nor does the term “husband’s donation” apply to the heritage devolving to the wife on the decease of her husband; for the mention of it occurs in a chapter treating of the peculiar property of a woman, and heritable wealth does not form her peculiar property;—Supposing such to be the case, the sense of the verb “da,” to give, would then become metaphorical.

13. “Commit it,” deposit it; “The family.”—Her husband’s family, his younger brother and the rest.

14. “Or else,” that is if unable to preserve it herself. Thus Yājñavalkya. “What has been given to woman [before or after her nuptials] by the father, the mother, the husband, or a brother, or received by her at the nuptial fire, or presented to her on her husband’s marriage to another wife, as also any other separate acquisition] is denominated woman’s property.”

15. Wealth given by a man for the sake of gratifying his first wife when desirous of espousing a second, is called a gift on a second marriage, since the intention of it is to obtain another wife.

16. So Devala says, “Her subsistence, her ornaments, her perquisite, and her gains, are the separate property of a woman. She herself exclusively enjoys it; and her husband has no right to use unless in distress.” “Subsistence,” food, and raiment.

17. Kātyāyana describes the fee or perquisite. “Whatever has been received as a price of workmen on houses, furniture, beasts of burden, milk, animals, and ornaments, is denominated a fee.” That is termed a fee, which a woman receives from others as a dowry for influencing her husband, an architect or other description of artist, to expedite the completion of their business, such as the construction of a house, or other kind of work. It is the price in fact which she receives for sending her husband [to the employment.]


19. Thus Vishnu says, “What has been given to a woman by her father, her mother, her son, or her brother, what has been received by her before the nuptial fire, what has been presented to her, on her husband’s espousal of another wife, what has been given to her by kindred, as well as her perquisite, and a gift subsequent are a woman’s separate property.” By “kindred,” maternal uncles are indicated.

20. Devala describes “a gift subsequent,” “What has been received by a woman from the family of her husband at a time posterior to her marriage, is called a gift subsequent, and so is that which is similarly received from the family of her kindred; Whatever is received by a woman after her nuptials from her husband, or from her parents, through the affection of the giver, Bhūrgu pronounces to be a gift subsequent.”
21. "From the family of her kindred." Here by the word "kindred," her father and mother are [also] intended.

22. Therefore any thing received after the marriage from persons related through her husband, such as her father-in-law and others, or from persons related through the father and mother, namely, maternal and paternal grandfathers, is termed a gift subsequent. Such is the meaning of the first text, and the meaning of the second text is that any thing received posterior to the marriage, either from her husband, or from her parents, is also termed a "gift subsequent."

23. Since various sages have recounted woman's peculiar property as comprising sundry descriptions, the number six specified in the text of "Nārada," (§ 1) is not to be respected, and the different texts must therefore be considered as generally descriptive of woman's peculiar property.

24. A woman's property may then be briefly defined to be that wealth which independent of her husband's control she has a right to dispose of at pleasure, recognized as this right is by law which Kātyāyana has declared.

25. "The wealth which is earned by mechanical arts, or which is received through affection from any other [but the kindred] is always subject to the husband's dominion. The rest is pronounced to be the woman's property."

26. "That which is received by a married woman, or a maiden in the house of her husband or of her father, from her parents, is termed the "gift of affectionate kindred." The independance of women who have received such gifts is recognized in regard to that property, for it was given by their kindred to soothe them, and for their maintenance. The power of woman over the gifts of their affectionate kindred is ever celebrated, both in respect of donation and of sale according to their pleasure, even in the case of immovable."

27. He explains the meaning of the word "rest," (§ 25) by the text which follows (§ 26.) "That which is received by a married woman," &c.

28. "From any other." The husband has authority over that which the woman has obtained from any other excepting the family of her father, mother, or husband, or in that which she has gained by the exercise of an art, such as painting, or spinning. He is entitled to take it even without the occurrence of any distress.

29. Therefore notwithstanding the woman has ownership in both descriptions of property, she has not independent power in regard to it; On the contrary, it appearing from the text that her husband has authority over such property, his permission authorizing the disposal of it must be awaited by the woman.

30. "Pronounced to be the woman's property," that is declared alienable by the woman at her own pleasure. "By a married woman,"
&c. That which is received by a married woman from the family of her husband, or from the family of her parents, and by a damsel from the family of her parents, is the "gift of affectionate kindred;" Such is the meaning. "To soothe them," that is through a motive of tenderness.

31. "Even in the case of immovables," relates to immovable property other than that which has been bestowed upon her by her husband, for a prohibition exists against the gift or sale by a woman in regard to immovable property given to her by her husband; So, Nárada, "What has been given by an affectionate husband to his wife, she may consume as she pleases when he is dead, or may give it away, excepting immovable property."

32. Since "given by her husband," is here particularly specified, the general text of Kátyáyana above quoted, must be considered applicable to immovable property, other than bestowed by a husband, in conformity with the principle which admits of a special provision limiting the operation of a general rule.

33. But the husband is at liberty during a period of famine and the like when unable to subsist without the use of the woman's separate property, to take such property even though it be the gift of affectionate kindred. Thus Yajnavalkya, "A husband is not liable to make good the property of his wife taken by him in a famine, or for the performance of a duty, or during illness, or while under restraint."

34. "While under restraint," which a creditor or other person imposes on himself for the purpose of recovering his right, being debarred at the same time from ablution, from food, &c. Kátyáyana has declared the husband to have no right to the use of the woman's separate property [as before described] during the non-existence of any such calamity as a famine or the like.

35. "Neither the husband, nor the son, nor the father, nor the brothers, can assume the power over a woman's property to take it or to bestowed it. If any one of these persons by force consume the woman's property, he shall be compelled to make it good with interest, and shall also incur a fine. If such person having obtained her consent, use the property amicably, he shall be required to pay merely the principal when he becomes rich. But if the husband have a second wife, and do not shew honor to his first wife, he shall be compelled by force to restore her property, though amicably lent to him. If food, raiment and dwelling be withheld from the woman, she may exact her due supply, and take a share [of the estate] with the co-heirs."

36. "Make it good with interest," that is the woman's separate property taken by force in the form of a loan must be rendered with interest; The word "with interest," [Savriddhī] must not be supposed a discriminative of (Stridhana) "the woman's separate property," for supposing this to be the case, Savriddhi would be the proper form in which the word would appear.
37. "Merely the principal;" Here the insertion of the word "merely," is intended to preclude [the payment of] interest.

38. "But if," &c. the meaning of which is, that if the husband after making use of the separate property of one wife, reside with another wife, and neglect the former, he shall be compelled by the ruling power to restore such property, even though it had been amicably lent.

39. "Food and raiment?" Should the husband not allow his wife the necessaries of life, food and clothing, then she may, if immaculate, require the supply of food and raiment, which is her due.


41. "A share," that is, on the death of her husband, she is to receive from his co-heirs, his younger brother, and the rest, the share to which he was entitled. Let this suffice. Further detail being superfluous, the subject in question is therefore propounded.

SECTION 3.

On the Succession to the Separate Property of a Woman when received by her at her Nuptials.

1. The separate property of a woman having been thus defined, the right of succession to such property on the decease of the woman is next described.

2. In respect to property received at her marriage, "Yautaka," her maiden daughter succeeds first; A text of Manu declares. "The wealth obtained by the mother at her marriage, let her maiden daughter exclusively take."

3. In default of such daughter, it appertains to the damsel allianced, and failing her, the married daughters who have, and those who are likely to have male issue, inherit together.

4. A text of Gautama expresses, that a woman's property goes to her "daughters unaffianced and to those not actually married."

5. Here as by the word "daughters," the right of succession by all the daughters is generally declared, the mention of "unaffianced" &c. becomes significant, as denoting the order in which they shall respectively inherit, and therefore first the maiden succeeds; then the allianced daughter, that is, one whose troth is plighted; in her default, the married daughter described as above, and failing her, the succession devolves equally on the barren and the widowed daughters. This is the meaning of the text.
6. Here however on the death of a maiden daughter, or of one affianced, in whom the succession had vested, and who having been subsequently married, is ascertained to have been barren, or on the death of a widow who has not given birth to a son, the succession to the property which had passed from the mother to her daughters, would devolve next on the sisters, having, and likely to have male issue, and in their default, on the barren and widowed daughters;—not on the husband of such daughter abovementioned in whom the succession had vested: for the right of the husband is relative to the "Woman’s separate property," and wealth which has in this way passed from one to another, can no longer be considered as the "Woman’s separate property;"—This must be understood.

7. The right of the barren, and widowed daughters to succeed, notwithstanding they confer no direct benefits through the medium of sons, is gathered from the text of Gautama above quoted, which declares the right of succession by the daughters generally, whether married, or unmarried.

8. In default of all daughters, the son has a right to succeed: for the text of Bajnavalkya declares the right of the son to succeed on failure of daughters by the terms "male issue," expressed in this text, "Daughters share the residue of their mother’s property after payment of her debts;—the male issue succeeds in their default," and because the son compared with all the rest, confers the greatest benefits; The text of Baudhâyana also declares, that "Male issue of the body being left, the property must go to them."

9. In default of the son, the daughter’s son inherits, for it is reasonable, that since the daughter’s claim is preferred to that of the son, the son of the debarred son should be excluded by the son of the person who bars his claim.

10. Failing the daughter’s son, the son’s son succeeds, in his default, the great-grandson in the male line, according to the degree in which benefits are conferred by them.

11. In default of the great-grandson in the male line, the son of a rival wife succeeds, for the text of Vrihaspati recites that, "The mother’s sister, the maternal uncle’s wife, the paternal uncle’s wife, the father’s sister, the mother-in-law, and the wife of an elder brother are declared similar to mothers." "If they leave no issue of their bodies, nor son, [of a rival wife] nor daughter’s son, nor son of those persons, the sister’s son and the rest, shall take their property."

12. The term "son," which occurs as above, "nor son," is intended to propound the right of succession by the son of a rival wife; otherwise, it is useless to consider it as a discriminative of "Aurasa," meaning of itself "legitimate issue;" and it would also follow that the younger brother of the woman’s husband and the rest would have a right to succeed notwithstanding the existence of the son of a rival wife.
13. In default of the son of the rival wife, her grandson succeeds; and failing him, her great grandson, since they both present oblations to her husband in which she also participates.

14. In default of all the above heirs, if the property were obtained by the woman at the time of nuptials, celebrated according to one of the forms denominated Brāhma, Daiva, Arsha, Gāndharva, or Prajāpatya, her husband is the next successor, for the text of Manu declares, “It is ordained that the property of a woman married by the ceremonies called Brāhma, Daiva, Arsha, Gāndharva, or Prajāpatya, shall go to her husband, if she die without issue.”

15. On failure of her husband, her brother is the next successor according to the text of Yājñavalkya, “That which has been given to her by her kindred, as well as her fee or gratuity, and any thing bestowed after marriage, her kinsmen take, if she die without issue.”

16. The term “kindred,” means her mother and father, and consequently by the term “kinsmen,” her brothers are signified. The same is declared by Kātyāyana, who says, “Inmoveable property, which has been given by parents to their daughter, goes always to her brother, if she die without issue.”—Here since the terms “inmoveable property,” are used, other property is of course intended by the argument drawn from the loaf and staff. Thus it is stated in the Dāya-Bhagā. By the use of the term “always,” it appears, that the eight forms of marriage, namely, Brāhma and the rest are included.

17. “Fee or gratuity” has been before explained, as also the mother, and in her default the father inherits. A text of Kātyāyana says: “The fee of a damsel goes to her uterine brothers; failing them, the mother succeeds; and after her, the father.—Some hold that the father succeeds first.”

18. The “fee of a damsel,” that is, her wealth, belongs first to her uterine brothers; in their default, it goes to the mother; and after her to her father.—“Some hold,” &c. meaning in the opinion of others; but according to our interpretation, the father first inherits, and afterwards the mother. Such is the meaning.

* Manu, Chap. 9, v. 196.

† This example of analogy to which frequent allusion is made in argumentative writings, is variously stated. According to one explanation, the reasoning exemplified by it, is analogy drawn from association. According to another, it is argument a fortiori.—Colebrooke.
19. But if the wealth were received by the woman at the time of her marriage, celebrated according to any one of the three forms denominated Paśācha, Rākṣasa, or Āsura, then in default of the great-grandson of the rival wife, the succession devolves first on the mother, then on the father. For the text of Manu declares: ‘But her wealth given on the marriage called Āsura, or on either of the two others, is ordained on her death without issue, to become the property of her mother and father.’

20. Here the use of the compound in this form [‘Mātapitrōk’] is with the view of exhibiting the order of succession, for if it had been intended that the mother and father should inherit together, the form ‘Pitrōk’ would have been observed.

21. In default of the father, the brother succeeds, and failing the brother, the succession devolves on the husband according to the text of Kātyāyana, ‘That which has been given to her by her kindred, on failure of kinsmen, goes to her husband.’

22. ‘Kindred,’ mother and father:—On failure of ‘kinsmen,’ by which the failure of the brother must be understood; because [in the instance of wealth received by the woman at the time of nuptials, celebrated in one of the five forms called Brahma, &c.] the parents succeed only in the case of a failure of the brothers.

SECTION 4.

On the order of Succession to the Separate Property of a Woman, when not received by her at her Nuptials.

1. The order of succession requisite to be observed in regard to woman’s peculiar property, generally, whether ‘Yautuka’ or ‘Ayautuka’ on a failure of heirs including all as yet enumerated, will be hereafter declared. But first we treat of the order of succession in regard to wealth not received by the woman at the time of nuptials termed ‘Ayautuka.’

2. In the case of the peculiar property of a woman [not obtained by her at the time of nuptials, and] not given to her by her father at the time of the wedding, or at any other time, the son and the unmarried daughter inherit together.
3. This is declared by the first half of the following passage of Devala, "A woman's property is common to her sons and unmarried daughters when she is dead; but if she leave no male issue, her husband shall take it, her mother, her brother or her father."

4. Since the words "sons and unmarried daughters" are exhibited in the conjunctive compound (called "Dvandva"), and because the words "common to" are here expressed, it results that the son and the unmarried daughter possess the right of inheritance together, and in default of either of them, the wealth goes to the other.

5. On failure of both these two, the succession devolves equally on the married daughter, who has, and the married daughter, who is likely to have male issue—for a text of Niwasda recites, "In default of a son, let a daughter take the succession, for they are both offspring alike"—and because oblations of son's name obsequies are presented by the daughter through the medium of her son, to the husband of a woman, in which she participates, [that is, oblations are presented by the daughter's son to his own maternal grandfather.]

6. In default of either of these two, the other succeeds, and on failure of both of them the son's son inherits, for he presents an oblation at solemn obsequies to the husband of the woman, of which she partakes.

7. In default of the son's son, the daughter's son succeeds; for it is reasonable since the claim of the married daughter is barred by the son, that the son of the debarred daughter, should be debarred by the son of the person who obstructs her claim: and a text of Manu reciting that, "A daughter's son delivers him in the next world like the son of a son," declares the right of the daughter's son to succeed.

8. "Like the son of a son." From this expression it results, that when there is no longer an adverse claim, the daughter's son has a right to succeed after the son's son.

9. In his default the great-grandson in the male line succeeds. Failing him the son of a contemporary wife, her grandson and great-grandson in the male line: since all these present funeral oblations to the husband of the woman, in which she participates.

10. After these, the barren and widowed daughters both inherit together, for they too rank among the progeny of the woman, and the right of the husband to succeed is only in the case of a failure of progeny generally: Manu declares, that, the wealth of a childless woman, married according to the form denominated Brahma or the remaining four forms, goes to her husband.

* Manu, Chap. 9. 139,
11. Failing either of these, the other succeeds, and in default of successors including the barren and widowed daughters, the succession devolves in due order, by the rule of analogy, as in the case of wealth received at nuptials, viz.: on the woman's husband, brother, mother, and father; or if she were married according to any one of the five forms, denominated "Brahma," and the rest; or if she were married according to any of the three forms, styled Asura, &c. on her mother, father, brother, and husband.

12. The order to be observed on a failure of all these successors, will be hereafter declared.

SECTION 5.

On the Succession to the Separate Property of a Woman, when given to her by her Father.

1. In regard to the wealth given by a father to a woman at the time of the wedding, or antecedent or subsequent to it, a maiden daughter inherits in the first place.

Next the married daughters.

2. After her, a married daughter who has, and one who is likely to have male issue, inherit together.

3. Next, the succession devolves on the barren and widowed daughters, and in default of all daughters, the son and the rest succeed, as in the case of property received at nuptials; for a text of Manu declares, "The wealth of a woman which has been "in any manner given to her by her father, let the Brāhmaṇī damsel take, or let it belong to her offspring."*

4. Here by the specification of "given by the father," it is intended, that whatever has been given by the father even at any other time than that of the wedding, belongs first to the damsel, and after her, it goes to her offspring,—her son.

5. The expression Brāhmaṇī damsel, is merely an illustrative recitation ("Anuvāda.") Thus it is stated in the Dāya-Bhāgā.

* Manu, 9. 198.
SECTION 6.

On the Succession to the Separate Property of a Woman, generally, on a failure of all the Heirs as yet enumerated.

1. In default of successors down to the father, in respect to wealth received at nuptials solemnized according to any one of the five forms of marriage, denominated Brahma and the rest, and on failure of successors down to the husband, in respect to wealth received at nuptials, celebrated according to any one of the three forms styled Asura, &c., as well as in the case of all other peculiar property of a woman, the succession devolves on the husband’s younger brother for the right of the husband’s younger brother and the rest to succeed at that time, has been propounded by Vrihaspati in the following text: “the mother’s sister, the maternal uncle’s wife, the paternal uncle’s wife, the father’s sister, the mother-in-law, and the elder brother’s wife are pronounced similar to mothers:—If they leave no issue of their bodies, nor son, [of a rival wife], nor daughter’s son, nor son of those persons, the sister’s son, and the rest shall take the property.”

2. The word (“aurasa”) “issue,” in this text implies both son and daughter. “Nor son” must be considered as intending the “son of a rival wife.” It must not be supposed discriminative of the word “issue,” since it would be unmeaning, and it would follow that the succession devolved on the husband’s younger brother and the rest, even while the son of rival wife were existent. “Nor son of those persons.” Hereby “these persons,” the son, and the son of the contemporary (or rival) wife are intended:—the expression does not refer to the damsel and daughter’s son, for the damsel’s son is included in the term daughter’s son, and the daughter’s son’s son confers no benefits, being incompetent to present the funeral offering: [to the woman’s husband]. By the term [“au”] “nor,” the sons of the son, and of the son of the rival wife are to be understood. But the order of succession prescribed by the above text is not to be respected; for if this were the case, it would follow, that the husband’s younger brother succeeded last, and this would be improper, since he confers greater benefits than all the others who are specified in that text; and the following texts of Manu, “To three ancestors must water be given at their obsequies; for three, (the father, his father, and the paternal grandfather) is the funeral cake ordained.”* “To the nearest Sapinda the inheritance next belongs,”† are recited in a treatise of inheritance, for the purpose of exhibiting that the order of succession takes place according to the greater or less benefits conferred; otherwise, the introduction of them in such a treatise would be useless; consequently the order of succession must be understood as

* Mann, 9. 166. † Mann, 9. 187.
taking place according to the proximity of benefits conferred, and this
being the case, the order inferable from the spirit of the text, rather
than that derived from the letter of it, must be respected.

3. Therefore the husband's younger brother is first entitled to
the succession, because he presents oblations to the woman, to her
husband, and to three persons to whom her husband was bound to
offer oblations, and he is moreover a "Sapinda."

4. In his default, the succession devolves at once upon the sons
of the husband's younger and elder brother, because
they present oblations to the woman, to her husband,
and to two persons to whom her husband was bound to
offer oblations, (namely to his father and grandfather,)
and they are moreover within the degree of relationship, termed
"Sapinda."

5. In their default, the sister's son, though not a Sapinda, is
entitled to the succession: for he presents oblations
to the woman and to three persons, namely, her father
and the rest to whom her son was bound to offer oblations.

6. Failing him, the husband's sister's son: for he presents obla-
tions to her, to her husband, and to three persons to
whom her husband ought to have offered oblations.

7. In his default, the [woman's] brother's son,
who presents oblations to the woman, and to her
father and grandfather.

8. Failing him, the son-in-law, who presents
oblations to his father-in-law and mother-in-law.

9. Vṛhaspati's text above quoted, proponds therefore merely
the right of succession by the persons abovementioned, and is by no
means intended to exhibit the order in which they succeed.

10. Failing all these heirs including the son-in-
law, the father-in-law, and the husband's elder brother,
who are Sapindas, succeed according to their nearness
of kin.

11. In default of all Sapindas, the "Sakulyas," those allied by
common oblations of water, and those descended from
the same pūrṇashāstra in the male line, succeed.

12. Failing all these, in the case of the property
of a Brāhmaṇī woman, Brāhmaṇas, inhabitants of
the same village, exceedingly learned in the Vedas, are
entitled to the succession.

13. But in the case of the property of a woman of
the Kshatriya and other tribes, the king is exclusively
entitled to the inheritance.
CHAPTER III.

ON EXCLUSION FROM INHERITANCE.

1. Those who are excluded from inheritance are now specified, from which exception, those who are competent to inherit, will appear: Thus Manu, "Impotent persons and outcastes, persons born blind, and deaf; madmen, idiots, the dumb, and those who have lost a sense or a limb,"* are excluded from a share of the heritage.—A text of Kātyāyana has more particularly defined the impotent person.

2. "Born blind and deaf." That is by nature, not those who have become so, from some adventitious cause; the meaning therefore is, those who are blind and deaf from the period of their birth. Nārada says—"An enemy to his father, an outcaste and one who is addicted to vice [or has been expelled from society,] take no share of the inheritance, even though they be legitimate: much less if they be sons by an appointed kinsman."

3. "An enemy to his father:" One, who ill-treats his father during his life-time, or one, who is averse to performing his obsequies when dead.

4. "One who is addicted to vice:" One, who by reason of his crimes and vices, is excluded by his relations from drinking water in company with them.

5. Thus Yājñavalkya: "All those brothers who are addicted to vice, lose their title to the inheritance."

6. "Addicted to vice." That is, adhering to a contrary or an improper course, such as drinking, gaming, &c.

7. So the text, "An outcaste, his offspring, an impotent person, one lame, insane, or an idiot, a blind man, one afflicted with an incurable disease, should be supported, since they are excluded from the inheritance."

8. "Lame:" That is, one who cannot walk with both his feet.


10. So Nārada: "Those of the family, who are afflicted with a long and painful disease, idiots, those who are insane, blind, or lame, should be maintained; but their sons are partakers of the inheritance."

11. "Long:" That is, from the period of birth.

12. "Painful:" Such as the leprosy, &c.

* Manu, 9, 301.
13. Their sons however if devoid of these faults, are partakers of shares.

14. The maintenance is directed for all, except the out-caste, for a text of Nárada declares, that “Food and raiment is ordained for all, excepting the out-caste.”

15. By the term out-caste, his son must also he considered as understood, for he becomes so, in consequence of having been begotten by an out-caste.

16. Baudhayana has declared this explicitly. “Let the co-heirs support with food and apparel those who are incapable of business, as well as the blind, idiots, impotent persons, those afflicted with disease, and calamity, and others, who are incompetent to the performance of duties: excepting however the out-caste and his issue.”

17. The incompetency of the wives of such persons to inherit has also been declared by the following text. “Their childless wives conducting themselves aright, must be supported, but such as are unchaste, should be expelled, and so indeed should those who are perverse.”—Their daughters also should be maintained until provided with husbands.

CHAPTER IV.

ON DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE PROPERTY.

SECTION I.

On Property liable to Partition.

1. Katyáyana has declared the property which is liable to partition: What belonged to the paternal grandfather, or to the father, and any thing else [appertaining to the co-heirs having been] acquired by themselves; must all be divided at a partition among heirs.

2. “And any thing else?” The particle “and” is here connected with “themselves;” Therefore from the use of this particle which occurs in the expression “and acquired by themselves;” the acquisition of another is also to be understood: provided however such acquisition have been made through the joint-stock, or by [joint] personal labour.

3. Consequently the acquirer has two shares of wealth which has been acquired by the expenditure of the joint-stock, and the rest have only one share each. So Vyása says: “Whatever wealth a man gains with the aid of the patrimony, by valour and the like, the brothers are sharers therein. To him must be allotted two shares, and the remainder should be made equal sharers.”

* Yajñavalkya,
4. "To him?" That is, the acquirer, and this is reasonable; for the acquisition is made on the part of the acquirer both by the use of the common property, and by personal labour; but on the part of the rest, simply by means of the joint-stock.

5. In like manner, when an acquisition is made by two persons: by the personal labour of the one, and by means of the wealth, and of the personal labour of the other, then the acquirer by means of personal labour alone, has one share, and the acquirer by wealth and labour has two shares, by parity of reasoning.

6. Therefore these three descriptions of property, viz: ancestral property, wealth acquired by a father, and that which has been acquired by the expenditure of joint-stock, are partible among all; but wealth acquired by individuals through their own exertions, [such as partnership in trade, &c.] must be shared exclusively by the acquirers. This is settled.

7. Wealth however acquired by science, and such other means, without the use even of joint-funds, must be shared with partners equally or more learned, not with less learned, or unlearned partners. The text of Kātyāyana declares: "No part of the wealth which is gained by science, need be given by a learned man to his unlearned co-heirs; but such property must be yielded by him to those, who are equal or superior in learning."

8. The term "learning," above, refers alike to the words equal and superior, like the eye of the crow* [looking two ways.] Therefore the meaning is, "partners, equally, or more learned."

9. But if during the period of acquisition of science by one brother, another brother should through his own personal exertions, and by means of his individual wealth, support the family of such brother, then, even though utterly ignorant, he is entitled to a share of the wealth which his [acquiring] brother had gained by means of science. Thus Nārada declares: He who supports the family of a brother employed in the acquisition of science, shall even though ignorant, receive a share from the wealth obtained by means of such science."

10. "Ignorant." That is, though a fool.

11. But all the partners, whether learned or ignorant, are entitled to share in wealth which has been acquired by science, imparted to them by their own family, their father and the rest. Varāhaṇas says: "Whatever wealth has been earned through valour by brothers, who have derived science from their family, or even from their father, is partible (a)."

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* The crow is supposed monoculous.

(a) See Chākaṇḍa Aṣṭādi v. Chākaṇḍa Ṛatasahalām 2 Mad. H. C. Rep. 56, where all the authorities on the subject were considered, and the High Court held that at all events the ordinary gains of science were divisible when such science had been imparted at the family expense and acquired while receiving a family maintenance, but that it was otherwise when the science had been imparted at the expense of persons not members of the learner's family.—Ed.
12. By the words "or even," the grandfather, the uncle and the rest are intended. "Earned through valour;"—the gains of valour acquired by means of the expenditure of the joint-stock, for, it will be hereafter declared, that wealth acquired without the expenditure of the joint-stock is indivisible.

13. Kātyāyana has particularly described the gains of science, as follows: "What has been gained by the solution of a difficulty after a prize has been offered, must be considered as the gain of science, and is not included in partition, [among co-heirs].—What has been obtained from a pupil, or by officiating as a priest, or for answering a question, determining a doubtful point, or through display of knowledge, or by success in disputation, or for superior skill in reading, the sages have declared to be the gains of science, and not subject to distribution. The same rule likewise prevails in the arts; for the excess above the price; [of the common goods] and that which is gained through skill by winning from another a stake at play, must be considered as acquired by science, and not liable to partition. So Vṛhaspati has ordained."

14. "Gained by the solution of a difficulty?" As where one agrees with another, "If you resolve this well, then will I give you so much wealth." What is gained after this stipulation in consequence of a good solution of the difficulty, is indivisible.

15. "Obtained from a pupil?" That is, from one to whom instruction has been afforded.

16. "Officiating as a priest?" That is, what has been received as a fee, for having performed for a person, the duties of family priest, ("Purohita.")

17. Also on the occasion of one having "propounded a question," relative to any particular science, what he bestows on a person, through satisfaction, at having received from him a complete answer.

18. "So likewise for determining a doubtful point?" That is, for a determination on a question, proposed with a view to the removal of a doubt, and in this form: "I will give this gold or other consideration to him, who dispels my doubts on this point of law;"—What in fact is gained (after such a proposition being made,) for having dispelled the doubts of the proposer.

19. Or what is gained by a third person deciding justly between two disputant parties, who mutually appeal to him for his judgment, in the determination of a doubt in a matter of dispute.

20. "Or for the display of knowledge?" The meaning of which is, what has been received as a present or so forth, for having luminously exhibited one's own knowledge in the sacred ordinances, &c.

21. "So by [success in] disputation?" That is, what has been obtained by getting the better of another in an argumentative discussion.
22. So likewise, where any particular thing is to be given to one of several Brâhmans, who reads the "Vedas in a superior manner." So also, what is gained by painters, goldsmiths, [or other artificers] by the exercise of an art or science.

23. Also what is "obtained by winning from another at play;"—All of these are gains of science and indivisible with the rest.*

24. Kâtyâyana has stated a special rule: "Wealth gained through science, which was acquired from a stranger, while receiving a foreign maintenance, is termed acquisition through learning."

25. Therefore, an acquisition made through science imparted by others, than a father or an uncle and the rest, [of the acquirer's own family,] and without the expenditure of the joint-stock, must be shared with parents, more or equally learned, but not with those who are less so, or who are wholly ignorant.

SECTION 2.

On Property not liable to Partition.

1. On this subject Nârada says: "Excepting wealth gained by valour, property received with a wife, and the gains of science, these three are indivisible; as also a paternal gift made through affection."

2. The meaning of this text is, that since the gains of valour, what has been obtained from the parents in law, &c., on account of having espoused a wife, the gains of science, and what has been received through affection from a father and others, are indivisible; therefore, setting these four aside, the rest [of wealth] is divisible. This is connected with the subject of partition of inheritance. Manu says: "Wealth acquired by learning, belongs exclusively to him who acquired it. So does any thing given by a friend, received on account of marriage, or presented as a mark of respect to a guest."†

3. "Given by a friend?" Obtained from a friend.

4. "Received on account of marriage?" That is, obtained from the parents in-law, by reason of having become their son-in-law.

5. "Presented as a mark of respect?" Obtained for officiating as a priest. Mann declares: "What a brother has acquired by labour and skill, without using the patrimony, he shall not give up without his assent, for it was gained by his own exertion."‡

6. So Yâjñavalkya: "Ancestral property, which had been before usurped by any one, and afterwards recovered by an heir, is not to be divided among the other heirs—nor are the gains of science."

* Vide: (7 and 8) Supra.
† Manu, 9, 206.
‡ Manu, 9, 206.
7. "Ancestral property before usurped? Supposing any one heir without the expenditure of the joint-funds, or aided by the exertions of the other heirs, to recover such property, it is not divisible among them.

8. He has stated a special rule regarding land: "Land inherited in regular succession, but which had been uniformly lost, and which a single heir shall recover, solely by his own labour, the rest may divide, according to their due allotments, having first given him a fourth part."

9. Having given a fourth part of the land recovered, to him who recovered it, let all the rest divide the remaining three shares with him, according to the due proportions to which they are entitled, and take their respective allotments.

10. This is ascertained from these texts [above cited.]

11. What has been acquired by a separated or an unseparated parcellor without the expenditure of the joint-property, and without the assistance of another, belongs exclusively to the acquirer, and is indivisible with the rest.

12. The distinction, however to be observed in regard to the gains of science, has already been declared.*

13. Manu and Vishnu have both declared other descriptions of property to be indivisible. "Clothes, vehicles, ornaments, prepared food, water, women, and furniture for repose or for meals, are declared not liable to distribution."†


15. "Vehicles." Such as carriages, horses, &c.


18. "Water." In wells or tanks.—The water contained in wells and tanks, which have all along belonged to the father and the rest, is not divisible like other property: but must be taken by each co-heir according to his exigency. A text declares: "The water of wells and tanks, must be drawn up and used by turns."

19. "Furniture for repose and meals." Such as the couches and seats adapted to the use of each co-heir, and the vessels used by each for the purposes of eating and drinking.

20. Thus Vyasa: "A seat, a couch, a place of sacrifice, a field, a vehicle, dressed food, water and women, are not divisible among kinsmen."

* See (7 and 8) Sect. I. Supra.
† Manu, 9, 219.
21. "A place of sacrifice?" That is, where sacrifices are made, or the image of a god is placed; but not wealth obtained by sacrificing, since that has already been included in the gains of science. Thus Kâtyâyana: "The path for cows, the carriage-road, clothes, and anything which is worn on the body, should not be divided, but what is requisite for use, nor intended for arts." So Vyhaspati declares.

22. "What is requisite for use?" What is serviceable, such as books, for the use of the learned, should not be divided with fools.

23. Therefore books must not be taken by the ignorant parceens they belong to those of them, who are learned.

24. But the ignorant brother must receive from the learned parcer some other article, equivalent to the share of the books, to which he is otherwise entitled, or else the value itself thereof; for if it be assumed that the ignorant parcer has no right whatever in the books, then, supposing books alone to constitute the common property, when a partition took place, the ignorant parcer would be entirely deprived of his share.

25. This is however inadmissible; since it would be at variance with the text, which declares: "They who are born, and they who are yet unbegotten, and they who are actually in the womb, all require the means of support; and the dissipation of their hereditary maintenance is censured."*

26. Nor must it be supposed, that the application of this text is limited to other cases than the one in question; for if a true conclusion is obtainable without [such] limitation, an erroneous one is arrived at by the supposition [of it.]

27. In like manner, whatever is adapted to the exercise of the arts, should belong to those of the heirs who are artists, and not to the unskilled. The rule above stated holds equally good in this instance.

28. Sankha and Likhita declare: "No division of a dwelling takes place; nor of water-pots, ornaments, and things not of general use; nor of women, clothes, and channels for draining water." Prâjapati has so ordained.

29. An habitation, a garden, or the like, which has been constructed by one of the heirs, within the premises, belonging to the dwelling house, during the lifetime of the father, is also indivisible: for it is fair to presume, that as the father did not prohibit, he permitted it.

30. This is likewise to be understood, supposing another of the heirs, to have constructed a similar habitation or the like, within the premises of another dwelling house [belonging to the father].

31. "Things not of general use?" Utensils for purposes of food, culinary, &c.

32. "Women?" Other than female slaves.
CHAPTER V.

ON A SECOND PARTITION OF PROPERTY AFTER THE RE-UNION OF CO-PARCENERS.

1. Re-union is in the first place described for the purpose of explaining a partition made by re-united co-parceners.

2. On this subject Vṛhaspati says: "He who being once separated, dwells again, through affection, with his father, brother, or paternal uncle, is termed re-united."

3. Therefore where a person has been once disunited from his father and the rest;—afterwards the former partition is annulled by mutual consent of the separated parties, and in consequence of an agreement being concluded to the following effect, "the wealth which is thine, is mine,"—"that which is mine is thine," they resolve on dwelling in the same abode.—This is considered re-union.

4. Here, since the father and the others are particularly specified, re-union takes place with those who are alone described, and not with nephews and the rest, who are not named; otherwise, the specific mention of father and the others would be unmeaning. Such is the opinion according to the Dāya-Dhāga.

5. The followers of the Maithili school are of opinion, that the use of the term father, and the rest, is figurative, and that re-union takes place, when those, whose right to a share of the common property is established by their birth, re-associate, after having once separated: consequently, that re-union can occur with nephews and the rest.

6. With regard then to a partition made by re-united parceners:—

7. In a second partition, made by re-united brothers, the eldest son has no right of primogeniture, but all the brethren of the same class must have equal shares. Vṛhaspati says: "Among brethren, who being once separated, again live together, through mutual affection, there is no right of primogeniture, when partition is again made."

8. Here among brothers or others, connected by parity of relationship, re-associated, and unassociated, the re-united parceners are first exclusively entitled to the wealth of the deceased re-united parcener. For a text which will be hereafter recited, declares, that "A re-united [brother] shall take the share of his re-united [co-heir]."

9. In default of such re-united parcener, the disjointed parceners related as above, are entitled to the succession.
10. In like manner, supposing a father, who has made a partition among his sons, and taken for himself the share allowed him by a law, while unassociated with his sons, to beget another son, and afterwards to die, then this son born subsequent to the partition, is entitled to his father's share of the wealth: and not a son who was formerly separated.

11. In like manner the son, who is born after a partition, is not entitled to share in the partition of the wealth of the brothers, who were formerly separated from the father.

12. Thus Vṛhaspati says: "The younger brothers of those, who have made a partition with their father, whether children of the same mother, or of other wives, shall take their father's share. A son born before partition, has no claim on the paternal wealth; nor one, begotten after it, on that of his brother. They have no claims on each other, except for acts of mourning and libations of water."

13. "The younger brothers? That is, those born subsequent to a partition.

14. If a father should die after having re-united himself with any one of his sons whomsoever, then his wealth is equally shared by the re-united sons and those born subsequent to the partition, according to the text, [of Manu and Nārada] that "A son, born after a division, shall alone take the paternal wealth; or he shall participate with such [of the brethren] as are re-united with the father."

15. A special rule is however to be regarded: where an acquisition has been made by a re-united father, by means of his individual wealth, and through his own personal labour and exertions, such acquisition shall belong exclusively to the son born after a partition, and not to another son who was re-united.

16. Vṛhaspati says: "All the wealth which is acquired by the father himself, who has made a partition with his sons, goes to the son begotten by him after the partition. Those born before it, are declared to have no right."

17. Here by the use of the word "himself," the author shews the acquisition to have been made with individual wealth, and by means of personal exertion.

18. In like manner a debt incurred by a disunited father on his own account alone, shall be discharged by the son born after partition exclusively. "As in the wealth, so in the debts likewise, and in gifts, pledges, purchases," being the remainder of the text above quoted. (19)

19. Where, however, a debt has been incurred by a re-united father, for the sake of the community, it shall be discharged both by the re-united parceners, and the sons born subsequent to a partition.

20. One born after partition, is one who has been born of a conception which took place subsequent to partition, for without conception, there can be no act of procreation.
21. Hence, if a partition be made among sons, while the conception of the woman be yet unknown, then the property which had been divided must be re-collected and a second partition take place, at which the son born of such conception, will be entitled to his share with those brothers who had formerly separated; but the paternal wealth must not be shared with him.

22. What has been declared with regard to the right of a son born after partition to succeed to the wealth of his father, relates to a father's own acquisition, since it is impossible that any partition of the ancestral property should take place until the mother's and the step-mother's courses have ceased, and supposing even such a partition to have been made by mistake, it would have no effect, as being contrary to law.

23. All sons, whether born subsequent to partition or otherwise, are entitled to participation in such property; consequently if a father should accidentally have made a partition of ancestral property consisting of land, &c. and live separate after having taken the share, to which he is by law entitled, still the son born after partition, would be entitled to obtain from his brother and the rest, a share in the wealth derived from the grandfather; and the former partition having been illegally made, must be considered null and void.

24. The text of Vishnu on this point declares, that "Sons, with whom the father has made a partition should give a share to the son born after the distribution."

CHAPTER VI.

ON PARTITION MADE BY A FATHER OF ANCESTRAL, AND OF HIS OWN ACQUIRED PROPERTY.

1. A partition made by a father of his own acquired wealth, is regulated by his will alone; but in regard to a division of the ancestral property, the circumstance of the cessation of the mother's courses must be associated with the father's will. This is the difference.

2. Thus Vishnu declares: "When a father separates his sons from himself, his will regulates the division of his own acquired wealth."

3. But in regard to ancestral property, Gautama says: "After the [denise of the] father, let sons share his estate, or while he lives, if the mother be past child-bearing, and he desire partition."

4. It should not be argued that this text of Gautama is also applicable to a father's own acquired property; for if it be alleged that partition of the father's acquired wealth takes place indeed on the cessation of the mother's courses, it would follow that the text [of Gautama] which declares: "A son begotten after partition takes exclusively the wealth of his father," would be wholly irrelevant: since no son can be born on the extinction of the mother's courses,
5. It must not be asserted, that this last cited text of Gautama relates to ancestral property, and is consequently not irrelevant, for supposing such to be the case, a son born after partition, would be debarred from participation in the ancestral property, and consequently deprived of subsistence: which is forbidden by the text, declaring “They who are born, and they who are yet unbegotten, and they who are actually in the womb, all require the means of support and the dissipation of their hereditary maintenance is censured.”

6. Nor should it be said that the son begotten after partition would not be deprived of subsistence, since he would be entitled after his father’s death to that share of the ancestral property, which had been taken by him, for supposing the father to have dissipated the whole of such property, the son would inevitably be deprived of subsistence.

7. The fact then is, that this text of Vishnú: “When a father separates his sons from himself, his will regulates the division of his own acquired wealth,” is useful, as showing, that the father’s will is absolute in regard to the division of this wealth, and accordingly, that the text of Gautama which exhibits the concomitancy of the cessation of the mother’s courses with the will of the father, is strictly applicable to ancestral property. This is correct.

8. Hence in a partition made by a father of his own acquired wealth, he may take as much of it as he pleases, and divide the remainder among his sons according to the text of Vishnú already quoted, and the following text of Harita: “A father, during his life, distributing his property, may retire to the forest, or enter into the order suitable to an aged man; or he may remain at home having distributed small allotments, and keeping a greater portion. Should he become indigent, he may take back from them.”


10. “Should he become indigent?” Meaning, should he have spent the whole of his wealth.

11. If a father should give to any one of his sons a greater share, by reason of his good qualities, or of his piety, or of his having a numerous family, or of his incapacity, such a distribution is authorized by law.

12. Nárada says: “For such as have been separated by their father with equal, greater or less allotments of wealth, that is a lawful distribution: for the father is lord of all.”

13. “Lord.” That is, possessed of the power to alienate at pleasure: consequently, this text relates to property acquired by a father himself, by reason of the impossibility of the existence of such a power as above described, in regard to ancestral wealth.
14. A father must not however, while afflicted by sickness or disorder, or labouring under distraction of mind, or inflamed with anger, or influenced by partiality for the son of a favourite wife, distribute a less or greater share to one of his sons, without the existence of any of the causes abovementioned: for the text of Nanda declares, "A father who is afflicted with disease, or influenced by wrath, or whose mind is engrossed by a beloved object, or who acts otherwise than the law permits, has no power in the distribution of the estate.

15. "Engrossed by a beloved object." Such as excessive partiality, for the son of a favourite wife.

16. But when a father makes a partition of the ancestral property, he may take two shares for himself, and allot to each of his sons a single share: for the text of Vīnapati which declares, "The father himself take two shares at a partition made in his lifetime," relates to ancestral wealth.

17. It must not be supposed that this text refers to the father's own wealth, since it would contradict the texts of Vishnu and the rest, which declare, that what a father may in such case take, depends entirely upon his own will; and as he may take a greater or less share, at his pleasure, the restriction of two shares only, would be useless.

18. A father has not the power to make an unequal distribution of ancestral property, consisting either of land or a corody, or slaves, even though any of the causes abovementioned, namely, the superior qualifications of one particular son, &c. should exist, and the text of Yājñavalkya, which declares: "The ownership of father and son is the same in land, which was acquired by his father, or in a corody, or in chattels," is intended to restrain the exercise of the father's will; for (although contrary to the received opinion) [of equal ownership between father and son] it is impossible that, as long as the father, the owner of the ancestral property, continues to survive, his sons should have ownership therein.

19. But the father possesses a power in regard to ancestral property, other than land (and the descriptions abovementioned,) such as pearls, gems, similar to that which he has in the disposal of his own acquired wealth. Yājñavalkya declares: "The father is master of the gems, pearls and corals, and of all [other moveable property:] but neither the father, nor the grandfather, is so, of the whole immovable estate."

20. Here, by the specification in the first instance, of gems, pearls and corals, and afterwards by the use of the word all, gold and other effects, exclusive of the three descriptions of property, consisting of land, &c. are intended. The word whole, again, which occurs in the second portion of the above text, is made use of for the purpose of showing, that a prohibition does not exist against a gift of immovable property, not incompatible with the due support of the family. Thus it is stated in the Daśa-Bhūjas.
21. In like manner, a father may at his pleasure, allot to his son, the deduction of a twentieth from his own acquired wealth, or the ancestral property. Yājñavalkya says: "If a father make a partition, let him separate his sons at pleasure, and either dismiss the oldest with the best share, or if he choose, all may be equal sharers."—Here the first half of this text relates to a father's own acquired wealth, and the last refers to ancestral property. This is the opinion stated in the Dāya-Bhāga.

22. When a father makes a partition of his own acquired property, he should give a share equal to the share of a son to such of his wives, as are destitute of male issue. A text of Vyāsa declares: "Even childless wives of the father, are pronounced equal sharers."

23. The expression "of the father" in the sixth case serves to denote, that this distribution is made by him; for it will be hereafter stated, that step-mothers are not entitled to shares, at a partition made by sons.

24. This donation of equal shares occurs, where no peculiar property has been bestowed on a wife, by her husband and the rest. So Yājñavalkya says: "If he make the allotments equal, his wives, to whom no separate property has been given by their husbands or their father-in-law, must be rendered partakers of like portions."

25. Where peculiar property has been bestowed on some of the wives, the other wives destitute of male issue, must be rendered by the father partakers of wealth, to the same amount.

26. But where such peculiar property has not been given, then they must be rendered equal sharers with the sons. This is the law in the case, where the sons are made equal sharers.

27. According to the opinion of the Māyūras, where a father has allotted lesser shares to his sons, and reserved the greater portion for himself, equal shares must be made up to his wives from his own portion.

28. In the case however, of peculiar property having been given, [to all the wives,] then they will only receive half a share by the rule of analogy, observed in the case of a superseded wife, who has received peculiar property, and who is entitled to receive only half the gratuity [otherwise] given to a wife on her supersession.

29. So the text of Yājñavalkya: "To a woman, whose husband marries a second wife, let him give an equal sum, as a compensation for the supersession, provided no separate property have been bestowed on her: but if any have been assigned, let him allot half.

30. The wealth which is bestowed on a first wife, by a man desirous of marrying a second, is termed a gift of supersession, for the object of it is to contrive a second marriage.
31. As much as has been given to a second wife, so much should be bestowed on the first wife. This is the meaning, and conformable to the opinion of the Daya-Bhāgā. The Mīras however assert, that when peculiar property has been bestowed, then there is no gift of a half share, since it is unauthorized by any text.

32. The son of a Čūdra, by a female slave, may at the will of his father, be rendered an equal sharer with the son, born of his wedded wife. On the decease of his father, he is entitled to half a share;—in default of such a brother, and of a daughter’s son, he is entitled to the whole of his father’s wealth: but if there be a daughter’s son, he must be an equal sharer with him.

33. Thus Vājñavalkya declares: “Even a son begotten by a Čūdra on a female slave, may take a share by the father’s choice: but if the father be dead, the brethren should make him partake of the moiety of a share: and one who has no brothers, may inherit the whole property in default of daughter’s sons.”

34. “By the father’s choice? That is, at his pleasure.

35. “In default of daughter’s sons?” But if there be a daughter’s son, then the son of the Čūdra will be entitled to participate equally with him. The participation is in this case equal, according to the rule by which it is thus settled, when no specification exists to the contrary. It is so stated in the Daya-Bhāgā.

CHAPTER VII.

PARTITION BY BROTHERS, AFTER THE FATHER’S DECEASE.

1. Partition by brothers is not lawful during the life-time of the mother, notwithstanding ownership of wealth is vested in them on the decease of the father. The text of Mann, “After the [death of the] father and the mother, the brethren, being assembled, must divide equally the paternal estate: for they have not power over it, while their parents live,”* indicates, that partition should take place after the death of the mother.

2. If however a partition be made during the life-time of the mother, then she must be made an equal sharer with her own sons, according to the text [of Vṛhaspati] which declares, that the mother should on the decease of her husband be made an equal sharer with her sons.”

3. Here since the term mother relates to the natural parent, the step-mother does not participate, but she must be maintained with food and raiment.

* Manu 9, 145.
4. In like manner, in a partition about to be made of the grandfather’s wealth by grandsons, the grandmother must be made an equal sharer. By the expression “similar to mothers,” in the text, “All grandmothers are pronounced similar to mothers,” it is shown, that as the mother is entitled to an equal share in a partition of her husband’s wealth, made by her own sons, so in a partition about to be made of the grandfather’s wealth by grandsons, the grandmother has an equal share with them.

5. In this instance likewise the contemporary wives of the grandmother are not entitled to participate; they need only be maintained.

6. For the reason above stated, (§3) the term grandmother refers exclusively to the natural parent of the father. This is the received opinion: although in fact, considering the use of the words “all” and “grandmothers,” (in the plural number) in the text above quoted, it is reasonable, that the contemporary wives of the grandmother should be allowed to participate.

7. But the followers of the Maithila school assert, that the word mother in this text of Vṛhaspati: “The mother should on the decease of the husband, be made an equal sharer with her sons,” (§2) intends also the step-mother, in support of which opinion, they adumbrate the following text of that author of the same import: In his default, the mother is an equal sharer with her sons; mothers are equal sharers with them, and daughters are entitled to a fourth part.”

8. “In his default:” In default of the father, when a partition is about to be made by grandsons.—“The mother:” she who has male offspring.—“Mothers:” Step-mothers, destitute of male offspring; all these are sharers in equal proportions with their sons.

9. The sisters also of these sharers must be rendered participators to the amount of a fourth share receivable by their brothers respectively, for the purpose of marriage.

10. The followers, however, of the Maithila school assert, that the sisters should be made partakers inasmuch as will suffice for the object of their marriage, and according to their opinion also, the contemporary wives of the grandmother are entitled to participate in the wealth of their husband. This should be understood.

11. A partition made by brothers of the same class, is of two descriptions: either with specific deductions, or equal. A text of Vṛhaspati declares: “Partition of two sorts is ordained for co-heirs: one in the order of seniority, the other by allotment of equal shares.

12. “Order of seniority:” indicates partition by the mode of deduction:—It must not however be supposed that because the mode by equal division is more generally practised, and the form by deduction seldom observed, that the former is the only mode sanctioned by law, and the latter unauthorized: for a partition by the mode of deduction may take place at the will of [younger] brothers by reason of greater veneration [for their elder brother].
13. But the mode by equal division is the only one adopted in the present age, because younger brothers are now-a-days seldom met with, who entertain this great veneration, and elder brothers deserving of it are [equally] rare.

14. "Seniority." That is, priority of birth among brothers, all born of mothers or step-mothers alike by class. A text of Manu declares: "As between sons, born of wives equal in their class [and] without [any other] distinction, there can be no seniority in right of the mother; but the seniority ordained by law is according to birth." *

15. "Women equal in their class." That is, of the same class.

16. An appointed daughter and a legitimate son are entitled to equal participation. The appointed daughter is not entitled to the share of an elder brother by reason of priority of birth, for a text of Manu declares: "But a daughter having been appointed to produce a son for her father, and a son [begotten by himself] being afterwards born, the division of the heritage must in that case be equal: since there is no right of primogeniture for a woman." †

17. The deduction of a twentieth takes place only in the case of partition among brothers not uterine, but in a partition made among brothers of the whole blood alone, the eldest is entitled to two shares. Thus Vṛhaspati declares: "All sons of regenerate men, born of women alike by class, should share alike, after giving a deduction to the eldest."

18. "Women alike by class." Meaning: where there are several of them.—Since the mention of a deduction occurs in this text with respect to "sons born of [different] women alike by class," therefore, what has been declared regarding the eldest taking two shares, by that part of the text of Manu, which says: "Let the eldest take a double share," and also by the text of Gautama: "Let the first born have a double share," must be understood to apply to the case of a partition made among uterine brothers alone, according to the principle which admits of a special provision, limiting the operation of a general rule.

19. Further, since the above cited text [of Vṛhaspati] specifies "women alike by class," Brāhmaṇa and other sons born of women of different tribes are entitled in their due order, to four, three, two and one share. Thus Manu declares: "Let the son of the Brāhmaṇi take four parts; the son of the Kṣatriya three; let the son of the Vaśya have two parts; let the son of the Cādrā take a single part [if he be virtuous]." §

20. A Cādrā is entitled to one share, because he is bound to perform certain religious initiatory ceremonies, after the birth of his son.

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* Manu 9. 125.
† Manu 9. 134.
‡ Manu 9. 117.
21. The term "regenerate," in the above quoted text of Vṛhaspati, (§ 17) is merely illustrative; consequently the deduction of a twentieth, and the other [namely the double share] take place even in favour [of the eldest son] of a Čūdra, who is equally entitled to a larger share, since he, without distinction, confers benefits by delivering his father from the hell, named Put.

22. Therefore the text of Manu, which declares: "For a Čūdra is ordained a wife of his own class and no other; all produced by her shall have equal shares, though she have a hundred sons," should be considered as prohibiting the marriage of a Čūdra with a woman of a different class, and declared for the purpose of forbidding an unequal distinction by reason of difference of class;—not as prohibiting the deduction of a twentieth, &c. This is considered to be right.

23. In a partition made between legitimate and adopted sons, the legitimate son has two shares, and the adopted sons, who are of the same class with the father, take one share; but adopted sons belonging to an inferior class, are not entitled to any share.—They need only be supported with food and raiment.

24. Nārada declares: "All these sons are pronounced heirs of a man, who has no legitimate issue by himself begotten, but should a true legitimate son be afterwards born, they have no right of primogeniture. Such among them as are of equal class, [with the father,] shall have a third part as their allotment; but those of a lower tribe must live dependent on him, supplied with food and raiment.

25. "Heirs:" That is, partakers of the father's whole estate.—"Such among them:" Meaning, such sons as are of equal class [with the father.]

26. A partition should be made by sons of the wealth of their deceased father, which remains after discharging his debts; or with the consent of the creditors, the partition may take place first, and the debts be afterwards discharged.

27. Nārada declares: "What remains of the paternal inheritance over and above the father's obligations, and after payment of his debts, may be divided by the brethren; so that their father continue not a debtor."

28. Here from the expression, "So that the father remain not a debtor," it appears, that the debts may be cleared off subsequent to the partition; otherwise, it would be unmeaning.

29. In like manner, whatever excess has been expended by one brother, in consequence of his having a large family, should not be taken into account at the time of the partition. But a partition should be made of the wealth, which is actually forthcoming.
30. The text of Nárada declares: "Among unseparated kinsmen, let not one restore what has been expended. A partition should take place of the visible wealth, corrected for income and expenditure."

31. From the use of the particle ["va,"] in this text, the meaning of the word strictly is intended to be conveyed. Consequently, having compared the amount of the wealth, which had accumulated at a time when no partition had taken place, with the amount expended, a division should be made of the balance actually remaining.

32. Vyásá has declared, that the initiatory ceremonies of uninitiated brothers and sisters, should be performed from the paternal wealth: "Uninitiated brothers should be initiated from the father's wealth by those elder brothers, for whom the ceremonies have been already performed," and the sisters should also be disposed of in marriage; if there be no wealth of the father, they must be initiated at the expense of their brothers. A text of Nárada recites: "If no wealth of the father exist, the ceremonies must without fail be defrayed by brothers already initiated, contributing funds out of their own portions."

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTS CONCEALED.

1. The partition of effects concealed by some one parceller at the time of partition, and subsequently discovered, is next declared.

2. On this subject the following text of Manu occurs: "When all the debts and wealth have been justly distributed according to law, any thing which may be afterwards discovered, shall be subject to an equal distribution."—The distribution of such concealed effect with the concealer, should be exactly conformable to that, which had been before made. A less share is not to be given to him by reason of his concealment, nor is he on that account to be altogether excluded from participation: This is the meaning of, "shall be subject to an equal distribution." It is not intended by the text, that all shall share equally in the concealed effect, as there exists not any reason for the prohibition of the deduction of a twentieth, and it would moreover follow, that the Bráhmaṇa and Kśatriya sons would participate equally. Thus Kátyáyana declares: "Effects which are withheld by by them from each other, and property which has been ill distributed, being subsequently discovered, let them divide in equal shares." So Bhrgu has ordained.

3. "Subsequently discovered:" By this it is shown, that partition is to take place of the concealed effects alone, and not that a second partition is to be made, of what has already been once divided.
5. Property which has been ill distributed:—Intending that property, of which a distribution has been made contrary to law,—through error and the like, must be again divided according to law, for that part of the text of Manu,* which declares: “Once is the partition of inheritance made,” is intended to forbid a second partition after the first has been legally made. It is therefore determined, that the division of concealed property must be made with the person, who concealed it, as has already been declared.

CHAPTER IX.

ON THE ALLOTMENT OF A SHARE TO A COPARCENER RETURNING FROM ABROAD.

1. Vyhaspati declares: “Whether partition have or have not been made, whenever an heir appears, he shall receive a share of whatever common property there is.”


3. “Common property:” Common to all.

4. Further. “Be it debt, or a writing, or house or field, which descended from his paternal ancestor, he shall take his due share of it, when he comes, even though he have been long absent.”

5. By this it is not meant, that he alone shall take his due share of it, but that his descendants, (who are Sapiudhas) down to the seventh degree, shall also take their shares,—as the same author has declared: “If a man leave the common family and reside in another country, his share must no doubt be given to his male descendants, when they return. Be the descendant, third, fifth or even seventh in degree, he shall receive his hereditary allotment on proof of his birth and name. To the male descendants, when they appear of that man, whom the neighbours and old inhabitants know by tradition to be the proprietor, the land must be surrendered by his kinsmen.”


7. “Neighbours:” Those residing in the vicinity.

8. “Land:” This expression is merely used figuratively for any description of common property.

9. Therefore, it is a settled point, that one who travelled in a foreign country, at a period when no partition had taken place, and returned after a long lapse of time, as well as his descendants, as far as the seventh in degree, after they shall have made themselves recognized by the elder inhabitants and neighbours, shall obtain a lawful share of the heritable wealth.

10. This is the law relative to the allotment of a share to a parcener, who had journeyed into a strange land.

11. But descendants only, as far as the fourth degree of one, who had remained all along in his own country, are entitled to share his wealth, for it has been formerly declared, that the fifth in descent and the rest confer no benefits on a deceased owner, since they are not competent to present funeral oblations to him at solemn obsequies.

CHAPTER X.

ON PARTITION BETWEEN SONS BORN OF THE SAME MOTHER, BUT OF DIFFERENT FATHERS.

1. Vishnu says: "If there are two sons begotten by two fathers, but born of the same mother, let each of them take that which was the father's property and not the other." Let the son take the wealth of him, from whose soever seed he is produced, and not the other, that is, the son born from another's seed should not take it. Such is the meaning.

2. The law regarding equal participation, &c., does not therefore apply to this case.

3. In like manner, in a partition by sons of this description, let each son take, (exclusively of the other;) of the wealth of their mother, what was given to her, by their fathers respectively, according to the text, of Narada which declares: "If two sons begotten by different fathers contend for the wealth of the woman, let each of them take that which was his father's property and not the other."

4. In the case however of an acquisition made exclusively by the mother, the participation is equal.

CHAPTER XI.

ON THE POWER OF ONE PARCENER TO MAKE A DONATION OR OTHER ALIENATION OF JOINT PROPERTY.

1. Some maintain, that a gift cannot be made by one [parcener] of joint property, a prohibition against such transfer being contained in this text: [of Vṛhaspati] "The prohibition of giving away, is declared to be eight-fold: A man shall not give joint property, nor his son, nor his wife, nor a pledge, nor all his wealth, nor a deposit, nor a thing borrowed for use, nor what he has promised to another;" and they have further deduced the want of the 'right of one parcener to make a gift of the whole immoveable estate, or of what is common to the family, from the two following texts of Vyāsa: "a single parcener may not without the
consent of the rest make a sale or gift of the whole immoveable estate, nor of what is common to the family."—"Separated kinsmen, as those who are unseparated, are equal in respect of immoveables; for one has not the power over the whole, to give, mortgage or sell it."

2. The opinion held by those, who maintain the invalidity of a gift or sale, [of joint property,] at the will of one partener, is grounded on the doctrine, that co-partners possess a general property in the estate:—in fact, that all of them have a right to the whole estate. This opinion is incorrect; for it has been rejected by the author of the Dāya-Bhāga, as unsupported, by authority.

3. Accordingly, the author of the Dāya-Bhāga, having cited the texts of Vyāsa, for the purpose of refutation, and taken up the argument maintained from those texts by those of the opposite opinion, namely, the want of authority of any single partener to make a gift, says: "For here also as in the case of other goods, there equally exists a property consisting in the power of disposal at pleasure," and adds "But the texts of Vyāsa exhibiting a prohibition are intended to show a moral offence: since the family is distressed by a sale, gift or other transfer, which argues a disposition in the person to make an ill use of his power as owner. They are not meant to invalidate the sale or other transfer." This is determined.

4. "As in the case of other goods." Meaning goods, which are not common.

5. "Here also:" "In the very instance of land held in common."

6. "Equally exists:" Intending that there is no distinction of ownership.

7. Since therefore there is no general property of parteners in the whole estate, it is fallacious to suppose, that a plurality of owners constitutes community, and community must therefore be considered as meaning the state of not being separated. For as propriety exists in the common property, even before partition, there is nothing to prevent the gift or other alienation by a partener of his own share, even at that time. This is the opinion entertained by the author of the Dāya-Bhāga, who maintains a partial right to a certain portion [of the estate ascertainable by partition] vested in each individual owner. Accordingly Nārada says: "When there are many persons sprung from one man, who have duties apart and are separate in business, and character, if they be not accordant in affairs, should they give or sell their own shares, they do all that as they please, for they are masters of their own wealth," and thereby, shows that in transactions about to be concluded by one partener, he has the power to give or otherwise dispose of his own share, without the consent of the rest.

8. It should not be said, that this text refers to a state of separation, for since the want of ownership [by one partener in the portion allotted to another] is in that case clearly determined, the consent of
either to the transactions of the other, is totally out of the question. Such being the case, the text [of Vyhaspati above cited] which enumerates common property as not being a subject of donation, must be considered merely in the light of a prohibition, and not as meant to invalidate the transfer. — It is thus stated in the Smṛti Saṅgara and other books.

9. Therefore, a gift by a parecner of his own share of the common property is valid, whether such gift have been made antecedent, or subsequent to partition.

CHAPTER XII.
ON SLAVERY.

SECTION I.
Descriptions of Slaves.

1. The debt incurred by a slave for the support of the family of his master, while in a foreign country, or elsewhere, must be entirely discharged by the master. Mann says: "Whatever contract a dependent may conclude for the benefit of the family, let not his master, whether in his own or in a foreign country rescind."*


3. "Contract debt, &c." Slaves are of fifteen descriptions and are thus described by Nārada: "One born [of a female slave] in the house of her master; one bought; one received [by donation;] one inherited [from ancestors;] one maintained in a famine; one pledged by a former master; one relieved from a great debt; one made captive in war; a slave won in a stake; one who has offered himself in this form, "I am thine;" an apostate from religious mendicity; a slave for a stipulated time; one maintained in consideration of service; a slave for the sake of this bride; and one self-sold, are fifteen slaves declared by the law."

4. "Born in the house:" Born of a female slave in the house [of her master.]

5. "Inherited:" Succeeded to from ancestors.


7. "Pledged by a former master:" Granted as a pledge in consideration of a loan.

8. "One relieved:" One who has consented to become a slave, in consequence of being relieved from a great debt. Such is the meaning.

* Mann, 3, 197.
9. "I am thine." One who not being the slave of any one, surrenders himself in this form to slavery.


11. "Stipulated." One who influenced by some motive or other, contracts an engagement in this form, I am thine for a certain period.

12. "Maintained." One who has consented to become a slave even in a time of plenty, for the sake of obtaining a maintenance.

13. "A slave for the sake of his bride." One who has consented to slavery under the influence of desire. Vraspati says: "But the man who co-habits with the female slave of another should be considered as a slave for the sake of his bride; he must perform work for her master like other slaves, or like servants for pay."


15. Narada declares, as follows, respecting the apostate: from religious mendicity: "The man who is an apostate from religious mendicity, becomes the slave of the king, giving a pair of cows, and he ought never to be emancipated nor purified."

16. Those only of the Kshatriya and Vaiṣya tribe who thus apostatize, become slaves to the king; but Brāhmaṇas of this description, should suffer banishment, in lieu of slavery. Thus Kātyāyana says: "Where men of the three twice-born classes forsake religious mendicity, let the king banish a man of the sacerdotal class, and reduce to slavery a man of the military or commercial tribe."

17. The expression "military or commercial" [Kshatriya and Vaiṣya] appears in the form of a conjunctive compound, and if considered in the [accusative or] 2nd case, it becomes the object of the transitive verb.

SECTION 2.

On Emancipation from Slavery.

1. Of the slaves abovementioned, the first four: (one born in the house, one bought, one received, one inherited,) and the slave self-sold, are not of right released from slavery, unless they be emancipated by the indulgence of their masters.

2. "A slave maintained in a famine," becomes emancipated on repaying what he consumed during the dearth, and on giving a pair of oxen.

3. "A slave maintained only," is enfranchised by relinquishing his maintenance.

4. "A slave for the sake of his bride," is emancipated by quitting her.

5. "A slave pledged," is redeemed from his slavery to the creditor, on the re-payment of the debt incurred by his [former] master.
6. Should any one of these slaves rescue his master from danger menacing his life, or from impending peril, he is entitled to emancipation.

7. Katyāyana declares: "A free woman, or one who is not a slave of the same master, becoming the bride of a slave, also becomes a slave to her husband's owner, for her husband is her lord, and that lord is subject to a master."

8. Here by reason of the connection implied by the term slave, the woman is understood to become the female slave of the master, suggested by that term.

9. The female slave is of two descriptions: first, not emancipated to any one; and secondly, the slave of another.

10. The woman of the first description becomes simply by her marriage with a slave, the female slave of the master of her husband.

11. The female of the second description becomes a slave with her husband's permission, but not otherwise.

12. In like manner by parity of reasoning, if a man, not the slave of any one, marry a female slave, then he becomes a slave to the master of his wife.

13. But should a man, the slave of another, marry with the consent of his master, he becomes the slave of the master of the female slave.

14. In like manner, if a female slave unite herself in marriage with a slave, without her master's permission, then each remains the property of their masters respectively, but their offspring should be shared by both owners.

15. It must not be supposed from the following texts of Manu, *Whatever man, owns a field, if seed, conveyed into it by water or wind, should germinate, the plant belongs to the land owner; the mere sower takes not the fruit.—Such is the law concerning the offspring of cows, and mares, of female camels, goats, and sheep, of slave girls, hens, and milch buffaloes,* that such offspring belongs exclusively to the owner of the female slave; for the female slave therein mentioned, refers to one, who has been once married, [and afterwards contracted another marriage with the slave of a different owner.]—But the offspring as above described of a female slave [regularly] married, must be shared.

16. Thus is concluded the Compendium of the Law of Inheritance, by Sri Kṛṣṇa Tarkālakāra Bhāptāchārya.

* Manu, 9, 54 and 55.
THE

DATTAKA-MĪMĀNSĀ,

AND

DATTAKA-CHANDRIKĀ,

TWO ORIGINAL TREATISES

ON THE

HINDŪ LAW OF ADOPTION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSKRIT,

BY J. C. C. SUTHERLAND, ESQ.

WITH

NOTES ILLUSTRATIVE AND EXPLANATORY,

AND

A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF THE LAW,

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

Calcutta,
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PREFACE

The religious ordinances of the Hindūs inculcate the indispensable necessity that a man should be survived by male offspring for performing his exequial rites and other purposes. In consequence, on defect of real legitimate issue, the affiliation, under prescribed rules, of a kinsman or other person is enjoined: and an individual, thus regularly adopted, acquires the filial rights which attach to the real son. This law, peculiar perhaps to the Hindū Code, must often operate harshly towards relatives connected by the nearest ties of kinsred; and it is not surprising, that cases of great importance, involving questions as to the legality of an adoption, should, (and they frequently do,) arise.

The admirable translations by Mr. Colebrooke, of the treatise of Jīmūta-vāhana, and that in the Mitāksharā, on the law of inheritance, have laid open to all, that important branch of Indian jurisprudence. But, though the judicious notes, subjoined to that part of the latter treatise, which refers to the succession of adopted sons, afford valuable information on many questions of consequence, relative to adoption; still, the want of an English version of some work of authority, professedly treating, on the subject, and which might exhibit the law of adoption fully and connectedly, has been sensibly felt. It was with a view to supply this deficiency, that the present publication was undertaken under the authoritative sanction of Mr. Colebrooke's advice.

The Dattaka-Mīmāṃsā is the most celebrated work extant on the Hindū law of adoption. Its author, Nanda Pāṇḍita, has attained considerable literary pre-eminence—an "excellent and copious" commentary by him, on the institutes of Viṣṇu, denominated the Vaijayanti, exists in much esteem; and he likewise was the author of a commentary on the Mitāksharā, under the title of Prātiākśhara. The Dattaka-Mīmāṃsā, as its name denotes, is an argumentative treatise, or disquisition, on the subject of adoption; and though, from the author's extravagant affectation of logic, the work is always tedious, and his arguments often weak and superfluous—and though, the style is frequently obscure, and not unrarely inaccurate,—it is on the whole, compiled with ability and minute attention to the subject, and seems not unworthy of the celebrity which it has attained. But whether justly or unjustly, the estimation in which it is held, peculiarly suggests its selection for the purposes of the present publication.

The Dattaka-Chandrikā is a more concise treatise, on the same subject, by Devanda-bhaṭṭa, the author of an eminent compilation of law entitled the Śmṛti-Chandrikā. It is a work of authority, and supposed to have been the groundwork of Nanda Pāṇḍita's disquisi-

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* Mr. Colebrooke in his Preface in the Dāya-bhaṭṭa, &c.
tion. The doctrines of the two books, vary on some points, and as the work is short, it was deemed advisable to include it in the present publication.

Having said thus much, in explanation of the selection made, the Translator would willingly annex some account of the authors, whose tracts are now presented in an English dress. With very limited opportunity, however, he has failed in ascertaining any particulars, relative to them, further than that they are both writers of Southern India. Of the Shri-Chandrika of Devanda-bhaṭṭa, Mr. Colebrooke observes,—"This excellent treatise of judicature, is of great and almost paramount authority, as I am informed, in the countries occupied by the Hindu nations of Dravīra, Tailigna and Karnaṭa; inhabiting the greatest part of the peninsula or Deccan."—It is not unlikely, that the Dattaka-Chandrika may have attained equal distinction.

The method in which Hindu lawyers, (and indeed Hindu writers in general,) treat every subject, is highly uncongenial to European taste: and in fact, in order to acquire or retain a correct knowledge of the subject, treated on, and the author's peculiar opinions, indistinctly blended, as they often are, with those of others, it is necessary to devote much attentive application,—generally more, than inclination and leisure will admit of being bestowed, by the officers entrusted with the administration of civil justice in India.—The Translator in consequence, in the hope of augmenting the general utility of the work, has compiled, and added a brief Synopsis or summary of the Hindu law of adoption; in which, it has been attempted to exhibit succinctly, every topic practically important. This compilation, of course, possesses no intrinsic authority whatsoever. Of the positions, it contains, many are dubious, and some may prove erroneous. Still however, it is hoped that, it will be found useful, in directing the attention of judicial officers to the various questions, which may arise in case of adoption—questions, which in many instances, would not occur to those, who have not made this branch of law, the object of particular study, and which, the native officers, on whom the duty of exposition devolves, might ignorantly or wilfully leave unnoticed, or erroneously solved.

In regard to the law of inheritance, important distinctions obtain, in the doctrines of the Guzra or Bengal, and other schools of law—and this difference has given rise to controversial writing, and various tracts, professedly treating on that branch of judicature, as received in the different schools respectively.—But the case is not the same, in regard to the law of adoption. Some difference of opinion, may be indeed observed amongst the individual writers on the subject, but it does not appear, that any set of dogmas, has been espoused, or opposed, as the peculiar doctrine of any particular school.—The points, on which any difference of opinion obtains, are noted in the Synopsis; and the translator has in some instances intimated, what appears to him, the more correct and prevailing doctrine. But compiled, as this work has been, under circumstances, affording little facility for enquiry or collecting information, he has not, from an apprehension of misleading, attempted to debar, or restrict the operation of any particular rule, to the limits
of any peculiar tract of country. In fact, such precision is scarcely to be attained. Every contested question or dubious point, which may arise, can only be determined, by reference to the Hindu law-officers; who, in delivering their opinions, would be guided by the law, as generally received in the part of India, where the case might arise. Much collision, however, of decision, would be obviated, and the accuracy of undeviating principles attained, if the opinions, of the subordinate Pandits, on any question or point of the nature referred to, were submitted for verification, to the Pandit of the Sadri Divaní 'Addílat.

The translation, particularly of the more abstruse treatise of Nanda Pandita, in many places, unavoidably partakes of the obscurity of the original: to render it more intelligible, notes have been occasionally introduced: other notes have likewise been added, in illustration of particular allusions and rites, and rarely to exhibit variations in the reading of the text. It is hoped, that these notes, (they may always be passed by others,) will not prove unacceptable to the curious, and still less to the Sanscrit reader, whose study of the original treatises, particularly in the absence of all commentary, it is presumed, the volume now published, is calculated to facilitate. The addition of the Synopsis has superseded the necessity, which otherwise would have existed, of indicating in notes, on what points the respective treatises may differ, and in what respects they may be supported and contradicted by other authorities.

Five years have nearly elapsed, from the commencement of the translation of the treatises now presented to the public. Its progress has always been retarded, and often totally suspended by official avocations and other causes. This circumstance, no doubt, has been productive of some inaccuracies and omissions, which a continuous application to the work would have obviated. Much labour, however, has been bestowed to render the translation correct, and it is hoped, that on the whole, it will be found a faithful version. The Translator is conscious, that from a publication, such as that now offered, no literary reputation can be derived, but he indulges in the hope, that the humble merit of having devoted to an useful purpose, some hours of occasional leisure, will not be denied; and ample indeed, will be regard the remuneration of his labour, if this meed be bestowed, or should the present work be found in any degree, to facilitate the dispensation of civil justice in India.

MONGER, 1st July, 1819.

* The manuscript of this work, was sent down from Monger, to a friend in Calcutta, who kindly undertook to superintend its progress, through the press, in which duty he had much experience: to his death, and the change which the pursuits and profession of the Translator have undergone, is to be ascribed the great delay with which the publication has taken place.
DATTAKA-MIMÁNSÁ.

A TREATISE ON ADOPTION.

BY NANDA PÁṆḌITA.

SECTION I.

Adoption why, and by whom to be observed—By a Woman when valid—By what precept ordained—What descriptions of Sons to be Adopted in the present age.

1. Having prostrated himself before Vínáyaka,² whose two feet are to be adored by the world, Nanda Páṇḍita argumentatively discusses the subject of affiliation.

2. By whom; how qualified; at what time; for what purpose; from whom; and who may be adopted as a son? That, on which former writers have not deliberatively treated, is fully propounded here.

3. On this subject Atri says, “By a man destitute of a son only, Atri quoted to show that the soulless man only is enjoined to adopt—and why.

ANNOTATIONS.

2. By a man, § 2.] This text is here translated so as to conform with the interpretations subsequently given by the author, this will account for the deviation in some parts from the more obvious sense of the passage.

² Gangga.
4. A man destitute of a son (aputma) is one, to whom no son has been born, or whose son has died: for a text of Ātri explained. "One to whom no son has been born or whose son has died, having fasted for a son, &c." Another reading recites, "The impotent man or also one whose offspring has died."

5. "By a man destitute of a son, &c." Since it is shown by this, that the being so destitute, is a cause; in omitting to adopt a son, an offence even is incurred; for the precept enjoining the production of a son being positive, it results that the contravention of it, is the cause of an offence; and on defect of any son, in general, exclusion from heaven is declared in this text; "Heaven awaits not one destitute of a son, &c."* And further in the following passage, also, a son in general, is shown to be the cause of redemption from debt. "A Brāhmaṇa immediately on being born, is produced a debtor in three obligations: to the holy saints, for the practice of religious duties; to the gods, for the performance of sacrifice; to his forefathers, for offspring. Or he is absolved from debt, who has a son: has performed sacrifices: and practises religious duties."

The expression "only" in the text of Ātri meant to exclude adoption by one having a son.

6. "By a man destitute of a son only." The incompetency of one having male issue is signified by the term "only" in this passage.

7. By this the word 'distress' (aputma) used by Manu in the following text is explained. "Whom the father or mother during distress, may give as a son, confirming the gift with water, &c."† And it is explained in the same manner by Aparāśka. "during distress that is the adopter having no son."‡

8. Or it may be interpreted 'during distress' during a famine and so forth; as in the Mitakṣarā.|| "By specifying distress it is intimated that the son should not be given, unless there be distress: this prohibition regards the giver." Accordingly Kātyāyana. "During a season of distress the gift or even sale [of a son] may be made: otherwise the same must not be done: this is the injunction of the holy institutes."

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* Both passages here cited are from the Vedas.
† Mann 9. 138, cited also at length in the Mitakṣarā on inheritance, V. Colebrooke's translation, Ch. 1. Sect. XI. § 9. and notes where this and other explanations are noticed.
‡ Aparāśka the author of a commentary on Manu.
§ On inheritance, vide trans., Ch. 1. Sect. XI. § 10 and note.
9. Manu also “A son of any description must be anxiously adopted by one who has none: for the sake of the funeral cake, water, and solemn rites; and for the celebrity of his name.” He who has no son may appoint his daughter in this manner to raise up a son for him, &c., &c.”

10. As for the instance, appearing, of the adoption as sons of Dévaráta and the rest by Viqvémitra, and others, although possessing male issue: that from its repugnancy to the revealed law, as contained in passages before quoted (v. § 3,) must be understood, (in the same manner as the eating the haunch of a dog, and so forth,) not to imply the existence of a revelation [authorizing the act.]

Objection, that the indication of a revelation supersedes that recorded from memory, anticipated and related.

11. It is not to be argued, that a revelation recorded, from recollection, does not supersede the indication of a [different] revelation: for it is of greater authority being supported by direct passages of revealed law, such as: “Heaven awaits not one destitute of male issue,” and so forth.

ANNOTATIONS.

9. Manu also.] Two texts are here quoted. The first though also cited in the Dattaka-Chandrika and other works, as from Manu, is not found in the institutes of that author. It may however be from Viñat-Manu, a work frequently quoted in law treatises, but which if extant is very rare. The latter text is from the institutes: Its sequel is thus. “[Saying.] The male child who shall be born from her in wedlock shall be mine for the purpose of her feeding my obsequies.” Manu, 0. 197.

10. The adoption as sons of Dévaráta and the rest, &c., &c.] On this subject the following passage from the Vishnu Purāna occurs. “The son of Viqvémitra was Chana-sipha, a descendant of Bhrigū given by the gods: subsequently he was called Dévaráta. And afterwards persons called Madhu-chalihanda, Jaya-krit, Dévashyaka, Kachchhanapa and Haritaka were the [adopted] sons of Viqvémitra.” Viqvémitra was born in the Khatriya or military class and by excessive devotion raised himself to ascendent rank. The passage quoted has reference to that period of his life when he had become a Brāhmaṇa:

The eating the haunch of a dog.] It is recorded of Viqvémitra that when perishing with hunger he ate the haunch of a dog. (v. Manu 10. 108.) It is not however to be inferred from this that there exists a revelation authorizing the act.

11. It is not to be argued.] The author anticipates that an adversary may allege that the instance recorded in scripture of Viqvémitra and others adopting another son though possessed of male issue, indicates the prior existence of a revelation authorizing the act: and that a revelation so indicated is more cogent than the rules of revealed law recorded from memory by Atri and Manu in § 3 and 9. This objection he refutes.

* It may be here observed, once for all that words or sentences included within these marks or brackets [ ] are not expressed in the original, but inserted by the translator to complete the sense of the text or render it more clear.
12. But, however if you pertinaciously insist on the superior cogency even of the indication of a revelation, to a revelation recorded from memory; then we accede that a man though possessed of male issue, may adopt another son with the sanction of such issue; on account of the revelation indicated in the following passage: "By that which our father recognised we abide. We place you before us, you, we follow, &c."

Neither should it be urged, that this regards the making an elder son, not the adoption of a son; for the one would be invalid if the other, may not be done. It is useless to enlarge.

13. "By a man destitute of a son." The word son here used is inclusive also of the son's son and grandson, for through these the exclusion from heaven, denounced in such passages as "Heaven awaits not one destitute of a son" is removed: since it is declared in the text subjoined, that the mansions of the happy are attained through the grandson and the other. "By a son, a man conquers worlds; by a son's son, he enjoys immortality: and afterwards by the son of a grandson, he reaches the solar abode."*

14. Nor can it be alleged that the adoption of a son [though a grandson and his son exist.] is for the sake of the funeral obsequies; for from this text it appears, the other two also are competent to perform such rites, "The son of a son and the son of a grandson like these the offspring of a brother, &c., &c."†

15. 'By a man destitute of a son.' From the masculine gender being here used, it follows that a woman is incompetent [to adopt.] Accordingly Vasishtha ordains; Let not a woman either give, or receive a son in adoption: unless with the assent of her husband.‡

* It follows a widow cannot adopt;  

16. From this, the incompetency of the widow is deduced since the assent of her husband is impossible.

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19. Neither should it be urged that this regards.] The passage quoted is apparently from the Vedas: but the translator not having succeeded in discovering it, is unable to estimate exactly the scope or merit of the arguments used. It is difficult to suppose that the author means to assert the analogy between investing a younger son with seniority and the adoption of a stranger. To reconcile this part satisfactorily, it appears necessary to assume, that the passage cited, regards the case where a father creates as an elder son in preference to his other real sons, one previously adopted.

† From the Vishnu Purana v. infra Sect. II. § 60, where this text is completed.
‡ Vasishtha, 15. 4.
17. Nor should it be argued, that the assent of the husband is requisite for a woman whose husband is living; because she is subject to control: but not so the widow, for mention being made of woman in general, dependency on control is not the cause: and [were it] her subject to the control of kinsmen exists as shown in the following text: "On default of these the kinsmen, &c."

18. If it is contended, then, that she may adopt a son, with the assent of the kinsmen even; it is wrong: for the term “husband” would become indefinite: and the purpose would not be attained. Now the purpose of the husband’s sanction is, that the filiation, as son of the husband, may be complete, even by means of an adoption, made by the wife.

19. Accordingly, [as appears] from this aphorism, (“lastly of the mother, first of the father, &c.”) the connection of the son affiliated, through the wife to both, is declared in the following compendious rule of Satyāśādha: “Of the son by marriage: the father’s son: the son made: the son of an appointed daughter: the son affiliated through the wife: the son of a marriage according to the Nāṣṇa form: the son of a female given as a gratuity, [the relation of lineage] to both parents [obtains].” Now the connection of lineage to the father, is the filiation as his son; and such filiation proceeds from the sanction only of the father; not from the act of adoption: for the agent of that, in this instance, is the wife.

20. “The son by marriage,” is the son received with a pregnant bride (Sadādhā). “The son affiliated through the wife,” is the son demanded by the wife (Strī-yāchita) or the son obtained through the wife (Strī-santaṇa). “The son by a female given as a gratuity,” is one born on a damsel obtained, as a fee at a sacrifice. The rest are obvious. Thus expounds Savarsvāṇi.”

21. And in the case in question, the wife being mentioned as the instrumental means, a primary author of the act, is obtained: for otherwise, one accepted in adoption by the wife, being son to such his mother [only], since his connection, as lineage to her husband, would be wanting; his incompetency to perform the funeral rites of the husband would result; and no father existing,

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17. As shown in the following text.] The text alluded to is the following of Yajñavalkya: “The father protects her when a damsel. The husband when married: sons in old age: on default of these kinsmen, a female attains not independence.”

18. Accordingly as appears from this aphorism.] In the passage from Satyāśādha the term “pitrū” occurs. This may either signify “to both fathers” vis., the adoptive and natural fathers or as translated “to both parents” the father and mother. To clear the ambiguity and conform the latter construction, which the author adopts, he adduces the other aphorism; “Lastly of the mother, &c.”

21. And in the case in question.] That of the son adopted through the wife.
at his marriage, and so forth, the paternal family and other particulars must of consequence remain unspecified.

22. If the case is thus, then the assent of the wife is requisite for the husband also; for the purpose [of such sanction] would be the same; [as that of the husband to the adoption by the wife].—This (if alleged) is wrong; for in consequence of the superiority of the husband, by his mere act of adoption, the filiation of the adopted, as son of the wife, is complete in the same manner as her property, in any other thing accepted by the husband.

23. Moreover Vâchaspati, "Having offered a burnt offering (Hutvā) with recitation of the holy words, he should take an unremote kinsman, &c." In this text, the indelible past participle 'Hutvā,' (Having offered, &c.), indicating the government of both verbs, by the same agent, being used: the adoption by one only, who may offer a burnt offering, (Homa) is valid: therefore women, from their disqualification to perform such sacrament, are incapable to adopt.

24. It must not be argued, that, since under a text of Çāunaka the employment of a priest is according to the approved doctrine, the "Homa" may be completed by his intervention: for although that were completed, still would the adoption [by the woman] be imperfect, since she is not competent to perform the prayers requisite for the same.

25. These Çāunaka has specified: "And taking him by both hands, with recitation of the prayer commencing ("Devasyatva, &c."), having inaudibly repeated the mystical invocation, "Angād-angat, &c." having kissed the forehead of the child," &c.

26. Nor does thus the want of power of Çūdras follow: for, their ability [to adopt], is obtained from an indication [of Law], conclusive to that effect, in this passage: "Of Çūdras from amongst those of the Çūdra class.

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24. Under a text of Çāunaka.] The part of Çāunaka here alluded to, is subsequently cited. v. §.

25. "Angād-angat, &c." These are the initial words of a passage from the Vedas subsequently cited at length. "From my several limbs, &c." (v. Sect. 7, § 7.)

* V. infra. Sect. 5, § 15.
† Çāunaka subsequently cited at large, v. Sect. 2, § 74.
27. Since the [only] power of widows is fixed to be that of using property during their lives, it is established that they have not power to adopt a son. But it must not be affirmed, that it follows that in the same manner women also, whose husbands are living, are incompetent on account of their incapacity to perform the burnt sacrifices, prayers, and so forth. For, by the reservation "unless with the assent of her husband," ability to perform what is principal [viz., adoption], being established, from their consequent power to perform what is subordinate [viz., those solemnities], the burnt sacrament, prayers, and so forth, might be inferred. Therefore, since by this passage ("of women and Gādras without prayers") a dispensation with respect to prayers, is established, the adoption [of the women in question.] would be valid without prayers; like their acceptance of any chattel.

28. Besides, this part of the text, "unless with the assent of her husband," is an exception exemption from the general prohibition, contained in the part preceding; "Let not a woman either give, or accept a son;" and in it, the assent of the husband is the cause. Therefore, the widow is incompetent [to adopt]; for, her husband being dead, since his assent is impossible, the exemption destitute of the cause [to give it effect], is without validity; and other means of deducing [her authority.] are wanting. Thus the doctrine of every writer is rendered even consistent.

29. Nor must it be argued, that this being the case, [that is, if the widow may not adopt] her exclusion from heaven would not be obviated. For that, in the following text, is declared by Manu to be removed by devotion to pious austerity. "Like those abstemious men, a virtuous wife ascends to heaven, though she have no child; if after the decease of her lord, she devote herself to pious austerity."** Thus the whole is unexceptionable.

One son may not be adopted, by more than one father.

30. "By a man destitute of a son." From the singular number being here used, it follows; that, the same son must not be adopted, by two or three persons.

31. But would not thus, the law as to the son given, and the rest, being 'Dvārakamushyāyanas,' (or sons of two fathers) be contradicted? Accordingly, there is this passage of law, in the Prayogapāñjikā. "Sons given, purchased, and the rest, are sons of two fathers. Their marriage

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27. A dispensation with respect to prayers.] Prayers here must be considered, as used for the whole of the solemnities.

31. As was the case of Grīga and Caśatra.] The translator has failed in discovering the particulars of the case here referred to.

* Manu, 3, 160.
may not take place in either family; as was the case of Činga and Čaisira."

32. It is not so: for, the state as son of two fathers, imports both a natural and an adoptive father; and the prohibition regards two adoptive fathers. Thus there is no contradiction.

33. The substitute is of eleven descriptions: the son of the wife, and the rest, according to a text of Manu which recites, "Sixes declare these eleven sons, (the son of the wife and the rest) as specified, to be substitutes for the real legitimate son; for, the obsequies would fail (Kṛṣṇaopā)." 112

34. Of these, those are substitutes by right even, who are related, by containing portions of either, of the husband, and wife; and the text, [of Manu] intends a restriction [as to the substitutes not so circumstance]. Again, those who bear not such connection, are substitutes in virtue of passages of Law.

35. For instance: the son of the wife, the son of an appointed daughter, the daughter appointed to be a son, the son of an unmarried daughter (Kārina), the son of a twice married woman, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son of hidden origin, are principal substitutes, as partaking partially of portions [of the pair], from their kindred, in some instances, to their mother only, and in others in a small degree, to both parents. The son given, the son bought, the son made, the son self-given (Dattātṛa), and the son rejected, are substitutes in virtue of express texts of Law. Now, the term 'substitute' is applicable to both classes even.

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33. The substitute is of eleven descriptions.] The following is the specification of these succedaneous sons, in their order enumerated, by Manu—The 'Kshatriya' or son of the wife by a kshatria. The 'Dattātṛa' or son given. The 'Kriyāpatra' or son made—The 'Guhapippuruśa' or son of hidden origin—The 'Abhipādena' or son deserted—The 'Kuṭi' or dāsah's son—The 'Bhūsā' or son received with a pregnant bride—The 'Katra' or son bought—The 'Paumābhaya' or son of a woman twice married—The 'Swayamārā' or son self-given,—and the 'Chandra' or son by a 'Chandra' woman.—These technical terms are explained fully in Sir Wm. Jones' translation of Manu, Chap. 8, verses 128 to 173.—But more extensive information will be found in Chap. 1. Sect. XI. of Mr. Colebrooke's translation of the Mīrākṣaṇa, and the copious and very valuable notes subjoined.

35. In the same manner, &c.] Allusion is here made, to an elaborate, and oblong disquisition on the passage from the Vedas quoted, which forms the 17th topic, 4th chapter, 1st Book of the Mīrākṣaṇa. It is there proposed, as the subject for discussion, whether the passage in question, contains a precedent in itself; or is merely confirmatory of a precedent conveyed, in some other passage. The latter position is demonstrated, to be the correct one: and it is shown, in the course of the argument.
by reason of its frequent use [in such general sense]; in the same manner as in the passage, "He places Bricks (Srishti)" the term 'Srishti' [intends bricks generally].

36. It has been said by Medhātithi.—"These cannot be substitutes: a substitute is supplied on defect of the means of completion of an act commenced.—Now a son is no such means, for, he is the primary object of the act, of the production of offspring; Hence the term Putra (son,) applying even to the son of the wife, and other adoptive sons, the designating these substitutes, is for the sake of shewing respect to the son of the body (Arrasa); for, the expression 'substitute' as current, denotes a lesser degree of benefit. To the same extent, as the real son can confer much benefit, the others are unable."

37. This must be canvassed; for, the position to be proved, Doctrine of being this, that the sons given and the rest are not Medhātithi canvassed. substitutes; the cause assigned, viz., the not being the means of completing the act, of the production of a son, does not apply to the persons affected by the point to be proved: since these, as they already exist, are not liable to be produced.

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that 'Srishti' occurring in the passage, does not mean particular bricks, at the laying of which, for an altar and so forth; 'Mantras' in which that term occurs, are read; but bricks in the general, since the term is frequently used in such general sense.

36. A substitute is supplied.] The reader is referred to a subsequent note to § 47.

Means of completion.] The Sanscrit term so rendered is Arga. In the language of Logic, it signifies the materials, or means of completing any work.

37. This must be canvassed.] Nanda Tapālī assumes the argument of Medhātithi to be this—A substitute is supplied on defect of the means of completing an act commenced;—adopted sons are not substitutes, because a son (real or adopted) being the object of the act proposed (viz., the production of a son,) is no complete means (either primary or as a substitute).—Accordingly (if this is the meaning of Medhātithi), he correctly states that the reason assigned, does not apply to the adopted sons, or persons affected by the point to be proved: as these already existing, are not liable to be produced.—Medhātithi subjoins "Hence the term Putra (son,) applying even to the son of the wife and other adoptive sons, &c."—This passage gives colour to the construction, assumed by Nanda, of the argument of the author mentioned; yet, the following syllogism exhibits a preferable, if not, the more obvious sense of the argument in question.—A substitute is supplied for the defective means of an act commenced,—the son (legitimate), being the object of the act proposed (viz., the producing a son,) is no such means.—Therefore, sons given and the rest cannot be substitutes for the real legitimate son. Nanda however, rests his refutation of the doctrine of Medhātithi, by shewing in the following section, that a son, though not the means of completing the production of a son, is however, the means of accomplishing another act, and consequently there may be logically a substitute for a son, as such means.

The persons affected by the point to be proved.] The single Sanscrit term 'Taksha' is rendered by this circumlocation. In the language of logic it signifies, the party or object whose quality and so forth, would be affected by the position to be proved.
38. Again, in the precept, enjoining the production of a son, the
son, being the object to be produced, is no means of
completion. But this is the case in respect to, that
precept only, not any other precept.—For, from pas-
sages of scripture such as, "(or he is absolved from debt who has
issue, &c."
"v. § 5.) this precept resulting, 'Let him procure absolution
from debt through a son;' it is established, that the son, as being the
instrumental cause of such absolution, is a means of completion: and
the instrumentality of the son is even expressly declared by Manu,
in this and other passages, "By a son, a man conquers worlds &c."
(v. § 13.)

39. If this be the case: then there may be for the sake of at-
taining immortality, and the solar abode, a substitute
for a grandson, and great grandson—Be it so: we are
in no-wise affected.

40. Nor does an identity of precept follow, from both, [viz., the
precept enjoining the production of a son, and that
directing the attainment of redemption from debt,
through a son] having a common result: for, in the
same precept, the two instrumental causes, (consummual intercourse at
due season, and a son,) and their several effects (a son and redemption
from debt,) cannot be included: and were they, three contradictory
things would become two.

41. Consequently, the son being the instrumental cause, in an
act, the object to result from which, is absolution from
debt: on his failure the son given, and the rest may
without repugnancy, be substitutes: in the same man-
ner, as [at a sacrifice] where the ‘Soma’ plant is wanting, the ‘putika’
is a substitute.

42. This even is made obvious, by Manu [who says] "For, the
Supported by
obsequies would fail" (v. § 33.) Because the failure of
these would ensue; if on default of a legitimate son,
the affiliation of a substitute might not take place.

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40. Nor does an identity of precept follow.] The author here anticipates an
argument of an opponent. if the two precepts, from implying the same result [viz., the
acquisition of a son], are identical; the argument of our author in § 38, would not hold.

Three contradictory things would become two.] That is, if the two causes, and their
two effects, specified in the text, be included in the same precept, they would be blent-
ed into one cause, and one effect: and in this manner, three contradictory things,
[viz., consummual intercourse at due season, a son and redemption from debt,) would
become two.—The two causes and their two effects are enumerated only as three: because the son is mentioned, as the effect of one cause, and the cause of the
other effect.

41. Where the Soma plant is wanting, &c.] This is in allusion to the following
rule in the Vedas,—"Should he be unable to procure the Soma, let him cut the puti-
ka." This rule forms the subject of an elaborate disquisition in the 13th topic, 3rd
section of the 6th Book of the Mimansa of Jaimini.
Obsequies, are funeral rites, consisting in presenting oblations of food and water, and so forth. In the same manner by Atri also [it is said]: "For the sake of the funeral cake, water and solemn rites" (v. § 3.) Thus the whole is unimpeachable.

43. "There is no substitute for mastership; a wife, a son, a country, time, fire, the divinity, an act and word, &c.," as for also the exclusion of the substitute for a son, by this text of Satyashdra; that [is propounded by the author], after having authorized to one, having no son, a substitute for the same, (in such passages as that subjoined,) for the sake of obviating, the recital of the benediction [therein alluded to]. "He recited, for offspring, that beneficent prayer called "Jyotishmati." Accordingly, there is this passage of revealed Law: "He, to whom no son may have been born, should recite for offspring, the prayer commencing "Jyotishmati."

44. So in the Saman Veda, in the part treating on father and son, after having by such passages as "The father of such a one sacrifices, &c.," authorized, to one destitute of a son, the substitute for the same: [the subsequent prohibition] is meant to avoid, such particular passages; but not intended to exclude, in every case even, a substitute for a son; for, that would contradict the following and other passages of recorded Law: "A substitute for a son must be adopted." (§ 3.) "To be substitutes for the real legitimate son." (§ 33.)

45. It is next deliberated, whether this substitute for a son, who is ordained, is so, in virtue of, the precept enjoining the production of a son, or that regarding the funeral obsequies. For, allusion has been made, as to both; for instance, with respect to the precept to produce a son, by the first part of Atri's text. "By a man destitute of a son only, a substitute for the same, must always be adopted,"—and with respect to the precept regarding funeral obsequies, by the concluding part of the same text: "For the sake of the funeral cake, water and solemn rites."

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43. That [is propounded by the author], after having authorized, &c.,] Nanda Pandita assumes that the prohibition, of a substitute for a son, by Satyashdra, here noticed, is only with reference to the particular passage recited, by which, that author had previously authorized, such substitute for the particular purpose therein contemplated.

For the sake of obviating, &c.,] A different reading of this passage in the original is found: 'dviragwasum' instead of 'dviragwasasam'—if the latter be correct, (which it does not appear to be,) the translation should be, 'for the sake of obviating the appellation of childless.'
46. Of these positions, the first is not correct: for, there can be no substitute in virtue of the precept to produce a son; as the son, by reason of being the object to be produced, is no means of completion.

Not by that, directing the production of a son.

47. Neither is the second accurate; for, a contradiction would be involved. The substitute for a son is ordained for one having no male issue: but not funeral obsequies performed by such person; and exequial rites, the agent of which is a son, [are ordained]; but there is no precept executed by a son, directing a substitute on his (the son’s) account. Nor is there a substitute for an agent.

Nor that regarding the funeral obsequies.

48. Or it also may be affirmed that the substitute is supplied, with respect to being an agent, in the performance of the act, but not in respect to enjoying the fruit; in the same manner as in the case of the death of either of the seventeen priests engaged in a sacrifice (Sacr.), a substitute is supplied, with respect to being an agent in the act: so also, in the case in question.

An adversary’s mode of reconciling the difficulty anticipated.

49. This also is wrong; for, the cases are not parallel. In the instance of the sacrifice, the substitute is for one, by whom an act was commenced: But in the case proposed, since the act’s commencement even, (being completely non-existent,) is impossible, how can there be a substitute? Nor is the commencement of an act, by a substitute, admitted by one versed in logic.

And controverted.

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47. A contradiction would be involved, &c.] The translator is far from confident, that, he can satisfactorily illustrate this very obscure part, of which different readings occur. To render it however, at all intelligible, the following maxims of Hindu Logic, must be premised.—There can be no substitute for the agent, or object of an act: but only for its materials or means of completion: should these, or any of them be wanting, a substitute for the same, can be constituted by the agent only.—Now, if it is asserted, that, the substitute for a son, is ordained in virtue of a precept directing the performance of obsequies, it must be affirmed, that, the person, for whose sake, the substitute is supplied, and the performer of the obsequies, are the same.—For, the person, for whose sake, the substitute is supplied, is the individual, who constitutes the substitute. Now, as an agent only, can constitute a substitute for the means of completing his own act; it follows, that the individual in question, would be the agent of the obsequies. But these are admitted, to be distinct persons: and thus a contradiction would be involved. Accordingly, the author with reason says,—"The substitute for a son, &c. Moreover, a son, being the agent of the act, enjoined in a precept, directing the performance of obsequies, the author further refutes the doctrine, that a son is ordained, in virtue of that precept, by adding, in allusion to the maxim above specified, "Nor is there a substitute for an agent."

48. Or it also may be affirmed that] The author anticipates, that it might be alleged in support of the position, which he controverts, that a substitute might be supplied, in virtue of the precept proposed, merely as the performer, of the act required; as in the case alluded to in the text.
50. Or it may be next alleged that there is a precept regarding oblations of food, and so forth, performed only by one anticipated, and having no son, at his own funeral repast (Graddha), rejecting. Taking place during his life. In virtue of this only, is a substitute [ordained]. This is likewise incorrect: for, if [in this case] there might be, the substitute for a son, the precept itself, regarding the funeral repast to take place during the life of the individual, would be of no effect.—Besides, himself being the agent, in the performance of the funeral repast, taking place during his life; the substitute would be even for himself, not for the son: since the son [in this case] is not the agent.

51. Therefore, in virtue of the two precepts first mentioned, there can be no substitute for a son. Moreover, the assigning also as a reason, “For the sake of the funeral cake, water and solemn rites” (§ 3) would be inappropriate; for, it would not apply, to the person to be affected by the point to be proved. It has already been said, that exequial rites, performed by the man having no son, are not suggested.*

52. The question is thus solved: “By a son, a man conquers worlds, &c.” In virtue of the precept, implied in this and other texts, and supported by confirmatory passages, (such as “Heaven awaits not one substitute of a son”); on failure of the legitimate son, the son of the wife, and the rest, are ordained to be, the eleven-fold

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51. Moreover the assigning also as a reason, &c.) The following is hazarded as an illustration to this obscure part.—The author adverted to the text of Atri (§ 3), by which the constituting a substitute for a son, by one having no male issue, is enjoined, proposed a discussion, in respect to the particular precept, in virtue of which, such substitute is ordained; accordingly, he suggests and rejects two, viz., that which enjoins the production of a son: and that which, directs the performance of exequial rites; and he here uses an additional argument, to support the rejection. If it be held, that the first of these precepts, be that required, then the ‘Paksha’ or individual to be affected by the point to be proved, is the man wanting a son; the point to be proved, his obligatory production of the same; and the reason (that used by Atri), ‘on account of exequial rites.” If the second be regarded, as the precept; the ‘Paksha’ and reason would be the same, as in the first supposition; and the point to be proved, his obligatory adoption of a substitute. Now it is rule of Logic, that the reason assigned, should bear on the person affected by the point to be proved, and this is not the case in either of these suppositions. To be so, such person (here the man wanting male issue), should be the performer of the exequial rites: but it has been shown that he is not.—It is to be feared, that the author’s extravagant affectation of logic, has here misled him into an error.—His argument is good, on a supposition, that the reason in question is logical, or one of the premises of a syllogism.—It is obvious, however, that it is not so, but is rather used as a cause or motive.

52. In virtue of the precept, implied in this and other texts, &c.] The author here shows a precept, in virtue of which, the substitute for a son is ordained; to which, none of the objections, made to the two first suggested, apply.—In the first place, in

* Y. supra, § 47.
substitutes; and in the precept alluded to, an act being required, to operate intermediately, in completing the state of Heaven, and the son, severally, as the effect to be produced, and the efficient means; it is added “For the sake of the funeral cake, water and solemn rites.”

53. The term ‘always’ (§ 8) signifies, that in the present case, no definite period is required, as in such cases, as [that contemplated in this passage] “The barren woman, in the eighth year, is to be superseded.”

54. The funeral cake] the ‘Çrāddha’ or funeral repast.—Water] that is, the presenting water in the two united palms, and so forth. Solemn rites] meaning, rites in honor of the deceased, cremation and the like. These are the cause (hetu):

55. The reason, occasioning the adoption, is the cause. This, from being used in the singular number, shows, that these ceremonies collectively, are the cause, and not individually; and consequently, the meaning is, that there is not a distinct affiliation, severally for each; but one adoption only, on account of the whole: for, on default of a son, the failure of the oblation of food, and other rites, is the consequence.

As confirmed by a phrase, from a text of Manu. Which is explained.

56. Accordingly, Manu says “Sages declare these to be substitutes; for, the obsequies would fail (kriyālopat).” Here, this part, “for, the obsequies would fail” is a reason, subjoined on a negative hypothesis: “The meaning is,—because, if there were no substitute for a son, the obsequies would fail.”

57. Or, there may be this disjunction, [of the compound term ‘kriyālopat; kriyā―lōpat—lōpat, would then be, the fifth or ablative case, used after the rejection, of the indeclinable past participle, formed by the affix ‘iyap.’ The meaning is,—for the sake of preventing a failure.

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the precept, enjoining the conquest of worlds by a son, the son is neither the object or the agent: but the means of the act; therefore, there may be a substitute for a son, in virtue of this precept: again, the objection just made to the two precepts, first suggested, does not apply to this precept. Here the ‘Prakāsa’ or person affected by the point to be proved, is the son: that point, that he is an efficient means for the conquest or attainment of Heavens; the reason, of course as before; and it here, accurately applies to the Paksha: that person, and the performer of the exquial rites, being identical.

55. This, from being used in the singular number.] Atri has in his text ‘piu-dākṣa kriyāheito’ translated, ‘for the sake of the funeral cake, water and solemn rites.’—Here, ‘hetu’ (‘for the sake’) is the fifth or ablative case singular, of ‘hetu’ a cause.

57. Or there may be this disjunction, &c. In disjoining the compound term ‘kriyālopat,’ occurring in the text of Manu (§ 32), kriyā―lōpat, or kriyā―lōpat, may be obtained.—For, by the rules of orthography: kriyālopat would be equally produced.

* Vide supra, § 32.
58. "On failure of the son, let the wife be, &c.," although, by this and other passages, the capacity of the wife, and other [heirs] also, to perform the obsequies, is declared: still, it must be unquestionably affirmed, that, from the authority of such passages, as this ("Heaven awaits not one destitute of a son"), the mansions of the happy, attainable by obsequies, performed by a son, are not acquired by such rites executed by the wife, and the rest. For, otherwise, the wife and other heirs, of one desolate of male issue, being competent to perform rites, which would be equally effective; the specification, of failure [of the son], would be meaningless; as an alternative results, from such equality.

59. Hence, for the acquisition of some particular Heaven, to be attained by obsequies performed by a son, the substitute for a son, is indispensable. And, it is said by Medhatithi, "Now, as for the assigning there, the first gradation to the legitimate son, that is, not productive of any temporal effect, [but, on account of] excessive spiritual benefit: to the same extent, as the legitimate son, can confer much benefit, the others are unable—and 'substitute' as generally accepted, implies a diminution of benefit."

60. Kriyālopaḥ. The 'kriyā' or act, here alluded to, is from 'kriyate,' what is done—the precept [by which it is enjoined], 'offspring, must be produced.' Let there be no omission (lopa), of this. This precept is peremptory: in some manner, or another, it must be ac-

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whether lopa, or alopa, were subjoined to kriyā:—that is in the first case, no permutation of letters, would take place: and in the second, a single long & would be substituted for the final long a of kriyā, and initial short a of alopa. Accordingly, the author after professing that mode of construction, by which 'lopa?' would be read, here indicates the other, which would give 'alopa.'—This latter, is in fact, that adopted by the scholiasts of Manus.

Used after the rejection of the indeclinable past participle formed by the affix 'īrap.' The term 'īrap' in the text, is used, to denote the participle, of which it is the grammatical affix: its first and last letters are servile. The author alludes, to an emendatory rule of Kātyāyana, on Pāṇini, 2.3.28—the result of which is this.—If a mode of expression, composed of an objective or accusative case, and the indeclinable participle ending in 'īrap,' might have been used, but is rejected: and the ablative or fifth case he adopted; it denotes the object to such participle. Thus, "he sees from the top of the house (prāsidā)" that is: "having mounted (arūya), the top of the house, he sees." In the same manner, the author regards the ablative case 'alopā, where, the second mode of construing the term kriyālopaḥ, occurring in Manus's text (§ 33), may be preferred: thus, "sages declare,—on account, of preventing, a failure of obsequies (kriyālopaḥ); that is,—having intended a prevention, of a failure of obsequies (kriyālopaḥ-udēṣya).

58. As an alternative result.] The rites might be indifferently performed, by the son, or wife and other heirs.

60. Kriyā or act, &c.] Medhatithi, the author of a commentary on Manus, explains the term kriyā, occurring in this phrase, as signifying the act of acquiring a son.
complished, by the householder. Of the offspring alluded to, the real legitimate son is the first in rank; should such not be acquired, these descriptions of sons [that of the wife and the rest], must be resorted to."—This interpretation by that author [Machātithi] alone, must be canvassed. It is said [by him], that, the precept directing the adoption of the son given, and the rest, is a substitute for that directing the pro-creation of a son; or perhaps that the son given, and the rest, are the substitutes for a legitimate son?

61. Of these [supposed meanings], the first is not correct: for, the substitute of an act, is forbidden, in the passage "of the divinity, fire, a word, an act, &c." Neither, is the second accurate; since it would be at variance, with preceding passages [of the same author]; such as, "These [the wife’s son, and the rest] cannot be substitutes, &c." (§ 36). For, in this passage it is declared, there can be no substitute for a son: as a son, by reason of being the object to be produced, is no means of completion.

62. Therefore, from the term ‘kriya’ (in the expression ‘kriyālo- pāt’), the precept to produce a son cannot be inferred; but on the contrary, funeral rites alone must be understood; on account of unity of import with the text of Atri, which expresses: “For the sake of the funeral cake, water and solemn rites.” It would be useless [to enlarge.]

63. ‘Prayatnatas’ (resource). The affix ‘taqil’ of the fifth case, is used to form this word, for the sake of agreeing in construction, with the preceding terms “yasmat tas-māt” (with some one): and consequently the meaning is, that by some one resource (or mode) whatsoever, a substitute for a son is to be affiliated.—And, although in that text, any resource in general, is mentioned, still, since eleven descriptions of sons have been ordained, eleven resources only are recognized.

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This is contrary to the interpretation of other scholiasts, and general acceptance: according to which, in this and similar passages, it bears its secondary sense of, ‘obscurities’ or solemn rites,’ &c.

By the householder, the Guhi or householder, is the second of the orders or stages (aṣṭama), prescribed for the devout. These, are thus enumerated, in Mr. Colebrooke’s translation of the Kosa of Amara Sinha—1st. The religious student (Brahmachārī) who has received investiture, and is unmarried.—2d. The householder (Grhi) or married man.—3d. The hermit or ascetic (vanaprastha).—4th. The mendicant or ascetic (Bhikshu).

63. The meaning is, that, by some one resource, &c.] The author presently will apparently forget this his interpretation of the term prayatnatas, occurring in Atri’s text. In sect. 3, § 21, he suggests, that, the same word, in a text of Čāmuaka, may signify ‘on account of the distress of the adopter’: viz., the want of male issue. This he confirms by referring to the text of Atri; thereby indicating that the word in question, has there, a similar import.
64. "Sons of many descriptions, who were made by ancient saints cannot now be adopted by men: by reason, of their deficiency, of power, &c." On account of this text of Vyāsputi, and because, in this passage, ("There is no adoption, as sons, of those other than the son given, and the legitimate son, &c.") Other sons are forbidden by Čaumaka; in the kali or present age, amongst the sons however, [who have been mentioned,] the son given, and the legitimate son only, are admitted.

The term "given" illustrates of others on account of a text of Parācara.

65. The term "given" is inclusive also, of the son made, (kritirima) on account of a text of Parācara, on the occasion of treating on the law of the kali age, which expresses, "The son of the body, (amūsa), the son of the wife, also, the son given, the son made, &c."

66. Nor, is it to be argued from this, that, in the kali age, there may be the son of the wife [technically so called]: for, such is forbidden, by the mere prohibition, against the appointment in that age, [of a wife to raise issue to her husband by another.]

67. Should it be contended, that, then an option would proceed, from the wife's son, being ordained, and forbidden [by different authorities]. It is wrong, for many objections would be the consequence.

68. Again, if it be asked, in what light then, the mention of the son, of the wife, in this passage, [must be regarded]? We reply, as an epithet of Amūsa, (the son of the body). Accordingly Mann says: "Him whom a man has begotten on his own wedded wife, let him know to be the first in rank, as the son of his body, (Amūsa)."

SECTION II.
Who is to be adopted?

1. Of these two: the rules regarding the 'Dattaka,' or adopted son, are now propounded. The three points, on this subject, to be considered, are,—who is to be adopted? how qualified? and in what manner?

2. As to the first of these points, Čaumaka has declared: "the adoption of a son, by any Brāhmaṇa, must be made from amongst 'sapindas' or kinsmen connected by an oblation of food; or, on failure of these, an 'asapinda' or one, not so connected, may be adopted; otherwise let him not adopt."

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67. Many objections? In the original 'eight' occurs: a definite, for an indefinite number.
3. "From amongst sapinda—we term it sapinda; amongst such kinsmen, extending to the seventh degree inclusive: and the term being used in its general sense, it follows—from among such kinsmen belonging to the same or a different general family (gotra).

4. Of these, with respect to the being of the same general family, Vṛddha Gautama cited as authority—"The sons given, purchased, and the rest, who are adopted, from those of his own general family, by observance of form, acquire the state of lineage (gotrā) [to the adopter]. But the relation of sapinda, is not included.

5. State of lineage (gotrā) [that is, the condition of offspring (santati); for, a passage from the Kalikā Purāṇa recites—"Sons given, and the rest, though sprung from the seed, of another, yet being duly initiated [by the adopter], under his own family name, become sons [of the adoptive parent]"—and in the Trikāṇḍa or vocabulary, of Amara Sinha, the terms 'santati,' and 'gotra,' are exhibited with others, as synonyms signifying 'race or lineage.'

6. Nor, by the term 'gotrā,' is connection by the same general family, declared: for, the declaration would be unnecessary, as that connection is obvious, from the affiliation, taking place only, from amongst those of the general family, of the individual himself.

7. "But the relation of sapinda is not included"—By this, in the case of the affiliation, of one not being a sapinda, such connection, as extending to both the fifth and seventh degrees, is barred.

8. With respect to the affiliation, of one, belonging to a different general family, the following passages, severally, from Manus, and Vīhat Manu, are authorities. "A given son, must never claim the family, and estate of his natural father, &c." "Sons given, purchased, and the rest, retain relation of sapinda, to the natural father, as extending to the fifth and seventh degrees:—like this, their general family, [which is] also, that of their adopter.

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4. The text of Vṛddha Gautama], Nīlakṣṇata, in the Vyavahāra-Mayūkha denies the authenticity of the text quoted.

5. And in the Trikāṇḍa, &c.] In the text, a verse from the Trikāṇḍa is cited at large.

8. Passages severally, from Manus, and Vīhat Manu]. The authenticity of that attributed to Vīhat Manus, is denied in the Vyavahāra-Mayūkha.

* Manus 3.142. This text is subsequently quoted at large, v. infra, Sec. 6 § 6.
3. That, which has been explained, is the primary class: in case the adoption cannot be made from this, the author propounded. [Cannaka] propounds a subordinate class; "on failure, of these, an 'asapinda,' &c." "On failure of these,' that is of the sapinda's, or kinsmen connected by an abatement of food, a person, not so connected (asapinda), must be substituted.

10. Those not sapinda's are kinsmen beyond the seventh degree and persons not allied at all. And these also are of two descriptions: those belonging to the same, and those belonging to a different general family. For this also the passages before cited are authorities.

11. Of what has preceded, this is the abstracted meaning.—The 'sapinda' belonging to the same general family, is the first [in rank]; on failure of him, such kinsman of a different general family.

12. Although the "sapinda" of a different family, and a person of the same family, but not a "sapinda," are both equal with respect to their severally wanting a quality possessed by the other: still, however, by reason of propinquity, the individual deriving his claim, from the connection as "sapinda," is preferable to him claiming by family; and hence it is, that though of a different family, a "sapinda," even, from the family of the maternal grandfather, must be adopted.

13. In every case, on default of a "sapinda," one not related as such, is to be adopted: of this description, the kinsman allied by a libation of water (Sodaka) to the fourteenth degree, being of the same general family, is the nearest;—On failure of him, one not so allied, but of the same general family, to the twenty-first degree; and on defect of such also, one not belonging to the same general family, and not related as a 'sapinda.'

14. Sakulya has declared this, "Let a regenerate man, being destitute of male issue, adopt as a son, the offspring of a 'sapinda' kinsman: or next in order, the son of one of the same general family (sagotra) on defect of such, let him bring up one born in a different general family."—By the expression 'sagotra,' those allied by a libation of water (sodaka), and belonging to the same general family, are included.—Now, in this text, the proximity [in order], of each successively, is particularly shewn.

15. Vasishtha, also propounds the same—'should take an umbroto kinsman or near relation of a kinsman, &c.'

16. The construction of this passage is thus. He is an unremote kinsman, who is both a kinsman, and in a near degree;—meaning, a near 'sapinda.'—Now, propinquity is of two descriptions,—by belonging to the
same general family,—and by the intervention of few degrees. Of
those allied by propinquity, the ‘saptinda,’ of the same general family,
and removed by few degrees, is the principal: on default of him, a
‘saptinda’ of the same general family, though removed by many
degrees; on failure of such a saptinda belonging to a different general
family: on default of this latter class, “the near relation of a kinsman,”
—meaning of a ‘saptinda’ kinsman, the near relation or ‘saptinda’—
being one allied to the individual himself, by libations of water
(sodaka), but not his ‘saptinda.’ Such is the import which is
deduced.

17. Relationship also, when limited to, is of two descriptions—
Illustration continued.
by belonging to the same general family—ent, by the
intervention of few degrees. The first in rank, is the
’saptinda’ kinsman, of such kinsmen of the near
himself, removed by few degrees, and belonging to the same general
family, as that person, though not his own saptinda. On default of
such, the ‘saptinda’ of his own ‘saptinda’ kinsmen, being of the same
general family, though removed by many degrees.—One connected by
a libration of water, is intended.

18. If a ‘saptinda,’ or ‘sodaka’ relative, cannot be procured, one
belonging to the same general family, to the twenty-
first degree, must be adopted: should none such exist,
a person of a different family, although not asaptinda,
must be adopted; for, the text of Çānakha (§ 2)
expresses, “or, on failure of these, an ‘a saptinda,’”
and this is indicated by Vasishthā, [who says,] “But
if doubt arise, let him set apart like a Quids, one
whose kindred are remote.”

19. He, whose kinsmen are distant, is ‘one whose kindred are
remote’: the meaning is,—one not allied by an origin
from the same stock, or by the relation of ‘saptinda.’
The doubt, alluded to in this passage of Vasishthā,
regards lineage, disposition, and so forth: it arises
in the case, of one unconnected as a ‘saptinda,’ and not sprung from
the same general family. This is also implied in the passage,
“otherwise let him not adopt.” (v. § 2).

20. Although none other than such as are connected, as ‘saptindas’ and not so, can exist: still, since by this sequel
of the text, (“of all, and the tribes likewise, in their
own classes only, not otherwise”*) those, connected
as saptindas, and not so, are qualified, as being of the
same class; both saptindas, and those not such, who
do not belong to the same class, are excluded [from being adopted].
For, they might be inferred as a subordinate class, by the rule of logic
“What is not denied, is admitted.”

* Çānakha subsequently quoted, v. § 74.
Accordingly, Vyddha Gautama forbids the participation in inheritance, of one, not of the same tribe, thus—"or should one of a different class be taken as a son, in any instance, let him (the adopter) not make him a participant of a share, this is the doctrine of Çaunaka."

Hence, it is established, that one of a different class cannot be adopted as a son.

Accordingly Manu. "He is called a son given, whom his father or mother affectionately gives, as a son being alike, alike. Allike, that is,—of the same class: for, a text of the chief of the saints (Yajñavalkya) expresses, "This law is propounded by me, in regard to sons, equally by class."

As for what has been said by Manu himself; "He is called a son bought, whom a man, for the sake of having heirs, purchases of his father, and mother: whether the child be like or unlike": this must be interpreted, whether like, or unlike, in qualities, not in class.

Accordingly, a Kshatriya, or a person of any other inferior class, may be the son of a Drāmagha. As for this interpretation of Medhatithi, and in the Kalpaśu, "a Čudra even is certainly a son, such is the meaning":—those both must be rejected, on account of their repugnance, both to the passage from Yajñavalkya before cited, ("This law is propounded by me in regard to sons, equal by class")—and the text of Çaunaka, which recites, "[in their own] classes only: not otherwise."

A son self-given, and a son by a Čudra, are the six kinsmen, but not heirs."—The enumeration by Manu, in this passage, of the son by a Čudra, as a substitute, must be explained, as meaning, that, one procreated by a Čudra, on a female slave, but not born in wedlock, insomuch, as he is not a principal son, is a substitute

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As for what, &c.] The author here copies closely, nearly verbatim, from the Mitākṣara, on inheritance.—The reader is referred to Colebrooke's translation, chap. 1, Sec. Xl. § 16, and the note subjoined.

As for the interpretation of Medhatithi. This class of Medhatithi, is noticed by Mr. Colebrooke, in his translation of the Mitākṣara, on inheritance. Vide note, subjoined to ch. 1, Sec. Xl. § 9, in which the text of Manu here cited in § 23, is quoted.

By Manu in this passage.] The text, of which part is quoted, in its complete state, is thus—"The son of a young woman unmarried: the son of a pregnant bride:

By an error of the author, or his transcriber Vyddha Gautama, has been written for Çaunaka. v. infra § 33.

Manu 9, 163.  Manu 9, 171.  V. Infra, § 74.  Manu 9, 166.
This is supported for the same. For, a text of Vājīnāvalkya expresses:—

"Even a son begotten by a Čādra, on a female slave, may take a share by the father's choice. But, if the father be dead, the brethren should make him the partaker of the moiety of a share: and the one who has no brothers, may inherit the whole property, in default of daughter's sons."

Conclusion that the term 'alike' means of the same class.

27. Hence, the explanation by Aparārka, of the term in question, is only correct; "alike, being of the same tribe, &c." Vājīnāvalkya also.—"This Law is propounded by me in regard to sons, equal by class."

28. Now, amongst near sapindā kinsmen of the same general family, a brother's son only must be affiliated: and this doctrine is recognized also, by Vījñāṇadevī.†

29. By the position, that, 'a brother's son only must be affiliated; it is meant, that the son of a whole brother only, must be affiliated. Manu declares this:—"If one, among brothers of the whole blood (ekajata), be possessed of male issue (putravān), Manu pronounces, that, they all are fathers of the same, by means of that son."

From the text cited, it is argued, a brother cannot be adopted.

And brothers of the half blood, cannot be the adoptive fathers, such as there alluded to.

30. In this text, the state of brothers, as adoptive fathers, being propounded, their incapacity to be the objects of adoption follows.

31. Of the whole blood. By this expression it appears, that, this condition of adoptive fathers alluded to, applies to those only, begotten by the same father, on the same mother, not to such as are born of a different father or mother.

32. Brothers.] From the masculine gender being used, it results that brothers, and sisters also, of the whole blood, are not reciprocally the adoptive parents of the son [of any one of them]; and this conclusion is confirmed by the

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a son bought; a son by a twice-married woman: a son self-given, and a son by a Čādra, are the six kinsmen: but not brothers.—The author obviates the inference, which might be drawn from this, that a son by a Čādra woman, and consequently of the servile class, may be a subsidiary son, of his natural father of a superior tribe.

33. By the mention of two terms, &c.] In the original of the text of Manu, "of the whole blood (ekajata)" is an epithet of 'brothers,' agreeing with that term, in

† Vājīnāvalkya 2, 134, 135.

† Author of the Mīrākshēra, vide translation chap. I. on inheritance, Sect. XI. § 36.

† Manu 9, 182.
included, in this reciprocal state of adoptive parents.

Vṛddha Gautama supports this.

And explicitly, as the term ‘sister’s son’ is explained to include a brother’s son.

33. The expression ‘sister’s son’ is inclusive of the son of a brother also. Hence, this meaning is deduced, that, a brother’s son must not be adopted by a sister; for, brothers only are mentioned, to be adoptive parents [in the text of Manus § 29].

34. ‘Brother’ and ‘son,’ when occurring in combination, severally, with ‘sisters’ and ‘daughter,’ are retained; [the other terms being omitted.]† Although, by this rule of grammar, [the term ‘brothers’] may be a compound, formed by the retention of one term, and omission of another; and hence, the reciprocal affiliation, by a brother and sister, of a sister’s and brother’s son, respectively, might be inferred: still, those are ‘ekajata’ whose jata or jati (kind) is the same: for, these words with ‘samanyas’ are cited in the dictionary, as synonyms signifying kind or sort; ‡ [therefore,] since by ‘ekajata,’ the epithet of ‘brothers,’ it is intimated, that, those [signified by that term] are of the same kind, the affiliation, by brothers, who are male, of a brother’s son, and by sisters, who are female, of a sister’s son, would be established. The adoption of a brother’s son by a sister, or a sister’s son by a brother, could not take place, on account of the difference of their kind, in being male and female [respectively].

35. But the single expression ‘ekajata,’ once uttered, can not bear two meanings, namely, ‘being of the whole blood,’ and ‘being of the same kind’: for, this maxim in logic, would be contradicted; ‘A term once uttered, conveys a single meaning’—Should this objection be made, it is wrong: for, the word ‘samsrishta,’ occurring in the following passage, has been explained by Vijnanavara, as signifying, a whole brother, and re-united as a co-

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gender, case, and number.—These may be the two terms alluded to, or, they may be, ‘brothers,’ and the term ‘one’ represented in the original, by the word ‘ekajata,’ which is in the nominative case, and masculine gender, of the singular number.

35. The word ‘samsrishta’ occurring in the following passage, &c., The very obscure text, of which a portion is cited, is the following of Yajnavalkya. “A half brother, being again associated, may take the succession, not a half brother, though not re-united; but one united (samsrishta), &c., &c., &c.” In his gloss on this passage, †This passage is a portion of Čauana’s text cited in § 74. It may belong however to both authors; but it is most likely that in the same manner as in the preceding instance; the author has here erroneously substituted the name of Vṛddha Gautama, for that of Čauana. (V, § 22).

† Pāṇini 1, 3, 68. ‡ Dictionary of Amara, Book 1 chap. 1 sect. 1, verse 9.
distinct senses, a word used in a text of Yajnavalkya.
parcener: "... though not re-united; but one united
(sansrishta) [by blood, though not by co-parcency]
may obtain the property, and not [exclusively] the
son of a different mother."** So even, in the present
case likewise. Thus, there is no inconsistency. Sufficient has been
said.

36. The plural number is inclusive also, of the
dual; for, two are contained in many; and the being
son of two fathers, is shewn in the following text: "If
he be son of two fathers, let him designate both, in
each distinct oblation of food."

37. "If one"—that is, "if one even". By this, where two or more
are the fathers, the author implies a sortiis, the
more easy adoption of a son, by the others, destitute
of the same; he does not bar, the affiliation of
the only son of a single brother: on account of—the
eccency of the specification of the term "one,"—and
the singular number, in the expression "that son." The
derivative adjective "putravân" possessed of male issue, applies to him,
of whom, there are, one, two, or more sons.

38. And hence, from the sanction of the gift, of an only son even,
in the present case, there is no room, for the applica-
tion of the prohibition, ("Let no man give or accept
an only son, &c."). For, since, as propounded in the
sequal of this text, assigning the reason ("For he is
[destined] to continue the line of his ancestors,"*) the
continuation, of the line of his ancestors (the father,
and the rest), is completed, by means of a son, although

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Vijñâneśvara, the author of the Mitkâshâra, holds that the word "united" (in the same
manner as the expression "not re-united," ) is connected, with both its preceding, and
following terms; and that accordingly, in one sense it means, united by blood, or a
whole brother, and in the other, (that is, taken as an epithet, of the son of a different
mother,) it signifies re-united, as a co-parcener: side Colebrooke's translation of the
Mitkâshâra on inheritance—chap. II. Sect. IX § 7. 9. and 10 and notes subjoined.

37. He does not bar &c. The author here further supports his position, (in § 36),
and also alluding to the prohibition, in the text above noticed, shews that Manu in his
text (§ 26), intimates that an only son of one brother, may be affiliated by another brother;
for, by the singular number in the expression "that son," the case of one brother
having a single son even, is indicated: the term "putrâvan" applying, as well to a person
having one son only, as to him, who has more.

The derivative adjective "putrâvan"). This is designated in the original, by the
affix "matâp," by the subjunction of which to "putra," the derivative noun, "putrâvan"
in its crude state, of which, "putrâvan" is the inflected nominative case, is formed. Thus
the "ap" of "matâp," is redundant; and by a special rule, the "m" becomes, "y," where
the last vowel of the root, (as in this case,) is the short "a," or "â." In his illustration of
this derivative, the author alludes to Panini 5. 2. 94; by which rule, it is used to supply

* Yajnavalkya, 2, 146.
† Vasishtha, 15. 8.
common to two brothers; it is established, that the prohibition in question, refers to persons other than brothers.

33. Besides, as gift, consists in the creation of another’s property, after the previous extinction of one’s own; and this is forbidden by the law—unless, in the case supposed, there is no such other property, by asking the son of one brother, common to both;—in the sense of the word gift, [as applied thereto,] like the gift of a daughter in marriage, is ignitive.

41. Since the word ‘putra,’ [in ‘putravan,’ ‘possessed of male issue’] in the sense of the real legitimate son, is primary, it is established, that, those designated by that term, are sons of that description only; and consequently it follows, that there is no adoption, [by other the others] of the substitute for the real son, made by a brother.

42. Since, the brothers only, destitute of male issue, would be designated by the pronoun, ‘they’; ‘all’ is added, with a view to obviate [any inference], as to the want of relation, of the natural father, to his own son.

43. As ‘they’ is a compound, formed by the retention, of one term, and omission of others, being resolvable into the phrase “he and they (dual and plural);” at the desire of one, two, or more [Brothers], for male issue, the affiliation of a brother’s son, takes place.

44. ‘By means of that,’] By him even, by whom, the natural parent becomes the father of male issue, do all the brothers also become so,—‘Son’. From the use of the singular number, the relation as son, of one even, to many, being declared; the prohibition, contained in the text, “Let no man give or accept an only son” is not applicable here: as indeed, has been already declared. (§ 33).

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a periphrasis, combining a nominative case, governing the verb ‘to be,’ and in construction, with a genitive or locative case. Thus, ‘Garbham’—one of whom there are cows. ‘Briseshavam,’—woody: applied to a place in which there are trees.
43. And accordingly, in the Kālika-purāṇa, an indication of Vetāla and Bhairava, sons of Čiva, becoming both fathers of male issue, by means of the same son, is thus found: “The sages said: ‘There is no salvation for one destitute of male issue. This is recognized in the world and Vedas. Vetāla and Bhairava formerly went to a mountain to perform devotion. Previous to that, they were unmarried, and sons of them, are not mentioned, [as having been born or not born. If sons were born, O excellent of the regenerate] we much wish to hear, the particulars concerning them.’ Markandeya replied: ‘salvation is not for one destitute of male issue, both in the next world, and in this: O excellent saints, those, who are fathers of male issue, by means of their own sons, and those of brothers, attain heaven. Having in this world attained great perfection, when Vetāla and Bhairava reached the abode of the great deity, they were happy on the hill Kaśī. Then, Oh! twice-born men, Nandī by the order of Čiva, as one consoling addressed them,”

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43. Čiva.] Or the great deity is mentioned in this extract, under his names, ‘Sukara,’ or the benefactor, and ‘Hara’ or the destroyer.

The sages said, &c. &c.! It is to be feared that an instance here occurs of literary fraud, too commonly practised among Hindu authors, and perhaps those of every nation, where the art of printing has not reduced works of authority to an accurate and unvarying standard. On collating this precluded extract from the Kālika-purāṇa with a copy of the original, it proves to be suitably mangled and fabricated. Indeed, were an extract authentically made from that work, it would tend to establish the converse of the position, in favour of which it is adduced.—The following notes will explain these assertions:

And sons of them are not mentioned.] The translator has supplied from the Kālika-purāṇa what here follows between these marks [ ], with a view of rendering the passage the more intelligible. This part has been apparently omitted by the author, to favour the omissions below noticed.

Both in the next world and in this.] Instead of ‘pratyachāchācha’ thus rendered, in the copy of the original Kālika-purāṇa, consulted by the translator, ‘nāśītāchāchācha,’ occurs, meaning, ‘and this is certain.’ The circumstance of three copies of the author’s work conccurring in the former reading, deterred the translator from adopting the latter, which in point of sense, is unquestionably the preferable.

Attain heaven.] A stanza of the original immediately following here has been purposely omitted: It is to this effect “Oh, Brāhmaṇas, the sages Vetāla and Bhairava had offspring born to them. Listen illustrious saints, while I declare their progeny.”

Is easily attained.] Here stanzas to the following effect have been purposely omitted:—“One destitute of male issue, beholds the hell named Put.—None can escape from that, either by religious austerities or devotion: Liberation from it proceeds from the production of a son only. Therefore, beget ye sons on the bodies of divine females: your immortality has been produced, by drinking the milk of Kātyāyana: therefore procreate immortal sons on immortal beings: wherefore having in any manner produced sons from the bodies of celestial beings, your welfare will quickly follow.”

We will make one [son] only.] The author by the substitution of one letter for another, has ingeniously produced a sense directly opposite, to that of the Kālika-purāṇa. The Daśākta Mānasa reads ekamāva, ‘[one] only,’ the original ‘evamāva,’ by which the sense would be, “we will do this even.”

* One of the celestial attendants of Čiva. † A name of the goddess Durga.
in private, in the following true and instructive speech: he said "Do you sons of Śiva, destitute of male issue, exert yourselves in the production of a son. By one to whom a son is born everywhere salvation is easily attained." Markandeya continued: 'having heard these words of Nandi, they became elated in their hearts, and said to him: "we will make one [son] only." Accordingly Bhairava, at some time, copulated with Urvasi, a celestial nymph, and proceeded on her a son named Suveṣa. Vetaśa also affiliated him as his son: and as a consequence, by means of this son, both attained heavenly salvation.'”

46. But must not this relation of one as son to many [brothers] be either produced at once, or in gradation? Not the first: for, there is no precept enjoining that they should receive in adoption at once. Nor is the other supposition accurate: for a boy precluded by a previous initiation, another initiation of the same description as the first, cannot be performed.

47. Should this be alleged, it is wrong: for, analogous to the case exemplified in the passage ("seventeen are inferior and twenty-four superior sacrifices, &c.") the words 'they,' and 'all,' being the abridged form of the conjunctive compound: the association of the adopting brothers, is meant to be declared thereby: hence the gift even [of a son] to several brothers associated, is valid. In the same manner, as at the religious gift denominated 'tulāpurusha,' the united officiating priests are the objects to whom it is made, and the receivers.

48. Vāchaspati Miśra declares the same, thus: "since the plural number is used in "officiating priests" in this passage, (Having thus prayed to the gods, let him give the officiating priests ornaments of gold,) the whole of them conjointly even, are the object, to whom the gift is made: and hence, after having placed, his spiritual preceptor's hand, above all, and arranged in order under it, those of the officiating priests, who read the Rig-veda, &c. the ornaments are to be given."

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Accordingly Bhairava at some time, &c.] What follows from this part, to the end of the alleged extract, appears to be a fabrication. It is cited indeed in the Dattaka Chandrika, as from the Kālīka-purāṇa: but is not found in that work. On the contrary, it is related with much frequency, in the Kālīka-purāṇa, that Bhairava had a son Suveṣa, by Urvasi: but it is not written, that such son, was adopted by his brother, who is mentioned as having raised distinct male issue to himself.

47. Religious gift denominated 'Tulāpurusha.'] This gift (as its name denotes) is, where for pious or auspicious purposes, the donor presents united Brāhmaṇas, with his weight in some substance: some years ago Nāja Rājkiśha, publicly gave away in Calcutta, his weight in gold: instances of such pious, or rather ostentatious munificence, are of course rare: though this gift in barley, rice, salt, &c. is prevalent throughout the country.—It should be observed, that it must not be made to an individual Brāhmaṇa.
49. Nor is even, the being son to many [brothers], at the same
time, anomalous: for, analogous to Draupadi’s, being
the wife [of several brothers] by simultaneous accept-
ance, that relation of one, as son to many, though
somewhat differing, is acknowledged; like the recog-
nised state of the ‘Dvyāmushyaṇa’ or son of two
fathers.

whom, there is a son.”—By the verb ‘is’ (signifying
existence) in this phrase, (into which this derivative
adjective resolves,) since existence is declared; and
existence not applying to one who has not been pro-
duced, an act of the adoptive fathers is implied.

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49. Analogous to Draupadi’s being the wife, &c.] Draupadiline 146.6x210.4
the wife of, and
received in marriage at the same time by, Yudhishthira, Bhīma Sēna, Arjuna, Nakula and
Sahadeva, the five sons of Pāṇḍu, a king of Indra Prastha (Delhi). The following par-
ticulars, relative to this circumstance, are mentioned in the Mahābhārata: Draupada,
the father of Draupadi, was the sovereign of the Punjab country. He had heard of
the virtues of Arjuna, and his unrivalled skill in archery; and secretly desired him for
his son-in-law. To promote this object, he caused to be erected a pole, on which a
wheel having a hole in it, and which constantly revolved, was horizontally placed. He
also proclaimed a vow, that he would bestow his daughter to the person whoever
might succeed in discharging an arrow from underneath through the hole of the revolving
wheel, so dexterously, as on its descent, to fall through the same aperture. A par-
ticular day was appointed for the trial: and he invited princes of the vicinity, and
persons of all degrees, assembled at the court of Draupada. Previous to this, Arjuna,
his brothers had become ascetics—Bhīma appeared at the place of trial, with other
religious mendicants; and when no one in the assembly would attempt so difficult an
undertaking, by the advice of his companions, brought his brother Arjuna from their
abode in the city.—Arjuna advanced to the trial and accomplished the task imposed.—
Draupada would have fulfilled his vow, but the princes and others, jealous of the
success of one apparently so mean, attempted with force to prevent his receiving the
prize his skill had won. Arjuna, however, with the assistance of his brother, succeeded
in carrying off Draupadi.—Having arrived at their habitation, Arjuna addressed his
mother, who was reclined with her face covered, that “he had brought something.”—
To this the mother (her face still covered) replied, by directing him, to divide it, what-
ever it was, equally with his brothers; and afterwards, when aware of the object, to
which her son alluded, would not retract her injunction.—In the meantime, with the
advice of Draupada, his priest repaired to the abode of the brethren, and secretly listen-
ing to their conversation, discovered, who they were; with this information, he returned
to his master, who the next morning invited the whole family to his palace, for the pur-
pose of solemnizing the nuptials of his daughter, and Arjuna. They attended with
Draupadi.—The preparations were commenced, and when the king formally proffered
his daughter in marriage to Arjuna, he explained the nature of his mother’s command:
and that he would not espouse her, except in conjunction with his brothers. The king
reluctantly consented, and Draupadi was received in marriage, at the same time, by the
five brothers.

50. This phrase into which this derivative adjective resolves ) The Sanskrit
reader will perceive that a literal version, here, has not, and indeed could not well have
been given. “Pātirāṇa” cited from Manu’s text (§ 29) is the nominative case plural,
of the derivative, formed by the suffix “in.” This is used in the same sense, as that
formed by the suffix “matup,” already noticed in § 37 and note subjoined, and is con-
sequently illustrated by the same periphrasis which Nanda Pandita, accordingly intro-
duces. v. Popini s. 2. 115.
51. And accordingly Atri. "By a man, destitute of a son only, must a substitute for the same, be made, &c."—Vasishtha also: "A person being about to adopt a son, should take an unwomen kinsman, or the near relation of a kinsman, having convened his kindred, and announced his intention to the king, and having offered a burnt offering, with recitation of the holy words, in the middle of his dwelling." Likewise Čauṇaka: "Having advanced before the giver, let him thus cause to be asked, 'Give this son,' &c."

52. "Cause to be asked." Here, by the causal form of the verb being used, it is meant:—'Let him ask, through a Brāhmaṇa employed for that purpose.'

53. And consequently, the position that, the son of a brother though unadopted, bears filial relation to his paternal uncle, on account of this text of Viṣṇu Parāśara, ("Let the nephew of a paternal uncle, destitute of male issue, be his son; he only should perform his obsequies, of the funeral repast, and oblations of food, and of water") is refuted. For, without an act of the adoptive parent, filiation, as his son, is not accomplished.

54. It must not be argued that in the cases of the son of hidden origin and the son self-given, there is no act of an agent, [as adopter]; because, in these passages,—("one secretly born in the house, is considered a son of hidden origin"—"Self-given, meaning, given by himself") no such act is mentioned. For, it is inferred, as otherwise, the consecration of an effect, to an act, would not be attained.

Were Manu and Parāśara (§ 29 and § 83) literally construed, it would follow, there were thirteen sons.

55. Therefore, the text of Manu, and Viṣṇu Parāśara (§ 29 and 53) are not pertinent, to the extent of their verbal import; for, thirteen descriptions of sons would be the consequence.

56. Nor would thus, what was intended result: for the enumeration of twelve, in this text, would be contradicted: "of the twelve sons of men, whom Manu, sprung from the self-existent, has named: six are kinsmen and heirs; six not heirs, but kinsmen."* 

57. But, may not this contradiction of number be admitted on account of the passages below cited? Firstly: A different text of law: "The legitimate son, the appointed daughter, the son begotten on another's wife, the son of the wife, the son of an appointed daughter, the son of a twice-married woman, the damsel's son, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son of hidden origin, the son given, the son purchased, the son self-

* Manu, 9, 158.
given, the son made, the deserted son, and the one born on a woman of unknown caste,—are the fifteen sons of a man.

Vāhāspati. Secondly: A text of Vāhāspati: “Of the thirteen sons, enumerated in their order, by Manu, the legitimate son, and appointed daughter, are the cause of lineage.” Thirdly: A text [of Manu]: “Sages declare these eleven sons, (the son of the wife, and the rest,) as specified, to be substitutes for the real legitimate son, for the obsequies would fail.”—And finally: A text also of Manu, which declares: “The son of the body, and, the son of the wife, may succeed to the paternal estate: but, the ten other sons, can only succeed in order, to the family duties, and to their share of the inheritance.”

58. Should it be thus argued, by an opponent, we reply,—True: It is established, that there is no contradiction of the number twelve: for, the several enumerations in each authority, are consistent; since in some, particular sons are implied, and in others, expressed.

The gradation of the nephew, as fifth, in the order of inheritance, would be contradicted.

59. And moreover, the assigning in the following text, the fifth place, in the order of succession to the estate of one, who died without male issue, would be contradicted: “The wife, and the daughters, also: both parents, brothers likewise, and their sons.”†

60. The exposition of this, is thus. If the brother’s son, though unadopted, bear filial relation [to his uncle]; the enumerating the brother’s son, on account of his wanting such relation, in the fifth place, in the order of succession to one dying without male issue, would be contradicted. The same also must be understood, in respect to the right in gradation, to perform the obsequies, as declared in this, and other texts. “The son, the son of a son, the son of a grandson: like these, the offspring of a brother, or, that of a Sapinda also, are born, Oh king! capable of performing obsequies.”‡

61. But, is it not deducing a false conclusion, to argue a want of filial relation from not performing the obsequies and succeeding to the estate; for, the son of an unmarried daughter, and the rest, notwithstanding their filiation, are shown by Vishnu, in this text, to be incompetent to perform obsequies or succeed to the estate. “Exceptionable sons, as the son of an unmarried daughter, a son of concealed origin, one received with a pregnant bride, and a son of a twice-married woman, share neither the funeral oblation, nor the estate.”|| So also, notwithstanding participation in the obsequies and estate, may be wanting, the filial relation of the brother’s son, though unadopted, may be admitted without objection.

* Manu, 9. 166. † Yājñavalkya, 3. 136. ‡ Vishnu-parāsya.
|| This text is unauthentic; vide note to Colebrooke’s translation of the Mitākṣarā, Chap. I, Sect. XI § 27.
62. Should this be objected: it is erroneous. Participation in the obsequies and estate has been declared to be the result of filial relation, in this passage (“Among these, the next in order is heir, and presents the funeral oblations, on failure of the preceding”); for, otherwise, like the impotent person and the rest, one, who merely bore the semblance of being a son, would be of no use; and in this text, (“By a man desistute of a son only, must the substitute for the same, always be adopted, &c.”) an imperative mode of expression, being used, the filial relation of one unadopted, cannot exist.

63. Nor must it be affirmed that the injunction in question regards those other than the brother’s son: for there is no proof of such partial application; and on the other hand, it would be at variance with the instance of the adoption by Vetasla of the son of [his brother] Bhairava, contained in the portion [of the extract from the Kalika-purana, before quoted] commencing, “We will make one son only,” and ending “Vetasla also affiliated him, as his son.”

Besides if the filiation of a nephew, existed without adoption, where of several brothers, some not sons, and others had not, an absurd consequence would result.

64. Moreover, in the case, where, of ten whole brothers, five have each ten sons, and five are wholly desistute of male issue, it would follow, that, the five brothers desistute of male issue, would have each fifty sons; and it would also result, that the fifty sons would severally have ten fathers: thus, there would be a great absurdity.

65. Nor, would an intended consequence thus result: for, in the passage, (“a substitute for a son must be adopted”) unity, ascribed to the object to be adopted, is of definite import: and the singular number, used in the following passage to express severally both the male issue and the father of the same, would be contradicted. “If one among brothers of the whole blood be possessed of male issue, Manu pronounces that they all are fathers of the same, by means of that son.”

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62. Amongst these, &c.] The text of Yajnavalkya, of which the initial part only, is here cited, is completed from the translation of the Mitakshara on inheritance. (v. Colebrooke’s translation, Ch. I. Sect. XI. § 91). The passage quoted in the last paragraph, as from Vishnu, which is cited in § 27 of the Section noticed, is explained, as merely barring the right of the exceptional sons in question, to a fourth share, legitimate issue existing: and as not affecting the text of Yajnavalkya, here alluded to, by which any description of son whatever, on default of legitimate issue, may inherit the whole patrimony.

Impotent person and the rest.] Meaning the outcaste, and his issue, one lane and the others, who are excluded from inheritance.

An imperative mode of expression being used.] ‘Vidhipravataye’ or an allusion of injunction, are the terms of the original thus rendered: by these, the injunctive future participle ‘Kartavya’ (must be adopted) used by Ati, is designated.
63. Neither must it be alleged that because the plurality of brother's sons is mentioned in this passage, ("those who are fathers of male issue, by means of her own sons, and those of brothers, are completely saved."*) many brother's sons, even though unadopted, may be sons of one person: for, from occurring in respectful modes of expression, in which by popular acceptation, the plural number is used, it has an indefinite import: also, the injunctive precept proposed, being accomplished in our opinion, by means of one only, the propounding many would be contrary to sense and law.

67. Hence it is a settled point, that amongst near "sapinda" kinsmen of the same general family, a brother's son only must be affiliated: and therefore, by being adopted [the brother's son, and other kinsmen,] are first in participating in the estate and funeral oblations: but, not being adopted, they hold their respective places [in the order of heirs].

The text of Vishnu reconciled without contradiction.

68. The text, too, of Vishnu, (§ 61) refers to where, any son prior in the order of enumeration, may exist. Thus there is no contradiction whatever.

69. But, this being the case: the filial relation of one unadopted, declared in the following text also, would not subsist. "If among all the wives of the same husband, one bring forth a male child, Manu has declared them all, by means of that child, to be mothers of male issue."†

And this would not be an intended consequence; for, it would be contrary to custom, and at variance with the appellation of mother, occasioned merely by being the wife of the father, as expressed in this passage. "The wives of the father, are all mothers."

70. Should this be objected, it is wrong: for the son of a rival wife, originating immediately from portions of the husband, may, though unadopted, bear the relation of son [to another wife,] and the text [of Manu] intends a restriction, [as to substituents, not so circumstanced] as has already been declared‡.

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66. Also, the injunctive precept proposed.] That enjoining the necessity of adoption as conveyed in Atri's text.

70. And the text [of Manu] intends a restriction, &c, &c.] The author's doctrine, advanced in Sect. I § 34, is, that, any one connected to the husband and wife, by containing portions of either, may of right be a substitute; and that, the text of Manu,

* From the extract from the Kālika-purāṇa before cited v. supra, § 45.
† Manu, 9. 183.
‡ Vide supra, Sect. 1. § 34.
But since the brother's son, is not connected, by containing portions of either the husband or wife even, he does not unadopted, bear filial relation.

71. "If there are several brothers, the sons of one man by the same mother, on a son being born to one even of them, all of them are declared to be fathers of male issue. The same rule is also ordained in respect to many wives of the same person: if one brings forth a son, he is the presenter of the funeral cake to the whole." As for the application by analogy of the rule regarding the brother's son, to that of the rival wife, declared by Vīhaspati, in this text: that is propounded as meaning, [the son of the rival wife] to be a subsidiary son, not as intending his affiliation: for, his filial relation [to his step-mother] is established from his proceeding from portions of her husband. Also, she being a substitute, being established, from proceeding partially from portions [of the pair]; the text [of Manu] intends a restriction, [as to substitutes, not so circumstance,] as already has been declared.

72. Either portion [of the passage from Vīhaspati] has been made clear, by Devasvāmi, in this text. In both, even, [it is meant, that] another substitute, must not be adopted."—And this text is thus interpreted in the Chandrika—"In both, even—in the two texts commencement, ("If there are several brothers, the son of one man, &c.") [it is meant that] the son of a brother, and that of a rival wife, being any how capable of being substitutes, another must not be adopted, as a substitute.

73. Vījāneqvāra also thus explains the text of Manu (§ 29): [This text] is intended to forbid the adoption of others if a brother's son can possibly be adopted: it is not intended to declare him son of his uncle: for that is inconsistent with the subsequent text: "Brothers likewise, and their sons, &c. &c."

74. If no brother's son exist, another even, being the nearest relative, according to the mode mentioned [must be adopted.] Conformably Čaunakha [continues]†. "Of Kṣatriyas, in their own class positively: and [on default of a sapinda kinsman] even in the general family, following in the same primitive spiritual guide (Guru): of Vaiṣyās, from amongst those of the Vaiṣya.

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* V. Midakshā on inheritance. Colebrooke's translation, Ch. I. Sect. XI. § 35.
† This passage from Čaunakha, is the continuation of that cited in § 2.
class (Vaiṣya-jātesha; of Čādras, from amongst those of the Čādra class. Of all, and the tribes likewise, [in their own] classes only: and not otherwise. But a daughter’s son, and a sister’s son, are affiliated by Čādras. For the three superior tribes, a sister’s son, is no where [mentioned as] a son.”

73. “In their own class.” In the Kshatriya tribe. Notwithstanding ‘class’ (jāti), being used in its general sense, propinquity as before, here likewise, constitutes a restrictive condition; on account of the text Vasishtha: “a person being about to adopt a son, should take an unremote kinsman, &c.”

76. On default of a sapinda kinsmen, “and even in the general family, following the same primitive spiritual guide.” Since there are no distinct and peculiar general families, of the [primeval] Kshatriyas; the primitive spiritual guide is mentioned, [to particularize the class, from which, the adoption is to be made.]

77. Accordingly, an account of his more remote connection, on failure of the “sapinda” kinsman, one, belonging to the same general family, is ordained. In respect to him also, the clause “In their own class, &c.” is likewise applicable; on account of the conclusion, of the passage “of all, &c.” And hence a near or distant relation of a different class is precluded [from being adopted.

78. “Vaiṣya-jātesha”] this must be rendered,—from amongst those of the Vaiṣya class,—as if, ‘jātesha’ had been used: for ‘jāta’ or ‘jāti’ [of which the words are several inflexions, are recited in the dictionary, as synonyms, signifying, ‘class or sort.’

79. Here also, although the specification is general, propinquity as before, constitutes a restrictive rule. The clause too, (“and even in the general family, following the same primitive spiritual guide,”) is here likewise understood; on account of the text, commencing “[He specifies] the

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76. Since there are no distinct and peculiar general families of the [primeval] [Kshatriyas]. The general families of Kshatriyas and Vaiṣyas, are distinguished by the primitive saint, or pātrariṣh hereditarily acknowledged, in the family. This is not the case with Brāhmaṇas. The gotra, or general family of whom, is determined by linage descent, from some particular saint. Čādras again, are all supposed to belong to the gotra of Kāyapa, the common progenitor of the four tribes.

78. Vaiṣya-jātesha.] These terms occurring in the original, might also be rendered ‘amongst those sprung from a Vaiṣya;’ accordingly, it is here the object of the author, to restrict them, to their other construction, viz., “In Vaiṣya classes,” which he prefers. The Sanskrit reader will observe, that a literal translation has not, [been] nor could not well be attempted here.

79. The text commencing, &c.] Not having met with this text in its complete state, the Translator offers with diffidence, the note, in which, the initial words, of the original, are rendered. These occur in the Mitākshara, where they are cited, under the
clause, as to the general family following the same ‘Gurum,’ are equally applicable.

general families of Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas, as distinguished by following the same primitive spiritual guide; and because, the passage, the initial words of which, are “who are adopted from those of his own general family, &c. &c.” is common to the three tribes.

It is equally the case, in this instance also, that, on default of a ‘sapinda’ kineman, one of the general family, following the same primitive spiritual guide, [is to be adopted.]

80. ‘From amongst those of the Cudra class.’ Here also propriety as before, [constitutes a restriction;] and the clause, (“and even in general family following the same primitive spiritual guide,”) does not here apply; since, [amongst Cudras] a general family, distinguished by following the same primitive spiritual guide, is not ordained. Therefore it follows, that the Cudra class, in the general, [is the order from which the adoption is to be made.]

81. The same is declared in the Brahmanaparâga.—“In fact, for Cudras, gaining their livelihood by servitude, living on another’s breast, whose bodies depend on another, there is not a son, from any order whatever, [but their own tribe]; because a slave only is produced from a male slave and a female slave.”

82. On account of the superiority of those of the three first tribes, and of those born in their direct order; and of the inferiority, of those born in the inverse order, a son cannot be adopted, from any order whatever, [by Cudras, but their own tribe]. A Cudra only, therefore, must be affiliated; for a slave is produced from slave parents.

83. But the three sentences regarding the ‘Kshatriyas’ and the rest, (§ 78) should not have been propounded; because their import is obtained from the passage preceding (v § 2); and even if propounded, there is tautology in the part commencing “of all, &c.”

84. This if objected, is wrong; because by the terms ‘Kshatriya’ and the rest, the inclusion of the Mardhavasikta and other mixed classes regulated by the same rules as the Kshatriya and the rest, is meant: for, a text of Cankha expresses:—

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name of Avvalânya, the author of a work entitled the Grhya-sutra. —The same text is noticed in the Dattaka-Chandrika, where the additional word “propriety,” “He specifies” occurs.

* Viddha Gautama, vide supra. § 4. In the original, those cited, are the initial words of the text.
one procreated,—on a female Kshatriya by a Brāhmaṇa, is a Kshatriya even: on a Vaiśya woman, by a Kshatriya, is a Vaiśya even: by a Vaiśya on a female Čātra, is even a Čātra."

The phrase 'in their own class' shows that, a Mādhavakāśika, one of any mixed class, may not be adopted by one of the tribe with which he ranks.

85. 'In their own class.' This is to show that though the same rules apply to the Mādhavakāśika, and other mixed classes, as to the Kshatriya and the rest: still those do not become sons to a Kshatriya, and the rest, on account of the indication, of direct order, in this text. "Three wives in the direct order of the tribes, &c. &c."

86. Nor, is there any tautology in this sentence, "of all, &c.:" for this part of the text: "of all, &c." by reciting a restriction, as to their own classes, in respect to the tribes, and those born in the direct order of the same, is pertinent, in indicating, that, that does not apply to those, born in the inverse order.

"Of all is used, to include those born in the direct order of the tribes, who would not otherwise be included by the term 'all.'

It is not an epithet of tribes.

87. The expression 'of all' implies in fact this, from the cogency in the specification of the word 'tribes,' the restriction to their own class, would apply to the tribes only: not to those, born in their direct order. To include those the word 'all' is used. Now, they are included, because they are regulated by the same rules, as the tribes. Nor is this term, an epithet of tribes; for the conjunction 'and' would be insignificant.

88. And therefore, the restriction is,—of the tribes, and those born in the direct order of the same, in [their own] classes only. 'Not otherwise,'—meaning—not amongst others, born in the inverse order of the tribes.

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85. On account of the indication of direct order in this text? The text, of which the initial words only are cited, is the following of Yājñavalkya: "Three wives in the direct order of the tribes, two, and one, are, for a Brāhmaṇa, Kshatriya and Vaiśya respectively. For one born a Čātra, a woman of his own 'wife.' The argument of the author, here used, requires illustration. A son born to a man of superior tribe, on a woman of inferior tribe, is of his mother's class, and technically called 'śvapuṣpa' and 'dhanamnuṣpa' that is,—one of a mixed class, born in the direct order of the tribes. Such instance of several describes. For instance, the Mādhavakāśika, or offspring of parents of the Mādhava and Kshatriya tribes. Though considered, however, as of his mother's tribe, and son may not be adopted by a Kshatriya. It is a maxim, but a man, must be, in whom, one of his own class, of whom he might have been the natural father. Now in Mādhavakāśika, is born in the direct order of the tribes, being the issue of the union of a Brāhmaṇa, with a female Kshatriya; and not that of a Kshatriya, with a female Brāhmaṇa, which could not take place; as it would be in the inverse order of the tribes.
86. But why should not this part, [commencing 'of all, &c.'] be 
considered, as an exception to the rule, as to propinquity, inferred from the preceding passage [in § 2]? Should it be replied, because, it would be repugnant to the 
text of Vasishtha (‘no person being about to adapt, &c.’): the argument is wrong; for, the result is 
obtained from that text, is, that, it is identical in its import 
with the passage [in question] regarding Brähmans.

90. Such objection, if made, is inadmissible: for, were the passage 
in question, such exception the rule, however* no peculiar 
practice, which makes propinquity as recognized by 
popular acceptation and in holy writ, a condition, would be contradicted: no advantage would result: it would be repugnant to the context: 
and lastly were an exception, as to propinquity in the general, means 
even, by this passage, the exception as to particular relationship, con 
voyed in this part of the text, (‘But a daughter’s son, and a sister’s son, &c.’) would be inconsistent. Therefore, the interpretation only, as 
given, is pertinent.

The daughter’s 
son, and sister’s son, are excepted, from the three 
first tribes by the part “But a 
daughter’s son, &c.”

This construc 
tion is a elucidated. 
It is supported by 
the part sub 
joined as a reason.

91. The part of the text, (‘but a daughter’s son, 
&c.’) enjoins an exception, as to those of the three 
first tribes, with respect to the daughter’s son, and 
sister’s son, inferred from the mention of propinquity in 
the general.

92. Since, (the particle ‘but,’ having an exclusive 
import; a restriction ‘by Κιδρας only.’) is conveyed; 
those of the three first tribes are excluded. On this 
point the author subjoins a reason: “For the three 
superior tribes, &c. &c.”

93. Since the filial relation of a sister’s son to one of the three 
first tribes, is not exhibited in any authority what 
ever, the passage is relative only to Κιδρας. This is
the meaning of the whole.

‘Sister’s son’ is 
used, in the reason, indefinitely: 
otherwise, in a special term, or ‘daugh 
ter’s son,’ in the preceding sentence would be 
meaningless.

94. The expression, ‘a sister’s son’ is of indefinite 
import, in the [part subjoined as a] reason; for, [other 
wise] it would follow, that it were therein an un 
moving term: or were it of definite import, one portion 
of the preceding sentence, viz. ‘A daughter’s son’ would be void of sense.

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91. It would follow that it were therein an unmoving term.] Literally epithet; 
for, in the original of the passage of Gauṇaka, alluded to, the single derivative word 
‘bhašīghaṇāḥ’ (sister’s son) may be construed as an epithet of ‘bhaśitaḥ’ (son), therefore encour 
ging. The idiom of the English language requires that these terms should be disjoined 
in the translation; that is, that “Sister” should be construed by itself, as the predicate of 
the sentence.
95. The daughter's son, and that of the sister, refer to the Çádra tribe: for, in no other authority, do they relate to those of the three first tribes; an argument, the same as that, used in the question, as to drinking spirits, and so forth. Hence, it is not accurate that these two refer to those of the three first tribes.

93. Next it may be alleged, that, both passages by being construed in a literal manner only, are demonstrative of their several subjects, but not so by being construed from inference. Consequently, it is the sister's son alone, that does not refer to the three tribes: not the daughter's son.

97. This is also wrong: for a splitting of the text would result; and an option to those of the three first tribes, in respect to the daughter's son, follow: since by being an unremote kinsman, he would be inferred [as eligible] and interdicted [as such] by the restriction to Çádras only.

98. Or thus. By the restriction to Çádras only, a prohibition of the daughter's son, in respect to those of the three first tribes, would be established. And by the restriction that a sister's son only may not be [adopted] by those of the three first tribes, a sanction of the daughter's son would be obtained. Thus there would be an option.

99. Besides, if [the two passages in question,] are to be construed with reference merely to their verbal import, in the first passage, there would be either a restriction [as to the object of adoption], or one in respect to the agent (pronamkhyá). In what does the one, and in what the other consist? 'By Çádras, a daughter's son and a sister's son only [may be adopted].—This is a restriction [as to the object; required], because [otherwise,] the daughter's son, and the other, would be inferrible, from one portion [of the general text];—and every relative commencing with the brother's son from another. 'By Çádras only, a daughter's son, and a sister's son [may be adopted]. This is a restriction in respect to the agent; [which would be required,] as the daughter's son, and the other might be inferrible [as eligible], to the four tribes collectively.

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95. In the question as to drinking spirits, and so forth.] The drinking spirits is declared lawful for Çádras. But not so by any authority, for those of the three first tribes. Therefore it is argued that these are meant to be excluded.
100. If restriction, as to the object of adoption, be meant, then there would be, a contravention of the whole law ordaining the brother’s son and the rest, [as eligible for adoption]: the word ‘class’ in this passage (“of all, and the tribes likewise in [their own] classes only: and not otherwise”) as signifying the daughter’s son and the sister’s son, would be contracted in its import: and it would follow, where no daughter’s son, or sister’s son existed, the affiliation of a son could not take place.

101. But, supposing a restriction in respect to those who may be the agents, meant; then, by the mere restriction to the three first tribes, being conclusively established, it would follow that the passage commencing, (“for the three superior tribes, &c.”) as again prohibiting the same, were unmeaning.

102. Therefore, by a construction deduced from inference only, is the interpretation of the two passages correct. And, moreover, a verbal construction founded on revealed law, is more vacatious, than a construction deduced by the help of inference, and grounded on reasoning: and revealed law, being taken [as the basis of the construction], two revelations must be assumed. Now rationalization being the ground-work, this would not be the case. Therefore, the apparent reason presenting itself, is the demonstrative means.

103. Although there is another reading.—“The daughter’s son, and the sister’s son, are declared to be sons of Cudras”¹: still, [both] are identical in their import, since the passage, commencing,—“For the three superior tribes, &c.”—is introduced, to manifest, that a restriction even, is intended, for obviating a doubt, whether, “of Cudras only,”—or “of Cudras also,”—were meant.

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102. And moreover a verbal construction founded on revealed law, &c.] The following is offered as an illustration of this part. If the two passages in question, (viz., those which conclude the text of Cummak) be construed verbally, they must be regarded as unconnected, and declaratory of distinct positions, which can only be considered true, by assuming them, to be founded on revealed law. And, as the passages are distinct, two revelations or passages of that law must be assumed. In construing however, these passages liberally, by the help of inference, the author understands their import to be thus: ‘A daughter’s son and a sister’s son are adopted by Cudras only.’ For in no authority are such sons mentioned as eligible to the three first tribes: as they are to Cudras. Thus, without referring to revealed law, he understands the position in the first passage, demonstrated by an argument in the second: and this seems, to be what he intends, when he says: “Therefore the apparent reason, &c. &c.”

¹ Vide infra, Sec. V, § 13.
104. Now, that a restriction is meant, thus [appears]. Were there no restriction, in respect to the act of celibation, the object of which, is the daughter’s son and sister’s son, the whole four tribes might be interfered with, as the agents therein. [But] from the consequent restriction to Čudras, it is established, that ‘of Čudras only’ is meant.

105. And accordingly, the term ‘sister’s son’ is inclusive even, of the daughter’s son also; i.e., otherwise the restriction, that the daughter’s son and sister’s son refer to Čudras, would not be attained: as if attained, an option as to the daughter’s son, in respect to those of the three first tribes, would result; as has been already noticed.

106. If this is the case then, let the non-relation merely, of the sister’s son, to those of the three first tribes, be proved by the daughter’s son, and sister’s son, referring to Čudras: should this be alleged, it would be wrong. For, as such position would be established, by this reason alone,—from referring to Čudras,—the mentioning the daughter’s son, and sister’s son, would be unmeaning: and if a loose mode of expression must be assumed, the use of the term ‘sister’s son’ only, without specific meaning, is less vexatious, than the use of both terms, in an indefinite import. Consequently, that only, which has been pronounced, is accurate.

107. Čákara has clearly laid down the above points: “Let one of a regenerate tribe destitute of male issue, on that account, adopted as a son, the offspring of a sapija relation particularly: or also next to him, one born in the same general family: if such exist not, let him adopt one born in another family: except a daughter’s son, a sister’s son and the son of the mother’s sister.”

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106. If this is the case, then let, &c.] In an enlarged state, the following appears to be the objection, which the author here anticipates. If the two last passages of Čaṇakya’s text, are to be construed only, from inference and reasoning: and if the restriction in respect to Čudras, would not be attained, unless the term ‘sister’s son’ were inclusive of ‘daughter’s son’ then, instead of the last of these passages, being considered, as containing the reason or argument demonstrative of the position declared in the first, let the first be regarded as the reason, establishing the position in the last: or, (in the words of the text) “let the non-relation &c.” In this case, the passages in question, would be still interpreted from inference, and what is objected in the preceding paragraph, would not apply.—The author anticipates, and refutes this mode of eluding, or retorting his arguments.

106. The mentioning the daughter’s son, and sister’s son.] In the first of the two last passages of Čaṇakya’s text, that is, in that, which is here proposed to be assigned as a reason.

107. One of a regenerate tribe.] That is of any tribe other than the Čudra.
109. By this it is clearly established, that the expression 'sister's son' [in the last sentence of Čautaka's text § 74], is illustrative of the daughter's son; and mother's sister's son, and this is proper, for prohibited connection is common to all three. To enlarge would be useless.

SECTION III.
Rule, should one different by class be illegally adopted.

1. It has been declared that, one different by class, must not be adopted: should this rule be transgressed, what would be the case? In reply to this question, Čautaka says: "If one of a different class, should however, in any instance, have been adopted, as a son, he should not make him the participator of a share. This is the doctrine of Čautaka."

Import of the expression 'different by class.'

2. The meaning is:—should one be adopted, according to form even, whose class is different,—being superior, or inferior, in respect to the adopter.

3. Exclusion, from participation in the whole estate, is implied, from the cogency of the term 'share'; [which intends] 'a share of the estate': and on account of—a text of Kātyāyana, which expresses,—"But, if they be of a different class, they are entitled to food and raiment only,"—and a portion from Yājñavalkya, commencing, "amongst these, the next in order is heir, and presents funeral oblations, &c." and ending "this law is propounded by me, in regard to sons, equal by class."

SECTION IV.
The qualification of the person to be adopted.—The gift of a son, under what circumstances and by whom proper.—The son of a twice married woman, and show's are specially referred to.

1. Next, in reply to the question, as to the qualification of the person to be affiliated, Čautaka declares: "By no man, having an only son (aṣa-putra), is the gift of a son, to be ever made. By a man having several sons (bahu-putra), such gift, is to be made, on account of difficulty (prayāvatās)."

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108. For prohibited connection, &c.] What is here meant is explained in Sect. IV. § 18.
2. He, who has one son only, is 'eka-putra,' or one having an only son: by such a one, the gift of that son must not be made; for a text of Vasishtha declares, "an only son, let no man give, &c."

3. Since, the word 'gift' means the establishing another's property after the previous extinction of one's own; and another's property cannot be established without his acceptance: the author (Çaunaka) implies this also, in his text in question. Therefore, a prohibition likewise against acceptance is established by that very text. Accordingly Vasishtha: "an only son, let no man give or accept, &c. &c."

4. To this he subjoins a reason, "For, he is [destined] to continue the line of his ancestors." His being intended for lineage, being thus ordained: in the gift of an only son, the offence of extinction of lineage is implied. Now, this is incurred by both the giver and adopter also. For the [reason in question] is subjoined, after both [verbs: viz. 'give' and 'accept.]

Other texts, which prohibit the gift of a son, refer to the case, of an only son, not to where there are several.

5. As for another text of recorded law,—"In instruction, the father is absolute over a son and sons' wives: but not so with respect to the son, in sale and gift," and the text of the Holy Saint: "except a wife and a son, other things may be given:"—these texts regard the case of an only son.

6. 'Ever' in a time of calamity: accordingly, Nárada says: "A deposit, a son, and a wife, the whole estate of a man, who has issue living; the sages have declared unalienable, even by a man oppressed by grievous calamities: although the property be solely that of the man himself." This text also, regards an only son; for it is declaratory of the same import as the texts of Çaunaka and Vasishtha.

7. Next, the author replies to the question,—By whom is a son to be given? 'By one having several sons.' He who has several sons is 'bahn-putra,' or one having several sons.'

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2. 'Eka-putra,' or one having an only son.] The compound, 'eka-putra' is capable of being variously rendered: The interpretation of the author restricts it to the sense in which it is here used.

7. By whom is a son to be given?] This is one of the topics specified in the commencement of the work.
8. "By no man having an only son." From this prohibition, the gift, by one having two sons, being inferrible: this part of the text ("By one, having several sons &c.") is subjoined, to prohibit the same, by one having two sons also. For, the speech of Çantami to Bhishma, expresses: "He who has only one son, is considered by me, as one destitute of male issue, oh! descendent of Kuru. One, who has only one eye is as one destitute of both: should his only eye be lost, he is absolutely blind."

9. "By a man having several sons." Since, the masculine gender is here used, the gift of a son, by a woman, is prohibited. Accordingly, Vasishtha says: "Let not a woman either give or accept a son:"—and [her] independency is not ordained.

10. With the husband's assent, a woman also is competent. Accordingly, Vasishtha adds: "unless with the assent of her husband."

11. "Whom, his mother, or his father, gives (धार्यत)"—his mother or father give (धार्यतम्)."

Two passages seemingly implying the equality of the wife, consistently explained.

12. It must not be argued that thus the gift of her son by a widow, though during a season of calamity, could not take place, on account of the impossibility of the assent of her husband; analogous [to her incapacity] to adopt. For, by referring to the instance recorded

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9. And [her] independency is not ordained.] In rendering this passage from a variety of readings, which occur, and constructions, which might be adopted, those which appeared to agree best with the context, have been selected.—Two or three manuscripts referred to, concur in reading ‘nārāpeksha-saṃvādācha.’ This however, is not so easily rendered with general constitude, as the reading of the third manuscript, which has been adopted; viz., ‘nārapeksha-saṃvādācha.’ To the former of these readings, the printed copy adds iti-bhava. This confirms as proper the construction of the sentence with what precedes, rather than what follows it; though thereby an inaccuracy of style (by no means however to him uncommon) must be imputed to the author. If the first of the readings noticed be preferred, the translation must be thus: ‘And [besides in the text of Āharaka, in question, the man] is mentioned independently of and without reference to his wife.”

12. Instance recorded of Gālava.] The translator has not yet succeeded, in discovering the circumstances here alluded to; indeed the terms of the original, ‘Gālaveśa-linga,’ might equally be understood, as signifying an instance recorded by Gālava. It should be observed, the printed copy reads ‘nārāveśa-linga,’ which may be rendered, ‘the text of Manu’: and if this reading be correct, that cited in § 11 and § 10

* Part of a text of Yājñavalkya, 9, 122. † Part of a text of Manu, 9, 103.
of Gála, such gift may be inferred as legal, and the
singular number, indicating independance of another,
is used.

13. The

The husband, singly even and independent of his wife, is
competent to give a son: for in the two passages cited
(in § 11) the father is mentioned singly and unassociated
with the mother, and there is this reason of
Baudháyana found: "From the predominance of the
virole seed, sons are regarded even, as not produced of
the womb." In the Bhráta also, [a reason is found.]
"The mother, is the fosterer: the son is of the father:
he is [as it were] that very person, by whom produce."
A passage of revealed law, is likewise [confirmatory]. "His-self
is truly born a son."

14. And, from the intimation of the agency of
both together, by the verb 'give' in the dual in Mann's
text, the competency of both united is principal. Accor-
dingly Vasishtha says: "Man, produced from virile
seed and uterine blood, proceeds from his father and
mother, as an effect from it's cause, therefore, his father
and mother have power, to give, to sell, or to abandon
their sons." Baudháyana also. "For, the connection
to the father and mother, is equal."

15. Conformably, in this passage, ("the mother or
father given")
Mann, intending,—from her dependance on the assent
of her husband, the inferiority of the mother [as the
agent, in the gift of a son];—the mediocrity of the
husband, on account of his independance of the wife;—
and the pre-eminence of both united, from their being
equally parents,—propounds three positions,

16. It must not be argued that this is merely a single sentence,
on account of the only verb being used in the dual
number: for the disjunction in the middle [by the
particle, 'or'] would be inconsistent. Therefore the
passage in question comprises three positions.

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wherein the expression 'during distress' occurs, is alluded to. Three distinct copies
referred to by the translator, occur in the reading adopted by him: for which reason
he regards the other as a substitution, made by some partik, to obviate the difficulty on
the reading adopted.

The singular number, indicating independance of another is used.] In the passages
quoted in § 11, 'mother' is mentioned in the singular number, and (as it were,) independ-
dent of the father.

14. Therefore his father and mother, &c.] In the original, the compound of con-
junction "Mátipilahar" occurs, indicating the association of the father, and mother.
17. Accordingly, the chief of saints, in this passage, "whom his mother or his father gives," has used the verb in the singular number even, though referring to each [nominativo case.]

18. On the subject proposed, the author [Śaunaka] assigns a reason,—"on account of difficulty (pryatmatatas)." That time in which there is great trouble is [a time of] difficulty, that is, a season of calamity.

19. Hence, the meaning is this;—a gift of a son, is to be made in a time of calamity only; not otherwise. Thus Kātyāyana says: "But during a season of distress, the gift or sale even, may be made; otherwise he must not attempt the same. This is the injunction of the holy institutes."* From the context, —"of sons and wives," is understood. Manu also: "Whom his mother or father give during distress, confirming the gift with water."

20. "During distress:" In a famine, and so forth: should the gift be made, no distress existing, the giver commits a sin, on account of the prohibition, "otherwise he must not attempt the same."

21. Or, the term 'pryatmatatas' may signify—"on account of difficulty of the adopter." During distress; that is,—when destitute of male issue: on account of the text of Atri, commencing,—"By a man destitute of a son only, must a substitute for the same, always be adopted &c."†: and it is thus interpreted, even by Aparārka, and in the Chandrika. ‡ "During distress"—that is,—the adopter having no son.

22. Another special rule, is propounded, in the Kalika-purāṇa. "Sons given, and the rest though sprung from the seed of another, yet being duly initiated under his own family name, become sons. O Lord of the earth, a son having been initiated under the family name of his father, unto the ceremony of tonsure inclusive, does not become the son of another man (anyatas). The ceremony of tonsure and other rites (Chudādyā) of initiation, being indeed performed, under his own family name, sons given, and the rest may be considered as issue: else, they are termed slaves. After their fifth year, O King, sons, given, and the rest are not sons. [But] having

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22. Another special rule, is propounded in the Kalika-purāṇa.] This passage from the Kalika-purāṇa down to "sacrifice for male issue," is inserted in the following note, by Mr. Colebrooke, in his translation of the Mitaksharā on inheritance, Chap. I. Sect. XI. § 13.—"Raghumandana in the Ucchavā-tatva, has quoted a passage from the

† V. Supra Note to Sect. 1, § 63.
‡ V. Supra Sect. 1, § 7.
taken a boy five years old, the adopter should first perform the sacrifice for male issue. But, the son of a twice-married woman, immediately on being born, he should duly take as a son. Having performed positively (vai) for such, immediately on being born, the burnt sacrifice for the son of a twice-married woman, the man should complete every initiatory rite, the ceremony for a male born (jñānakarma) and the rest. The burnt sacrifice for the son of a twice-married woman, being completed, from these (tattvas) a son of that description, is filially related.

23. The meaning is,—although sprung from the seed of another, sons given, and the rest, when 'duly initiated under his own family name,' (that is, by the adopter, according to the form prescribed by his own code, under the family name of himself,) into the different rites, commencing with that for a male born, then become sons of the adoptive parent, not otherwise.

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Kalika-purāṇa, which with the text of Vasishtha* constitutes the ground work of the law of adoption, as received by his followers. They conceive the passage, as an unqualified prohibition of the adoption of a youth or child, whose age exceeds five years, and especially one whose initiation is advanced beyond the ceremony of tonsure. This is not admitted, as a rigid maxim by writers in other schools of law; and the authenticity of the passage itself, is contested by some, and particularly by the author of the Vyasavahara-mayūkha, who observes truly, that it is wanting in many copies of the Kalika-purāṇa, others, allowing the text to be genuine, explain it, in a sense more consonant to the general practice, which permits the adoption of a relation, if not, of a stranger more advanced both in age and in progress of initiation. The following version of the passage conforms with the interpretation of it given by Nanda Pandita, in the Duttaka-Mimamsā.

23. The different rites commencing with that for a male born.] These are specified, in the following note of Mr. Coleridge, in his translation of the Digest, on text 134, Chap. 111, Book 5: "By these eight ceremonies I understand. 1st, Jñānakarma; a ceremony ordained, on the birth of a male, before the section of the navel string, and which consists in making him taste clarified butter, out of a golden spoon. 2d, Nāmakarma; ceremony on giving a name, performed on the tenth day after birth; or on the eleventh, twelfth or even the hundred and first day. 3d, Nishkramana; carrying the child out of the house to see the moon, on the third lunar day of the third light fortnight from his birth; or to see the sun in the third or fourth month. 4th, Asnanda; feeding the child with rice, in the sixth or eighth month, or when he has cut teeth. 5th, Chaitkārama; the ceremony of tonsure, performed in the second or third year after birth. 6th, Ujanayana; investiture with the marks of the class, performed in the eighth year from the conception of a Brahmāna; but is may be anticipated in the fifth, or he delayed to the sixteenth year. 7th, Śāvīti; ceremony of investiture hallowed by the Gāvati, which must not be delayed for a Brahmāna, beyond the sixteenth year; it should be performed in the fourth day after the first investiture. 8th, Sanāvartana ceremony on the return of the student from his preceptor's house. The whole number of ceremonies, called Sanskāra, as expounding the sinful bond contracted in the mother's womb, and as effecting regeneration, in other words, as perfecting the class of a twice-born man are ten. To the eight ceremonies now enumerated, must be therefore added the ceremony which precedes conception (Garbhādhāra, and marriage, which is the last of these sacraments. Rituals contain other ceremonies, two of which are mentioned in the text and in the preceding note, but these are not essential."—Allusion is made to the punsavāra or ceremony to obtain male issue, performed at the expiration of the third months of pregnancy, and the Siṣṭautonnayana performed in the 4th, 5th, or 6th months of the first pregnancy. This rite consists in combing the wife's tresses and need only be performed once.

* Vasishtha 15, 1, 7.—the same cited in this work in Sect. v. § 31.
24. Vasishtha declares this,—"and a given son, even sprung from one following a different branch of the Veddas, being initiated [by the adopter], under his own family name, according to the form prescribed in his own branch of the Veddas, is a follower of the same branch."

25. "The son given, and the rest." By the term "rest," here used, the son made, and the others, are included; on account of this part which preceded [in the Kalika-parāma]. "The legitimate son, the son of the wife, the son given, the son made, the son of concealed birth, and the son rejected, take shares of the heritage. The son of an unmarried girl, the son of a pregnant bride, the son bought, the son by a twice-married woman, the son self-given, and the slave’s son; these six are contemptible as sons: on failure of the first in order respectively, let him invest the next with filial rights. But let him not appoint to the empire, the son of a twice-married woman, nor a son self-given, nor one born of a female slave."

26. The non-appointment to empire of the son of the twice-married woman, and the other two, which is directed in the latter part of this quotation, holds, even on default of any other son besides the legitimate son. For this part of the passage is subjoined as an exception to the preceding part, ("on failure of the first would be respectively, &c.") and their non-succession to the empire, should a legitimate son exist, was declared in this preceding passage:—"A legitimate son existing, let not the king invest in the empire, the wife’s son, and the rest; [nor] cause to be completed [through such sons] the solemnities for his forefathers."

27. The meaning is.—A legitimate son existing, let him not invest with empire the son of the wife, and the rest: [nor] cause to be completed,—that is, nor cause to be performed [by such inferior sons] the ‘solemnities,’ meaning the funeral repast and other rites, in honour of his forefathers.

28. "Under the family name (gotrēpa)."

Though the specification of the family name is not directly made in the Jātakas and others, it is in their component parts, the vṛddhi-grāddha.

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28. Still since, in the vṛddhi-grāddha. This is a ceremonial, performed on the occasion of every initiation, to secure prosperity to the individual. —It consists in offering to the names of three sets of three ancestors, oblations of rice, &c. &c.—The first set comprises, the mother, the paternal grandmother, and great-grandmother—
But it is directly made, in tonsure and other rites.

Filial relation proceeds from initiatory rites; which are affirmatively, and negatively shown, in the extract in § 22.

29. It is declared that filial relation proceeds from initiatory rites: these, [as applicable to different cases,] the author propounds affirmatively and negatively—"a son having been initiated, under the family name of his father, &c. &c."

30. That son, who is initiated under the family name of his natural father, unto the ceremony of tonsure, that is in rites ending with that of tonsure, does not become the son of another man—"anyatas' must be rendered, in the sense of the regular genitive, 'anyasya' (of another.)"

31. In respect to the passage in question, there is this reconciliation.—It must certainly be affirmed, that, what is there declared, that, one on whom the ceremony of tonsure is completed, becomes not the son of the adopter, refers to the state, as son not in common; otherwise by this part,—"Having taken a child of five years, &c." the propounding one even, whose ceremony of tonsure has been completed, to be son of the adopter, would be contradicted. That this passage necessarily regards a child on whom the ceremony of tonsure has been performed, will be made clear (v. § 48).

Conclusion, that if one initiated as far as tonsure, be adopted, he is the son of two fathers.

32. Hence, if one who has been initiated in the different rites down to tonsure be adopted, he becomes son of two fathers: for he is initiated under both family names; and that the effect of this is his connection to both families, will be declared in the sequel.*

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The second, the father, paternal grandfather and great-grandfather.—The third, the maternal grandfather, great-grandfather, and great-great-grandfather. If any of these should not be dead, the next nearest deceased ancestor, whose relation is analogous is substituted.

29. These the author propounds affirmatively and negatively.] Difficulty occurs in explaining, and translating, the intent of the author, in this part, consistently with his elaborate and abstruse commentary. The following illustration is offered with difficulty. In the extract from the Kalika-purana, there is this passage, "A son having been initiated, under the family name of his father, unto the ceremony of tonsure inclusive, does not become the son of another man." By this the author implies negatively, that rites ending with tonsure, are the cause of filial relation to the adoptive father; and this has reference, to what the author regards, as the most preferable adoption—viz., that of a boy wholly uninitiated, and consequently recently born. "The ceremony of tonsure and other rites of initiation, being indeed performed under his own family name, sons, given, and the rest may be considered as issues."—By this sentence, the author declares affirmatively, that tonsure and the rites following, are the cause, of filial relation, and this must be regarded, as applicable to the case, provided for in § 35, viz. that, where a boy wholly uninitiated is not procurable.

* V. infra sect. 6 § 41 et sequ.
33. Thus, the different initiatory ceremonies, from that for a male born, down to tonsure inclusive, are declared to be the cause of filial relation, [in the case of the adoption of one wholly uninitiated.]

34. Āchūḍām (‘unto the ceremony of tonsure’) might have been used [by itself]. The subjunction of the term ‘inclusive’ (anta) is for the sake of authorizing, the affiliation of one whose coronal locks have not been made according to the form of his patriarchal tribe. For, the principal rites, not being completed, he is capable of becoming a son, and the part, commencing—("The ceremony of tonsure and other rites of initiation, &c. &c.,") is about to be explained.

35. How is the case, should a boy, on whom the rites, commencing with that for a male born, have not been performed, not be procurable? Anticipating this question, the author adds—"the ceremony of tonsure and other rites of initiation, &c."

36. When indeed, the rites of initiation, commencing with that of tonsure, are performed under his own family name,—that is—under the family name of the adopter, (the particle ‘vai’ (indeed) having an exclusive import): then, only can sons given, and the rest be considered as issue, else they are termed slaves.

37. The complex phrase “chūḍāḍya” signifies those rites, of which tonsure is first; but not rites antecedent to tonsure. For, with reference to what preceded, tautology would result.

38. Therefore, even should the ceremonies commencing with that after birth and ending with that of ‘amaprágāna’ or feeding with rice, have been performed under the family name of the natural father, there is no repugnancy [in the adoption]: and thus it is established, that the child, on whom the ceremony for a male born and the rest, have not been performed, is principal [as the object of adoption]; and one, on whom the rite of tonsure has not been performed, [but the other previous rites have] is secondary.

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37. The complex phrase ‘chūḍāḍya,’ &c.] This compound term, might admit of either interpretation.

Tautology would result.] The same position as that contained in the first sentence of the extract, would be declared.—This has been explained by the author, as referring to the adoption of one wholly uninitiated and consequently just born. In which case, the whole initiatory rites preceding tonsure, are to be performed by the adopter,
By "The rest," the son made, and the other sons are included, whose filial relation is from initiatory rites also.

39. Sons given, and the rest.] By the term 'rest' are included, the son made, and the others, as has in fact been declared: they become sons by initiatory ceremonies also: not merely by adoption: for, that would defeat the opposite alternative subjoined "else they are termed slaves."

40. 'Else']. The meaning is, should the ceremony of tonsure, and the rest, not be performed [by the adopter], or should one be adopted, on whom the ceremony of tonsure and other rites have been performed; a servile state ensues, not that of a son.

41. Since, that filial state, is produced from ceremonies; in the same manner as the being a sacrificial post and so forth; it is established, that one uninitiated is to be adopted.

42. A limited period for adoption being necessary, the author adds "after their fifth year, &c."

43. One, though uninitiated, is not to be adopted after the fifth year: for, the time having gone by, he cannot become a son. By this it is declared, that the five first years only, are the season for adoption. Now, the pronouncing this position negatively is for the purpose of shewing that an age beyond five years, is not even a secondary season: for, otherwise by the rule, ("every season ulterior to the appropriate season, is pronounced secondary") it would follow, that any time, beyond the fifth year, were secondary.

44. And, therefore, as by this passage ("commencing from birth, unto the third year &c.") the third year, is the principal season for its performance: and since, year is mentioned in the conclusion ("after the fifth year &c.") it follows, that in the extract in question, the word 'tonsure,' is meant to signify the third year. For, otherwise the consequence would be, that, where the ceremony of tonsure, took place at the same time, with the investiture of the characteristic cord, at his eighth year; one on whom the ceremony of tonsure had not been performed, might be adopted. Nor would, what was meant thus result: for, it would be at variance with the part commencing "after the fifth year, &c."

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41. Sacrificial post and so forth.] The post and other implements, necessary for a sacrifice are consecrated by the performance of ceremonies, and thus are qualified for the purpose.
45. Hence, it is established, that the term 'tou-
shore,' in the passage,—"unto tonsure inclusive"—in-
tending also, the third year, denotes the proper season;
that, beyond the third year, to the fifth, is the secon-
dary season; but that after that, no time is even sec-
ondary [for the adoption of one initiated in rites pre-
ceding tonsure, but not in that rite].

46. (Are not sons.) By this, it is intimated, that though filial
relationship be not produced, yet tonsure and other rites of
initiation may be completed; for the time for the
performance of these respectively, yet exists: still,
however, they are only slaves, for filial relation is wanting; and this
is the third cause of a servile state.

47. "Let not wives and sons, being unwilling, undergo sale, nor
even gift." As for the prohibition in this text, of
Katayana, against the gift and so forth, of persons
unwilling, that even, must be interpreted as forbidding the gift of a boy of five years only: not of one
older.—And:—"one discriminating, not a minor." As
for, what is thus interpreted by Sarvajnya, advert-
ting to this reading,—"(discriminating good and evil)" in
the text,—"whom a man takes being alike, &c."; that
must be explained thus—a boy of five years only,
discriminating by the faculty of reason: but not a
minor [generally]." The meaning is, "he should not
take [any] one, coming within, this definition,—a
minor (bala) is
till the sixteenth year."

48. Then, if there be none unintiated [unto tonsure
inclusive], what is to be done? In reply to this,
the author adds,—"having taken, &c." The meaning
is,—having taken a boy five years old, initiated in rites
ending with tonsure.

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46. And this is the third cause of a servile state]. The other two causes are
indicated in § 40.

47. As for the prohibition in this text, &c.] From the text in question, the
possibility of the gift of a son, however old, is inerible, the author accordingly, to
reconcile it with the doctrine, that the adoption is not to take place, after the fifth year,
interprets, (though unsatisfactorily,) that, the text regards the gift of a child of that
age: there being no ground to presume, the gift of one older.

As for what is thus interpreted, by Sarvajnya, &c.] The text alluded to, as interpreted,
is one of Manu, describing the son made, or adopted—the expression, "discriminat-
ing good and evil," there occurring, is an epithet of the object of adoption.—If this phrase,
as the interpretation by Sarvajnya, might imply, signify, one passed the years of minority:
the rule, excluding from adoption, one of six years old, and upwards, would be contra-
dicted: accordingly, the author restricts the passage of Sarvajnya, as initiating, one of
five years, capable of discrimination, not any minor in the general sense of the term.
The passage, "the adopter should first perform a sacrifice for male issue," is now subjoined.

49. But how can such be adopted, since he is declared to be a slave? Anticipating this objection, the author subjoins,—"The adopter should first perform the sacrifices for male issue." The objection is thus reconciled.

50. "He who is desirous of issue should offer to Agni, parent of male offspring, an oblation of kneaded rice, roasted on eight potsherds; and to Indra, father of male issue, a similar oblation of rice, roasted on eleven potsherds. Fire grants him progeny, Indra renders it old." In this passage [of the Vedas] sacrifice is declared as a cause productive of offspring.

51. Hence, in the case where the offspring is not born, its production is the effect to be produced: but when offspring already born is adopted, it is implied, that, in that case, since the birth has taken place, the filial relation, is the effect to be produced: for otherwise, the precept proposed would not be accomplished. Now, this relation cannot subsist, without the removal of the servile state: therefore the removal of that also [by the sacrifice] must of necessity be admitted; otherwise, were [the sacrifice] productive of filial relation only, it would take place in any mere adoption of a son; and if [it be argued that] there, it is not required, since the filial relation is produced from initiatory rites only; then, the same is the case, in the instance proposed: for, those rites are here inferred from the term 'first,' and it is declared in the sequel; "The man should complete every initiatory rite, the ceremony for a male born and the rest."

52. Therefore, since filial relation, preceded by the removal of the state of slave, which had been occasioned by previous initiation, is produced by a sacrifice for male issue; it is established, that one though initiated [unto tonsure inclusive] may be adopted.

53. If this is the case, then the passage should only recite,—

Objection obviated. "Having taken one initiated [unto tonsure inclusive]."

What occasion is there, to use the expression, "a boy five years old?"—Should this be objected, it is erroneous; for, the passage intends this restriction,—"a boy five years old only.

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51. The precept proposed. That is the one, enjoining the production of a son.

Those rites are inferred from the term 'first.' By the use of the word 'first' in the passage; "The adopter should first perform the sacrifice, for male issue,"—the performance of rites, subsequent thereto, is implied, and initiatory rites are meant, as subsequently shown.

53. For the sake of securing an investiture of the characteristic thread, &c.] The Vedas, or holy scripture must not be studied, till this ceremony has been completed; the fifth year, is the proper season, for learning the letters; therefore to secure an investiture of the characteristic thread, such as may be productive of holiness, resulting
[i.e., under six]: and the restriction, is for the sake of securing, an investiture of the characteristic tiara, conduotive to the holiness, resulting from the study of scripture, which is preceded by the previous acquisition of letters.

54. And it must not be argued, that this restriction is established by the preceding sentences; for this here its limiting the period, for [the adoption] of one, whose initiation [as far as tenure inclusive], has not been performed, is received, as not intending the meaning in question.

Import of the term “first,” that is, previous to initiatory rites being performed.

56. But it is asked, why is it not meant—“previous to the sacrifice for adoption?” Because, the past participle “having taken” being used, an antecedent time for the act of adoption, including all its essentials, is inferred: and the previous initiatory rites, being annulled by the sacrifice for male issue, the performance of other rites is absolutely necessary.

The passage: “A child begotten on a woman, whose [first] marriage had not been consummated, or on one, who had been divorced [before marriage], is called the son of a twice-married woman.” By this definition, one born on a twice-married woman, of any of the seven descriptions, is included.

58. A child begotten on a woman, whose [first] marriage had not been consummated, or on one, who had been divorced [before marriage], is called the son of a twice-married woman.* By this definition, one born on a twice-married woman, of any of the seven descriptions, is included.

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from the study of scripture, it is necessary that the adoption should be restricted to one of five years.

54. The meaning in question.] A boy five years old, or one, the sixth year from whose birth, has commenced.

57. The author subjoins an exception.] By the first sentence, (“after their fifth year, &c.”) it is implied, that sons given, and the rest within their fifth year by adoption, acquire filial relation. By the expression sons given, and the rest, the son of the twice-married woman, is included. To except such description of son, from the operation of the rule mentioned, the author supposes the subsequent passage, (“But the son of a twice-married woman.”) to be subjoined. By this, the adoption of such son, is restricted to the time of birth.

58. A twice-married woman of any of the seven descriptions.] These are specified in a text of Nārada, cited in the Mahābhārata, in the chapter on granting loans. They are the following:—1. The re-married dāsini, whose first marriage had not been consummated.—2. A woman who having been guilty of incontinence, is given in marriage to another husband, by relatives apprehensive of legal penalties.—3. One given in marriage by kinsmen to a spurious relation of her first husband, no brothers of the same clading.—4. One who during her husband’s life cohabits with another.—5. Such a one who subsequently returns to her husband.—6. The widow who after her husband’s death,

* Yajñavalkya.
59. ‘I immediately on being born’ that is, as soon as produced: hence the time of birth only, is meant, no other.

Import of the term ‘duly take.’

60. Duly take] that is adopt according to the rules of adoption.

61. But, for one just born, is not the ceremony for a male born, alone proper, on account of this rule,—“Before others have touched the new borne boy, &c.” Therefore, how can it be said: ‘immediately on being born, he should duly take as a son.’ Excellent! for then, one unadopted, not having filial relation to the man himself, initiatory rites could not be performed: for, a text expresses,—“Let the father initiate his own sons, &c.”

Further argument of opponent refuted.

62. Neither can it be said, that paternal right proceeds alone from the relation, as natural father: for, this is denied, by this passage,—“the receptacle is more important than the seed;”[8]—and a text of Gautama recites, “of the other by special agreement, &c.” The meaning is [the child begotten, on one man’s wife] is the son of the other,—that is the procreator,—by special agreement only, &c.

Conclusion that in the case in question adoption first takes place.

63. Hence in the case, in question, adoption takes place, anterior to the performance of the ceremony for a male born.

The performance of the initiatory rites, being inferred, as following the adoption, the author propounds a variation in this respect; “Having performed, &c.” The meaning is this: After the adoption, having performed the burnt sacrifice, for the son of a twice-married woman, subsequently, let him perform the ceremony for a male born, and the other initiatory rites.

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avoiding his brothers and other kinsmen, from lust co-habits with another.—7. A woman forcibly taken, purchased, or induced by distress, who voluntarily prostitute herself with another man.—It should be observed that the three first only in the strict sense of the term are ‘punarśīv’ or twice-married women, the others being denominated ‘avāris’ or self-guided. The whole however, are classed under the general term ‘parapārā’ meaning one who has had previous connection with another man.

62. By this passage the receptacle, &c.] The close of a text from Manu, is here cited, which in its complete state, is thus. “Unless there be a special agreement between the owners of the land and of the seed, the fruit belongs clearly to the land owner, for the receptacle is more important, than the seed.”—The text of Manu, as well as that of Gautama, refer to,—where a husband being impotent, may appoint another to raise up issue to him on his wife; in which case, unless with express agreement, the offspring bears not filial relation to the procreator.

63. But, is not this impossible, since it is contrary to the argument, exemplified in the sacrifice [to fire] for a son born? Accordingly, on the same principle, as this is ordained, so is the burnt sacrifice, for the son of a twice-married woman, directed in the case in question. [Now this according to your opinion] is performed, previous to the ceremony for a child born: therefore, since it is to be completed in five days, the principal rite [being the ceremony] in question, would be barred.

66. Should this be objected: it is replied, that, in the case in question, the burnt sacrifice for the son of the twice-married woman, is not analogous to the sacrifice [to fire] for a son born, which is ordained in respect to spiritual purposes. Besides, [that used] may be a more unrestrictive order, of mentioning the former sacrifice, and the ceremony for a child born, and other rites for a son produced from the wife of another: in the same manner, as in this passage,—"Having performed the sacrifices prescribed for the day of the new moon, and that of the full moon, let him offer an oblation with the Soma plant." Thus there is no repugnance.

67. The particle vai [positively], having an exclusive import, the construction is,—"For one directly after birth only, at no other time;"—therefore, a restriction as to the priority in time, or otherwise, of the sacrifice, for the son of the twice-married woman, is not deduced; as in the case, of the sacrifice [to fire] for a son born.

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65. The argument exemplified in the sacrifice [to fire] for a son born.] Allusion is here made, to the 18th Topic, 3rd Section of the 4th Book of the Mindasas, by Jaimini, it is there proposed, as a subject for a disquisition, whether the sacrifice to fire, takes place immediately after birth, or when the ceremony for a child born, has been completed. The opponent argues, that the consequence should immediately follow its cause, and therefore, the sacrifice to fire, occasioned by birth, should be consecutive thereto. On the other hand, the supporter of the right opinion contends, that, as the giving the breast to the infant, is ordained, after the completion of the ceremony for a child born, if the sacrifice is to be performed, previous to this ceremony, from the great delay, which must necessarily occur, before the breast could be given the child, its death would be occasioned; and in that case, there would be no object, to whom the fruit of the sacrifice, consisting in purification, and so forth, would accrue. Therefore, the sacrifice in question, does not immediately follow, but takes place, after the completion of the ceremony for a child born.

66. In the same manner as in the passage, &c.] In the 2nd Topic, 4th Section, 5th Book of the Mindasas, a disquisition is proposed, whether a restrictive order, is intended, or not, in the passage in question, for the performance of the ceremonials specified. The opponent alleges, that a restrictive order, is deducible from the past participle, —"having performed,"—This is denied, by the supporter of the right opinion, on the ground, that the sacrifice with the Soma plant, is shown, to be consecutive to the establishing a consecrated fire, in the passage,—"one about to offer an oblation, with the Soma plant, should [first] establish a consecrated fire." It should be observed, that without having first established such fire, an individual cannot sacrifice after the forms prescribed, for the Darqua and Purva-sasa sacrifices, or those on the days of the new and full moon.

67. Therefore a restriction as to the priority, &c.] Great obscurity pervades the whole of this part of the work. The translator conceives, that in this particular place, the author has omitted to express the train of reasoning, by which he arrives to the
68. By the term 'every' alone, the meaning being complete, the mention of the ceremony, for a male born, and the rest, is added to exclude anterior rites, whilst the offspring was in the womb.—As for the use of the expression 'all,' notwithstanding the mention of the ceremony for a son born and the rest: that is, for the purpose of suggesting, whatever initiatory rites may belong to any particular individual; and hence, it is to be inferred, that although for Čādins, there is no investiture of any characteristic coat, and so forth, still, they become sons even, by the ceremony of tonsure and other rites.

69. "The man." Although a general expression is used, still, since one of the three first tribes only, is competent to perform, the burnt sacrifice, for the son of the twice-married woman; in respect to others, the filial relation proceeds from mere initiation alone.

70. The author thus concludes, that the burnt sacrifice, and initiatory rites united, are the cause of filiation; "Being completed, &c. &c."

71. The meaning is: the burnt sacrifice for the son of the twice-married woman, being completed, 'from these,' that is,—from these initiatory rites,—a son of the twice-married woman, becomes filially related.

72. Under the same head, the author of the Kālika-purāṇa proposes a rule, applicable to the son of the twice-married woman. "He should perform, at the funeral repast of his father, a rite dedicated to a single ancestor (ekoddhīṣṭa); not any pārvan, or double rite, and so forth."

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In the extract from the Kālika-purāṇa, it is first stated, that a person should regularly adopt the son of a twice-married woman, immediately after birth. The following sentence adds "having performed positively, (vai) for such, immediately on being born, the burnt sacrifice for the son of a twice-married woman, the man should complete every initiatory rite, the ceremony for a male born, and the rest."—This the author construes as implying positively, the performance of the sacrifice directly after birth. But the preceding sentence directs that adoption should then take place. From the contrast of the two injunctions, the author argues that no positive and restrictive rule, as to the priority in time or otherwise, for the performance of the sacrifice for the son of a twice-married woman, can be deduced.

As in the case, of the sacrifice [to fire] for a son born.] On a reference to the note subjoined to § 66, it will be perceived, that the sacrifice here alluded to, is restricted to be subsequent to the ceremony for a child born.

73. A rite dedicated to a single ancestor (ekoddhīṣṭa) not any pārvan or double rite, &c. The first sixteen funeral repasts, taking place after the ten days immediately succeeding the day of death, as well as that on the anniversary of such day, are ekoddhīṣṭa. On these occasions the following articles are first presented in honour of the deceased:—raw rice, liquid butter, honey, barley, soaked peas, fruit, water, frankincense, white flowers, kusa grass, a lamp, sandalwood, betel, cloth, a thread, and water for the feet. The abolition of the funeral cake, then takes place—The pārvan, or double rite, consists in the same oblations, and other ceremonies, being consecrated, on the death of the father and other rite, in honour of the ancestors on the mother's side, as well as in that of their...
73. The son of a twice-married woman, at the funeral requiem of his father, on the anniversary of the day of death, should perform rites, dedicated to a single ancestor, not any pârâvya, or double rites, and so forth.

74. By the terms, “and so forth,” the different variations of the pârâvya rites, are likewise specified. For, a text of the Purâna expresses—“Annually, let the son of the wife, and legitimate son, perform [observed] according to the pârâvya form: the other ten sons should perform a rite, dedicated to a single ancestor,”—and, a text of Purânas, recites; [A funeral requiem] by the legitimate son, for a father, who has departed this life, on all occasions, is in honor of three ancestors; that, by those of a different general family, is consecrated to a single ancestor, on the anniversary of the day of death.”

75. On the subject of sons, it has been said,—“The son self-given, and the slave’s son, (Dasa-putra).” Of these he describes the former: “A female purchased by price, who is enjoyed, is a slave: it is thus declared. The son who is born on her, is considered a slave-son.”

76. That female, though of equal class, being purchased by price, who is, ‘enjoyed’, is cohabited with,—is denominated by former sages, a slave. For, a text expresses,—“That woman, who is bought by price, is not considered a wife; she neither [saves] in rites, in honour of the gods, nor in rites, in honour of

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on the father’s side. Thus, besides, the articles above enumerated, a funeral cake is offered, to each of the three nearest deceased male ancestors, on the father’s side, and mother’s side. The oblations in honor of the ancestors on either side, being preceded by a Visvadeva offering—The term Visvadeva, denotes a certain set of divinities collectively, and the offering so called, is in their honor, and consists of the different articles, above enumerated: these should also be presented both on the occasion of a pârâvya and skandâsha rite, to the Lord of the soul—Rites in the form of pârâvya, are celebrated by a rigid Hindu, on the following occasions; on the last day of every moon (amavasya)—on the 8th and 9th days of the dark fortnights of Pausa, Mâgha, Phâlgunâ and Magha, when oblations are made in honor of the mother, and two nearest deceased female ancestors in the line of the father,—on the full moon of Mâgha,—during the whole of the first fortnight of Phâlgu, which is denominated * Pîrijaksin, as peculiarly set apart for the performance of rites in honor of ancestors; and particularly on the 13th of this month,—on any day of Agrâhyâna, previous to using the rice of the new crop,—in Varâgha, on occasion of the grain which then ripens,—in Ashâdha for the rains; when the sun enters the constellation Ardra,—on occasion of eclipses, and visiting places of Pilgrimage.

74. The different variations of the pârâvya rites, such as the daily funeral requiem, consisting in oblations of rice, &c. to be performed in honor of either set of the three ancestors, on the side of both parents respectively, and a portion of the ceremony of * sapâl-kâraṇa, The first of these, differs from the real pârâvya rite, inasmuch as no pâl, or Visvadeva, oblation is offered. In the second, the same ceremonials are observed, but the objects in whose honor they are performed, are different (v. Note to § 35 of Sect. 8.)

* Vide supra. § 25.
the males. The sages regard her as a female slave.” One born on her, is a slave’s son. The son of a female slave, is ‘a slave’s son (dásaputra), the feminine of ‘Dása’ (slave) being like the masculine in the Vedas.

77. Or, the compound Dása-putra, may be explained.—‘one who is both a slave and a son’ or, thus —‘a son denominated a slave.’

78. The author lays down the rules, regarding this son,—“[such a son] must not participate in the dominion of a king; nor of Bráhmanas, perform the funeral repast; he is the lowest of all sons: hence, let him reject him.”

79. The meaning is,—since, he is lowest of all sons, he must not share in the dominion of a king, nor perform the funeral repast of Bráhmanas.

SECTION V.

The mode of adoption—Form by whom propounded—Necessity of observance—Effect of omission.

The mode of adoption.

1. The qualification of the person to be adopted, has been defined. The mode is now propounded.

2. On this subject, Čaunakha has said “I, Čaunakha, now declare the best adoption: one having no male issue, or one whose male issue has died, having fasted for a son.”

3. ‘Adoption’—the form of adoption.—Having fasted on the day preceding, that of adoption—Vṛiddhā Gautama has illustrated the parts of the text.

“‘The impotent man, or also, one whose offspring has died.”

4. “Having given two pieces of cloth: a pair of ear-rings, a turban, a ring for the fore-finger, to a priest religiously disposed, a follower of Vishnu, and thoroughly read in the Vedas; having venerated the king and virtuous Bráhmanas, by a ‘madhuparka’ (or prepared food consisting of honey, liquid butter and curds);”

5. ‘The King’ here signifies, the chief of the village, for a text of Vṛiddha Gautama recites,—‘having invited all kinsmen and the chief of the village also.”

6. As for also the term, ‘Lord of the soil (Prithiviśeṣī)’ in a subsequent passage of the same author even,—“After this, let him give a madhuparka to the Lord of the soil”—that intends only the owner of the village: for, this, being expressed in what preceded, is the more forcibly suggested.
7. The meaning is,—having venerated these Brāhmaṇas, by a
cānutāka, and so forth, for the purpose of asking
Exposition. [for the child to be adopted.]

8. "Both a bunch of sixty-four stems, entirely of the kuça
Grass, and fuel of the jujūca tree also; having collected
these articles, having earnestly invited kinsmen and
relations;"—

9. ‘Kinsmen’ (bandhun)—his own, his father's and mother's
kinsmen, ‘Relations’ (jñayati)—sapindas. The invitation
of kinsmen, and the others, is for the sake of their
witnessing: in the same manner, as the invitation of
the king: for both terms are confirmatory of this, in the sense,—They
unite with (baddhanti),—and ‘know (jñayati) as their own, the adopt-
ted person.

10. “Having entertained the kinsmen with food: “and especially
Brāhmaṇas;”—The meaning of this is,—having enterte-
named invited kinsmen and Brāhmaṇas, previously
appointed, and (on account of the conjunction ‘and’ in
§ 8) invited relations.

11. “Having performed the rites, commencing with that of
placing the consecrated fire, and ending with that of
purifying the liquid butter. Having advanced before
the giver, let him cause to be asked thus,—‘give the boy.’”

Explanations. 12. The meaning is,—let him cause a demand, to
be made through Brāhmaṇas, previously appointed.

13. “The giver, being capable of the gift, [should give] to him,
with the recitation of the five prayers, the initial
words, of the first of which, are,—ye-yajñena, &c.”

14. The capacity to give, consists in having a plurality of sons,
and the assent of the wife, and so forth.—Should
give,” is understood before this part,—“with the recita-
tion of the five prayers;” for, gift is indicated in the
prayer, commencing—“Let him receive a male from an intelligent
person.”

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9. [or, both terms are confirmatory of this, &c.] Both terms, viz. ‘Bandhun’
(kinsmen) and ‘jñayati’ (relations), ‘Bandhu’ and, ‘jñayati’ of which, these terms are
severally the accusative case plural, are derivatives of the roots ‘bandh’ bind, ‘jñayā’
know.

13. With the recitation of the five prayers.] The translator has not yet been
able to learn the particular five prayers, alluded to.

14. [And the assent of the wife.] The calling ‘patrī’ (the husband) is found in
some copies; but that of ‘patrī’ (the wife) appears to be the more prevalent, and on
that account adopted in the translation. The author does not mean that the gift of a
son, without the assent of the wife, would be invalid, but with reference to his doctrine,
so Sect. 11, § 15, that, such assent is essential to render the gift preferable.
15. "Having taken him by both hands, with the recitation of the prayer, commencing,—"devasyatva, &c.," having inaudibly repeated the mystical invocation "Aungad-anganat, &c.," having kissed the forehead of the child: having adorned with clothes, and so forth, the boy, bearing the reflection of a son:"—

16. "The reflection of a son." The resemblance of a son,—and that is, the capability to have sprung from [the adopter] himself, through an appointment [to raise issue on another's wife], and so forth; as [is the case] of the son, of a brother, a near or distant kinsman, and so forth. Nor is such appointment of one unconnected impossible; for, the invitation of such [to raise issue] may take place under this text: "For the sake of seed, let some Brahmana be invited by wealth, &c."

Deduction, that a brother, uncle, &c. who could not have been begotten by the adopter, are not to be adopted.

17. Accordingly, the brother, paternal and maternal uncles, the daughter's son, and that of the sister, are excluded; for they bear not resemblance to a son.

18. Intending this very position, it is declared in the sequel, by the same author:—"The daughter's son, and the sister's son, are declared to be the sons of Ādikes. For the three superior tribes, a sister's son, is no where [mentioned as] a son." Here even, the term 'sister's son' is illustrative of the whole not resembling a son, for prohibited connection is common to them all. Now, prohibited connection is the unfitness, [of the son proposed to be adopted,] to have been begotten by the individual himself through appointment [to raise issue on the wife of another.]

19. "The mutual relation between a couple, being analogous to the one, being the father or mother of the other, connection is forbidden: as for instance,—the daughter of the wife's sister, and the sister of the paternal uncle wife."—The meaning of the text is this. Where, the relation of the couple, that is of the bride and bridegroom, bears analogy to that of father or mother: if the bridegroom be, as it were, father of the bride, or

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16. Through an appointment [to raise issue on another's wife] and, so forth.] By such an appointment, or marriage, and the like.

As [is the case] of the son of a brother, &c. &c.] Such son, might have been begotten by the adopter himself, had he been appointed by the husband of the boy's mother, on account of his own impotence, to raise up issue on his wife; or, if the adopter himself, had married, the mother of the boy.

*4 V. infra § 7. Sect. VII where this passage from the Vedas, is cited at large.
† V. supra 2, 74.
the bride stand in the light of notice, to the bridegroom, such a marriage is a prohibited connection. The two examples illustrate these cases in their order.*

20. In the same manner as in the above text, of the Ghyaparvisishta, on marriage, prohibited connection, in the case of marriage, is excepted; so, in the case in question, [one, who, if begotten by the adopter, would have been the son of] a prohibited connection, must be excepted; in other words, such person is to be adopted, as with the mother of whom, the adopter might have carnal knowledge.

21. "Accompanied with dancing, songs and benedictory words, having seated him in the middle of the house: having according to ordinance, offered a burnt offering of milk and curds, (to each incantation, with recitation of the mystical invocation,—"Yastva-hrida;" the portion of the Rig-veda, commencing,—"tubhyam-agne;" and the five prayers, of which the initial words of the first, are Somadat, &c."

Explanation.

22. The meaning is,—with such seven incantations, having offered seven burnt offerings of milk and curds.

23. Vyidhha Gautama, propounds a special rule: "Let him then, cause to be offered, as burnt offerings, an hundred oblations of milk with liquid butter, contemplating in his mind, as the object, the lord of created beings, with recitation of the prayer "prajapate-na-tva-getem, &c."

Rule propounded by Vyidhha Gautama.

24. The stanzas, which follow the passage, [of Caurakha last quoted,] commencing,—"The adoption of a son, by a Brahmana, &c."† and ending with,—"such gift is to be made, on account of difficulty,—"‡ having been before explained.

Stanzas following, the part of Caurakha in § 15, have been before cited and explained.

25. Next in order, to these stanzas, is this passage,—"Let the best of the regenerate to the extent of his ability bestow a gratuity on the officiating priest."

Comment.


Text.

27. "A king half even of his dominion: next in order, a Vaiyasa three hundred pieces."

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28. In the case in question.] That of adoption.

* The translator has here omitted an explanation in the original, by other terms, of the words used in the quotation, to express the daughter of the wife's sister, and the sister of the paternal uncle's wife. The translation in English would be a ludicrous tautology.

† See, II. § 7 et seq. ‡ See, IV. § 7, 8, 15, 19, 20 and 21.
28. "Half even of his dominion." The produce for one year, of half his dominion; for a text of Vṛddha Gautama, recites,—"Let him proffer the profits, arising from half his dominion, received in one year." And, this is with respect to one of the royal tribe.—

Text.  Three hundred stampt coins (nānaka), and this must be understood, to mean of gold, silver or copper, with reference to the state of the individual, being superior, middling, or inferior respectively; on account of the text of Vṛddha Gautama,—"Let him proffer three hundred pieces in gold, or in silver, or in copper, according as his condition may be superior, or otherwise."

29. "A Cūdra, the whole even of his property; if indigent to the extent of his means."

30. "The whole of his property." That is, the amount earned by the labour of one year; for, the expression,—Received in one year,—is not special; and there is this prohibition, "if offspring exist, the whole of the property, must not be given."

31. Vasiṣṭha propounds another mode. "Man produced from virile seed and uterine blood, proceeds from his father and his mother, as an effect from its cause. Therefore, his father and mother have power to give, to sell, or to abandon, their son. But let no man give or accept, an only son: for, he is [destined] to continue the line of his ancestors. Let not a woman give or accept a son, unless with the assent of her husband. A person being about to adopt a son, should take an unremote kinsman, or the near relation of a kinsman, having convinced his kindred and announced his intention to the king, and having offered a burnt offering, with recitation of the prayers denominated Vṛṣṇihṛiti in the middle of his dwelling. But, if a doubt arise, let him set apart like a Cūdra, one whose kindred are remote. For, it is declared [in the Vedas] 'Many are saved by one.' When a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son, be afterwards born, the given son, shares a fourth part."

32. Of this, the part commencing from.—"Man produced from virile seed and uterine blood, &c.;" and ending,—"unless with the assent of her husband,—" has been before explained.

33. 'Kindred' and other terms explained. 34. 'With recitation of prayers, &c.' On conclusion of the Śāyānāḥ śaṃcāra, having offered with fire, four oblations with recitation of the prayers, denominated Vyāhriti severally, and collectively. Such is the meaning.
35. "An unremote kinsman" this has been explained.

36. "But if doubt arise, &c." He, whose kinsmen are in a distant country, is one whose kindred are remote, being widely different by country and language: should such a person be adopted, a doubt even exists, with regard to his race, disposition, and so forth; this being the case, let him set him apart like a Čūdra; until the ascertainmetn [of doubtful particulars] let him not hold communion with him; this is the meaning.

37. On this point the author subjoins a passage of revealed law, as a reason. "It is declared, &c." through one son, many,—the father and other ancestors,—are to be saved. On this account the adoption of a son takes place: not that through one, many may be condemned: now, a doubt existing, on one side, condemnation is possible: therefore, he should not hold communion with him: for an offence, though eventual, must be avoided.

38. But, the author of the Kalpataru, inverting to the reading—"asamnikrśitam-eva"—says: "one even whose kinsmen are not at hand, (asamnikrśitam-eva)—even one whose good or bad qualities are not known. The particle 'eva' is in the sense of,—even—or though, 'But if doubt arise';—on account of his kinsmen, not being near, should a doubt, with respect to his class arise; considering him as a Čūdra, let him set him aside, desist from even of initiation—A Čūdra even, is indeed a son, this is the implied import.”

39. Either of these expositions of the implied meaning, is inaccurate: for the adoption of one of a different class is forbidden. Therefore the passage in its obvious sense only is correct.

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35. The prayers denounced 'Vyāhriti,' &c.] There are three prayers in the Vedas, distinguished, by pre-sounding, by this term; and when recited consecutively, they are denounced, Maina Vyāhriti, or great Vyāhriti. This term, in its original sense, signifies narration.

36. But the author of the Kalpataru, &c.] A variety of reading and interpretations of the passage of Vaisishṭha, here referred to, occur. The passage as read by Nāṇḍa, is thus: ‘adura-bandhāmud-bandhu-samnikrśitam-eva pratiṣṭhānayet’ which is rendered, should take an unremote kinsman, or the near relation of a kinsman—The variation of reading, in the Kalpataru noticed, is the substitution of ‘asamnikrśitam’ for ‘bandhāmud-bandhu-samnikrśitam’; and the passage is accordingly differently explained in that work: the variety in the reading and interpretation of this passage, is fully noticed by Mr. Colebrooke, in a note subjoined to chap. I. sect. XI. § 13. of his translation of the Kāitakāhārī on inheritance.

V. Sapra Sect. 2 § 15.
40. After the adoption of a son given, should a real legitimate son be born, the author (Vasishthá) propounds a special provision with respect to the division of the heritage;—"When, &c." The meaning is: this son given, being adopted, if a real legitimate son be born, then the son given, receives a quarter-share: not an entire share (a.)

41. It is to be considered, whether this form [for adoption] in question, is to be applied, [generally] to the son bought, and the rest, or its application be determined by the distinction in the part, which preceded;—"to give, sell, or abandon their son."

42. Bandhayana, propounds a particular rule, for those following the Taittiri portion of the Vedas;—"We are about to explain the mode, for the adoption of a son"—(here follows the same, as in the quotation from Vasishthá, from "Man produced, &c." down to, "unless with the assent of her husband.") "One about to adopt, produces two pieces of cloth, a pair of ear-rings, a ring, and a priest, thoroughly read in the Vedas, a bunch of sixty-four stems of the kuśa grass, and fuel of the 'pûrṇa' tree." Then having invited kinsmen, into the middle of the dwelling, and having made a representation to the king: having sat down by the direction of a Brāhmaṇa, in the assembly, or in the middle of his house: having caused to be exclaimed, auspicious day! benediction! prosperity! having performed rites, commencing with the recitation of the prayer 'Yaddevāyājuna,' down to the placing the vessels for water: having advanced before the giver, let him thus beg 'give me this son.' The other replies 'I give.' He receives the child [and says] 'I received thee, for the sake of religious duty. I adopt thee, for offspring.' Then having adorned him, with cloths and ear-rings and ring: having performed the investiture, and other ceremonial, down to the kindling, a flame of fire: having dressed the oblations, he offers a burnt offering. After

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41. It is to be considered, &c.] It is subsequently determined, that the form is applicable to the sons made, and self-given, as well as the three sons, indicated by the terms,—"to give, sell, or abandon" viz. the sons given, bought, and deserted. (v. infra § 49, 50, and 51.)

The Taittiri portion of the Vedas]. This is included in the Tājur Veda, and takes its name from 'taittiri' a partridge.—"The text of this Veda being digested by Yājñavalkya, in a tangible form, and picked up by the rest of Vaisampayana's disciples, who for the purpose assumed the shape of partridges." (Wilson in his Dictionary on the word—taittiriyas.)

* Butea frondesca.

† The reading in copies of original gives "having presented Brāhmaṇas with prepared food" but this appearing erroneous and inconsistent with practice, the translator has adopted the reading in the Dattaka Chakrākā.

(c) See 1 Mad. H. C, Rep. 49; 1 Morl. Dig. 306.
having recited the incantation in the first chapter of the [Yajur] Veda, commencing ´(Yas-tvā-hridākārinām-anyamāna)´ with recitation of the sacrificial prayer ´Yasmai-tvān-sukritajātā-vede, &c.´ he offers a burnt offering—Next, having performed the burnt sacraments, where the prayers denominated ´vyāhari´ are recited: [and] that designated ´svishṭa-kṛit´ with other ceremonials, being completed, down to the bestowing an excellent cow, he presents the fee [saying, `yours are'] these two cloths, the ear-rings, and the ring likewise. But subsequently, if a real legitimate son is born, he [the adopted son] succeeds to a fourth share; so says Baudhayana."

43. As for the text of Vṛiddha Gautama, "A given son abounding in good qualities (yatha-jāte) existing: should a legitimate son, be born at any time: let both be equal sharers of the father's whole estate." That must be construed, as supposing the former possessed of good qualities, and the legitimate son, destitute of the same: on account of the epithet `yatha-jāta' ("abounding in good qualities"). He, in whom there is a `jāte', that is an assemblage (summaṇa) of good qualities, (implied by `yatha') is `yatha-jāta',—one abounding in good qualities. This is the meaning; for, the term "yatha" is significant of similitude, depending on quality.

44. Accordingly, by this text, ("of the man, to whom a son has been given, adorned with every virtue, he even, shall take the heritage, though duly brought from a different family.") Manu hath declared on defect of the real legitimate son, the succession [of the son given] to the whole heritage. Therefore, his participation of a moiety, a legitimate son [not possessing good qualities] existing, is even proper.

45. The same author propounds a special rule, should the due form for adoption, not be observed: "He, who adopts a son, without observing the rules ordained, should make him a participator of the rites of marriage: not a sharer of the wealth."

46. The meaning is: the marriage only, of one adopted, without the form for adoption, is to be performed; no wealth is to be bestowed on him: on the contrary, in such case, the wife and the rest even succeed to the estate: for, without observance of form, his filial relation is not produced.

47. Accordingly Vṛiddha Gautama. "The sons given, purchased, and the rest, who are adopted from those of his own general family, by observance of form acquire the state of lineage [to the adopter]; but the relation of sapinda, is not included." Here, there is this restric-

* This sacrament is so called from the prayer, read on the occasion.
of the adopted, declarative rule: 'by observance of form only, acquired the state of lineage;' for, the forms for gift, and so forth, from being comprehended in the descriptions of the son given and the rest, are necessary to complete the peculiar nature of each. For instance, [in Manu's description of the son given], it is said: "give as a son in a time of distress confirming, the gift with water"; here the mention of water is illustrative of the whole form necessary for the gift [of a son]; and hence the form for adoption also is implied: for a text of Manu expresses—"Though duly brought from a different family." The meaning is 'obtained legally, according to form.'

48. "Purchased and the rest." By the word 'rest' the sons made, deserted and self-given, are included. For, by the expression "as specified" in the text subjoined, it is declared by Manu, that those only, who are qualified by the form, indicated in their respective descriptions, are substitutes for sons. "The sages declare these eleven sons, the son of the wife, and the rest as specified, to be substitutes for the real legitimate son; for, the obsequies would fail." Accordingly in the description of the son made,—"whom being equal in class a man affiliates (prakuryat, &c.)"—by the preposition 'pra' [which has a perfective import],—in the description of the son deserted whom a man receives (pari-grhiniyat) as his own son &c."—by the preposition 'pari' [implying thoroughly],—and in the description of the son self-given,—"who offers (sparasyet) himself &c."—by the verb 'offer' synonymous with 'give,' reception in adoption (parigraha) with the observance of form, is declared.

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48. By the word 'rest' the sons made, &c. The reasoning of the author, in restricting the word 'rest' occurring in Vridhā Gautama's text, as denoting only the sons made, deserted and self-given, is not obvious. It should be observed, that, this text refers to sons, who may be adopted by an overt act of reception, from amongst those of the same family, whose filial relation is declared to be produced by the observance of form only, (of course the form applicable to such adoption); and whose relation, as capitis (meaning here by blood) is barred. The author restricts the sons alluded to in this text, whom the terms 'the rest' denote to the three mentioned, by referring to Manu, who declares that, the sons only, as previously described by him, are substitutes for the real son; or in other words, possessing filial relation. But of the descriptions which preceded, in those only of the sons made, deserted and self-given (besides, the son given and bought), is adoption, by an overt act of reception, and with the observance of the form proper for the same, indicated. Thus, in the descriptions of the sons made, and deserted, the species of adoption, in question, with the observance of the proper form is implied by the verbs 'pra-kuryat' and 'pari-grhiniyat' meaning literally, 'completely makes' and 'thoroughly receives.' The son self-given, described as one who offers (sparasyet) himself, &c., and the author explains this verb as synonymous with, —to give; but the gift cannot be completed without an overt act of reception on the adopter's part perfected by the observance of the proper form. The same may be observed, in the case of the sons given and bought. On the other hand, the other six sons cannot be referred to in Vridhā Gautama's text, as in their descriptions by Manu, adoption with an overt act of reception, and observance of form for such adoption, is not implied; and besides these are connected by blood, as containing portions of either of the adoptive father, or his wife, and those who on that account were before declared, to be adoptive sons of right (v. Sect. 1 § 34 and 35.).
49. Intending the same, after having premised,—"therefore his father and mother have power to give, sell or abandon their son," by Vasishtha also is the form for adoption declared. "A person being about to adopt a son, &c." Now from the expression 'adopt' (parigraha), this form is to be applied to the adoption likewise of the sons made, a self-given: for the same is implied by Manu by each preposition respectively [in their several descriptions.]

Conclusion that their filial relation is produced by the observance of a form only.

50. Therefore the filial relation of these five sons proceeds from adoption only with observance of the form of either Vasishtha or Çamakha; not otherwise.

51. As has been determined in the case of the son of the wife by Manu and Yajñavalkya: for, [the necessity of] observing form, is declared affirmatively and negatively, in these and other texts—"Even the son of a wife duly authorized not begotten according to law is unworthy of the paternal estate. For he was proscribed by an outcaste."* Either brother appointed for this purpose who deviates from, the strict rule, and acts from carnal desire shall be degraded, &c."†

52. As for what is declared in the Subodhini, a commentary on the Mitakshara,—"And the elders regard that property as temporal; like the filial relation and so forth;" that must be rejected, as contradicted; since it is repugnant to authorities cited: and because from the adoption only of a holy saint (sarsa) (that is,—one propounded by a holy saint) the relation as son is declared to proceed by Pañchinasi in this text; "Now these sons given, purchased and made, and the son of the appointed daughter who are in this case affiliated through the adoption of a holy saint, by another are not sons of two fathers [being] unconnected to those of the family, (asangata-kulādyānushyāyanā.)"

53. Such, to whom those of the family (that is the family of the natural father) are not connected, [are asangata-kulina; and] persons not sons of two fathers and the same, [are asangata-kulādyānushyāyanā. The meaning is,—those who are adopted according to the form of a holy saint are not

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49. Now from the expression 'adopt' (parigraha). Literally completely receiving.

53. Persons sons of two fathers and the same.] The author analyzés Pañchinasi's phrase 'asangata-kulādyānushyāyanā.' He begins by explaining the first member of this complex expression 'asangata-kulina' which is itself a compound and then indicates the class of compound to which the whole is to be referred. Thus the sentence 'persons sons of two fathers, &c.' shows that the complex phrase in question is a karmadhāra samāna, or compound of nouns, designating the same person, and not

* Manu 9, 146.  † Yajñavalkya.
allied to those of the family of the natural father: therefore they are not sons of two fathers.

54. Or the reading ‘Dvyanushayyaná’ (sons of two fathers) may be admitted. For it will be declared in the sequel, that where, both the natural and adoptive fathers perform the different ceremonies, the state as son of two fathers ensues.

55. “Although it may be used like the word Indra and so forth; still, since the prevailing sense proceeds from popular recognition and the production of an son] is ordained in holy write, the general acceptance of ‘son,’ like the general acceptance of ‘wife’ and the like, must be understood.” By the purport of this and other passages, Medhatithi also declares the filial relation in adopted sons to be occasioned only by the proper ceremonies.

56. It is therefore established that the filial relation of adopted sons is occasioned only by the [proper] ceremonies. Of gift, acceptance, a burnt sacrament, and so forth should either be wanting, the filial relation even fails.

SECTION VI.

Rule for Succession: where the real son and one formally adopted; and where one formally and one informally adopted may co-exist—

Relation in respect to family and so forth of the absolutely adopted son—of the Dvyanushayyaná—who is described.

Cautokha provides for the cases were a real son and a adopted son, and one formally and one informally adopted may co-exist.

1. Next should the real legitimate son and son given and son adopted, without observance of form be co-existent; the same author propounds the succession to the estate. “Him, existing—a son being created; and a son given, existing—one being adopted informally; that estate is his only who is justly master of the father’s wealth.”

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*a dvandva sanskara, or conjunct compound of nouns indicating distinct persons, but having a common government.

54. Or the reading, &c.] The variation in the reading noticed consists in ‘Dvyanushayyaná’ being read without the privative a, instead of with it, as in that preferred by Nanda. If this now noticed be adopted, sangata-kulina (connected, &c.) must be construed as contained in the text instead of asangata-kulina (unconnected, &c.) For by the rules of orthography, whether ‘a’ (which occurs in Pratishñi’s text) be followed by sangata or asangata in coalition, the same form ‘ta-sangata’ is exhibited, though it is usual to insert a macron mark equivalent to our apostrophe to denote the presence of the vowel a.

65. Like the word Indra and so forth.] The word Indra is figuratively used, to express a person of great wealth: the word son may in the same manner be used in a figurative sense.

* V. Infra Sect. 6 § 11.
2. "Him,"—the real legitimate son existing; whatever son is created by adoption and so forth; of these to him only, who is master of the father's wealth 'justly,' that is—by obvious inherent right,—does that estate belong: not to another. The meaning is that if a real legitimate son exist, the adopted son is not a sharer of the wealth: for in the affiliation of a son, the non-existence even of real legitimate issue is an essential condition.

3. Thus a son given, that is one adopted according to form existing, should a son be made without observance of law; of these likewise the son-given only is participant of the estate, not the one adopted without observance of law. Such is the meaning: for, ordained form alone produces the filial relation.

4. Should a son-given, and the real legitimate son exist together, the son-given does not receive the share of an elder brother. This, the same author propounds.—"Subsequent to the adoption of a son-given, other sons being born,—should the father divide his estate; let him not be the partaker of the share of an elder brother."

5. The meaning is this,—after the adoption of a son-given, a legitimate son also being born: the son-given does not receive the share of an elder brother.

6. Manu next propounds another rule. "A given-son must never claim the family and estate of his natural father.(a) The funeral cake follows the family and estate; but of him who has given away his son, the obsequies fail."

7. The son-given must never claim his natural father's family and estate. Thus, 'the obsequies'—that is, the funeral repast [which would have been] performed by the son-given fails of him who has given away his son.

8. The author of the Chandrika thus explains, "By this it is declared that by the act alone, creating the filial relation, property of the son-given in the estate of his adopter is established, and connection to him as belonging to the same family ensues: But through extinction of the filial relation from the mere gift, the property of the son-given in the estate of the giver is extinguished; and connection to the family of the giver annulled."*

* Vide Smitti Chandrika, Sec. 11. § 10. where this quotation in part occurs.

(a) Sec I Mad. H. C. Recp. 182.
9. But although by the text of Manu, connection to the family of the natural parent is annulled; what proof is there as to the connection to the family of the adopter being established? On this point Vyhat Manu declares,—

"sons given, purchased and the rest retain relation of sapinda to the natural father as extending to the fifth and seventh degrees; like this general family, [which is] also that of their adopter."

10. The relation as sapinda of sons given, purchased and the rest to the natural parent continues: by gift, and so forth even that does not fail; for by reason of consisting in connection through containing portions of the natural father, it is not possibly to be removed while the body lasts. By this it is declared that the relation of sapinda in question is the consanguineal connection only and not connection by the 'pinda' or funeral cake; for that this latter is barred is shown by this passage,—

"Of him who has given away his son the obsequies fail." Anticipating a question as to the extent of this relation as sapinda, the author adds,—"Extending to the fifth and to the seventh degree, &c." The meaning is this: 'Extending to the fifth degree'—completing five, that is—embracing, five degrees. So of the expression 'to the seventh degree.'

11. Gautama also, "With the kinsmen on the side of the father (viz. of the procreator (vij)) beyond the seventh degree; and with those on the mother's side beyond the fifth, &c."

12. Here the word 'vij' (the procreator) is used for the sake of comprehending every one even, the natural father of a son given and so forth; not merely the natural father of the son of the wife only: for a text of Manu expresses, "As for these, denominated from the context sons though produced from the seed (vija) of others: they are [sons] of that person from whose seed they severally sprang; and of no other.*

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13. By this it is declared, &c.] The word 'pinda' signifies either the 'body' or a 'cake' or ball of food presented to the menses of the deceased; the word 'sapinda' therefore, may denote either one consanguineally related, or one connected, through an oblation of such funeral cake.

14. Here the word 'vij' is used, &c.] This word signifying literally the owner of the seed, is more particularly used, to devote the person appointed to raise issue on the wife of another: in contradistinction to the husband of such woman, technically called the 'kaherti,' or owner of the soil. The author accordingly deems it necessary to explain that the word as used by Gautama has not such particular and limited sense: this he supports by referring to a text of Manu, where the word 'vija' or seed is used, in respect to the natural father of any subsidiary son.

* Manu, 9, 181.
13. 'They are sons of that person.' This declaration that they are sons is for the sake of propounding the connection of sapinda [by the body]; and not to establish filial relation. For that would be at variance with the declaration of filial relation [to the adoptive father] contained in this and other texts.—"Of these twelve sons of men, &c."— Of no other not of the adopter.

14. But analogous to the case of the daughter may not the relation of sapinda to both [the giver and the receiver] be admitted: for like the state of lineage, the relation of sapinda is established by the adoption.—Should this be objected it is wrong; for it would be at variance with the text of Vriddha Gautama.—"The sons given, purchased and the rest who are adopted from those of his own general family by observance of form acquire the state of lineage [to the adopter]. But the relation of sapinda is not included.”

15. Those sons given and the rest who are adopted 'from those of his own general family'—from among his general family acquire by the observance of form 'the state of lineage'—the state of offspring. But in respect to these the relation of sapinda 'is not included' by the form,—meaning—in is not established.

16. If the relation of sapinda be not established in those even of the same general family, it is declared a fortiori, that such relation is not produced in the case of one of a different general family.

17. And this is proper. As [in the case of the daughter] by reason of her proceeding from the father and producing in concert with the husband, the same body [their issue] the relation of sapinda [by the body] to both is established: in the same manner in the case of the son given it is not established; for though he proceed from the natural father, the producing in concert with the adopter a common body is wanting.

18. Accordingly, Devala in the text subjoined (since the family name, a share on the funeral cake are specified,) by the term merely: bars the relation even of sapinda—

"For the sake of religious merit [being adopted] like

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14. But analogous to the case of a daughter. A damsel retains the relation of sapinda to her father who gives and acquires the same to her husband who receives her in marriage.

18. Devala in the text subjoined.] In the Vyavahara Mayukha, this text is cited as attributed to Narada and alleged to be unauthentic.

* Menu 9, 138.
the real son under the family name of each respectively; (tat-tatgotama) sons [who are] reared: for such merely participation in a share, and [the] oblation of the funeral cake is declared."

19. But is not this irrelevant to the subject proposed: for it regards the son for religious merit. Thus:—"in those sons who like the real son are reared for the sake of religious merit 'under the family name of each respectively,' (that is under the family name severally of each only,) does the mere participation alone in a share and the funeral cake vest: not, (for such is the intent,) the relation of sapinda to the adopter. Hence the text imports the want of connection of sapinda of that son only to the adoptive father: not of the son-given.

20. This objection if made, is denied.—For a son for religious merit (dharma-pura) is not admitted, as [such admission] would be at variance with the enumeration in this text,—"Of the twelve sons of men whom Manu sprung from the self-existent has named &c."—or even were such son admitted as he is not classed in the series of heirs, (the wife and the rest,) he could not participate in a share: and the connection of sapinda, not being possibly implied to forbid it would be unmeaning. Therefore, that text regards only the son: since it propounds participation in a share.

21. Now of the text in question this is the meaning: 'For the sake of religious merit,'—(that is, for the sake of acquiring religious merit obviating the exclusion of the man himself from heaven,) after being adopted 'like the real son,'—(that is as substitutes for the same;) by the adopter 'under the family name of each respectively,'—(that is, even under a family name, different with reference to the natural father,) sons who are reared: in these merely participation alone in the heritage and [the oblation of] the funeral cake of the adopter vests: not connection as sapinda. Therefore, it is established that in the text in question the connection of the son given as sapinda to the adopter is not declared; but on the contrary his connection as such extending to the seventh degree inclusive to the family alone of the natural father.

22. But does it not follow on account of proximity, that sons mentioned in the plural number required by the repetition of 'tat,' are designated by that pronoun, not on account of remoteness, the adopting party becoming possessed of male issue; for,—it would be improper to apply to such, whose plurality is dubious, the repetition —the pronoun, 'tat' designating (as it were) a person not

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23. Required by the repetition of 'tat.' This pronoun is repeated to denote that the reference to the object is made distributively it follows, therefore that the object must be in the plural.
immediately obvious, cannot bear an import in the sense of ‘atma’ (self)—and the possessive pronoun ‘sva’ (own) denoting the person immediately obvious, only would have been proper.

23. Should this be alleged: we assert the contrary. According to the maxim,—"The application of pronouns is to the object presented to the mind,"—the adopting party is indicated by the pronoun ‘tat’ (‘of each, &c.’). For the being the object presented to the mind, depends on being principal: and the being principal, proceeds from being the object to be perfected, or from relation to the effect. Now the father is principal by reason of being the object to whom accrues the effect consisting of heaven, which in virtue of such text as,—"by a son he conquers worlds, &c."—is to be produced by an act, the instrument of which is a son: and because by thoroughly considering this and other texts,—"the rites for the father consisting of oblations of food, and libations of water to be performed by the son, &c."—it appears the father is the object to be perfected as such by rites of oblation of food and so forth, the agent of which is the son.

24. Thus. "He mixes coagulated milk (dādhī) in boiled milk: that is a curd of two-milk whey (āmilkṣā), an oblation for the Vaiṣṇava set of divinities." It being settled, that the curd here alluded to by reason of being formed of mingled coagulated milk and milk, is an altered mode of what was intended to be offered: should it be alleged by the opponent that the coagulated milk is what is altered; since that alone designated by the pronoun ‘that,’ (for, the coagulated milk mentioned in the accusative case, is principal by reason of the milk mentioned in the locative being secondary,) refers to the divinities,—it is thus demonstrated by the supporter of the right opinion, that the milk is what is altered. As the milk is pervaded by the coagulated milk, although the object [of the verb ‘mixes’], by reason of this consequent result of the import of the passage,—(’he perfects

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Not on account of remoteness, the adopting party.] In Devaka’s text, though not expressed, the adopting party is understood as the agent to the verb in immediate construction with ‘are revered,’ in the passive voice: and is consequently more remote than ‘sons,’ from the phrase ‘tat-tat-agamam.’

To such whose plurality is dubious.] The agent of the verb ‘revered’ not being expressed: its plurality or otherwise is not certain.

24. He mixes coagulated milk (dādhī) in boiled milk.] The author alludes to and enlarges on a portion of the 9th topic of the 1st section of the 4th book of Śāntah’s Mīmāṃsā. In the Vedas, this passage occurs. "He mixes coagulated milk, (dādhī) in boiled milk, that is a curd of two-milk whey (āmilkṣā), an oblation for the Vaiṣṇava set of divinities, and whey for horses [in particular ceremonies]." In the part of the Mīmāṃsā specified, it is proposed for a discussion whether the curd and whey, viz. the grumous and albuminous parts of this compound are collectively the object of the act or only the curd. Since both are equally produced by the act of admixing the coagulated milk. The first supposition might be inferred: it is however thus demonstrated, that the curd, formed as mentioned, is the object proposed by the act, and that the whey is incidentally or subordinately produced. The curd it is urged is no other than the milk.
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milk by coagulated milk,') the milk alone is principal. Therefore, this only designated by the pronoun 'that,' relates to the divinities. Analogous to this, in the case in point also, it is correct to say, that since the father is principal, by being the object to be perfected, he only is designated by the pronoun 'tat.'

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25. But should it be objected, if the son given, bear not the relation of saptāda to the family of the adoptive father; why should not his marriage take place therein? Excellent! we reply,—on account of his belonging to the same general family.

26. Then his marriage might take place with the offspring of the adopter's sister and so forth, for connection by identity of family and that of saptāda are wanting: nor do we at present find any text prohibitory of this. On the contrary, there are passages in favour of it such as, “Let not any one marry the daughter of that person, who taught him the sāvitar inscription: but marriage in the general or also in the peculiar family of that person, does not however occasion an offence.” Yet, this is not an intended consequence: for, it is at variance with the universal practice of good persons, uninfringed, and by holy writ unforbidden. Therefore, what reason is there against marriage in such instance.

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itself to which the coagulated milk is admitted, as is argued,—1st, from the use of the pronoun ‘that’ which indicates the boiled milk, for that is principal,—2d, from the import of a preceding portion of the Vedas referring to the oblation of curd, produced by the process in question, which recites, “consume this milk,”—3d, from the analogy of taste, the curd and milk both being sweet: whereas the whey is sour.

25. ‘Sāvitar inscription.] This (otherwise called the Gāyatrī,) is a verse of the Vedas, the mental recitation of which is an essential part of the daily observances enjoined the Brāhmans to whom, when invested with the characteristic thread, it is taught with an injunction of secrecy.—For the insertion here of this mystical verse, the curious reader is indebted to Rām Mohan Rāy, an enlightened Hindū distinguished by learning, but still more by the liberality of his sentiments, well evinced in the different publications which have emanated from his pen.—The text of the Sāvitar runs thus:

Om! Bhūr-bhūvah-svāh!

Tat-savitur-wareyaṃ bhargo davasya dhitahām dhiyo yo naḥ prachodayat.

This may be translated,—“Glory to the Almighty in his triple character of the preserver, the destroyer and creator:—to the earth, sky and heavens.—We contemplate that desirable light of the resplendent sun, who directs our intellects.”

On this Rām Mohan Rāy makes the following comment founded on interpretative passages from the Vedas, Manu and Yajñavalkya,—“Om! This mystical word is composed of the letters a, u and m, and is the emblem of God the author (as respectively intimated by those three letters) of preservation, destruction and creation.—Those letters likewise express that with respect to sentient beings, he rules the states of waking, dreaming and sound sleeping.—This word is called the Pranava or high praise.—* Bhūr-bhūvah-svāh*—These words signify the earth, sky and heavens.—This is called the vyahriti, or universe, or all comprehending—These (the pranava and vyahriti) are prefixed to the Gāyatrī, to make it complete. The three combined imply that,—we contemplate God, the author of preservation, creation and destruction,—the support of sentient beings, in the states of waking, dreaming and sleeping,—who comprehends the universe,—and is that desirable inherent light of the resplendent sun; that, as our internal light directs our understandings towards righteousness,—or in short, that God is all in all.”
27. On this subject, it is replied by a certain author. “She who is not connected, as sapinda, to his mother and father, which by a certain (pictus) and not belonging to the general family author, is reciprocated of either, is approved amongst twice-born men, for espousal and conubial intercourse.” As for the mentioning a female not connected as sapinda to the father, in this text of Manu, in which [if the son of the body were regarded:] it should have been expressed.— not connected as sapinda to himself—that is, only, to declare, that the marriage of an adopted son, must not take place with a woman connected, as sapinda, to the adoptive father: otherwise, the marriage of a bridegroom, the eighth in descent from the common ancestor, (his kindred being through his father) with a bride, the sixth from such ancestor, (her descent being through her mother) might not take place: for being related as sapinda, to the father of the bridegroom, her non-connection as such is wanting. But what was required, would not thus result: for, it would be at variance with the practice of good persons, and texts of every code of law; such as: “Beyond the fifth and seventh degrees, on the mother’s side, and the father’s side, respectively, (matritha-pitrithas-tatha) [the relation of sapinda, ceases].” Nor can it be alleged, that this objection is equally applicable to the adopted son also; since it follows, such son, the eighth, and a damsel, the sixth, in degree, by reason of her being related, as sapinda, to his...

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27. Otherwise]; That is supposing that the real legitimate son were referred to, and not the adopted son.

Her descent being through her mother]: A restriction to this effect, was necessary: for, if a female did not intervene between the proposed bride and ancestor common to her, and the bridegroom, they would belong to the same general family, and their marriage consequently illegal, as will appear from the following note.

Such as: “Beyond the fifth, &c.” The passage here cited is from Vajjvalikya. The following is a translation of the text where it occurs, and those immediately preceding and following. “Having given a present to hiswooer, he should perform the ablation [prescribed for the conclusion of studentship]: Having completed a Veda, or the sons of orally, called ‘vratas’; or both: persevering in holiness, let him marry a perfect woman: one not previously married or deflowered: beautiful: unrelated to him as sapinda: his junior: free from disease: having a brother: born in a family not following the same rites (or parameswara sects). Beyond the fifth and seventh degrees, on the mother’s side, and the father’s side, respectively, [the relation of sapinda ceases]. From an illustrious race of Brahmanas well versed in holy vow, of which ten ancestors are known, [the bride must be taken], but not from one affected by any infectious disorder, though free from reproach.” In the Mitakshara the following comment on the quoted part of these stanzas occurs. “On the father’s side (matritha),—that is, in the line of the father, after the fifth degree. ‘On the father’s side’—that is, in the line of the father, after the seventh degree,—the relation of sapinda, ceases as is understood; and this form ‘sapinda,’ though on the form of kindred, applying to every degree, refers only to these restricted: analogous to the words, ‘abhiruma’ ‘anuyoga’ and the like.] Accordingly, there are six sapindas in ascendent, the father, and the rest: and six in descendant, the son, and the rest, and the man himself, is

Maha 3, 5.

4 Of these words, the first is used to denote fire produced by friction on the actual occasion of being required for a sacrifice: the second, to signify the lotos: they do not, as might be supposed from their etymology, signify respectively any fire kindled by friction, and any aquatic plant; (v. Manu, of Jaisini) 1, 14, 10.
father, may not intermarry. For, under this text, subsequently recited "the relation of sapinda occurs with the seventh person," &c. &c.," the father of the adopted son, the seventh in descent, not being related as sapinda, to the common ancestor,—by reason of the bride, the sixth in descent, consequently not being so connected to him,—such bride, the sixth, and the father of the bridgroom, the seventh, are not mutually connected as sapinda: as has been already declared. Therefore, there is no inconsistency in alleging that this text even is decisive of the relation of the adopted son as sapinda [to the daughter of his adoptive father's sister and so forth]."

28. This is very erroneously stated: for, either of these alternatives [one of which under the foregoing construction must be assumed] is admissible. Accordingly, is the text in question decisive of the relation of sapinda, of an adopted son only; or, of both the adopted son, and the real legitimate son? The former proposition is not correct: the text may, in two ways relate to the son-given; either from such son being the subject treated on, or the text having the same meaning with a special text conclusive of the adopted son's relation as sapinda. Now, in this case, there is not either of these two causes, since they do not appear. Besides, did the text in question intend the adopted son, the term 'father' by a secondary import, would mean the adopting father; and that is not intended; for, it would be at variance with the rule of logic, "In a precept, the sense of a term is not secondary." Nor, also is the second position accurate, since it is forbidden to attach both senses to the word 'father.' Nor is there as in this instance,—"There are fish and a cow-house in the Ganges"—any proof, arguing the implied intent of a secondary sense. Therefore the text in question is relative alone to the son of the body; for conception and so forth are the subject treated on, and it is declaratory of the same effect, as this and other texts: "Beyond the fifth and seventh degree, &c."

29. Neither can the objection specified be alleged,—viz. that, if the text regard the real legitimate son, it would follow: that a bridgroom the eighth, from the common ancestor, and a bride the sixth, might not intermarry, on account of her non-connection to his father, as sapinda being wanting. For, that is no real objection from its being founded in a mistake of the ablative case, (pitch) for the genitive [inflected the same.]

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The argument also in the reply, that the text of Manu cited does not refer to the legitimate son, is founded in a mistake.

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The seventh. Should the line diverge, the enumeration should be made until the seventh degree; commencing from whence the direction of the line varies. This is applicable to every case."

25. As in this instance,—"there are fish and a cow-house in the Ganges." Here the word 'Ganges' in its primary sense obviously signifies the river; so called, in which the fish exist, and in a secondary sense, the bank, on which the cow-house stands.

26. The ablative case is rendered certain by this text of Gautama. The word 'bandhubhyah' occurring in the phrases 'pitri-bandhubhyah,' and 'matri-bandhubbyah,' can only be the fifth or ablative case.

† Manu 5, 60.
Accordingly, in this sentence “mātrītah pītīrāh tāhāh” cited by Gautama.  

the grammatical suffix “tāhāh” conclusive of the case being the ablative, is used by the chief of saints. Should a doubt arise from this suffix also, being context the injection of every [oblique] case—
the ablative is rendered certain by this text of Gautama. “With the kinsmen on the side of the father (pītī-hraddhābhaya) (sic, of the preserver) beyond the seventh degree, and with those on the mother’s side (nātī-hraddhābhaya) beyond the fifth, &c. Thus, that notice is not any satisfactory reply, another must be declared.

30. This others have pronounced—“Sages declare these eleven sons (the son of the wife and the rest), as specified to be substitutes for a son; for, the obsequies would fail.” Since in this text, the son of the wife and the rest, are declared to be substitutes for the real son—by the maxim of logic—
the substitute possesses his virtue.—the whole virtue of the legitimate son being inferred in them, the exception [from marriage with them] of a female sapindā of the adoptive father must follow.

31. This is not accurate: for, as the representation of the relation of sapindā forbidden by this passage—“the relation of sapindā is not included”—would be impossible: that not being obtained the exception of such female could not take place. Hence it is disproved that the exception [from marriage] of the female sapindā of the adoptive father is established from the representation of the virtue of the real legitimate son [existing in the substitute] by reason of the name of son. For, analogous to the case exemplified in the passage—“an animal being the object he performs not these two [rites],”—the representation of the relation of sapindā which is forbidden being impossible, the exception could not subsist.

32. Therefore, not being otherwise inferrible, the relation of sapindā in the peculiar family (kula) of the adopter as founded only on express texts of law must be admitted. This is declared. Relation of sapindā is

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31. “An animal, etc. etc.” Allusion seems to be made to the 2nd topic of the 1st chapter of the 12th book of Jaimini’s Mimamsa, or perhaps in the 2d topic, 8th chapter of the 10th book of the same work.—Whatever may be the object to be offered, generally speaking, in sacrifices the same rules are observed, and essentials necessary. In is however provided in the Vedas by the sentence quoted, that where an animal is the offering, the two “āśya-nilgā” sacraments are not to be performed, this term denotes a tribe, where clarified butter (ṣāja) is presented, and is applied more particularly to two ceremonies of a sacrifice wherein that article is presented, with recitation of two prescribed mantras or invocations. By the passage in question, the performance of these two ceremonies, in the case of the oblation of an animal being interdicted in alluding to such a sacrifice, there would be no occasion to except the sacraments in question; for, in such case their non-performance being especially provided for, there would be no ground for inferring their observance.

Maim, 9, 10.
The relation as sapinda of the adopted to the adopter's family is founded only on express texts. Hemadri propounds it as extending only to three degrees.

33. And so also Kārṣṇājīni—"As many as there may be degrees of forefathers; with so many their own forefathers, let sons given and the rest associate the deceased; in order their sons with two forefathers, their grandsons with one. This is general: the fourth degree is excluded: therefore this is a relation of sapinda] extending to three degrees."

34. This is the meaning of the text:—According as the deceased adoptive fathers may be sons legitimate, adopted absolutely or of two fathers; as many as there may be degrees of forefathers, three or six; (that is, in the first of these cases, three; viz. the natural father, grandfather and great-grandfather [of the deceased]. In the second, three; viz., the adoptive father, grandfather and great-grandfather; in the third three; the adoptive father and other two;—and three, the natural father and other two,—) with so many not exceeding six, [as the case may be,] let sons given, and the rest associate their acquired fathers.

35. The epithet "their own" is used for the purpose of suggesting that all these as many as three or six, (as the case may be) who are forefathers of the adoptive father are divine objects, contemplated in the ceremony of sapindī-karana, performed for the adopted son, by his own son. And hence it being deduced, that the forefathers of the adopter are in fact divine objects in the ceremony of sapindī-karana performed for the adopted son: the author propounds a distinction; "In order their sons with two [forefathers]—that is with two of three, and four of six.—

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35. All these, &c., &c.] The great-grandfather of the adopter, in the line of his natural father, and (if he be son of two fathers, his great-grandfather in the line of his adoptive father would not be included in a set of three ancestors, each of whom, of the sapindī-karana for the adopted son, to be performed by his son, an oblation of food and so forth, (as specified in the preceding note) is to be consecrated; and as any of the nearer ancestors survived each mentioned son. But either of these great-grandfathers would be contemplated amongst the remote ancestors, denominated lepadhik, to whom are offered the viarpuses of the oblations of food.

The ceremony of sapindī-karana or rite of associating the deceased with the names of departed ancestors: it should strictly take place on the anniversary of the day of death, but is more usually performed at the funeral feast of the 13th day from the decease: previous to its performance the deceased is not denominated a "pitī" or departed ancestor. This rite consists in the following ceremonials. Four vessels called "pāṭi" each of two leaves are prepared. These are filled with water for the feet,
On this principle let the grandsons of the adopted son perform the 'sapindi-karana' for their own father, with one (the father of the adopter, from amongst three forefathers of the adopter of their own grandfather; or in the case of [such adopter] being sons of two fathers, with both grandfathers of their own grandfathers. The author points out this rule in respect to the adopted son and his issue likewise.

36. 'This is general;'—that is, this ceremony of 'sapindi-karana,' where the adopted son, and his son also are sons of two fathers must be equally performed [by their descendants] with both sets of forefathers.

37. But, if this is the case: the 'sapindi-karana' for his own father, the grandson of the adopted son being performed by the great-grandson of that person, with these three,—the son of the adopted, the adopted, and the adopter,—no alliance by a funeral oblation with the three forefathers of the adopter would exist; as not one of them even is included. Accordingly, the author adds,—'the fourth degree is excluded.' The meaning is,—when any person may perform for his own father, the 'sapindi-karana,' he should do it with three, the father and other two ancestors of deceased, not with the fourth.

38. But in the instance of the real legitimate son is not thus the performance of the sapindai-karana [for his father] with three forefathers only, established by holy writ? Being established then by this alone, for what purpose is the inconvenience of introducing another express text [to declare it]? Anticipating this objection the author subjoins: 'Therefore this,' of adopted sons is a relation of sapindas extending only to the third degree being productive of uncleanness and disability of marriage, and consisting in connection by funeral oblations. It is not such relation including the seventh degree, declared in the subjoined passage from the Matsyapurana: for this being of a general nature is excepted by the special rule [in the case in point]—'The fourth in degree, and the rest are partakers of the wipings [of the oblations]. The father and the rest

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scented wood, flowers, sesamum seed, and consecrated severally to the deceased, and the nearest departed ancestors on the father's side. The consecrates of that consecrated to the deceased with the exception of a small part is poured out in equal portions into the other three, with recitation of the two prayers commencing "Yad yam purusam". Then the observances of the ekadashya and parvam rites with the variations necessary take place, the same prayers being recited—this is,—those of the former rite are performed in honour of the deceased, and those of the latter in honour of the three ancestors above-mentioned. Of the four funeral cakes which would be thus offered generally to the deceased, and the three ancestors in question, that consecrated to the deceased is divided into three parts, one of which is mixed with each of the other three cakes. It is from this that the ceremony takes its name. The part of the contents of the 'purusha consecrated to the deceased, which is reserved, is for the purpose of being presented to ascetics, amongst the other articles, the oblation of which is part of the ekadashya rite required to be performed in his honor. For a description of the ekadashya and parvam rites, v. supra, note to § 72 of Sect. IV.
are participant of the oblation. The seventh in descent is the giver of the oblation. Of these the relation of sapinda extends to the seventh degree."

39. Intending merely this, it is said by the author of the Sanchoratantra, "The relation as sapinda of adopted sons extends to three degrees in the family of the natural father, and like that, in the family of the adopter. This is a rule of law." The mention here of relation as sapinda in both families, is with reference to the son of two fathers, for, it has been shown that the ceremony ‘sapinda-shrauca’ for such son, is performed with two sets of three forefathers. Of the absolutely adopted son, the relation of sapinda in the family of the adopter, consisting in connection by funeral adoptions extends to three degrees; in the family of the natural father, arising only from consanguinity, it extends to seven degrees. To enlarge would be useless.

40. "Like this, the general family"

Explanation of a part of Vritadharma-sutra given in § 8, oppositely introduced.

Like this, analogous to the relationship as sapinda the general family likewise of sons given and the rest, is that of the natural father who contributes the seed; not only of the natural father however, but also of the adopter. The general family of sons given and the rest, is that of him also, who is the adopter of such son given and so forth. By this the relation of sapinda is shown to vary from the general family. Thus, that relationship is in the line of the natural father only, not so the general family; on the contrary, this is that of both fathers even. This likewise does not apply to the general adopted son, but is relative to the son of two fathers, a particular adopted son.

41. Accordingly sons given and the rest, [who are sons of two fathers] are of two descriptions: Those absolutely sons of two fathers, and those incompletely so. Of these, these are named absolute ‘dvya-mushyayaapas’ who are given in adoption with this stipulation,—‘this is son of us two’ (the natural father and adopter). The incomplete ‘dvya-mushyayaapas’ are those who are initiated by their natural father, in ceremonies ending with that of tonsure, and by the adoptive father in those commencing with the investiture of the characteristic thread, since they are initiated under the family names of both even, they are sons of two fathers but incompletely so. Should a child directly on being born be adopted; as his initiation under both family names would be wanting, he would partake only of the family of the adopter.

42. Intending all this, Satyasahda says,—“of absolute ‘dvya-mushyayaapas’ of both &c.” By this compendious rule, having declared the connection of absolute dvya-mushyayaapas to the patriarchal saints in both families, the author by another aphorism commencing,—“Of sons given and the rest like the dvya-mushyayaapa, &c.”—ordains the same connection with respect to those incompletely dvya-mushyayaapas. Now this is thus explained by Savarsavami. “Treating
on dvya máshiyānas, the author mentions those incompletely so, “Of sons given, &c.” Unto those only not to issue beyond, [does the connection to both families extend.] By the first only the initiatory rites [ending with tonsure are performed.] If by the adopter [the family of the adopted] is that of the latter: on account of priority. From this alone [the same is the case] in respect to a descendant beyond. So also those, who are affiliated by a descendant of the same general family, (as for instance a nephew, by an uncle,) are of the adopter’s family only.

45. The meaning of this explanatory passage is this.—He only is connected to both families, who has been initiated under both family names; not descendants beyond. In reply to the question, as to the cause of connection to the family of the natural father, the author says “By the first &c.” —The first:—that is, the natural father: [the cause is.—] on account of the initiatory rites, being performed by him only.—Now the initiatory rites, [alluded to,] are those ending with tonsure: on account of this passage from the Kaśika-purāṇa. “Oh Lord of the earth, a son having been regularly initiated under the family name, of his [natural] father, unto the ceremony of tonsure inclusive, does not become the son of another man.” This has been already before explained. He does not become exclusively, the son of another: but, is a dvya máshiyāna, or son of two fathers.

44. Anticipating a question, as to what would be the case, were the initiation performed by the first: the author adds,—“If by the adopter &c.” If every initiatory rite from that on birth, or even those commencing with tonsure, be performed by the adopter only, the family [of the adopted] is of the latter:—that is,—of the adopter only. For this, a reason is subjoined:—“on account of priority”—meaning,—from precedence in the performance of initiation.

45. The author declares the family (required to be known,) in the instance of the issue of the dvya máshiyāna, and that of the [absolutely] adopted son:—“from this alone”—from the initiation taking place under the family name only of the adopter in both instances even his, is the family of the descendants beyond.

46. The author alludes to the adoption of one belonging to the same general family,—“so also, &c.” That is,—if the natural and adoptive fathers belong even to the same general family, the distinctive appellations are fixed by the adopter only for the adoption, and initiation are performed by him.
47. The text, ("A given son must never claim the family and estate of his natural father, &c.") must be considered applicable to the case where every initiatory rite, from that of birth is performed by the adopter only; but the son given, and the rest who are absolute dvya-mushayanyas, belongs to both families; on account of this passage of Parijata;—"Sons given, purchased and the rest who are sons of two fathers, may not marry in either family even: as was the case of Srunga and Saisini."† "In either family"—in the family of the natural father, and in that of adopter.

48. With respect to the sons given, and the rest being sons of two fathers, this text and that of Satyashigriha, commanding ("of absolute "dvya-mushayanyas") are authority. With the same intent it is declared also in the Pravara-majjini:—"For the most part sons given purchased and made the son of the appointed daughter and so forth belong to both general families with connection to the patriarchal saints of each."

From this alone on the occasion of the marriage of those, appertaining to two families both families with each of which their connection to the patriarchal saints, is involved must be avoided.

49. The gakhâr or peculiar branch of the Vedas is that of the adopter only. Vasishtha declares so:—"Sprung from one following a different gakhâr (or branch of the Vedas) the given son even when invested with the characteristic thread, under the family name of [the man] himself, according to the form prescribed by his peculiar "gakhâ" becomes participant of the duties of such gakhâ; (sva-gakhâ-bhâk)." That duty in which his peculiar, (that is the adopter's) gakhâ prevails, is a duty of such gakhâ; in this he shares or is "participant &c." Such rite only which is prescribed by the gakhâ, of the adopter must be performed by him. This is the meaning.

50. The forefathers of the adoptive mother only are also the maternal grandfathers of sons given, and the rest: for, the rule regarding the paternal, is equally applicable to the maternal grandfathers [of adopted sons].

51. As far what is said by Hemâdri that the precept enjoining the performance of a funeral repast in honor of the maternal grand-father, refers to the natural maternal grandfather; that is inaccurate: for it is at variance with the passage—"of him who has given away his son, the obsequies fail,"† Nor is the capacity of the maternal grandfathers as givers wanting: for by reason of their offering their last to the gift (as appears from this passage)—"having convened his kin-

* 9142. † V. supra note to Sect. 1 § 31. ‡ 9, 142
dred, &c."")—they also are parties to the same. Besides, by this passage—"the funeral cake follows the family and estate"—the family and estate are declared to be the cause of performing the funeral repast; and the estate of the maternal grandfather also like that of the father lapses from the son given. His incapacity to perform a funeral repast in honor of his original maternal grandfather is properly declared.

53. Accordingly, Hemadri himself, from not being satisfied with that [just stated], has advanced the other position: "In the same manner as for the secondary father, a funeral repast must be performed in honor of the secondary maternal grandfather and the rest."

53. And this even is proper. The adopted son as substitute for the real legitimate son, being the agent of rites performed by a legitimate son, it follows that he is the performer of funeral repasts, the objects of which are the manes in honor of whom a legitimate son performs such repasts. For—without difference, relation to the father and other sides of the adopter obtaining; in the same manner as relation to the general family the gākhā, the family-deity and family-rules of that person:—the term 'son' is used without restriction in these and other passages;—"Fathers desire sons."

And thus the adopted son does not incur the offence of parīveda, as declared by Gautama.

54. Accordingly sons given and the rest do not incur the guilt of a 'parivitrā' and the like: for a text of Gautama recites:—"By marriage and the establishing a consecrated fire, the offence of 'parivedana' does not attach to a half brother, a son given and the son of a paternal uncle likewise."

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53. Of the Asuras and the rest.] That is,—of the Gaudharvas: of the Rākshas; and of the Pāchās. Where she espoused, in either of the four superior forms of marriage,—viz. those of—Brahma,—the Devas,—the Rishis—and the Prabandhakas—at the ceremony of Saṁjña-karma performed for her, she would be associated with the paternal grandmother and so forth, and not with the maternal grandfather and the rest.

54. The guilt of a parivitrā or offence of parivedana; this consists in a younger brother marrying before his elder, or establishing a consecrated fire, while the elder may not have done the same.
53. ‘To a half-brother.’ On the marriage and so forth of either of two brothers by different mothers, the offence denominated ‘parivedana’ is not incurred. This is the meaning. ‘A son given’ It is meant—that although there be an elder brother in the family of the natural father, the adopted son is not (should he marry and so forth,) a ‘parivriti’; nor also by such previous marriage and the like of the younger, is the elder a parivitta or person passively implicated in the criminal acts alluded to. The son of a paternal uncle.’ On the marriage and so forth of the ‘kshetraja,’ son of a brother begotten [on his wife] by her brother-in-law or on the same of the legitimate son of such brother-in-law, the guilt of being a parivitta parivriti and the like, is not incurred by such son of the brother-in-law or such ‘kshebraja’ son respectively. This is the meaning.

56. The son of a paternal uncle’ in the general sense of the terms is not meant: for one adopted is suggested by the expression ‘a son-given,’ and by reason of there being no grounds for supposing an unadopted [nephew to be referred to] (as the prohibition [against previous marriage, and so forth,] does not apply to him,) there can be no rule for exempting him from the same.

57. Nor must it be argued that from the particular authority in question, the filial relation of a brother’s son though unadopted is established; for this is obviated by the several objections before stated: viz. by, where of ten brothers five were without male issue, and five had each ten sons, it would result that the brothers destitute of male offspring would severally have fifty sons; and it would follow that the fifty sons would each have ten fathers. Therefore the interpretation given only is accurate.†

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57. Nor must it be argued, &c.] The offence of parivedana, is incurred by those hearing a mutual fraternal relation. The text of Gautama exempts those specified from the operation of this rule. If his expression ‘son of the paternal uncle,’ be considered to refer to the mere nephew, there would be room to suppose that a nephew though unadopted bore filial relation to his uncle.

† V. Supra, Sect. 2 § 63.

† In this place the following passage is contained as part of the text, in some MSS. though omitted in most: “Also the articles presented at the funeral repast, in honor of a kinsman of the adopter, are not to be given to the adopted, nor the articles presented at a funeral repast for a kinsman of the adoptive, or natural father, to the son of two fathers: on account of this text, cited by Hemädri and Parijata:—'He should not cease to be given to a near or distant kinsman, the oblation at a funeral repast: in the same manner he should not present with food at the funeral repast of his father, one having the same set of patriarchal saints.' The ‘oblation at a funeral repast’ is what is offered on that occasion.”—This passage may accurately belong to this section, treating on the rules relative to the adoptive son.
SECTION VII.

For the legitimate daughter, there may be the different substitutes, corresponding with those for the son.

1. As on defect of the legitimate son, so on defect of a legitimate daughter likewise, daughters of the wife and the rest are substitutes on account of the rule of logic, "on defect of the principal a substitute, &c." Now she is principal by reason of her being the means of completion in the precept enjoying gift and so forth. And a daughter produced according to the precept directing conjugal intercourse at due season is such means; in the same manner as rice and so forth acquired according to the rules of acquisition are the complete means of a sacrifice.

2. Accordingly it appears from the argument exemplified in the instance of the sacrifice at night, that progeny (praśā) only deduced from revealed law and indifferently male or female is liable to be produced under the positive precept regarding conjugal intercourse at due season contained in such passages as this commencing—"Let him approach in due season, &c."—and inferred from these and other confirmatory passages;—"We (women) obtain progeny from the approach of [our husbands] at due season."—"They obtain progeny from approach at due season."—For the etymology being thus; praśā, (progeny) from 'prajanayati' (one who procreates), by the word praśā a male or female being only possessing generative powers is intended; not one of the nearer gender; for such being produced from equality of the male and female seed is a monstrous production.

3. Therefore should no issue (santati) such as is contemplated in the passage following, be produced, descent to a region of horror is ordained.—"Not having read the Veda: not having produced issue: and not having performed the various sacrifices, a regenerate man desiring absorption falls to a region of horror."

4. What prolongs lineage, is 'santati' (issue) a synonyme of 'praśā' (offspring): for a passage of the keshā or vocabulary of Ānara expresses: "praśā stands for 'santati' (issue) and 'jana' (people)." Thus is explained the word 'apatya' (offspring) occurring in the passage subjoined: on account of—a text of Yaska which expresses—"'apatya' (offspring) that is, from whom there is exemption from falling into hell (apattita): or through whom one falls not (patati) into hell?"—and this passage of the keshā.—The synonyms signify 'soul' are
—astusr̥astamāyah-sunyāt-sutāh-putrāh: all these terms in the feminine signify a daughter. The terms 'apatya' and 'tukam' apply to the two sexes."

5. "For the sake of offspring (apatya) were women created; woman is the soil; men, the sowers of the seed: to one possessed of seed must the soil be given; but one destitute thereof deserves not the soil."

6. "Here 'pumān (male) is 'purumān' (comprehending much): or its etymology, is the root puru (to cover, clumb, &c.)."—Although by this passage from Yaska, the word puru (male) signifies one knowing much;—still from this part of his passage in question,—"or its etymology, is the root puru (to cover &c.),"—it must be interpreted as signifying persons both male and female possessing the procreative faculty.

7. Accordingly Yaska has shown by the following passage that the term 'putra' there occurring signifies children of both sexes (mithuna). "That children male and female (mithuna) are heirs is declared by these two stanzas.—"From my several limbs, thou art distilled; from my heart, thou art produced. Thou art indeed self, but denominating son (putra): mayst thou live an hundred years."—Manu descendant from the self-existent hath declared at the commencement of the world,—without distinction that wealth is that of children (putra) male and female (mithuna)."

8. It must not be alleged that the term 'mithuna'† in the above passage intends the son and daughter-in-law; for the text,—"From my several limbs thou art distilled &c."—would be impertinent; and the exclusion of the daughter from inheritance according to the doctrine of some mentioned in this passage would be incongruous. "Not daughters:—thus some. [But by me] the male is recognized as an heir: the female as an heiress.

9. As for the term 'putra' (son) used in this and similar texts: "Heaven awaits not one destitute of a son (putra);" that also even signifies both sexes. For it is declared by Pāṇini in the following rule to be a complex expression (formed by the rejection of one term and retention of the other) denoting son and daughter. "The expressions bhṛti (brother) and 'putra' (son) are severally inclusive.

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8. And the exclusion of the daughter from inheritance.) If Manu, by the term 'mithuna' did not intend children male and female; but the son, and his wife, why in a corresponding passage of another Manu here subjoined, should mention be made of the exclusion of daughters, from inheritance according to the doctrine of some?

* Of the Vedas. † Literally a couple, a pair.
of sister and daughter."* By this, is explained the term 'putra' (son) in such texts also as,—"By one destinate of a son, must a substitute for the same always be made, &c."

Examples will be cited indicating the adoption of daughters.

10. And, as conforming with this doctrine, the indication of the affiliation of a daughter, will be subsequently declared.†

11. Accordingly it is said,—"Equal to him is the prakrśa-sātra or daughter appointed to be son;"—"as a son, so does the daughter of a man, proceed from his several limbs," §—and,—"If by the insauspiciousness of destiny, a daughter should not be born; then that must be propitiated by the observance of rites, such as repasts in honour of the deceased, on the first day of the dark fortnight; in the same manner as the destiny for a son, by funeral repasts, and the like, on the fourth day of the same."

12. "Thus approaching let him beget a son." As far as what is suggested by this, that a son only is the object proposed to be produced in an act, the only means for completing which is the approaching; that is a recital of 'son,' intended to show the commencing act of one desirous of male issue; the mother having first determined a son,—one of the male and female children alluded to by the term progeny (prāja) —to be the fruit of the essentials (guru) mentioned in the same passage.

13. And these essentials in this and other texts, ("thus, &c.") are explained by the holy saint Manu and the rest to be, —on a night whose date is an even number, predominance of the virile seed; and passiveness of the woman: —the moon being in an auspicious mansion: —the ceremony, 'pusavatana,'—destiny and so forth.

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13. In this and other texts ("thus, &c.") The text of Yājñavalkya alluded to is the following. "Thus approaching a passive woman, he should avoid the Magha and Mula constellations. The moon being in an auspicious mansion, let the man beget a son, eminent in qualities."

The ceremony 'pusavatana'[1] A description of this ceremony and that denominat-ed Simantottanamana occurs in the following note subjoined by Mr. Colebrooke, in § 28 chap. IX of his translation of Jñātā Vābhana. "The first of the ceremonies here named [viz. the Pusavatana] is celebrated at the close of the third month of pregnancy. It consists of the following prayer, recited by the husband addressing his pregnant wife, "' Male are Mitra and Varun (the sun and the regent of sea): male are the twin sons of Śvina. Male are fire and air: may the child in thy womb prove male.'" The recital of this prayer is preceded by burnt offerings of clarified butter. The other ceremony mentioned should be performed in the fourth, sixth or eighth month of the pregnancy. The husband decorates his wife's head with manijas, ornaments, and other articles: reciting divers prayers for a fortunate gestation."
14. It is explicitly propounded by Asvalâyana also, that in marriage, a son and daughter are the fruit of particular essentials. — "Let the man take the thumb of the woman repeating the portion of the Vedas—'I take your hand for your prosperity'—should he thus desire—'may my children be born males only';—[let him take] the fingers alone: if his desire be for female issue, the hand in the middle: if both be desired, the hand in the middle, including the thumb."

His text illustrates a passage of Manu.

15. By this is explained the passage—"On the odd nights, daughters, &c."

16. Therefore, in the same manner as the son by reason of being the means of procuring heaven as the agent in the performance of the funeral repast and so forth, is principal; the daughter also being the same by reason of her being the means of accomplishing the precept enjoying gift, the funeral repast, and so forth; on defect of her a substitute is proper.

17. "Duhita" (daughter)—that is—"dhu-re-hita" or "dhu-re-hita" one remotely benefiting; [derived] like "dogdha" (a milkman). By this analysis, Yaska shews that the daughter benefits her father by means of her son also—Manu likewise. "Now between the sons of his son and of his daughter, there subsists in this world no difference: for even the son of a daughter delivers him in the next like the son of his son." And in the Mahabharata this speech of Gandhari. "This one daughter born after one hundred sons shall be mature. Hence I shall obtain words acquired by a daughter's son.—This is my persuasion."—In another authority also: Are daughters also real legitimate children of their father and mother? Formerly one falling, being upheld by a daughter's sons did ascend to heaven. —By a daughter's sons,—by the sons of Meghadhu of the description denominated 'kâma' through funeral rites performed on the eighth lunar day and the like.

From which it is to be concluded that on defect of the real, a substi-

18. Consequently on failure of the real legitimate daughter, for the sake of obtaining the heaven procured by the daughter's son, the constituting the kshetra-ja and other adoptive daughters even substitutes is

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17. [Derived] like dogdha (a milkman). Duhita and dogdha are equally derived from the root 'dha' (to milk.) by the subjunction of the affix 'eh' of which the 'eh' is servile. To form the first of these terms, the augment 'it' is interpolated, by the option allowed by a special rule; and in forming the second, such augment not being used by other special rules, certain permutations are undergone, by which the term dogdha, is produced.

* Manu 3, 48.
The inference that the sister-in-law might thus be substituted for the wife as the brother-in-law is for the husband.

19. If this is the case; then in the same manner as on the death of the husband, the brother-in-law is substitute; on the death of the wife the sister-in-law would be the same on account of her exact resemblance in point of consanguineal relation to the father-in-law, viz. her own father."

20. This objection if made is inaccurate. The designation of "Wife" is not in consequence of consanguineal relation to the father-in-law, but from being the lawfully wedded spouse of the husband. Now, the sister-in-law is not such: where such essential exists in younger wives, in that case one [according to the order of age] may be the substitute for the eldest. Accordingly the chief of saints hath negatively declared this. "Another wife of equal class [with himself] existing, he should not cause a religious act to be performed [by one of inferior class]; amongst several wives equal in class except the eldest, no other officiates in a sacred rite."

21. Therefore it is established by reasoning even that those [the ksuetrajra and other secondary daughters], may be substitutes. Of these from amongst the following five subsidiary daughters, viz., the daughter of the wife that of hidden origin, the damsel's daughter, and that of the twice-married woman, Mann himself has pronounced the production of the daughter of the wife;—on failure of issue [by the husband] the desired offspring may be procreated either by his brother or some other sarinda on the wife who has been duly authorized."—It is meant by this that on failure of issue of both sexes, as offspring male or female is the object desired [that begotten by a kinsman] is a substitute for either as the case may be.

22. As to the other four subsidiary daughters in question there is no necessity for an express rule for their production: for their existence proceeds from the inclination of individuals.

23. The names of these [subsidary daughters], are only those adduced (v. § 21) corresponding with those of the sons: for the cause from which they proceed is the same even in respect to both.

24. And their being substitutes for the legitimate daughter is established from analogy even from their originating partially from portions [of the husband and wife]; in the same manner as wild rice (nivara), is shown to be a substitute on defect of the cultivated rice which ripens in the rains (vriti). Now such portions are
partial, because the connection being through portions of the wife only, relation through portions of the husband is wanting.

25. Allowing however that by force of analogy the daughter of the wife and other four secondary daughters are substitutes for the legitimate daughter, —How are a daughter given, one purchased, a daughter made, one self-given and a deserted daughter, (no analogy applying) substitutes?

26. This objection is invalid.—To these descriptions of daughters also analogy even does extend; since an exact resemblance exists through equality of tribe and so forth as intimated by the saint—"This law is pronounced by me in regard to sons (tanayeshu) equal by class"; —and this passage was before explained* in treating on the substitute for a son.

27. But admitting that the daughter of the wife and other four daughters from relation as containing portions of the mother—and the daughter and the other four from equality of class—are substitutes; still since there is no difference in their resemblance, how is the order [of succession] as provided for [in the case of sons] by this passage ("on failure of the preceding the next in order is heir &c."†) to be applied?

28. This objection is wrong: we reply,—by the greater worthiness of each successively. This Vishnu declares—"among these the preceding successively is the more worthy."

—Now worthiness is distinguished into what is temporal (drishiṣṭa) and what is spiritual (adrisiṣṭa). That which is temporal proceeds from relationship through consanguinity and the like: that which is spiritual from being purified and so forth. And the text in question intends a restrictive rule: in the same manner as such texts, as—"Should be not procure the 'Soma' creeper let him even admit the 'putaka' plant &c."

Reference to the author’s commentary on Vishnu.

29. Further particulars may be consulted in the Kesava-Vaijayanti, my commentary on Vishnu.

30. Instances indicating the substitute for a daughter are found in the Puranas—Amongst these the recital to Dasaratha by Sumantra of the prophecy foretold by Sanat-Kumara in the Bāla-kanda of the Rāmāyaṇa is an indication of a daughter given.—"In the race of Ishvākū one very meritorious shall be born: by name the warrior Dasaratha: illustrious and constant in truth.—Great friendship shall subsist between him and the magnificent king of Anga; and he shall possess a daughter of exalted destiny of the name of Sánta. But the king of Anga (called Iomāpada) will be destitute of issue.—That monarch shall

* V, Supra. Sect. 11, § 23, &c. † Vaiśāvalika 9 138.
intreat the King Dasaratha thus:—"I am destitute of offspring; "Oh! 
versed in morality, let this girl Sánta of excessive beauty, with open 
heart be given me, for the sake of offspring."—Then, that Rája Dasara-
tha deliberating in his mind shall give the girl Sánta to the sovereign 
of Anga. That king, having taken the damsel, (his desires being ful-
filled,) with gladness of heart will quickly go to his capital—that po-
tentate shall bestow the damsel on Rishya-sringa, &c." There also is 
this address of Dasaratha to Lomapáda, "Let your daughter Sánta, Oh! 
warrior king go with her husband to my city—an affair of importance 
has arisen." There is likewise the address of Lomapáda to Rishya-
sringa:—"This king Dasartha is my amiable beloved friend. For the 
sake of offspring for me, this beautiful girl was given by him to me who 
demanded her: O Brahmána, Sánta is most dear to me; as myself, Oh! 
sage he, this king is my father-in-law."

31. In these quotations from the expressions,—"let be given"—
Illustration. "shall be given"—"having taken"—and 'given'—a 
rule for the gift is manifest. So it being premised, [that the king of 
Anga will be] destitute of issue, it follows, from the 
conclusion of his prayer ("for the sake of offspring") that the daughter 
given, resembling the legitimate daughter, is a substitute for issue.

32. An indication of the daughter purchased, is found in Hemá-
dri from the Skanda-puráña. "One even of a different 
family, having through gold, made the daughter of 
another, his own, is capable of bestowing her [in mar-
riage] according to legal form"—Also in the Linga-
puráña—"After having conferred with the parents, having made his 
own a damsel, perfect and free from every defect: by the gift of great 
wealth, having brought her [to his house]: having presented her with 
new clothes of good quality: having adorned her with ornaments, let 
him honor her with scented necklaces.—He is first well to consider 
causes, their respective families, constellations and so forth: he is to 
study their respective dispositions and after having liberally gratified 
both, she is to be given by him to a Brahmána only, who is conversant 
in scripture, a practiser of devotion, one who hath notoriously read the 
Vedas, and a student of theology."

33. In these quotations, from the expressions—"having through 
gold made his own"—"by the gift of wealth, &c."— 
Illustration. authority for the purchase, [of a daughter] is manifest.

34. An indication of the daughter made, is found in the Hari-
banca* where the offspring of Súra is enumerated. 
Indication of a [The author] having thus premised,—"Ten males 
daughter made. were begotten by Súra on the chief queen, the daugh-
ter of Bhoja viz.—first Vasudeva the long-armed surnamed Ánaka-Dun-
dabhi &c."†—then continuing,—"Next to him Deva-Bhága was born

* Or chapter of the Mahá-bharata, on the lineage of kings.
† It is related that at the birth of Vasudeva, the drums of Indra, spontaneously 
played, whence the name Ánaka-dandabhi, these words signify: in order, a small and 
large kettledrum.
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then Devas-Sravah then Anavprishii, Kanavaka and Vatsavāna : after these Ojinjona, Syanaa, Samika, Gandāsha—and of him were five daughters;—and having thus enumerated the five—“Prithu-kritti Prithā, and also Srutadevā, Sruta-sravā, Rajādhidevi, likewise. These five were mothers of warriors”—subjoins—“Kunti made Prithā his daughter: Pândā married her: on whom was procreated by the god of justice the king Yudhishtira well versed in morality.”

35. In this quotation since by the verb ‘made,’ the act of an agent even shewn: the female [the object] is a daughter made [kṛitrima].

36. Also in the Pādha-purāṇa, in the part treating on the Bhāma-vrata, or fast in honor of the planet Mars. “For the description there was Sunandika, a Brāhmaṇa thoroughly daughter made, read in the Vedas: his wife Sunandikā was barren; but extremely anxious [for issue]. No offspring was born to him: from continuing barren, [premature] old age came on. Himself having taken her [for adoption].—Suśila who was the child of another, beautiful in form and born in the family of a Brāhmaṇa was educated by him: and that Brāhmaṇi, also cherished her in her house as her daughter: and she was given in marriage to the Brāhmaṇa Somegara who then according to the form declared in the Vedas married her, &c. &c.”

37. Here the specification of—“herself having taken”—indicates an instance of a daughter made: and the construction—was educated “by himself”—is not accurate: for as the agent to the verbs ‘taking’ and ‘educating’ is the same—as shewn by the past participle ‘having taken’—it is established that the act of educating is by himself.

38. An indication of the daughter self-given must be searched for in the other Purāṇas: One the daughter deserted occurs in this passage from, the first Parban of the Mahā-bhārata, reciting the conversation between Dushmanata and Čakunkaśa. That hermit begot Čakuntāśa on Menukā. Menukā having deserted that infant born on the bank of the Mālinī river, on the delightful table-land of Himavat after hav ing performed the necessary rites at that river repaired thence quickly to the assembly of Indra. The birds having seen that infant sleeping in the forest uninhabited by men and abounding in lions and tigers surrounded it on all sides with a view that the voracious devourers of flesh might not hurt the child. The birds then guarded on all sides there, the daughter of Menukā;

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37. And the construction, —‘was educated by himself.’—] The original recites,—‘tama-naya-yugantā-jata-Suśila....grihitā-puta-svayam.’—The author, wishes to show that the extract quoted exhibits an instance of an adoptive daughter, of the description technically called,—“made by the man himself.”—For this purpose, he construes ‘svayam’ (himself) with the past participle ‘grihitā’ (having taken): not directly with ‘pushiṭā’ (educated): which latter construction, is in fact less accurate, as the agent to ‘pushiṭā’ (educated) must be the same, as that to the past participle ‘grihitā.’
and I (going to sip water) saw her sleeping surrounded in the beautiful uninhabited forest by birds. Having brought her hence I adopted her as my daughter. The maker of the body, the bestower of life, and he whose food is eaten these three in order are declared to be fathers in holy ordinance—Since she was surrounded in the desert forest by birds her name also was in consequence fixed by me Çakuntā. Thus recognize, oh! Brāhmaṇa my daughter Çakuntā! Being asked this he declared to the great saint to be my birth. Do you oh Lord of men regard me as the daughter of Kanva, I consider Kanva as my father; I know not my real father.”

39. Here, from the use of the expression—“having deserted”—authority for the deserted or discarded daughter is obvious. Hence, it is easy to establish authority for each, by instances appropriate to each respectively. It is useless to enlarge.

SECTION VIII.

On the mourning, and so forth, of, or for, the adopted son.

There is no reciprocity of uncleanness in the case of the adopted son, in the family of the natural father, on account of the text of Mann. “A given son, must never claim the family and the estate of his natural father. The funeral oblation follows the family and estate; but of him, who has given away his son, the obsequies fail.”

1. Next uncleanness [on occasions of birth, and death] in respect to the adopted son, is determined. That is not reciprocal, in the family of the natural father, on account of the text of Mann. “A given son, must never claim the family and the estate of his natural father. The funeral oblation follows the family and estate; but of him, who has given away his son, the obsequies fail.”

2. The terms ‘funeral oblation’ and ‘obsequies’ in this text are inclusive of every observance in honour of manes, uncleanness and so forth; for the exclusion of the family and estate, which are the cause of presenting the funeral oblation and so forth is mentioned: and it is a restrictive condition that uncleanness which is spiritual, precede the presenting the funeral oblation, and so forth, in honour of the dead.

3. And hence, the funeral oblation being barred, the exclusion of uncleanness is even implied; for by well considering such passages as the following the concomitancy of the funeral oblation and uncleanness appears.—“Whether one of the same family, or one not belonging to the family; whether a male or female; whoever, on the first day, presents the funeral cake, should complete the rites, till the tenth; and so also, it is not well for those who previously receive anything from the performer.

* Formed from ‘Çakuntā a bird, and the root ‘la’ take Ar.
of these rites.”—“Whilst the uncleanness lasts, a libation of water, and one funeral cake.”—therefore, there is no reciprocal uncleanness, and the like, between the adopted son and his natural father, and the rest.

4. As for the text,—“Impurity (aghan) arising from seminal connection, also continues three days”—that is overruled by this passage; “But of him who has given away his son, the obsequies fail:” for, it applies to instances other than that of the adopted son. Besides, since it appears that family and alliance by oblation of food are collectively the cause of impurity, the libation of water, and so forth; should one of these essentials be wanting, impurity and the rest, occasioned (partly) by it, does not exist.

5. Accordingly Sankha and Likhita. “The connection as sapinda from family, must be recognized, as extending to the seventh degree: and the funeral cake, and the gift of water, purity and impurity, are consequent to it.”

6. On the death of the son given, and the rest, the uncleanness of the adoptive father, and others, endures for three nights. This Vraspati declares:—“Wives, having taken to other men, and children by the wife of another, being dead: the best of the regenerate, having bathed, are purified.”—And this rule for uncleanness, applies to him only, to whom, the relation of wife or son, refers.

7. Marsch separately propounds [the uncleanness] of sapinda of the father, connected within the third degree. “On occasions of birth and death likewise, [the period of impurity,] for the first and second [husband,] is three nights: where the impurity of the father, endures three nights, that of the Sapinda lasts one day.”

8. Although, no impurity of the adopter, by acceptance of sons given and the rest, (who are already born,) as arising from their birth obtains: still, uncleanness is incurred from the birth of their offspring.—But, on account of the birth of the son of the twice married woman, in his own house, uncleanness on that occasion is fit.—Thus, is impurity from birth shewn.

9. This however regards sons of equal class only—Accordingly the Brahma-purana:—“Excepting the legitimate son, on the death and birth of the son of the wife, and the rest, always in every tribe, the impurity of those equal by class, endures three nights.—This is a settled point.”

* Grihya-parisikha.  † Vishnu.  ‡ Yama-prashkha.
10. ‘Always’—that is,—every time subsequent to investiture of the characteristic thread.

11. [Prajapati also] “Wives having taken to another, and children by the wife of another, [being dead:] those of the same general family, are purified by ablution: after three days at least, one versed in the divine truth.

12. Although, [it may be alleged, that] on the death of the adopter, the uncleanness of the adopted son, for ten days, is not fit, since the [general] relation of sapinda and connection by identity of family, associated together, are wanting [in him]; and no special rule in that respect, is at present found: still, by the following passage of Mārūchi, uncleanness for ten days is propounded, for the purpose of the disciple’s performing the necessary rites, in honour of his deceased ‘Guru.’ “The disciple of a deceased ‘Guru,’ performing uninterruptedly for ten days, with food for manes, the obsequies for a father, is purified.”

13. Here the term ‘Guru’ represents the preceptor, and other superior; and such venerable superiority, obtains in the individual in question [the adopter], on account of his performing the rite of investiture, and so forth.—Therefore, in case of the adopter having performed the initiatory rites of the adopted, the impurity of the latter endures for ten days; if this be not the case, for three nights only: on account of the text before cited.—(§ 9).

14. So on the death of a sapinda of the adopter, related within the third degree, the uncleanness of the adopted son, is for one day: for, the text in question of Mārūchi recites, ‘that of the sapinda for one day.”

15. On the death of one connected by an oblation of water, and one belonging to the same general family, ablution only is necessary: on account of the text of Prajapati, before cited (v. § ii.) “Wives having taken to another, and children by the wife of another, being dead, those of the same general family are purified by ablution, &c.”
SECTION IX.

On the funeral obsequies to be performed by the adopted son.

1. Next the funeral rites, performed by the adopted son, are described. On this subject, Jñānaka says:—“Annually let the son of the wife, and legitimate son perform [obsequies] according to the parvana form: the other ten sons, should perform the rite dedicated to a single ancestor.”

2. “Annually”—from this general mode of expression, although, the monthly (amavāsya) and other periodical funeral repasts may be inferrible; that only on the anniversary of the day of death is meant. For, the terms—“the anniversary of the day of death”—are expressly used in this text of Parāśara. “[A funeral repast,] by the legitimate son, for a father, who has departed this life, on all occasions is in honour of three ancestors, that by those of a different general family (anekā-gotra), is the rite consecrated to a single person, on the anniversary of the day of death.”

3. The expression—“those of a different general family” (anekā-gotra)—in this text does not intend the maternal grand-father, and the rest: for, its construction as intending a secondary son, as contrasted with the legitimate son, is proper,—from its proximity in the same sentence with the terms ‘father’ and ‘legitimate son’; for, otherwise [no contradistinction between the legitimate and secondary sons being meant,] if the meaning intended, be conveyed by merely declaring that, [a funeral repast,] in honour of three ancestors, must be performed by the son, on the anniversary of the day of the father’s death, it would follow, that the specification of the term legitimate were impertinent.—Nor is there any restrictive rule that on the anniversary of the day of death, merely the rite consecrated to a single person takes place for the maternal grandfather and the rest.

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3. Nor is there any restrictive rule. If it is contended, that the term “anekā-gotra” (which occurs in Parāśara’s text in the genitive case plural) intends the maternal kinsmen this expression must be construed as designating the object and not the agent of the ceremony—Accordingly the translation will be “that, for those &c.” and not,—“that, by those, &c.”

* For explanation of the rites referred to V. Supra, Section IV. § 72.
† V. Note to the same.
4. Accordingly Mārishi says—"Commencing with the father of the mother, three are considered maternal grand-sires—Let the sons of daughters perform for these, funeral oblations, as for the father."

5. By ordaining, in this text, funeral oblations in honour of three maternal grand-sires, the parvāna or double rite only, is inferred.—From the expression—"as for the father,"—an option of performing, for the maternal grand-sires also, obsequies in the form of parvāna, or ekodīśta, is not obtained; for, the sentence in question, is meant to enjoin, the absolute necessity for the performance of obsequies, in honour of the maternal grandfather.

6. Besides, why should not also the term 'yearly' in the following text, like the word 'annually' [in Jātākarna's text (§ 1.)—supposing this word, there occurring, to have such import] intend the magha, and other periodical funeral repasts, "Excepting the first sixteen funeral repasts, with rites performed with fire included,—and the yearly obsequies,—at the remaining funeral repasts, let six cakes be presented: this is a settled rule."

7. Should it be objected, that this would be an intended consequence; it is wrong: for it would follow, that the son given and the rest, at the different periodical funeral repasts would perform an ekođīśta rite. Now this is not meant by any one. For, if the term comprehend any funeral repasts in general, other funeral repasts, (as must be understood from the term 'remaining') not existing, any exception would be impossible.

8. Therefore this is the accurate exposition of the law,—that, on the anniversary of the day of death, in honour of the father and mother, a parvāna funeral repast only should be performed by the legitimate son: by the others (the son given and the rest), merely one consecrated to a single ancestor. To enlarge would be useless.
SECTION X.

On the succession of the adopted son.

1. The inheritance of the adopted son is now propounded.—On that subject, Vasishtha says:—“When a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards born, the given son shares a fourth part.”—On the default of him he is entitled to the whole.

2. Thus is the Dattaka-Mīrāṃsā, compiled by the fortunate Nanda Paṇḍita, the son of the fortunate Rāma Paṇḍita, lord of virtue, completed.

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A TREATISE ON ADOPTION,

BY DEVANDA-BHATTA.

SECTION I.

Reason of adoption—Who may adopt—What description of son—How to be selected—Preference to be given to a brother’s son—The gift by whom to be made.

1. By the favour of Chandrakadi, the Dattaka-Chandrika, dispeller of the doubts arising from what was not pronounced in the Chandrika, is compiled.

2. Every rule relative to the adopted son, ordained for the welfare, which was not discussed by me, in the Chandrika, in treating on the eighteen topics of litigation, pronounced in the texts of Manu, and other saints, is fully and specially expounded here.

3. On this subject Manu says: “A son of any description must be anxiously adopted, by a man destitute of male issue, for the sake of the funeral cake, water and solemn rites; and for the celebrity of his name.”—Atri. “By a man destitute of male issue, only, must the substitute for a son, of some one description, always be anxiously adopted; for the sake of the funeral cake, water and solemn rites.”

4. “By a man destitute of male issue” that is,—by one to whom no son may have been born: or whose son may have died; for a text of Cauana, expresses: “One destitute of a son, or one whose son may have died, having fasted for male issue.”

* Ch. 6.  † Smriti-Chandrika, a celebrated treatise on judicature.
(c) See 5 Mān. 1, 2, Ca. 75—78.
5. Therefore, although by the production of a son, the exemption from debt, deduced from the text of Manu subjoined, may have taken place; still on the death of such son, for the sake of funeral rites the affiliation of another son is indispensable. "By the eldest, at the moment of birth a man becomes father of male issue, and absolved also from debt to his progenitors. He therefore is entitled to take the estate."

6. The term 'male issue,' (putra) here used, is illustrative of the grandson, and great-grandson; for these equally present oblations of food, and preserve the line. Otherwise, it would follow that the adoption of a son, by one whose son had died, notwithstanding the existence of a grandson, were without reason. It therefore results that one only destitute of a grandson and great-grandson may adopt.

7. It must not be argued, that from the qualities of being male and singular, being attributed to the adopting party, by the expression "a man destitute of male issue," something definite is meant: therefore the same person must not be adopted by two individuals nor any son by women. For the adoption of the Dvayamushya or son of two fathers by two persons will be presently declared; [and] women with the sanction of their husbands are competent to adopt; as Vasishtha shews: "Let not a woman either give or receive a son in adoption: unless with the assent of her husband."

8. "A substitute." Now such is of eleven descriptions, the son of the wife and the rest. Thus Manu [ordsains]: "Sages declare these eleven sons (the son of the wife and the rest) as specified to be substitutes for the real legitimate son; for the sake of preventing a failure of obsequies." Vrihaspati also. "Of the thirteen sons who have been enumerated, by Manu in their order, the legitimate son and appointed daughter are the cause of lineage. As oil is substituted by the virtuous for liquid butter: so are eleven sons by adoption substituted for the legitimate son and appointed daughter."

9. Of these, however in the present age, all are not recognized. For a text recites;—"Sons of many descriptions who were made by ancient saints cannot now be adopted by men,—by reason of their deficiency of power;"* and against those other than the son given, being substitutes, there is a prohibition in a passage of law wherein after having

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9. In a passage of law.\[ This passage which is frequently cited, is attributed to the Adihsya-parana, and in its complete state is thus—"The adoption, as sons of those other than the legitimate son, and son given:—the procreation of issue by a brother-in-law:—the assuming the state of an anchorit;—these rules sages pronounce to be avoided in the kali age."

* Manu 9, 106.  † Vrihaspati.
been promised,— "The adoption, as sons of those other than the legitimate son and son given,"—it is subjoined,— "These rules sages pronounce to be avoided in the kali age."

10. The rules relative to the adopted son are now propounded. On this subject Čaunaka ordains,— "The adoption of a son by any Brāhmaṇa must be made from amongst sapindas, or kinsmen connected by an oblation of food; or on failure of these, an 'asapinda' or one not so connected; otherwise let him not adopt."

11. Here since it is mentioned generally, from amongst 'sapindas,' it is meant from such both of the same or a different general family; and, accordingly on default of a 'sapinda' kinsman, one belonging to the same general family and failing this latter, a person even of a different general family are to be adopted. Čākala declares this. "Let one of a regenerate tribe destitute of male issue on that account adopt as a son the offspring of a 'sapinda' relation particularly: or also next to him one born in the same general family. If such exist not, let him adopt one born in another family: except a daughter's son, and a sister's son, and the son of the mother's sister."

12. "Otherwise let him not adopt." By this, a given son being—other than a Brāhmaṇa,—a Kshatriya, and so forth—in short of a different class is excluded. This Manu declares. "He is called a son given, whom his father, or mother affectionately give as a son, being alike and in a time of distress, confirming the gift with water."

13. "In a time of distress."[1] The adopter being destitute of male issue.— "Alike"[1] belonging to the same class.

14. "Alike not by tribe, but by qualities suitable to the family. Accordingly, a Kshatriya, or a person of any other inferior class may be the given son of a Brāhmaṇa." A conflicting gloss by Medhātiṭhi, reconciled. As for this interpretation by Medhātiṭhi; it is thus reconciled. Where, there may be no real legitimate son, although as being inferior in class, the Kshatriya and the rest are not entitled to present the oblation of food and water; still their filial relation may be legally established by reason of their being beneficial in perpetuating the name and the like; but as they are beneficial in a small degree, they only receive maintenance.

15. Kātyāyana declares this: "If they be of a different class, they are entitled to food and succour only."— Čaunaka also. "If one of a different class should however in any case have been adopted as a son, he should not
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Kāṭaūṛakya:—make him the participator of a share: this is the doctrine of Čūравaka also.—By Kāṭaūṛakya also it is declared that one of the same class presents the funeral cake and participates in a share: but the filial relation of one of a different class is not denied;—and Yāṣka explicitly declares this: "A person of the same class must be adopted as a son. Such a son performs the obligations and takes the estate; on default of him, one different in class, who is regarded merely as prolonging the line. He receives food and remnant only from the person succeeding to the estate."

16. In fact, the construction of the word 'alike' (sadriça) in Čūra's text (§ 12), as signifying—of the same class—is only proper; for elsewhere the participating as an heir of such adopted son is shown: and the participating in the inheritance of one unequal in class is impossible.

17. "Except a daughter's son and a sister's son." This prohibition against the daughter's son and sister's son refers to those other than Čūdras. Accordingly Čūra.

The exception from adoption of the sons of a sister and a daughter in § 29, refers to the superior tribes, as is shown by Čūra.

"Of Kshatriyas in their own class positively, and [on default of a sapinda kinsman] even in the general family, following the same primitive spiritual guide (Guru). Of Vaikyas, from amongst those of the Vaikya class; of Čūdras from amongst those of the Čūdra class; of all and the tribes likewise in [their own] classes only and not otherwise. But a daughter's son and a sister's son are affiliated by Čūdras. For the three superior tribes, a sister's son is nowhere [mentioned as] a son."

18. "In the general family, following the same primitive spiritual guide." Since there are no distinct and peculiar general families of [primitive] Kshatriyas, the general family following the same primitive spiritual guide is specified; for it is declared in the passage subjoined, that one of the tribe in question participates in such general family. "He specifies the general families of Kshatriyas, and Vaikyas, as distinguished by following the same primitive spiritual guide."

Impact of the phrase, "in [their own] classes only, &c."

19. "In [their own] classes only not otherwise." This is a restriction intended to forbid the adoption of one of a different tribe; otherwise the text of Kātyāyana before cited would be contradicted.

20. In respect however to this subject [it is to be observed, that] where a brother's son may exist amongst near kinsmen, he only is to be adopted. This Manu ordains. "If one among brothers of the whole blood be possessed of male issue, Manu pronounces that they all are fathers of the same by means of that son." Vrishaspati [also.] *If there are several brothers, the sons of one man by the same mother, on a son being born to one even of

* V. notes to sect. II. § 73 and 79. D. M.
them, all of them are declared to be successors of male issue." Under these two texts, if a brother's son is in any manner capable of being a substitute, it is inferred that another is not to be adopted.

21. "Offspring must be produced: this present is peremptory: in some manner or another it must be complied with."

Argument that though unadopted, a nephew, would bear filial relation to his uncle.

Since the representation of the filial relation here [contemplated] obtains in the brother's son; the effects thereof, viz. the oblation of the funeral cake, libation of water and the like, and exemption from exclusion from heaven would be accomplished [by his existence]; hence there can be no occasion to proceed in the re-attainment of the same; consequently a brother's son though unadopted is filially related; in conformity with this text of Vṛhati Parāśara. "Let the nephew of a paternal uncle destitute of male issue be his son; he only should perform his obsequies of the funeral repast and of oblations of food and of water." Hence, a brother's son existing, no affiliation [of him or another] as a son given, and so forth takes place."

22. This is not to be argued: for although, by reason of the nephew's possessing the representation of the filial relation, he may be the means of procuring exemption from exclusion from heaven and so forth: still, as the celebration of name and the due perpetuation of lineage would not be attained,—for the sake of the same, the constituting him [an adopted son] is indispensable. Besides the two texts in question do not prohibit, where a brother's son may exist, the constituting [him or another] a son given and so forth: but indicate [as inherent in a nephew] the virtue of a son consisting in the capacity to perform the funeral repast and so forth.—For otherwise a contradiction of the rule for the production of a ksātraṇa son, notwithstanding a brother's son may exist would follow; and since by the text subjoined, the resemblance of a son's son obtains in a daughter's son, according to the reasoning recited, the non-adoption of a son given, and the rest where a daughter's son also might exist would result. "By that male child, whom a daughter whether formally appointed or not, shall produce from a husband of a equal class, the maternal grandfather becomes the grand sire of a son's son: let that son give the funeral oblation, and possess the inheritance."†

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23. Besides the two texts in question do not prohibit, &c.] If the texts of Manu and Vṛhati Parāśara cited in § 19 were prohibitory of the affiliation of an adopted son where a nephew existed, it would be invidious that such nephew without adoption bore filial relation to his uncle.—The author does not mean to imply that, the nephew has not a preferential right to be adopted, supposing his affiliation not barred by any legal impediment.

* This passage is assumed to be a quotation. It is almost identical with a portion of a passage from Medhatithi, cited in sect. 1. § 30. D. M.
† Manu 2, 135.
23. But, if where even a brother's son may exist, the constituting [him or another] a son given and so forth be legal; then, though in the texts subjoined, the resemblance of the virtue of a son is shewn to obtain in the son of a rival wife, where even such son existed, the affiliation of a son given and so forth by the step-mother might take place.—Vrihaspati:—"The same rule is also ordained in respect to many wives, of the same person." manus, if among all "the wives of the same husband, one bring forth a male child, manus has declared them all by means of that son to be mothers of male issue."

24. Should this be objected, it is wrong. In the same manner, as where the curd,—which is the object contemplated by the person proceeding to produce the gormous substance alluded to in the passage of the Vedas subjoined—is wanting, it is that substance which causes the individual to proceed therein and not the whey or curds part (incidentally produced); for that not being the object is of no use."—He mixes congelated milk (dahhi) in boiled milk; that is a curd of two milk whey (amiksha),—an oblation to the Vaisvadeva set of divinities, and whey for horses."—Or,—in the same manner, as on the anniversary of the decease of a father, [who died during the first half of Ashva denominated pitripaksha], the ceremonials of a parvaṇa having been completed in honour of the father and other two paternal ancestors in ascenity above him,—a parvaṇa rite is not recommenced on account of the funeral repast in honour of the maternal grandfather and other two male ancestors [on the mother's side]; for the commencement of the same depends on the funeral repast in honour of the paternal.

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24. In the same manner as where the curd, &c. &c. Reference is here made to the 9th topic of the first Chapter, 4th Book of the Mitamsā of Jaimini. This is detailed in a note to § 24. sect. VI. D. M.—By mixing congelated in boiled milk, the curd denominated 'amiksha' and whey are produced; where on the occasion of any sacrament, such curd is wanting, that is the object intended to be produced and causing the act of admixture; not the whey, which is incidentally produced. In the same manner the object and motive of any adoption by the wife, (which must be sanctioned by the husband,) are to create male issue to her husband, destitute of the same and not to herself; though the filial relation of the adopted to her is incidentally produced: consequently, where the husband has male issue, as the primary object of the act does not exist, the wife cannot adopt.

Or,—in the same manner, as on the anniversary of the decease of a father, &c. &c. &c. The nature of a Parvāna rite here alluded to is explained in a note to § 72, section IV. D. M. During the first half, the month Ashvin, (denominated in consequence pitri-paksha,) Parvāna rites are celebrated; whereas the same solemnities observed in honour of paternal ancestors are observed in honour of maternal.—But it is ordained, that where the father may have died during this fortnight on the anniversary of the day of his death, instead of the usual eko-dahia or rite dedicated to him alone, the same ceremonials of a Parvāna rite shall be performed as would have been celebrated in honour of the father, and his own ancestors,—had the anniversary of his decease not fallen within this fortnight; but a Parvāna rite shall not be commenced for the sake of the solemnities which, on this supposition would have been observed in honour of the three maternal ancestors: for the commencement of these is held to be subordinate to,
ancestors, [which in this instance would have been already completed]:—So also in the case in question, the affiliation of a son by woman proceeding legally, with the sanction of her husband, to constitute for him male issue, only takes place where no son of that person may exist. But, if he have any, although she may be destitute of the same, such adoption does not obtain; for to proceed therein would be unproductive of the object.

25. In that case she would not be exempted from exclusion from heaven. In anticipation of this objection, the two texts of Mānva, and Viśhaspati, by propounding the existence of filial relation, in the son of a rival wife, [to his step-mother,] provide for her exemption, from exclusion from heaven, and the performance for her funeral obsequies; for, except the offspring of her husband, she can have no other.

26. Since, [a wife] can have no other offspring, but the issue of her husband, the son in question even preserves her lineage. Therefore, where, the son of a rival wife exists; as the whole benefit even of a son is attained, no affiliation, [by the step-mother, of him or another,] as a son given and so forth, takes place.—But as the capacity of prolonging lineage, does not obtain in a brother’s son, although such son may exist; [he, or if any impediment exist, another,] must be affiliated, and so forth: there is in this respect a material differ-

27. But if, a brother’s son existing, the affiliation of him only is indispensable; where there may be only one brother’s son, in that case the adoption cannot take place; on account of the text of Viśakha, which recites,—“An only son let no man give, or accept.—For he is destined to prolong the line of his ancestors.”

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and to depend on the same solemnities in honour of the paternal ancestors, which would have already been especially performed. Or, in other words, the main object of performing a real Pārvuṇa rite, is the celebration of solemnities in honour of the paternal ancestors: in the case propounded, these would have already been performed: therefore the main object being wanting, a Pārvuṇa rite is not commended on account of the solemnities which, [had a real Pārvuṇa rite taken place] would have been observed in honour of the paternal ancestors. In the same manner, the main object of any adoption by a wife, is to create male issue, to her husband having none; but where he may have such issue, although she may have no son, she cannot adopt; for the primary object and motive would be wanting.—The translator has deemed it incumbent on him to attempt illustrations of the analogy alleged by the author to exist between the two cases cited, and the one proposed; this has been done in this and the preceding note. The analogy however is far from being obvious from the terms of the text.
28. Should this be alleged, it is not accurate. For, the text in question, is applicable to a case, other than that of the Dvāmatājyāyaṇa, or son of two fathers. —In the case of the Dvāmatājyāyaṇa, the extinction of lineage, contemplated in the clause of the text, containing the reason, would not take place; and an indication found in the Purāṇas, as to the affiliation, by Vetalā, of the son as [his brother] Bhairava. Thus — "Accordingly he, (Bhairava) at some time copulated with Urvasi, a celestial nymph, and procreated on her a son named Suvessa. Vetalā also affiliated him, as his son; and in consequence by means of this son, both attained heavenly salvation." —

A man only having several sons, may give one, as is declared by Āṇamaka.

Whose expression 'several' bars, the gift by one having only two sons.

With the sanction of her husband, a woman may give her son, without if he be dead, etc.

Vāsishṭha.

31. But by a woman, the gift may be made with her husband's sanction if he be alive; or even without it if he be dead, have emigrated or entered a religious order.—Accordingly Vāsishṭha. "Let not a woman either give or receive a son unless with the assent of her husband."

This assent of the husband is implied by his silence, and the independence of the woman is indeed suggested by Vājñavalkya.

32. Now, if there be no prohibition even there is assent: on account of the maxim; "The intention of an other, not prohibited, is sanctioned." —Vājñavalkya suggests, the independency of the woman, "He whom his father or mother gives is a son given."

—Also, in another place; "deserted by his father and mother or either of them."

* V. D. M. sect. II. § 46 et notes.
SECTION II.

The form for adoption—The most eligible period for selection—
Rules under certain circumstances—The adopted son may be
son of two fathers.

1. Next Çāunaka proposes the form for the adoption of a son.

The form for: “I, Çāunaka, now declare the best adoption: One
adopter, having no male issue or whose male issue has died,
having fasted for a son:—”

2. Adoption.] The form for adoption—Having fasted.] Having
observed a fast on the day preceding the adoption.—

Explanation. Vṛddha Gautama has—“The impotent man or also
one whose offspring has died.”

3. “Having given two pieces of cloth, a pair of ear-rings, a tur-
cum, a far, a ring for the fore-finger to a priest religiously
instructed, disposed, a follower of Vīshṇu, and thoroughly read
in the Vedas. Having venerated the king and virtuous Brāhmaṇas by
a mahapati (or prepared food consisting of honey, liquid butter
and curds.)”

4. If the king be at a distance, [he should thus venerate] the
chief of the village; for a text recites: Having invited
all kinsmen, and the chief of the village also.”

Brāhmaṇas.] The plurality meant by this word, is restricted to three
on account of the argument, exemplified in the instance of the white
partridges.—The venerating Brāhmaṇas is with a view to their asking
the child in adoption.

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4. The argument exemplified by the instance of the white partridges.] Allusion
is here made to the 5th topic of the 1st chapter (Adh.3) of the 11th Book (Adh.21) of
the Brāhmaṇa of Dandi. A passage in the Vedas to this effect occurs. “On the
occasion of the sacrificial offering of a horse, he should kill white partridges, for Vasiṣṭha (the god
of spirit).” In the part of the Mundus mentioned, it is proposed, as a subject for
discussion, whether, by the term, “partridges” in the plural, any indefinite number
exceeding two, is meant, or three only. The opponent affirms, that any indefinite number,
is meant; since plurality, is common to every number, exceeding two. The supporter
of the correct opinion, however, alleges—first. That, the ordinance of law in question,
is fulfilled by three.—3ly. The number three, must necessarily be included, in every
plural number; but four, or other steps for number, is not included in three.—5ly. The
number three, is the first in order of all plural numbers.—5ly. The selection of that
number, is more convenient.—5ly. The intent of the law, being accomplished by
three, in destroying more than that number, an offence would be incurred—Hence,
he argues, that three only, are meant by the plural term, used in the ordinance cited.

3 Gautama.
5. "Both a bunch of sixty-four stems, entirely of the kuça grass, and fuel of the palaça tree,—also having collected these articles; having earnestly invited kinsmen and relations; having entertained the kinsmen with food, and especially Brahmaṇas; having performed the rites, commencing with that of placing the consecrated fire, and ending with that of purifying the liquid butter; having advanced before the giver let him cause to be asked thus; 'give the boy.'—The giver being capable of the gift [should give] to him with recitation of the five prayers, the initial words of the first of which are ye-yājyāyena, &c."

6. 'Should give' is understood—'kinsmen' [the kinsmen of the father and mother. 'Relations'] sapindaḥ. The inviting these is for the sake of witnessing.—Having entertained invited kinsmen, and Brahmaṇas previously appointed, and (on account of the conjunction 'and') invited relations.—This is the meaning.

7. The same author continues.—"Having taken him by both hands with the recitation of the prayer, commencing,—"Devasya-tva, &c.;" having inaudibly repeated the mystical invocation,—'angadange, &c. ;' having kissed the forehead of the child; having adorned with clothes, and so forth, the boy bearing the reflection of a son."

8. 'Reflection of a son.'—The resemblance of a son,—or in other words,—the capability to have been begotten, by the adopter, through appointment, and so forth.

9. The text continues.—"Accompanied with dancing songs and benedictory words, having seated him in the middle of the house; having according to ordinance, offered a burnt offering of milk and curds (to each incantation,) with recitation of the mystical invocation 'yas-tvā-hrida'—the portion of the rik veda, commencing, 'tubhyam-agne',—and the five prayers of which the initial words of the first are 'Somo-dadat.'"

10. Vṛiddha Gautama.—"Let him then cause, to be offered, as burnt offerings, an hundred oblations of milk, with liquid butter, contemplating in his mind, as the object, the lord of created beings, with recitation of the prayer,—'prāja-pate-na-tva-detam.'"

11. Vasishtha.—"A person being about to adopt a son should take an unremote kinsman or the near relation of a kinsman; having convened his kinsmen, and announced his intention to the king and having offered a burnt offering with recitation of the prayers denominated 'Vyāhriti,' in the middle of his dwelling. But if a doubt arise let him set apart like a Cūdra one whose kindred are remote. For it is declared in the Vedas; 'many are saved by one.' When a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards born, the given son shares a fourth part,"
12. "Dwelling' house—A doubt'] is from the great difference of the country and language of one whose kinsmen are remote a doubt arise as to his lineage, disposition and so forth; this being the case till the ascertainment of these particulars let him not initiate such person.—On this point, a reason is assigned,—"many are saved, &c." 'Many'] The father and other ancestors.'

Form must be observed.

14. In continuation Caunaka says, "Let the best of the regenerate, to the extent of his ability bestow a gratuity on the officiating priest; a king half even of his dominion; next in order a Vaiśya three hundred pieces; a Čudra the whole even of his property: if indigent, to the extent of his means."

15. 'Half his dominion'] The produce for one year of half his dominion; for a text of Vṛiddha Gautama recites; "Let him proffer the profits arising from half his dominion received in one year."—According as he may be in a superior, middling or inferior condition [let a Vaiśya give] three hundred pieces of gold, silver or copper respectively: on account of the text of Vṛiddha Gautama. “Let him proffer three hundred pieces in gold or in silver or in copper according as his condition may be superior or otherwise." 'His whole property'] that is the acquisition by hire for one year.

16. Baudhāyana propounds a special rule for the followers of the Tittiri Veda.—"We are about to explain the mode of conduct, and for the adoption of a son. One about to adopt produces two pieces of cloth, a pair of ear-rings, a ring and a priest thoroughly read in the Vedas, a bunch of sixty-four stems of the kuça grass and fuel of the ‘purna’ tree.* Then having invited kinsmen into the middle of the dwelling and having made a representation to the king: having set down by the direction of a Brāhmaṇa in the assembly: having caused to be exclaimed auspicious day! benediction! prosperity! having performed rites commencing with the recitation of the prayer—‘yad-devay-jana’,—down to the placing the vessels for water: having advanced before the giver, let him thus beg; ‘Give me this son’—The other replies ‘I give’—He receives the child [and says ];‘I receive thee for the sake of religious duty: I adopt thee for offspring’—Then having adorned him with the cloths, the ear-rings and ring; having performed the investiture and other ceremonials down to the kindling a flame of fire; having dressed the oblations, he offers a burnt offering after having recited the incantation in the first chapter of the [Yajur] Veda commencing—"yas-tvā-hridā-kirināmanāmānā"—with recitation of the sacrificial prayer—"yasyaśi-vam-sukrīte-jāta-veda, &c."—he offers a burnt offering. Next having performed the burnt sacraments, where the prayers denominated vyahriti are recited: and that designated ‘sviśī-krīt’ with other ceremonials, being completed, down to the bestowing an excellent cow.

* Games Frondosa.
he presents the fee [saying: 'yours are] these two cloths, the ear-rings, and the ring likewise." But subsequently, if a real legitimate son is born, he [the adopted son] succeeds to a fourth share—so says Baudhāyana.'

The right of one adopted without form, will be declared in the sequel.

Many propose, that the relation of the given son to the family of his natural father ceases.

17. In case, no form as propounded, should be observed, it will be declared, that the adopted son is entitled to assets, sufficient for his marriage.

18. On the subject [of adoption] Mann says, "A given son must never claim the family and estate of his natural father. The funeral rites follow, the family and estate; but of him who has given away his son, the obsequies fall."

19. It is declared by this, that through the extinction of his filial relation from gift alone, the property of the son given in the estate of the giver ceases; and his relation to the family of that person is annulled.

20. And accordingly, since extinction of relation to the family [of the natural father] and so forth is shown, and as a text reciter, "let the father initiate his own sons," the initiatory rites even of the adoption, which are yet to be completed subsequent to adoption, are to be performed by the adopter; but those already performed by the natural father are not to be cancelled. For, any argument in respect to the renewal of these is wanting; since the removal of the root of the seed and so forth, and the acquisition of priesthood, as suggested in the following texts have already taken place. "Thus the sin produced by the seed, and "would acquire expiation, &c." "As a picture is produced gradually by many lines, priesthood in the same manner proceeds by the observance of form."

21. Otherwise, it would follow from the text subjoined, that he would have to perform also the rites of Punsavana and Simantonnayana.† "Let the father himself perform the eight initiatory rites, (or on his default some other) in their order." Now, this would be improper; for, it would not be consistent with approved practice: besides, as his authority to perform initiatory rites is from his relation of father subsequent only to adoption, the incompetency of the adopter in respect to rites which should take place previous thereto, [no reason of extreme necessity operating] follows; for, the appropriate time of performance no longer exists.

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20. But those already performed......are not to be cancelled, &c.] This has reference to the principal adoption taking place within the primary season prescribed for the performance of the rite of investiture, which, in the case of a Brāhmaṇa is ordinarily the eighth year after birth. infra § 23, 27, 30, 32.

22. But, if however, the initiatory rites which should have taken place previously have not been performed by the natural father; they are in that case to be completed by the adopter even, no account of the indispensable necessity of removing the taint of the seed and womb; and for the sake of preserving the order proscribed for the performance of the rites in question.

23. And accordingly if the rite of investiture merely be performed [by the adopter, the previous rites having been performed by the natural father; the filiation of the son given, as son of the adopter is completed; in conformity with the text of Vasishtha subjoined. But this must be understood in respect to an adoption taking place within the primary season for the rite in question which extends to the eighth year; otherwise, [in the case of an adoption after the expiration of such season,] the capacity of having been able to perform that rite, during the principal season being wanting, as there would be no ability for the same at a secondary season, the rite would remain unperformed, [unless as required in such inferior adoption the rite of tonsure; preceded by a sacrifice for male issue were renewed.] Text—“Sprung from one following a different Čākhrā, (or branch of the Vedes,) the given son even when invested with the characteristic thread under the family name of the man himself, according to the form prescribed by his peculiar Čākhrā becomes participant of the duties of such Čākhrā.

24. And relative to the subject in question, [it is to be observed, that] should an agreement subsist stipulating that the son adopted should be son of the natural father and adopter likewise, a special rule for his participating in the family of both by reason of being a Dvyāmushyāyaṇa will be declared.

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23. But this must be understood in respect to an adoption, &c.] The doctrine of the author appears to be that adoption may take place at any age; though the more preferable adoption is that of a child for the performance of whose rite of investiture the principal season has not expired. In this case the author holds that he becomesfilially related by the mere observance of the rite of investiture, the other previous rites of tonsure, and those preceding the same having been performed by the natural father.

As there would be no ability, &c.] The author supposes the case of adoption of a child for whose investiture the principal season has passed, where the adopter may omit the performance of the sacrifice for male issue, as proscribed for this inferior adoption. On the performance of this sacrifice, the adopter must perform for the child in question, the rites of tonsure and the rest, whereby filial relation is produced, (v § 27, 28, 32.)

* V. infra, section V. § 33.
† V. infra. § 33.
25. "Oh! lord of the earth, a son having been regularly initiated under the family name of his [natural] father, unto the ceremony of tonsure, does not become the son of another man. When indeed, the ceremony of tonsure and other rites of initiation (chūḍāyā sanskāra) are performed [by the adopter] under his own family name, [then only] can sons given, and the rest be considered as issue: else they are termed slaves.—Whether he be one, whose initiation has been completed, or one whose pupillage (gaṅgava) has passed on adoption after the fifth year, the adopter should first perform the sacrifice for male issue." As for what they thus read as from the Purāṇas, that is unauthentic.

26. Were it even authentic, still the interpretations given by some that,—"One initiated in ceremonies down to that of tonsure under the family name of the natural father bears no filial relation to the adopter; but such relation obtains, where the ceremonies commencing with that of tonsure are performed by the adopter only"—and—"if a child, whose tonsure has been completed [by the natural father], or one past five years of age be adopted, in that case, his filial relation does not accrue"—are inaccurate. For, a repetition [of the same position in two sentences of the same passage] would follow;—the generally received rule, as recognized by all good persons in respect to the filial relation previous to the investiture of the characteristic thread, of one also adopted under five years of age, [if uninitiated in tonsure by the natural father] would be invalidated;—and the adopter dying at that juncture, incompetency [of the adopted] to perform his obsequies would result.

27. On the contrary, this is the meaning of the passage.—Filial relation [to the adopter] of one initiated down to tonsure, under the family name of his natural father being first barred,—on the repetition of that ceremony and the rest, such relation is exempted from the prohibition: and accordingly, since previous to the performance of tonsure and the other rites by the adopter, the servile state of one initiated [by his natural father unto that ceremony,] and of him who has passed his fifth year is intimated: after the performance of that ceremony and the rest [by the adopter,] filial relation to him is established. In respect to one whose initiation has not been performed [by his natural father,] and a child who is under five years of age, this relation is obtained by law alone, and this is notorious.

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26. At that juncture.] That is previous to the performance of the rite of investiture of the characteristic thread, for which the eighth year is prescribed as the principal season.
28. Or, there may be this interpretation;—"a son [if adopted,]
though initiated as far as tonsure by his natural
father is not a son [to such father]."—the author
having thus premised such son not to be filially related
[to his natural father],—the sentence "anyatascha-
pitram yati" (meaning "and he acquires filial relation to another")
is subjoined as a reason: and thus the objection that one term
"putrah" (son) and the particle "cha" are meaningless is obviated.

29. And thus, on account of uniformity of import with the text
of Vasishtha before cited, (v § 23.) by the compound
epithet "chudadayan in the quality conveyed by which
the term "chud" is not included, rites commencing
with that of investiture for persons of a regenerate
tribe would be suggested; but for Cendars marriage
and so forth implied.

30. "After the fifth year." This regards a Brâhma, seeking
the fruit of holiness resulting from the study of scripture.* For since the fifth year only is the principal
season for the investiture of the characteristic thread
of one desirous of such holiness, as is shewn by this
text,—"For a Brâhma desirous of holiness, resulting
from the study of scripture, the fifth year, &c."—the
passage in question has the same foundation. But
for one not so desirous,—"after the eighth year, the adopter, &c."

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28. Or there may be this interpretation, &c.] In the original, the two first verses of
the supposed extract from the Purânas, cited in § 25, ran thus—"pitur-vatras-yah
putrah sanskritah prithivi-pat. * * * a-chud antamna putra so putraum-yati chany-
atrah.—The translation given, conforms with the commentary in the Datta-Mimânasa:
but a more literal version of these two verses would be thus.—"Oh ! lord of earth,
the son who (yah, putrah) has been initiated under the family name of his natural
father unto the ceremony of tonsure,—that son does not acquire filial relation,
(co another (na putrah sa putram-yati chanyatrah.)" Against this construction, the
author objects justly, that one of the terms putrah (son), which occurs twice, and
the conjunction "cha", (which signifies "and," become redundant and meaningless:
were, as he suggests, the phrase "na putrah" construed as the predicate of the
position, which preceded; and what follows, as containing a reason, for this position;
this objection would not apply. —According to the mode of construction adopted, in the
translation, the part commencing from "na putrah" to the end of these verses is received
as the predicate of the position contained in what preceded.

29. By the compound epithet chudadayana in the quality, &c. &c. &c.] This com-
 pound term might either signify, commencing with tonsure or following tonsure: if
 the latter construction be adopted, the compound would be denominated "stad-guna"
that is the term chud, would be merely segregative and not enter into the quality con-
veyed by the epithet.

30. "After the fifth year," &c.] In the extract cited in § 25, attributed by some
to the Purânas, it is stated that a sacrifice for male issue must be performed where
a child exceeding five years of age is adopted. —This implies that the fifth year limits
the more appropriate season for adoption, during which the filial relation is produced
without any special rite as here alluded to.—The author here shews that the mention

* V. D. M. sect. IV. § 33 et note.
31. [In adoption] respect should be shown to the several principal seasons, for the performance of the upanyasa rites of the Kashtriya and the Vaiyra respectively. For he only, to whom authority, produced in the principal season might have attached, is capable to perform such initiatory rite at a secondary season [if not qualified by the renewal of the ceremony of tonsure, preceded by a sacrifice for male issue.] This was before declared (v. § 23).—But in regard to tonsure, attention to the secondary season may be observed on account only of express passages of law.

32. ‘Sacrifice for male issue.’ Since, a person of the three first tribes only is competent to perform this by such person, the filial relation must be completed through the rites of tonsure and the rest, preceded by a sacrifice for male issue. But by a Čudra, the same even [is produced] through the rite of marriage alone—is unimpeachable.

The ancient practice of adoption unrestricted to any period is upheld under the construction in § 27 and 30.

33. And thus, the practice of all the ancients even in respect to the adoption of a son unlimited to any particular time is upheld. For, the construction suggested [by us of the supposed extract from the purānas] is self evident. *

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of the fifth year as the limit of the season has reference to a Brāhmaṇa, who is intended for the study of theology, for whose instruction, in which precedes the acquisition of letters, that year is prescribed.—He accordingly argues that in respect to others not so destined it is meant that the eighth year, which is the primary time for the performance of that rite, finds the more appropriate season for the adoption of such persons; that is, that a sacrifice for male issue must be performed, where one who has passed his eighth year is adopted.—The author, though he does not admit the authenticity of the passage attributed by some to the Purāṇas, yet considers it so as to conform with his own doctrine; viz., that by the observance of a sacrifice for male issue, and the subsequent renewal of initiatory rites, one, though adopted after the principal season for the performance of the rite of investiture of the characteristic cord may acquire filial relation.

31. Respect should be shown to the several principal seasons, &c.] Different seasons are prescribed for the performance of the upanyasa, or rite of investiture of the characteristic cord, and other peculiar marks, on a Brāhmaṇa, Kashtriya and Vaiyra, respectively.—These seasons are indicated in the following text of Tājāvaśaiki, translated according to the commentary in the Mārkaśāstra. The upanyasa rite of a Brāhmaṇa takes place in the eighth year from conception or the eighth year of his age of Kashtriya in the eleventh; or Vaiyra in the twelfth year [from their conception or birth respectively.] Some hold according to the custom of the peculiar family of the individual.” Author text of the same another relative to the extent of the period for the performance of this rite occurs.—“The period for the performance of this upanyasa rite of a Brāhmaṇa, Kashtriya, and Vaiyra respectively, extends to the sixteenth, twenty-second and twenty-fourth years. Subsequent threats should the rite be unperformed, they become castes and uninitiated persons, excluded from participation in religious rites, and incapable of being taught the Śāvitrī; except on the performance of a sacrament denominated Vrātyastoma.”

* Y. supra. 27. 30,
34. Also, in the same manner under the second interpretation, 
(328) the exclusive filial relation to the natural father, 
of the adopted son, whose tenure has been completed, 
having been first bestowed by the colonisation and in the sentence,—"and be receptive of the relation to another", 
—shall extend unto the natural fathers. The father 
is acknowledged to have been exchanged; and the adoptive relations, which 
there may be a stipulation to this effect between the 
two,—"This is son to us both," and such only is 
called a Brähmana, having two fathers, and belonging to two 
families.

35. But is it not true, that the Kshatriya or son of the wife, 
only is son of two fathers? Accordingly Hirita,— 
[The husband] living, [at the time of the] appointment, they call [the offspring of the same] the son 
of the wife: for [the natural father] has no control 
over him. Were he dead [at such time] they call 
him a Brähmana: for there can be no doubt 
as to who was the natural father." Hanu says, "But the owners 
of the soil, and of the seed may be considered in this world as joint 
owners of the crop, which they agree by special compact, in consideration 
of the seed to divide. However, this—The special compact proposed is a stipulation between the owners of the soil and seed, both 
decision of such issues to this effect,—"Mine is the soil, thine the seed; the offspring produced shall belong to both." Conformably, 
there is this text,—"A son begotten by one who has no male issue 
on the wife of another man, under the legal appointment, is lawfully 
born and given of funeral oblations to both families."—But this 
relationship in question does not appear to apply to the son given; 
on the contrary, the following passage of Hanu before cited is conclusion 
even of an opposite meaning. "A given son must never claim 
the family and estate of his natural father."

36. Should this be contended, it is wrong; the relation to both 
adoptive and natural fathers is established, since by 
general adoption referring to the text of Kautilya,— "What is 
not given by both of the fathers, declared to respect to one even of many, regulated 
by the same law, let him perform that, for the whole 
even. They are considered of the same description,"—the rules regarding 
the son of the wife are obtained in respect to the son given and the 
rest likewise—and the following text has a general application in the 
Pravaraśāṅkhyāya of Śaṅkhyāyana,—"He should perform two funeral 
rites, or at one, contemplating them separately, he should designate 
at each oblation, both the adoptive and natural fathers; together with 
the two sūtras of immediate ascent above each."
37. Accordingly Satya-shāgīha by the compendium rule,—“of absolute Dvīmāmushyāyānas of both, &c.”—having pronounced a relation to both families (including the perpetual estate) of absolute Dvīmāmushyāyānas, who are sons of the soil, applies by analogy, the rule regarding these [to sons given and the rest] by another sphāra, commanding,—“of sons given and the rest, like the Dvīmāmushyāyāna, &c.”—and this is explained by the commentator:—“Treating on absolute Dvīmāmushyāyāna, the author mentions the incompletely so,—“Of sons given and the rest, &c.” unto these only, not to issue beyond, [does the connection to both families extend.] If the initiatory rites are performed by the first only [the family is heir] but if by the adopter, that of the latter on account of priority. Through him only in the case of descendants beyond, [the family is determined.]”

38. The intent of this explanatory passage is this.—As in the case of the son of the wife,—should there be an agreement between the two, the adopted son participates in the family of both; otherwise where the whole of the initiatory rites have been performed by the natural father only, he shares the family of such father; but in the case of the initiation being performed by the adopter, in that of the latter,—that is the adopter, on account of priority,—meaning superiority. ‘Through him only, in the case of descendants beyond, the family is determined.

39. Accordingly Paśñānasi. Those sons given, purchased, made, and the son of an appointed daughter, who are in such case affiliated through the adoption of a holy saint by another, are sons of two fathers.”

40. The meaning is. Where a mutual agreement between the natural father and adopter exists; [those affiliated] through the adoption of a holy saint, that is, one propounded by a holy saint, are Dvīmāmushyāyānas.—This is clearly declared [in the prayoga-parījata]. “Sons given, purchased, and the rest are sons of two fathers: their marriage may not take place in either family even, as was the case of Śrīnaga Čājira.”

41. The state of a son given as Dvīmāmushyāyana, cannot obtain since, the property of the natural father in such son not being extinguished, the rule for the gift propounded in the text,—“Whom the father or mother may give, &c.”—would be meaningless.

42. This must not be affirmed. From gift, preceded by an agreement, such [as that promised] in the case in question, even, the common relation [to both fathers] of such given son, is established; like the property of the owner, (since he
himself is one of the objects, in water made common, (as a river, and so forth,) by a relinquishment, alluded to in such passages, as that subjoined,) the object of which is every creature: and which extinguishes the peculiar property of the individual himself. "This water is relinquished by me so common to all beings, let all creatures enjoy it by eating, drinking, and immersion." Enough has been said.

SECTION III.

Funeral rites performed by the absolutely adopted son—by the Upajyāṃda—Relation of Sarpinda, in the families of the adoptive and natural fathers respectively.

1. Next, the funeral rites performed by a son given are determined. In respect to these, although the son given be first adopted, yet the legitimate son existing, he is not competent to officiate in the sixteen funeral repasts, ending with the Sarpinda: for his superiority in rank is barred by Deva [who says], "A real legitimate son being subsequently born, superiority of rank from age does not rest in them." And a text of Yajñavalkya recites; "Amongst these, the next in order is heir and presents funeral oblations, on failure of the preceding. Otherwise the adopted son in every respect resembles the real legitimate one."

2. A special distinction obtains at the funeral repast, on the anniversary of the day of death. Accordingly Jātanikarna. "Annually (pratyabāna) let the son of the wife and legitimate son perform (obsequies) according to the Pāramana form; the other ten sons should perform a rite dedicated to a single ancestor."

Explanation. 2. "The other ten,"—the son given, and the rest.

4. Pārśara likewise—"[A funeral repast] by the legitimate son Pārśara, con- for a father, who has departed this life, on all occasions firms. is in honor of three ancestors: that by those belonging to more than one family, (aneka-gobra) is consecrated to a single ancestor; on the anniversary of the day of death."

Explanation. 5. "By those belonging to more than one family."—Meaning those belonging to two families.
6. The legitimate son, and the son of the wife also, if they preserve a consecrated fire, are competent to perform a Pāvana, or double rite. For, the text of Jāvela,—

"By one preserving a consecrated fire, the funeral repast is to be performed always after the Pāvana form"—corresponds with the Mātṣya-Purāṇa. "By those, other than the real legitimate son, and the son of the wife indifferently, whether they do or do not preserve a consecrated fire, a rite in honour of a single ancestor is to be performed. This is an established rule."

7. An avuncular of Svābhāvikeśa propounds a distinction in respect to the observances prescribed for the Dvāraka-pūjāya. "Having duly performed the preparatory avuncular called anvāyana, where there may be a diversity of fathers, both at each oblation."

8. Where there may be a diversity of fathers at each oblation, both the natural father and the adopter,—"let him celebrate" as is understood.

9. In the Pravaraṇāḥya also. "Those, who are begotten by a paternal uncle, for the obsequies of a single person, are the sons of the adoptive father only. Then, if there be no issue begotten on their [the natural fathers'] wives, let [the sons begotten on the wives of others] take the estate and offer in their honor oblataions, consecrated to three ancestors; if, however, there should be [such issue] still, such sons should present funeral cakes to both even. According to the text of a venerable saint, [the adopted son] should perform two funeral repasts, or at one, contemplating them separately; he should designate at each oblation, both the adoptive and natural fathers; together with the two ancestors in immediate ascendants above each."

10. The meaning is:—where there may be no express agreement on the part of the adoptive father [that the adopted son shall belong to both §] and [the natural father,] may not have other offspring; and where there may be such agreement by that person, and such offspring may exist, relation to both fathers obtains. In the passage cited, an option in respect to performing distinct funeral repasts or otherwise is contained.

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7. Ceremonial called anvāyana: This must precede the presenting of the funeral cake, and consists in pouring from a vessel on the grass upon which the same is offered water, white flowers, and sweet wood previously mixed.
11. Nor does this (namely) refer to the son of the wife; for by the compound rule of Satya-shālaka, — of sons given and the rest like the Dvīmānusūkhaṇa, &c. — the rules regarding such son are shown to be applicable also to the general adopted son who may be son to two fathers.

12. Accordingly Mārīci. "Of these, in the first place the tutelary saints of the natural father (are those of the adopted son). He should perform two several sets of funeral oblations, each consisting of two; or designate both in each (eka) oblation (of one set) his son — in his second, his grandson, in his third [should do the same]. Some hold since to be partakers of the wipping: others that they extend to the seventh degree."

13. "Of these" — That is from amongst these fathers, in the first place the set of tutelary saints of the natural father — in the second that of the husband of the wife [are those of the adopted son who] has thus two sets of tutelary saints. — "In each (eka) oblation" — a repetition [of the word eka] is understood on account of the text of Apastamba. "If son to both fathers, he should designate both at each several oblation." — "In his second" at his oblation to his grandfather, the son of the Dvīmānusūkhaṇa. "In his third." That is — at his oblation to his great-grandfather, the grandson of the Dvīmānusūkhaṇa.

14. But, if the adoptive father died first, [the son] should present the oblation first to him; if the natural father then to the natural father; should both have died [at once] then let him present first to the natural father and last to the adoptive. Mārīci declares this. "He who may be procreated on a widow by a kinsman or one unrelated should first present the oblations to and perform the observances of the funeral service in honour of the adoptive father, and after this to the natural father. If in any instance the adoptive father should survive, [the natural one] let the issue present the oblations first to the natural father; but the same must be given [to him] last should he survive; the adoptive father being dead. If both may have died [together], the oblation must be given first to the natural father after him the son should present the same to the adoptive father. Should it not be first offered to the natural father, it does not endure."

Which text indicates that the son of two fathers is to perform a pārvamāne on the death of either.

15. By this, the performance of a pārvamāne, by the son of both fathers, on the death of either even is shown.
16. In the same manner, by parity of reason, where there may be a diversity of mothers, the sires of the natural mothers, are first designated by a son, who is son to two fathers, at the funeral repast, (suggested by the passage subjoined) in honour of the maternal grandsires: subsequently, the sires of her, who is the adoptive mother—"Where the paternal sires are honoured, there certainly are the maternal."

17. But the absolutely adopted son presents oblations to the father and the other ancestors of his adoptive mother only; for he is capable of performing the funeral rites of their mother only: and thus, in conformity with the spirit of the sentence, "He is [destined] to continue the line of his ancestors,"—which is subjoined as the reason, [in the text of Vasiṣṭha], the prohibition [therein].—"Let not a man give an only son," refers to an adopted son, other than the Dvārakānyayana, or son of both fathers; for [where the adopted son is such] no extinction of lineage ensues, as has already been declared.*

The relation as sapindas, extends to three degrees in either family.

18. The relation as sapinda, is next considered. This extends to three degrees; in the family of the natural father, by reason of consanguinity: and in that of the adopter, through connection by the funeral cake.

19. This Kārṣṇaṅjini declares.—"As many as there may be degrees of fore-fathers: with so many, their own fore-fathers, let sons given and the rest associate, the deceased. In order, their sons with two fore-fathers, their grandsons with (samāny) one [should do] the same.—The fourth degree is excluded. This [relation of sapinda] extends to three degrees."

20. This is the meaning of the text, according as the deceased adoptive fathers, may be sons legitimate, adopted [absolutely], or of two fathers: as many as there may be degrees of fore-fathers, three or six, with so many, let sons given, and the rest associate them;—that is—connect by admixture of funeral cakes.—Of the cases in question, where the adoptive fathers are real legitimate sons [the fore-fathers, with whom their association is to be made,] are three, viz., the father, paternal grandfather: and great-grandfather; where sons adopted absolutely, three, viz., their adoptive father, grandfather and great-grandfather; and where sons of two fathers, six, viz., their natural father and the other two, and their adoptive father, and the other two.

21. And thus it is intimated, that those who are the revered objects, contemplated at a pārvana rite, performed by the adopted son himself, are the same at the sapinda-kārana ceremony also, celebrated for the adopted son by his own son: and the sons of an adopted son should perform his sapinda-kārana with

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* V. Supra, Sect. I. § 26, 27.
his adopter, and two out of the three fore-fathers of this latter.—And in the same manner the grand sons of the adopted son should perform the same—that is, the association of their own fore-fathers, by admixture of funeral cakes with—for ‘sama’ is used by Kārmāṇī in the sense of this preposition,) the adopted son, the adopter, and one out of three fore-fathers of that person; viz., the father of the adopter.

23. ‘The fourth degree is excluded.’] Whatever person, at any time, performs the ceremony of sāpinda-krama for any one does the same with three fore-fathers only of that individual:—by this, [which is the meaning of what preceded the passage cited] the exclusion of the fourth degree is established. The propounding the same position, [by the passage in question,] in conformity with the rule of logic, —a position having been established, its re-introduction, is for the sake of a peremptory rule—is meant to bar the relation as sāpinda [to the adopted son], of those, who (in the case of a real legitimate son,) would have partaken of the wippings of the oblations; by reason of their being precluded therefrom [in the present case]. The author declares this very position [in subjoining] ‘this’; that is ‘this relation of sāpinda, &c.’

24. And thus, the general relation of sāpinda, extending to the seventh degree, which is propounded in the Matsyas-purāṇa, in the text subjoined, is barred by the special rule in question.—‘The fourth and the rest in ascents are the partakers of wippings, the father and the others participate in oblations of food, the seventh presents the same.—The relation by oblations of food, of these, extends to the seventh degree.’ Consequently, the contrary doctrine suggested by Hārīta, in this passage.—They propound the partakers of the wippings to be three, or according to some, they extend to the seventh degree—is consistent, [as the opinion of the opposer of the correct doctrine.]

25. This very position is elsewhere compactly declared.—‘But of adopted sons, the relation of sāpinda extends to three degrees, in the family of the natural father; and in like manner in that of the adopter, this is a fixed rule.’

26. This relation of sāpinda extending to three degrees in both families, is propounded in respect to the son of two fathers: for his performing the ceremony of association by admixture of funeral cakes, with two sets of three ancestors is declared [by Kārmāṇī.] But the connection by funeral oblations of the absolutely adopted son obtains in the family of the adoptive father only; on account of the extinction of the funeral oblation of him, who hath given away his son, intimated in the following text of Mānu, before cited—‘A given son must never claim the family and estate of the natural father; the funeral cake follows the family and estate; but of him, who hath given away his son, the obsequies fail.’
26. "The sons given, purchased, and the rest who are adopted from those of his own general family by observance of form acquire inclusion into the family [of the adopter].—But the relation of sapinda is not included." The meaning is—sons given and the rest though adopted from those of his own general family by the observance of form only, participate in the family [of the adopter]. But the relation of sapinda is not established in them: and such relation not obtaining in those belonging to the same general family, of course, it can not subsist in those of a different general family. As for this text of Vṛddha Gauḍāma, it is prohibitory of the relation of sapinda extending to seven degrees, which might be inferred from analogy to the real legitimate son: or it bars the impurity for ten days and so forth, arising from the relation of sapinda.—But it does not prohibit totally such relation on account of the several texts before cited.

SECTION IV.

The impurity of the adopted son on occasions of birth and death—His marriage.

In the case of the absolute adopted son, reciprocal impurity in the family of the natural father, does not obtain. But in both families, in the case of the Dvya-mushāyana.

1. Next the impurity and so forth of the adopted son [on occasions of birth and death] is determined. In respect to this topic, [it is to be observed, that] there is no reciprocal impurity of the absolute adopted son in the family of the natural father; for relation to his family and the presenting in his honour, funeral oblations being barro, the extinction of uncleanness is an obvious consequence. But the impurity of the Dvya-mushāyana, is in both families.

2. In the Brahma-purāṇa [it is written.] "the son given, the son self given, the son made, as well also the son purchased, and the deserted son, who are always to be cherished, belong to a different family, present distinct oblations, and perpetuate a different lineage, and on occasions of birth and death, become impure for three days."

3. Parasāra. "On occasions of birth and death, impurity for three days is ordained for him, who, whether of a different or of the same general family by the will [of the adopter] is initiated and adopted."

Also another passage of the Brahma-purāṇa.

4. "So also, excepting the legitimate son on the death and birth of the son of the wife and the rest, a general impurity, lasting three nights, always takes place in every tribe.—This is a settled point."
5. 'Always'—subsequent even to the investiture of the characteristic thread. As the relation of one, though of the same general family, to the family of his adoptive father is attained through the observance of form, after the previous extinction of relation to the family of his natural father; there is no distinction between an adopted son of a different general family, [and one of the same.] Therefore, the uncleanness for three days proposed in the text in question [indifferently for either] is even proper.

6. Thus, where the adopted son may be unmarried, the offence of parivedana cannot be incurred.

But the adopted son might marry any female of the family of his real father, and the Dvyāmushyāyana, one removed more than three degrees.

7. But, since the extinction of his relation by oblations of food in the family of the natural father is shown, the marriage of an absolutely adopted son, might take place therein; and the marriage of a Dvyāmushyāyana with the issue of a female removed in relation more than three degrees would be proper.

8. It is not so; for in the text of Manu, subjoined of which (on account of the conjunctive particle 'and') the construction is—'who is not connected as Sapinda, to his father [as well as mother];'—the term 'father' is used to exclude [from marriage] a female related as Sapinda to and belonging to the general family of the natural father also of an adopted son, although exclusively belonging to the family of his adoptive father.—'She who is not connected as 'Sapinda to his mother and 'father, and not belonging to the general family of either, is approved amongst twice born men for espousal and conubial intercourse.'

9. Nor must it be argued that, still, where the father of the adopted son might himself be an adopted son, there would be no reason barring the marriage with a female removed in relation to such father beyond the third degree; since her relation as Sapinda to, and being of, the general family of the father are wanting. Because, the relation of Sapinda

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5. Subsequent events, &c.] Three days are the period prescribed for the uncleanness of a person, previous to investiture of the characteristic thread on occasions of death and birth.—The author obviates an inference, that the period in question fixed for the adopted son is so merely in case of his investiture not having taken place.
in question does not apply to marriage: but is an universal relation of that denomination, predefined as extending to the seventh degree in the line of the father and to the fifth, in that of the maternal grandfather. — Thus there is no inconsistency. These several descriptions of relations of Sāpinda will be enlarged on in their appropriate places respectively.

SECTION V.

The succession by inheritance of adopted sons linearly and collaterally — in the case of Gāḍhas — of the Dvayānagaredyāsī.

1. The inheritance of the adopted son is next propounded. On this subject Vṛihaspati says, — “the real legitimate son alone is master of the paternal estate: for the sake of affection, let him allow subsistence to the rest.”

2. ‘The rest.] Those who are excluded from participating in the estate— Affection.—Love.—Subsistence.—Alimony.

3. Yama also.—“Sons are pronounced by intelligent saints to be twelve: of these, six are kinsmen and heirs; and six kinsmen but not heirs. Those versed in the distinctions of class declare that the first is the one begotten by the man himself; the second, the son of the wife; the third, the son of the appointed daughter; the fourth, the son of the twice-married woman; the son of the unmarried daughter is considered the fifth; and [the sixth] the son secretly born in the man’s house. These six present funeral oblations—The son deserted, and the one received with a pregnant bride, the son given, and the son made, and fifthly, the son purchased, and the son presented by himself; These six, whose filial relation proceeds from an overt act of acceptance are kinsmen but not heirs.”

4. Nārada. “The real legitimate son; the son of the wife by appointment; the son of an appointed daughter; the son of an unmarried daughter; the son received with a pregnant bride; the son of hidden origin;

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3. These six whose filial relation, etc.] The terms of the original are śvastapanaśaman. — This expression disjointed may be construed as containing, or not containing, before svagama a privative. A. According to either mode of construction, a difficulty presents itself of rendering the compound epithet of eva (these) so as to apply to the six sons alluded to, and not be applicable to the other six. — The Sanscrit reader will perceive that a translation has been adopted, which it cannot be pretended, is suggested obviously by the terms of the text.
"the son of a twice-married woman; the deserted son; the son given; 
the son purchased; the son made also; and the one given by himself; 
these are declared to be the twelve descriptions of sons. Of these, 
six are heirs to kinsmen and six not heirs to kinsmen. Each ac-
according to priority in order is considered as superior; and the last 
successively as inferior. On the death of the father, according to 
their order they succeed to his estate. On defect of each preceding 
more worthy, let the next less worthy son obtain the estate."

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5. The meaning is on default of each preceding 
the next succeeding in order is entitled to the pro-
erty.

6. After having previously enumerated as sons, the real legiti-
mate son of the wife, the son of an appointed daughter, 
the son of a twice married woman, the son of the un-
married daughter, the son of hidden origin, the son received with a 
pregnant bride, the son given, the son purchased [the son made], the 
son self-given, the deserted son, and the son obtained in any manner 
whatsoever; Vishnu adds "of these, the first in order respectively 
is the most worthy; he only is entitled to the estate; but he should 
support the rest.

7. After having enumerated, the legitimate son, the son of the 
Yājñavalkya.

Yājñavalkya subjoins:—"Amongst these, the next in 
"order is heir, and presents funeral oblations on failure of the pre-
ceeding."

8. Manu,—"Not brothers nor parents; but sons are heirs to the 
"deceased." And again, "On failure of the best and
"of the next best, let the inferior in order take the 
"heritage; but if there be many equal, let all be sharers of the estate."

9. "Equal."—In respect to virtue or quality as being legitimate, 
the son of the soil or wife and so forth.—"Of the best,
Explanation. 
—that is of the legitimate son and the others.—"The 
inferior in order; the less worthy:—Meaning the son of the wife and 
those following.

10. The same author.—"The son of the body and the son of the 
Another text of 
wife may succeed to the paternal estate; but the 
the same author. "ten other sons can only succeed in order to the fami-
"The son begotten by the man himself, the son of the wife, the son 
"of the twice married woman, the son of the appointed daughter, and 
"the son of hidden origin or kinsmen and heirs. The son given, the
son purchased, the son deserted, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son self-given, and the son any how obtained are heirs but not kinsmen.

11. Manu.—"Of the twelve sons of men, whom Manu sprung from the self-existent, has named, six are kinsmen and heirs: six not heirs, but kinsmen. The son begotten by a man himself, the son of the wife, the son given, the son made, a son of concealed birth, and a son rejected, are the six kinsmen and heirs.—The son of an unmarried daughter, the son of a pregnant bride, the son bought, the son of a twice married woman, the son self-given, and the son by a Cúdra are the six kinsmen but not heirs.

12. Baudháyana.—"He pronounces the real legitimate son, the son of an appointed daughter, the wife's son, the sons given and made, the son of concealed origin, and the deserted son also partici-pators in the estate,—the son of an unmarried daughter, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son bought, the son of a twice-married woman, also the son self-given, and the Nisháda, or son of a Cúdra, he pronounces partakers of the family.

13. This declaration, that the son of the unmarried daughter and the rest participate in the family only, is for the sake of barring their taking a share of the heritage, where, one even of the others before enumerated, viz. the real legitimate son and the rest may exist.

14. Vasishtha having previously mentioned, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son bought, the son self-given, the deserted son, and the son by a Cúdra woman: and alluding to the legitimate son, and the rest in another place says: "Where there may be no heir to a person of any of the tribes, let those take the heritage."

15. Devala having recited the real legitimate son, the son of an appointed daughter, the wife's son, the son of an unmarried woman, the son of secret origin, the deserted son, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son of a twice-married woman, the son given, the son self-given, the son made, the son purchased adds: "Those twelve are pronounced sons for the sake of issue: some are sprung from himself: some from another also: some acquired by [an overt act of adoption]: and others filially related independent thereof. Of these, the first six are kinsmen and heirs [to collaterals], the rest are so merely to the father: and a special rule obtains, according to the priority in rank of the sons: all these sons are considered as heirs, to one having no real legitimate son; but should a son be subsequently born, no right of primogeniture attaches to them. Of these, those who are equal in class take a third share; but those inferior in rank should live in subjection to one of equal rank receiving maintenance."
16. Kātyāyana.—“If a legitimate son be born, the rest are pronounced sharers of a third part provided they belong to the same tribe; but if they be of a different class, they are entitled to food and raiment only.—In some copies the reading is—‘are pronounced sharers of a fourth part (a).”

17. Vasishthä. —” When a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards born, he shares a fourth part provided [the estate] may not have been expended in acts of merit.”

18. ‘He’ the adopted son. ‘Provided’ the whole estate (which is understood) may not have been expended by the legitimate son in acts of merit,—that is in sacrifice, and so forth.

19. For the sake of removing the conflicting contradictions of several varying texts of Manu and the rest, the following interpretations are offered on these texts. The declaration in Vṛhaspata’s text, that the real legitimate son succeeds exclusively to the estate, and that the rest are entitled merely to subsistence, regard such sons of the wife and the rest who are unequal in class, on account of uniformity with text of Kātyāyana and Devala. And the rule also in the texts of Nārada and the rest, for the succession of the son given and the rest to the estate, on default of the son of the wife, and the rest, regards their succession to the whole estate, and therefore the rule for the fourth of the share of the real legitimate son propounded by Vasishtha, where such son may be born subsequent to the adoption of a son given must be understood as applying to a son given.

20. So, also the rule for succeeding to a third share in the texts of Devala and Kātyāyana, must be alleged to refer to a son given, endued with eminent qualities, on account of uniformity with the following text of Manu.—“Of the man to whom a son has been given, adorned with every quality that son shall take the heritage, though brought from a different family”—With every quality’ class, science, observance of duties.

21. Others affirm it must apply to the son of the wife in conformity with this passage in the Brahma Puräna: “Let the real legitimate son even, who is subsequently born enjoy the whole estate—the son of the wife takes a third share, the son of an adopted daughter a fourth.”

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16. Sharers of a third part.] In citing this text, the author of the Mitakshāra adopts the reading which gives a fourth part. “This reading (observes Mr. Cobbrooke) is followed in the Madana-parījāta, Vīranitrodha, &c. But the Kalpaturu, Ratnakara and other compilations read ‘a third part’—vida Ṛṣabha-vāhaka C. 10 § 13.”

(a) See 1 Mea H. C. Rep. 49.
22. In the same manner the doctrine of one holy saint that
the son given is an heir to kinsmen,—and that of
another, that he is not such heir,—are to be reconciled
by referring to the distinction of his being endued with
good qualities or otherwise. By reason of succeeding
to the estate of sapinda kinsmen, as well as to that of
the father, he is [argued by the one to be] heir to
kinsmen; and on account of the particle "only" in the
phrase "of the father only" (occurring in the passage
subjoined) from inheriting merely of the father, he is [argued by the
other, not to be] such heir.—"Of these, the first six are heirs to kins-
men: the other six of the father only."

23. And thus [the objection of] variation from
the son given being enumerated higher and lower in
the order of inheritance, and so forth, by different
holy saints respectively, is obviated by the distinction
as to his qualities good and bad.

24. Therefore, by the same relationship of bro-
ther, and so forth, in virtue of which the real legiti-
mate son would succeed to the estate of a brother or
other kinsmen, where such son may not exist [the
adopted son] takes the whole estate even.

25. Since it is a restrictive rule, that a grandson succeed to the
appropriate share of his own father, the son given,
where his adopter is the real legitimate son of the
paternal grandfather, is entitled to an equal share
even with a paternal uncle, who is also such descrip-
tion of son; therefore, a grandson, who is an adopted
son may [in all cases] inherit an equal share even
with an uncle.—This must not be alleged, [as a gen-
eral rule]. For, there would be this discrepancy:
where the father of the grandson were an adopted
son, he would receive a fourth share: but the grandson, if he were
such son, [of him] would receive an equal share [with an uncle in the
heritage of the grandfather]. And accordingly, whatever share may
be established by law, for a father of the same description, as himself;
to such appropriate share of his father, does the individual in ques-
tion, [viz. the adopted son of one adopted] succeed. Thus what had
been advanced, only is correct. The same rule is to be applied by
inference to the great grandson also.

26. But, although the son of the wife, the son given, and the rest
may succeed to the general estate, their non-success-
sion to empire is advanced.—Thus it is ordained in
the Vedas.—"The legitimate son, the son of the wife,
"the son given, the son made, the son of conceal-
"birth, and the son rejected, take shares of the heri-
tage. The son of an unmarried girl, the son of a
would appear from two passages from
the Védas.
"pregnant bride, the son bought, the son of a twice-
married woman, the son self-given, and the slave’s
son, these six are contemptible as sons: on failure
of the first in order respectively, let him invest the next with filial
rights. But let him not appoint to the empire the son of a twice-
marrried woman, nor a son self-given, nor one born of a female slave"
"—In the same authority also—“Let not the king invest in the
c empire the wife’s son and the rest: [nor] cease to be completed
through such sons the solemnities for his fore-fathers, a legitimate
son, existing.

27. It is
 replied—If another ordinance of law exist, a special
rule for the sake of convenience [must be construed]
as conveying even the same meaning. Therefore, the
first passage cited, which is declaratory of the right
to succession of the next in order, on failure of each
preceding, extends even to the whole empire, as con-
forming with the texts of Nárada and the rest before
mentioned: and the latter passage prohibits the equal
participation of the son of the wife and the rest, if a legitimate son
exist, or it refers to a son of the wife and the rest unequal in class:
otherwise it would be vexations were adverse meanings deduced from
each passage. But if however this is admitted [and disregarded,] then
[we allege] that by the passage in question, the appropriate shares of
the son of the wife, the son given and the rest respectively are not
forbidden if a real legitimate son exist; but the investing such son
with empire is ordained [by that author] after having previously
barred the same in respect to those sons, in case of the existence of a
real legitimate son.

28. Thus, the son of the wife, the son given, and the rest receive
the share prescribed for them by the general law. For
grounds for contracting the operation of the same are
wanting: nor does the particular passage in question obstruct its
operation: for that relates to a different subject. Accordingly, their
right to inherit is clearly laid down in the preceding passage,—“take
shares of the heritage.” Nor can it be said they participate [merely]
in the estate other than the empire. For the empire also is treated
on in the passage in question. The exclusion of the son of the twice-
marrried woman and the rest from the empire, although each preced-
ing in order may have failed, is in virtue of a distinct provision in
respect to them.

In the Cúdra
tribe the partition
for the adopted
son is different.

29. The mode, however, of partition between the
son of the wife, the son given and the rest and the
legitimate son, which has been propounded in what
preceded does not apply to the Cúdra tribe.

30. Since, in the following texts of Manu and Yajñavalkya res-
pectively, a share equal to that of the real legitimate
son is prescribed for the son even by a female slave
of a man of the class in question: and the co-heirship
31. If according to this authority, where there may be no son of the wife and the rest, but there may be a wife and daughters, the daughter's son be entitled to share (with the son by a female slave); the rule for the succession of the daughter (or other proper heir) would be infringed; therefore, if any even in the series of heirs down to the daughter's son exist, the son by a female slave does not take the whole estate; but on the contrary shares equally with such heir.

32. Accordingly, the text subjoined must be construed as referring merely to Čudras. "A son given being thus adopted, if by any chance, a legitimate son should be born, let them be equal partakers of the father's estate."* So also in the following text, the equal participation of all lawfully begotten Čudras having been first propounded, the succession to equal shares, of the other sons likewise is subsequently declared by the sentence, ("if there be an hundred sons") occurring therein. "For a Čudra is ordained a wife, of his own class and no other. Those begotten on her shall have equal shares; if there be an hundred sons [the same mode of partition

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**ANNOTATIONS.**

31. If according to this authority, the text of Yājñavalkya provides that the son by a female slave who has no brothers, shall not take the whole estate, where there may be a daughter's son. Thence, it is inferred that the daughter's son shares with him. It is the object of the author to show that the term "daughter's son" is not restrictive in its sense, but includes any heir, enumerated in the series after the son down to the daughter's son; viz. the wife, the daughter, the daughter's son.

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* * Vṛddha Gautama.
shall obtain].” If the sentence in question be referred to the real legitimate son only, the position contained in it being obtained from what preceded, its repetition would be meaningless.

33. The son given who is a Dvayamshyagama, if both his adoptive and natural fathers have no other male issue, takes the whole estate [of both], one adopted, where legitimate issue [of the adopted] existed does not participate [in the estate of the adopter]; but a legitimate son being born [to the natural father] subsequent to the adoption, [the adopted son] takes half of the share of a legitimate son. If [however] such issue be subsequently born to the adopter, the adopted son in question] takes half of the share which is prescribed by law for an adopted son, exclusively related to his adoptive father, [where legitimate issue may be subsequently born to that person.]

34. The Pravartakshyayana declares this—“Should they have no offspring begotten on their wives, [the adopted sons] take the whole estate.”—A text of Narada also [declares—] “Let these, being sons to both fathers, present separately to each, oblations of food and water; they take the half of a share in the estate of the contributor of the seed and owner of the soil.” It has been before said, that the terms contributor of the seed and owner of the soil are illustrative severally of the natural and adoptive fathers.

SECTION VI

Exclusion from inheritance, in what cases.

1. As sons blind, lame, and so forth do not inherit—and since it is ordained that their legitimate son and son of the wife only participate in the estate of the paternal grandfather; a son given, or other description of son, adopted by such persons, have no right to the estate of the paternal grandfather; but to maintenance only. For alimony being provided for the wives of persons blind and so forth, maintenance for their adopted sons is inferred a fortiori.

1. And since it is ordained that their legitimate son, &c. &c.] The following is a text of Yajnavalkya.—“But their sons, whether legitimate, or the offspring of the wife by a kinsman are entitled to allotments if free from similar defects.” On this, the author of the Mitakshara thus comments—“The specific mention of legitimate issue and offspring of the wife, is intended to forbid the adoption of other sons.”
2. So also having previously declared sons blind, lame and so forth not to be heirs, an author adds—"Of these wives of those, [who are blind, and so forth] are to be supported if virtuous. Their daughters are to be maintained as long as unmarried."

3. In the same manner—since it is shewn that a son given participates with a real legitimate son born subsequent to his adoption—a son adopted, where a legitimate son exists does not take a share. Accordingly, an author declares the non-succession to a share of one adopted without observance of form does not inherit as appears from Manu. "Him existing, a son being created, and a son given, existing, one being adopted informally; that estate is his only, who is justly master of the father's wealth"—Manu. "He, who adopts a son without observing the rules ordained, should make him the participator of the rites of marriage, not a sharer of the wealth."*

4. It is declared by an author in the following text, that a son given likewise, who is of a different class does not inherit. "If one of a different class, should however in any instance have been adopted as a son, he should not make him the participator of a share. "—This is the doctrine of Čaunaka." Something to this effect has been before declared.† Sufficient has been said.

Peroration.—This treatise, succinctly exhibiting the rules relative to the adopted son is excellent, and the heart-delighting preserver of law through the serious application of students. Thus is the Dattaka-Chandrika, compiled by the great preceptor, the fortunate Devāṇḍa-Bhaṭṭa, completed.‡

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* This text is not found in the Institutes of Manu, v. D. M. Sect. V. § 45.
† Vide supra Sect. I. § 14.
‡ The printed copy, as well as manuscripts read Kuvera. As however the author avows himself to be the writer of the Śrīvī-Chandrika, which is known as the production of Devāṇḍa-Bhaṭṭa, this name in the translation has been substituted.

FINIS.
SYNOPSIS
OR
GENERAL SUMMARY
OF THE
HINDU LAW OF ADOPTION.

The Hindu Law of Adoption may be classified under the following Heads:

1st. The qualification and right to adopt.
2nd. The qualification and right to be adopted.
3rd. The form to be observed in adoption and the effect of its omission.
4th. The effects of adoption.
5th. Special rules.

It should be premised, that in the present age, amongst the various subsidiary sons* recognized in codes of law, according to the authority of writers, confirmed by practice, only those technically denominated, the son given (Dattaka or Dattrima) and son made, (Kritrima or Krita) are capable of being affiliated.† The author of the Dattaka or Chandrakaśi indeed admits the son given alone.—In effect however, without any great latitude, a son self-given, and a son rejected, might perhaps be included under the general denomination of the ‘son made’ the Kritrima or Krita putra (vulgarly called ‘Karta puter’) : and it should not be omitted, that in treatises of law, the term Dattaka or son given is sometimes used to denote an adopted son generally.

HEAD FIRST.
The qualification and right to adopt.

The primary reason for the affiliation of a son, being the obligatory necessity of providing for the performance of the eucrual rites(α), celebrated by a son, for his deceased

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* See these enumerated in a Note § 84. Sect. I. D. M.
† v. Notes I. and II. subjoined.
‡ v. Note III. subjoined.

See also Moore, I. A. Ch. 156.
D. Ch. Section I. § 3.

father, on which the salvation of a Hindu is supposed to depend, it is necessary that the person proceeding to adopt should be destitute of male issue capable of performing those rites. By the term issue, the son's son and grandson are included. It may be inferred, that if such male issue, although existing, were disqualified by any legal impediment, (such as loss of caste), from performing the rites in question, the affiliation of a son might legally take place.

A doubt might be entertained as to the validity of an adoption, by one not being in the order of the 'Grish' (the house-holder or married man) or by a blind, impotent or other person disqualified from inheriting. The more correct opinion, however appears to be, that an adoption by any of the persons described would be valid: though it seems reasonable, that the affiliation of one excluded from inheritance, should confer no right of succession on the adopted, of which the adopter is debarred by law.

The same reason which imposes the necessity of adoption on a man not equally applying to a woman, the latter (at least such seems the more accurate and prevailing doctrine) is incapable in her own right of adoption; though it is admitted that by his sanction she may affiliate on the part of her husband, a son who would necessarily be filially related to himself. Nanda § 15. et seq. Padažita denies generally the authority of a widow to adopt, assigning a reason by no means satisfactory, that the assent of her husband is impossible: but it is reasonable to admit, consistent with practice, and the opinion of other authors, the validity of an adoption made by a widow under the sanction of her husband written or formally expressed during his lifetime, and perhaps in some places under that of kinsmen(n).}

HEAD SECOND

The qualification and right to be adopted.

The first and fundamental principle is that the person proposed to be adopted, be one who by a legal marriage with his mother might have been the legitimate son of the adopter. By the operation of this rule, a sister’s son and offspring of other female, whom the adopter could not have espoused, and one of a different class are excluded from adoption. In the present age, marriage with one unequal in class is prohibited.

* v. Note IV. subjoined.
† v. Note V. subjoined. ‡ v. Note VI. subjoined.
(a) So held in Mad H. C. Rep. 205.
Nanda Paññita declares that a woman may not affiliate a brother's son: if his opinion be correct, it might be consistently argued, that where a woman is proceeding to adopt with the sanction of her husband or kindred, she must not select generally one with whose father she could not have legally married.

It is an obvious inference, that the person selected should be exempt from any disqualification, which might prevent him fulfilling the purpose of the adoption.—It has been intimated by writers on law, that proximity of kindred ought to determine the choice of an adopted son. But though Nanda Paññita extends this principle with elaborate minuteness, it can not be regarded as a rigid maxim of law, vitiating the adoption of a remote, where a near kinsman, or of a stranger, where a relative may exist. The right however of a whole brother's son to be adopted in preference to any other person, where no legal impediment may obtain, seems to be generally admitted, and may be regarded as a received rule of law.

An only son cannot become an absolutely adopted son (Sudhabhāra-Dattaka) but he may be affiliated as a Dvīyamunya or son of two fathers. In this case, the reason of the prohibition, viz., extinction of lineage to the natural father would not apply. An only son of a whole brother accordingly, if no other nephew exist for selection must be adopted by his uncle, requiring male issue and is son of two fathers. The same person can not be adopted by more than one individual, except in the case of one nephew by several uncles, the whole brothers of his natural father. It may however be inferred, that a legal impediment would exist to the affiliation by an uncle of a nephew, whom his father had given away in adoption as a Sudhabhāra-Dattaka, who retains no filial relation to his natural father.

To render the adoption valid and complete, it is necessary that the person adopted should assent, or being a minor, be given by a competent party.\(^\dagger\) On the subject of the legal ability to give a son in adoption, some difficulty exists in extracting a consistent doctrine.\(^\ddagger\) The more correct opinion appears to be—1st. That, the father may give away his minor son without the assent of the mother, though it is more plausible that he should consult her wishes.—2d. That the mother generally is incapable of such gift while the father lives.—3d. That she however on her husband's death may give in adoption her minor son, and even during the life of that person in case of

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\(^*\) Vasishtha, Cannaka, &c.


\(^\ddagger\) v. Note VII. subjoined. § v. Note IX.
urgent distress and necessity. A man who had permanently emigrated entered a religious order or become an outcaste, being civilly dead would be regarded as virtually deceased.

Discrepancy of doctrine amongst some writers, and the silence of others have left doubtful the determination of these questions;—1st. Whether the adoption of one, who has attained any particular age is barred; —2d. Whether the performance in the family of the natural father of any, and what particular initiatory rites constitutes an insuperable objection to being adopted.

On the subject of these questions, a passage attributed to the Kālika-purāṇa, (the authenticity and meaning of which are contested) is usually cited.* According to Jagannātha, the compiler of the Digest, this constitutes an absolute prohibition against any adoption whatsoever, of one, whose age exceeds five years, or on whom, the initiatory rite of tonsure(a) may have been performed in the family of his natural father.† And, in a case in which the adoption of one older than five years was contended to be illegal, on the opinion of it's Pandits,—declaring according to the Hindu law, as received in Bengal, the adoption of such person to be legal, provided the initiatory rites (sanskāra) in the family of the natural father have not been and in that of the adopter be performed—the Sadr Diwānī Aḏfālīt appears to have determined the following points, as applicable to Bengal, where, it should be observed, the Dattaka form of adoption chiefly, if not solely, prevails§—1st. That adoption is restricted to no particular age.—2d. That, one initiated in tonsure in the name and family of his natural father, is incapable of adoption.—3d. That the age of the person selected for adoption must be such as to admit of the ceremony of tonsure being performed in the adopter's name and family.

The limitation of adoption to any particular age is thus overruled: but without presuming to question as applicable to Bengal the accuracy of the other two points of law resulting from the decision referred to, there is no impropriety in expressing a doubt, whether they can be received as constituting a general rule universally decisive on the questions which they regard.—1st. Such rule would be at variance with the doctrines of the Dattaka Mimāṁsā, and Dattaka Chandrikā, as detailed in a note subjoined.||—2d. The authenticity of the passage, attributed to the Kālikapurāṇa, on which the opinion of Jagannātha and the Pandits of the Sadr Diwānī is founded is justly denied, and it is interpreted as admitting the adoption of one, although initiated in tonsure by his natural father.—3d. The received definition of the Krātrima son, and particularly the

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† v. Digest Ch. IV. Sect. VIII.
‡ v. Printed reports on select cases.—Kerat Nāman versus Mt. Bhobhiocarec.—Cause No. 23 of 1806.
§ v. Note X. subjoined. || v. Note XI.
(a) Sec 1. Merl. Dig. 30, 21.
mode of affiliation* current in the Maithila country, obviously refer to one of years somewhat mature, who, if not necessarily, would mostly be initiated in tosoner by his natural father; and the adoption of such person is certainly justified by practice obtaining in some parts of India.

The difficulty, or rather impossibility of defining any unvarying principles, universally decisive on the questions referred to is obvious. The most general and consistent rule which presents itself is this: Any person, on whom the adopter may legally perform the Upanayana rite,† is capable of being affiliated as a Dāttaka son; while one, not so qualified, may be lawfully adopted as a Kṛitrìma son.

HEAD THIRD.
The form to be observed in adoption, and the effects of its omission.

Regarding the mode of adoption, a text of Vaisishtha is most usually cited. This enjoins, that the party proceeding to adopt should previously give notice to the ruling power (Rājā), and after having invited kinsmen, should complete the adoption by the observance of the prescribed solemnities, viz., a burnt sacrifice and recitation of the prescribed prayers. The forms propounded at greater length by Caunaka, Vṛddha Gautama, Baudhāyana and other primitive writers, essentially conform with this of Vaisishtha. The former provide for the attendance of Brāhmaṇas, and an officiating priest, to demand the son to be given.

The expression ‘Rājā’ has been explained by commentators to signify the chief of the town or village. They seem however agreed,§ that, the notice enjoined, and the invitation of kinsmen are no legal essentials to the validity of the adoption being merely intended to give greater publicity to the act, and to obviate litigation and doubt regarding the right of succession.

The form propounded by Vaisishtha; and more particularly those by the other holy writers, in pursuance of the works of eminent authors, may be correctly regarded, as referring exclusively to the son given;‖ the adoption of a Kṛitrīma son being held to be valid, without the observance of any particular form or solemnities.¶

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* See that propounded by Rudra Dhāra in Note XVI.
† v. Note XII. subjoined.
‡ For the rules, for performing the rite of Upanayana, consult D. Ch. Note to Sect. II. § 31: and for the designation and order of the different initiatory rites, see D. M. Note to Sect. IV. § 23.
§ v. Note XIII. ‖ v. Note XIV. ¶ v. Notes XV. & XVI.
Should a son be adopted without the observance of prescribed form, his filial relation would not be established, but he would be entitled to assets sufficient to defray the expense of his marriage.

The Dattaka adopted son, except perhaps in the case of a nephew affiliated by an uncle must be initiated in certain rites in the name and family of his adoptive father, and the Kritrima son, in some instances may, but in all, need not necessarily be so initiated. The question as to the particular rites required has already been discussed under the preceding head.

HEAD FOURTH.

The effects of adoption.

The legally adopted Dattaka or son given in all cases is, and the Kritrima or son made in some instances may be, invested with every filial right in respect to his adoptive father, of whose family he becomes a member.

The Dattaka adopted son ceases to have any claim to the family or estate; and is incapable of performing the funeral rites of his natural father, except where affiliated as a Dyavamushyayapa, or son of two fathers. This rule would not apply to the Kritrima adopted son, who would be necessarily the son of two fathers, unless, (if such case could occur), where wholly uninitiated in the family of his natural family.

The adopted son cannot marry any kinswoman related to his father and mother within the prohibited number of degrees as his consanguineal relation endures: nor the son of two fathers marry in the general family of either.

The adopted son not only inherits of his adoptive father, but likewise lineally and collaterally of the near and distant kinsmen of that person. He likewise represents the real legitimate son, in relationship to his adoptive mother, whose ancestor are his maternal grandsires. The rule however now suggested, would not apply to the Kritrima son as usually adopted in the Maithila country.

† v. Note XVIII. §v. Note XXI.
HEAD FIFTH.

Special Rules.

Firstly.—Regarding the Dvámusháyána.

The adopted son may retain illial relation to his natural father. This double illial relation proceeds from a special agreement, between the adoptive and natural father, at the time of adoption, or may exist without such agreement; as mostly, if not always, in the case of the Krítima adopted son, who is not alienated by his natural father. In the first case, such son is denominated a complete (nitya) in the second an incomplete (unitya) Dvámusháyána.

The adopted son, who is son of two fathers, inherits the estate and performs the obsequies of both fathers, but the relation of his issue (except in the case of the Krítima son, as usually affiliated in the Maithila country,) obtains exclusively to the family of the adoptive father.

Secondly.—Regarding the succession of the adopted son.

Thirdly.—Regarding the succession of co-existent legitimate and adopted sons.

Where, subsequent to an adoption legally made, a legitimate son is born to the adopter, the adopted son, at a division of heritage with such son, receives a quarter share as apportioned to the Dáttaka-Chandiká. A distinction however obtains in the case of the Dvámusháyána—

From an obscure part of that work, it would appear to be the doctrine of its author, that such son, would only take half the share, to which the son absolutely adopted, would be entitled, in participating with a legitimate son, subsequently born.—On the same principles, this author appears to provide that, where legitimate issue is subsequently born to the natural father, the Dvámusháyána only takes in the estate of such father, the half of the share of a legitimate son.

ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES REFERRED TO IN THE PRECEDING SYNOPSIS.

NOTE I.

Only those technically denominated, the son given, etc. (p. 221). On the subject of sons, to be affiliated in the present age, the two texts of law quoted in D. Ch. Sect. I § 9, are usually cited. The term

9 s. Note XXII. subjoined.
'son given,' occurring in the latter, is explained in the Vyavahāra-
Madhava* and other works, as likewise denoting the 'son made'—
The Putrikā-putra does not appear to be regarded as a subsidiary son;† and it is not unreasonably to infer, that the affiliation of such son, would be valid in the present age. The term 'aursa' or 'legiti-
mate son,' occurring in the text noticed, might consistently be con-
strued as also indicative of the 'Putrikā-putra.' This term is used
to denote a daughter, appointed to be a son, the one appointed to
raise up issue, and the son of either.—Vājiravalkya declares the
Putrikā-putra to be equal to the real legitimate son,‡ and Manu pro-
pounds that there is no difference between a son and an appointed
daughter, and a son's son, and the son of such daughter.§ Further,
an equal division of the heritage is ordained between the Putrikā-
putra, and a real legitimate son subsequently born. It should be
observed however, that Jīmuṭa-Vāhana denies that a daughter, ap-
pointed to raise issue, can acquire any superior right, unless she bear
or be likely to bear a son.||

NOTE II.

The 'son given' (Dattaka or Dattirima) and 'son made' (Kritrima
or Krita) (p. 221). For the description of the 'son given' by Manu,
see D. Ch. Sect. I. § 12. The same author thus describes the son
made.—"He is considered as a son made, whom a man takes as his
'own son, the boy being equal in class, endowed with filial virtues,
'acquainted with the merit of performing obsequies to his father,
'and the sin of omitting them."—Vijñāneśvara in the Mitāksharā
and Visveśvara in the Madana-parījata intimate, that the son made
should be an orphan.¶

NOTE III.

A son self-given, and a son rejected (p. 221). These are describ-
ed by Manu (v. Translation by Sir William Jones, Ch. IX. verse 167,
et seq.) The author of the Mitāksharā and other writers provided that
these sons should be of the same tribe.

NOTE IV.

A doubt might be entertained (p. 222). The expression 'aputra,'
destitute of male issue, occurring in the texts of Manu cited as
authorities for adoption is explained as intending,—one whose son
may have died, and one to whom no son may have been born.**—
The first explanation obviously, and the second by implication may

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* A commentary on Parasara current, in Western and Northern India.
† Sect D. Ch. Sect. I. § 8.
‡ 2. 120. cited in Trans. of Mit. on Inh. Ch. I. Sect. XI.
§ 9. 130, 133.
¶ Consult generally Trans. of Dāya-bhāga, Ch. X.; and of Mit. on Inh. Ch. I, Sect. XI.
|| V. Trans. of Mit. on Inh. Ch. I. Sect. XI. § 17. et note.
be construed as solely referring to the ‘Grihi’ or married man.—Again, Medhātithi declares that the scriptural precept enjoining the production of a son must positively in some way be fulfilled by a person of the description noticed.* These however do not appear sufficient grounds to pronounce the illegality of an adoption made, generally by a man who may not have married(a) or still less, one whose wife may have died. In fact, the passage in question of Medhātithi may be regarded as merely enjoining the more obligatory necessity for a married man, having no male issue to adopt a son. Jagannātha, in the Vivāda-bhāṅgarāṇa or Digest, translated by Mr. Colebrooke expressly rejects as erroneous the doctrine which would restrict adoption to a man in the order of the Grihi.† It may be observed that as marriage is one of the last of the perfective rights, necessary to complete the regeneration of ‘the twice-born,’ celibacy is scarcely known amongst the Hindūs.—The individuals excluded from inheritance are, “the impotent person, the outcast and his issue, one lame, a madman, an idiot, a blind man, a person afflicted with an incurable disease, and others similarly disqualified.”—The admissibility of a doubt as to the legality of an adoption by such persons is suggested with reference to a passage in the Mitākṣarā, which declares, that the specific mention of ‘the legitimate son’ and ‘son of the wife’ in a text of Yājñavalkya, providing for the inheritance of such sons of disqualified persons, is intended to forbid the adoption by them of other sons.‡ The author of the Dattaka Chandrikā likewise, arguing from the same or a parallel text that an adopted son is not ordained for disqualified persons, excludes such son of those persons from succeeding to the estate of the paternal grandfather.§ In the absence, however, of other authorities, those alluded to can hardly be admitted as sufficient to establish a general rule vitiating in toto, the adoption by one excluded from inheritance.—In fact, the author of the Dattaka Chandrikā, without advancing such position, merely denies the right of one so adopted to inherit of his adoptive grandfather, and perhaps no more was intended by the author of the Mitākṣarā.

**NOTE V.**

*Is incapable in his own right of adoption* (p. 223). This position may be questioned, and does not appear to be a generally received rule. In the tract of country denominated Maithila, a custom prevails of the adoption by a widow of a Kṛitrīma son, for the performance of her Sapindikāraṇa, or right of association with departed ancestors, the observance of which, on the eleventh day from her decease, exempts the other relatives who are unable to celebrate such ceremony from observing in her honour, (as they otherwise would have to do,) twelve monthly funeral repasts.—The practice is perhaps founded on, or justified by, the following passage from the Dvaita-nirnaya of Vāchspatī-miśra, an author of paramount authority in the ‘Maithila’ country—“Its pur-“pose is, for the man, that he may be excluded from the hell denomini-

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* See D. M. Sect. I. § 60. † v. Trans. of Mit. on 1st. Ch. II. Sect. X. § 11. ‡ v. Digest, Chap. IV. Sect. VIII. § D. Ch. Sect. VI. (a) See 1 Med. Dig. 16.
"nated 'put; for the woman, that some one may exist, capable of per-
forming her rite of Sapinda or association with departed ancestors.
Should individuals, capable of promoting these objects exist, a son
must not be adopted." Accordingly, from the resemblance to the
condition of being parents of male issue; where, the son of a whole
brother may exist, by a man, other persons,—and where the son of a
rival wife may exist, by a female, sons made, and so forth, must not
be affiliated. To this doctrine conform Asahaya, Udaya-kara, the
Kalpataru, the Parijata, the Ratnakara and other works."—This
passage sufficiently explains, why the custom in question is restricted
to widows. A husband is capable of performing the Sapinda, or
Sapindaka-kara, (for the terms are synonymous) for his deceased wife.
On the same principle should the husband leave an adoptive son who
would necessarily be filially related to his wife, the widow could not
adopt a peculiar son for herself.—The son affiliated by a widow, accord-
ing to the custom noticed, is not regarded as related in any way to her
husband, and merely succeeds to her exclusive property.

NOTE VI.

Though it is admitted by his sanction, she may affiliate on the
part of her husband (p. 222)]. On the subject of the adoption by a
woman, this portion of a passage from Vasishtha is usually cited. "Let
not a woman either give or accept a son unless with the assent of her
husband." Vâchaspati-nâga, in another work, the Çraddha-Chintamani,
maintains that the clause, "unless with the assent of her hus-
bond," refers only to the gift, and not the adoption of a son, a woman,
as well as a Çûdra, from their inability to perform the sacrifice included
in the prescribed ceremony, being both incapable of adopting a Dattaka
or son given. In this opinion he is supported by Hudra-dâra, the
author of the Sudhi-Viveka, a work also current in Maithila. Both
authors have perhaps, from their silence, left it doubtful, whether they
allow the adoption of a Kritrima son, (at which no sacrifice is perform-
ed,) through the delegated agency of a wife or not: It would however
be difficult to show that such adoption were at variance with their
express doctrines.— This objection (says Mr. Colebrooke, in allusion
" to the opinion of Vâchaspati-nâga, just mentioned) may be obviated,
" by admitting a substitute for the performance of that ceremony: and
" accordingly adoption by a woman, under authority from her husband,
" is allowed by writers of the other schools of law: Nanda Panjiita,
" however in his treatise on adoption, restricts this to the case of a
" woman, whose husband is living, since a widow can not, he observes,
" have her husband's sanction to the acceptance of a son. On the
" other hand, Bâlam-bhatâ,* contends that a woman's right of adopt-
" ing, as well as of giving a son is common to the widow and the
" wife. This is likewise the opinion of the author of the Vyavahara-
" Mayûkha: but while he admits that a widow may adopt a son with-
" out her husband's previous authority, he requires that she should
" have the express sanction of his kindred. Writers of the Gaura

* A commentator on the Mitakshara.
"school, on the contrary insist on a formal permission from the husband declared in his lifetime." It may be added that the author of the Viramitrodaya concurs in the opinion of the Vyavahāra-Maṇḍūkya just noticed.—Of these works, the former is more particularly current at Benares, and the latter among the Marāḥatas. Nānda Pandita has not omitted expressly to disallow the ability of kinsmen to authorize a widow to adopt.†

NOTE VII.

An only son (p. 224)]. Nānda Pandita and the author of the Dattaka Chandrikā, extend the prohibition to one of two brothers, and the author of the Mitakshaṇā forbids the gift of the elder of many.‡

NOTE VIII.

Should assent or (being a minor) be given by a competent party (p. 224)]. The necessity of the assent of the object of a Kṛitrīma adoption, to which the only parties are the adopter and adopted is obvious: and it would be highly unreasonable, could parents affect the rights of their adult son, by giving him away against his consent. —Texts of law indeed are not wanting, prohibiting generally the gift of a son against his will: but it seems a correct construction, that such texts merely refer to the adult son. A minor legally can have no will.

NOTE IX.

Some difficulty exists in extracting a consistent doctrine (p. 224)]. Bālam-bhaṭṭa,§ and other authors seem to imply the necessity of the assent of the mother if alive and capable to the gift by the father; and Jagannātha in the Digest, while he admits the validity of the adoption intimates the ability of a son given without the assent of his mother, to perform her funeral rites. Nānda Pandita,∥ Vijñāneśvara,¶ Vāchaspata-miṃḍra, Rudra-dhāra, Chandeṇīvara, and others, who admit the legality of the adoption of a son given without the assent of the mother by the father, seem to restrict the independent gift by a woman of her son to the case of the widow; and on the other hand, the author of the Dattaka Chandrikā includes the cases wherein the husband may have emigrated or entered a religious order; and Bālam-bhaṭṭa provides, that the wife may give away her son without the consent of her husband, if the distress be urgent. A provision to this effect certainly appears consistent and reasonable. —In any case in which a question might arise, it would naturally rest with the court, assisted by Pandits to determine what special

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* Mr. Colebrooke in his Preface to the Dāya-bhāga, &c.
† D. M. Sect. I. § 12.
§ Trans. Mit. on Inh. Note to Ch. I. Sect. XI. § 9.
∥ D. M. Sect. IV. § 12.
¶ Trans. of Mit. on Inh. Ch. I. Sect. XI. § 9.
circumstances of distress or necessity would justify or validate the gift of her son by a mother without the father’s consent. It may with some reason be inferred, that one adopted as a son given, under an invalid gift, who voluntarily remained as son to his adopter, might be regarded as a Kṣitrida son.

NOTE X.

Chiefly, if not solely prevails (p. 226)]. In a Note on Chap. 10. Sect. X. of the Digest, Mr. Colebrooke observes, that in Gaura or Bengal and most countries, other than Mithila sons are only adopted in the Dattaka form. The prevalence however of such practice should not vitiate a Kṣitrida adoption, unless indeed it appeared such mode were expressly prohibited by works on law of paramount local authority.

NOTE XI.

The doctrines of the Dattaka-Mimamsā and Dattaka-Chandrikā (p. 226)]. The following appears to be that of Nanda Paṇḍita, from his elaborate and intricate gloss on the passage referred to, which is attributed to the Kālika-purāṇa. The most preferable object for adoption is a child wholly uninitiated: his filial relation proceeds from the performance by the adopter of initiatory rites. Next in rank, to him is one initiated as far as tonsure exclusive, for the performance of which, the period from the third to the fifth year is prescribed. Inferior as an object of adoption, is one, whose tonsure has been performed by his natural father, who, provided he be under six years of age may be adopted, and acquires filial relation to the adopter on the performance by that person of the different initiatory rites preceded by a sacrifice for male issue (putreśṭi). Such son, from his having been initiated in tonsure and other rites in both families is a Dvyāmushyāyana, or son of two fathers. It is to be observed, that Nanda Paṇḍita, in the abstruse gloss noticed, seems to have betrayed himself into an inconsistency. According to his explanation, if the boy proposed to be adopted have not been initiated in the rite of tonsure by his natural father, he cannot be adopted after having attained his fifth year: if however, he has been so initiated, he may be affiliated, (provided he be under six years of age,) a sacrifice and so forth being observed as already noticed.—The subjoined appears to be the substance of the doctrine in the Dattaka-Chandrikā, resulting from the most abstruse part of the work.†—1st. The most preferable object for adoption is one, for whose upanayana rite, the prescribed principal season has not elapsed: the previous rites performed by the natural father are not to be renewed. Such son becomes filially related by the mere performance of the rite in question,—2d. Inferior as an object of adoption is one for the performance of the upanayana rite, on whom the principal season has elapsed. In the case of such adoption, the sacrifice for male issue must be observed, and the rites of tonsure and the rest be performed by the adopter on the adopted.

NOTE XII.

The most general and consistent rule which presents itself (p. 227). This is stated with reference to a text of Vasishtha, and the supposed doctrine of the Dattaka-Chandrika detailed in the preceding note and founded on that text. This intimates, that the son given by initiation in the rite of upanayana, in the family of the adopter becomes a member of that family. Supposing the rule suggested to be accurate, it would remain to be determined, what circumstances would constitute a disqualification to the performance by the adopter of the rite in question on the adopted.—The author of the Dattaka-Chandrika has left it doubtful, whether in his opinion, the celebration of that rite by the natural father would be an insuperable bar to its re-performance by the adopter, and hence to adoption; or, in the same manner, as the rite of tonsure, it might be renewed by the adopter in his own family.—Another question would likewise arise, whether, even after the expiration of the secondary season for the celebration of the rite in question, as provided in the case of the natural father, the adopter by observing certain penances might not derive ability to perform the rite in question. A determination of these points in the present compilation could not without presumption be attempted. It may however be remarked, that it appears more reasonable to suppose, that the celebration in the family of his father, of so important a rite as the upanayana, or the expiration of the secondary period prescribed for the performance of that ceremony, should constitute an impediment to the adoption of a son given by precluding the capability of the rite referred to, being celebrated in the family and name of the adopter.

NOTE XIII.

They seem however agreed (p. 228). “The representation to the king, and invitation of kinsmen, are for the sake of attestation, and removing doubts as to the right of inheritance and not intended as any legal essential,” (Rudra-dhara in the Sudhi-viveka)—“Having convened kinsmen—This is for the sake of the succession of the adopted son (dattaka).”—Vachaspati-mitra in the Çraddha-Chintāmani.—So also in the Vivāda-Ratna-kāra of Chandeçvara.

NOTE XIV.

As referring exclusively to the son given (p. 228). In the forms propounded by Çauñaka and the rest, allusion is made in express terms to the son given; and that prescribed by Vasishṭha is directed after advertisement to the sons given bought and deserted. Nanda Pañcita insists, that these forms refer to the other adopted sons as well as the son given;* and the general application of the latter form is intimated in the Mitākshara.† The author of the Sudhi-viveka however, as well as those of the Çraddha-Chintāmani and Vivāda-

* See D. M. Sect. V. § 41. 50. &c.
† See trans. of Mit. on 1ub. Chap. I. Sect. XI. § 15.
Ratna-kāma introduce the form propounded by Vāsiṣṭha under the head of the son given, as merely applicable to that description of son and Bālam-bhāṭṭa commenting on the passage of the Mitākshara referred to in the case of a Kṛitrīma adoption, excepts the sacrifice or burnt offering directed in the text of Vāsiṣṭha. It has been intimated, that the other parts are no legally essential portions of the form propounded by the author in question.

NOTE XV.

The adoption of a Kṛitrīma son being, &c. (p. 228)]. The adoption of a Kṛitrīma son is chiefly prevalent in the Maithila country; and is rarely practised in other parts of India.—"The practice (says Mr. Celticbrooke) of adopting sons given by their parents, was there abolished by Čṛi-Datta and Pratihasta, although the latter had been himself adopted in that manner. Their motive was, lest a child already registered in one family, being again registered in another, a confusion of families and names should thence ensue. A son adopt- ed in the form so briefly noticed in the present section, does not lose his claim to his own family, nor assume the surname of his adoptive father: he merely performs obsequies and takes the inheritance."*
—The translator is informed that Čṛi-Datta and Pratihasta have not abolished the practice noticed in their written works. A case of the nature alluded to had occurred: in consequence, a general assembly of Brahmans was held, at which the celebrated Pandita mentioned presided, and it was there agreed, that for the future the practice of the Dattaka adoption should be discontinued. But though this mode of adoption does not accordingly now prevail in the Maithila country, unforbidden as it is by Vāchaspati-mitra, and the best writers there current, it is not to be inferred, that if in any case preferred, such mode of affiliation would be illegal.

NOTE XVI.

Valid without the observance of any particular form (p. 228)]. In treating on the Kṛitrīma son, Rudra-dhāra in the Sudhi-vīvēka adds.—"The form to be observed is this. At an auspicious time, the adop-
ter of a son having bathed, addressing the person to be adopted "who has also bathed, and to whom he has given some acceptable "chattel, says, "Be my son." He replies, "I am become your son." "The giving some chattel to him, rises merely from custom. It is "not necessary to the adoption. The assent of both parties is the "only requisite; and a set form of speech is not essential."

NOTE XVII.

The Kṛitrīma son in some instances may, but in all need not, &c. (p. 228)]. It would appear that the Kṛitrīma son as usually affiliated in the Maithila country is not initiated in any rites in the family of

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* Note to Chap. IV. Sect. X. of the Digest.
his adopter. That in some cases, such rites, might be legally performed by the adopter may however be inferred.—1st. In the dubious passage of the Kālika-purāṇa, the performance of initiatory rites in the family of the adopter is declared to be necessary in the case of all adopted sons.—2d. If the complete induction of the adopted son, into the family of the adopter, be contemplated, the necessity of the observance of these rites, should apply as much to the one adoption as the other. Important distinctions would probably obtain, between Kṛitrīma sons, who had or had not been initiated in the family of their adoptive fathers, as will be presently noticed.

NOTE XVIII.

The Kṛitrīma in some instances may be invested with every filial right (p. 228). Consult the preceding two notes. The Kṛitrīma son, as usually affiliated in the Maithila country would indeed take the estate of his adoptive father, but continues a member of the family of his natural father, and is not regarded as prolonging the line of his adopter.

NOTE XIX.

This rule would not apply to the Kṛitrīma adopted son, &c. (p. 229). In respect to this rule, it may be first observed, that Bāham-bhaṭṭa provides generally, that the given son is competent to inherit the estate, and perform the obsequies of his natural father, should he have no other male issue.* The rule in question is founded on a text of Manu,† in which the son given only is mentioned. In the Mitākṣarā, it is incidentally stated that the mention of the given son in this text, is intended for any adopted son; but it by no means appears that, this is a generally received exposition and could only hold in certain cases, (if any such might occur,) where the adopted son, were an orphan, or tacitly relinquished by his parents, and solely and exclusively initiated in the name and family of the adopter. It would certainly be inconsistent with the principles of Hindu law, could the filial relation towards the father, without any act on his part be divested from the son. In the case of the Kṛitrīma adopted son, as usually affiliated in Maithila, no doubt as to his retaining relation to the family of his natural father can exist.

NOTE XX.

But likewise lineally and collaterally (p. 229). This position, obviously resulting from adoption is supported by the Mitākṣarat. A doubt indeed with reference to passages in the Dattaka-Mīmāṃsā §

* v. Trans. of Mit. on Inh. Note to Ch. I. Sect. XL § 32.
† Cited in D. M. Sect. VI. § 6.
§ D. M. Sect. VI. § 32. et. seq.
and Dattaka-Chandrika may be entertained, as to the accuracy of this position, as a general and unrestricted rule. It however appears, more reasonable, to construe those passages, as well as authorities,—on which they are founded, and which declare the relation of the adopted son as Sāpinḍa, in the family of the adopter, to extend to three degrees only,—as referring merely to the oblation of the funeral cake, impurity on occasions of deaths and births, and disability of marriage in the family of the adopter. This in fact is intimated by Nanda Pandita.†

NOTE XXI.

Would not apply to the Kṛtrīma son as usually, (p. 229)]. In the Dvaita Nirmaya, Vāchaspati-misra declares, that no relation obtains between the Kṛtrīma adopted son and the father of the adopter. From which it is to be inferred, that such adopted son could not inherit of that person, and a fortiori from the collateral kinsman of the adopter. The same inference in fact results from the circumstance of the Kṛtrīma son in question, not being considered as a member of his adopter's family.—It may however be concluded, that where the adopter might die in family-co-parcenery with his father and brethren, his Kṛtrīma son would be entitled to receive on division his share.

NOTE XXII.

Receives a quarter share (p. 230)]. This rule is founded on texts of Vāsiṣṭha and Kātyāyana.‡ The latter of which however is variously read. 'A third part' is substituted by some for the more prevalent reading, 'a fourth part': the difference being adjusted with reference to the qualities of the claimants. It is not easy to determine at least satisfactorily the exact right conferred on the adopted son by the expression, 'chaturdhāraṇā (a fourth part or quarter share). If it be contended, as it perhaps justly may, that by the expression in question, a specific share of the whole estate is assigned to the adopted son, a great inconsistency would result.—Where, a division of heritage might take place between an adopted son, and several legitimate sons subsequently born, the share of the former would, in some instances exceed those of the latter. This objection might be obviated by adopting the exposition of Nanda Pandita, who explains the terms referred to as signifying 'a quarter share'; not an entire share.§ intimating probably thereby that the adopted son under the circumstances proposed should receive the fourth of the share which would be allotted to him, supposing him to be a real legitimate son. Thus, if 1,700 Rupees or Bighas were to be distributed between one

* D.C. Sect. III. § 18, 19, 20.
† D. M. Sect. VIII.
‡ Cited respectively in D. Ch. Sect. V. § 16, 17.
§ D. M., Sect. V. § 40.
adopted and four real legitimate sons subsequently born, the portion of the former would be 85, while each of the latter would take 40375, or perhaps, the objection stated might be more satisfactorily obviated, by construing the expression, "a fourth part or quarter share," to signify the fourth of the share received by a legitimate son. Thus in the case supposed, the share of the adopted would be 100, and those allotted to each of the legitimate sons 400.
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